State of Louisiana v. Tyrone Terry Braden

Judgment rendered September 27, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,275-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TYRONE TERRY BRADEN Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 372,153

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

*****

PAULA CORLEY MARX Counsel for Appellant

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
COURTNEY RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr.,

Judge, presiding. Defendant, Tyrone Terry Braden, was convicted by a

unanimous jury of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1.

The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years at hard labor, the maximum

sentence under La. R.S. 14:34.1(C). Braden appeals, urging that the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot the victim, the lineup

was improperly admitted into evidence, and the eight-year sentence for

second-degree battery is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2019, the defendant, Tyrone Braden, was charged

by bill of information with aggravated battery, illegal carrying of weapons

while in possession of CDS, and obstruction of justice. Braden waived

formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on February 20, 2020.

On February 7, 2022, an amended bill was filed charging Braden with

aggravated battery. Braden waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of

not guilty on that same date. A jury trial was held on May 25, 2022. The

evidence at trial included the following.

Kerion Mims testified that, on November 6, 2019, he returned to the

home he shared with his girlfriend after spending the day at the fair with his

family. Mims stated he lived at the house on Rosenwald Drive in

Shreveport, Louisiana, and had lived there for the last two years. Once he

dropped off the vehicle for his girlfriend, Mims left the home, located on a

cul-de-sac, on foot, and headed to his cousin’s house in a nearby

neighborhood. Instead of walking around the cul-de-sac, Mims used a trail

that runs between some houses in the area. Mims testified that others who

lived in the complex would use the trail to move to and from a nearby store.

As he walked along the trail and entered the David Raines Community

Center parking lot, an SUV approached Mims from the right side and

“pulled up on him.”

Once the vehicle stopped, Mims testified that a person in the driver’s

seat spoke to Mims and asked if he lived in the area; Mims’s response was

yes. In return, the person in the driver’s seat opened the car door and

confronted Mims in an aggressive manner, questioning why he was coming

down the trail between the houses. Mims indicated that he attempted to

defuse the situation by walking away in the direction of his cousin’s house.

As Mims continued to the sidewalk, he took about ten steps before he was

shot in the back of his legs. Mims stated that the shots occurred “kind of

quick,” and that five to ten seconds passed before he heard the gunshots after

he turned around to walk away.

When he heard the gunshots, Mims stated he took off running but

glanced over his shoulder and saw the same SUV that had confronted him.

He observed that its lights had been turned off and there was a hand over the

top of the window in the driver’s door. When asked if he saw the gun, Mims

responded, “I can say yeah and I can say no, because it was kind of, like,

you know, like, oh, and I’m gone.” Mims stated that he took cover behind

what he thinks was the community center’s van nearby. Mims then flagged

down off-duty Shreveport Police Officer Terence Washington, who was

parked in his cruiser in the apartment complex parking lot across the street

from the David Raines parking lot. Mims gave a description of the vehicle

to the officer.
2

Once Mims arrived at the hospital for treatment, he spoke with

Detective Jonathan Varnell and told the detective that he did not know who

shot him. In response to questions from the officer, Mims related that while

he did not personally know the man who shot him, he had seen the man

outside in the yard a few times prior to the incident. Furthermore, Mims

stated the man was tall and had a bald head, a goatee, and a distinctive head

shape.

After being questioned by Det. Varnell at the hospital, Mims stated

that he later discovered that “Monkey Roy,” or Tyrone Braden, was the

individual who might have shot him. Mims reported this to detectives.

Mims testified that he eventually met with detectives and identified Braden

from a photo lineup. The court admitted the photo lineup into evidence over

several objections from Braden’s counsel, who argued the State failed to lay

a proper foundation for introduction of the lineup. Mims testified that he

was instructed to pick out the offender from a photo lineup. Officers told

him to take his time, not to guess, and that the offender may or may not be

included. Ultimately, Mims identified Braden in the lineup.

Mims testified that he had previously been convicted of domestic

abuse battery. Despite this conviction, he carried a handgun in his pocket on

the night of the incident. However, Mims stated that he did not remove the

firearm from his pocket or use it during the shooting. Once he sought cover,

Mims removed the handgun from his pocket and put it on the ground next to

him. Mims testified that he carried the gun with him because someone had

been shot and killed in the area just 30 minutes before he began his walk that

night. He also noted that he was concerned for his safety in general because

3

of the area in which he lives. Mims stated that he was unaware he was

prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.

Officer Washington also testified at the trial, stating that he was in his

patrol unit near the David Raines parking lot when he heard shots fired. He

then rolled his window down and heard someone yelling and screaming.

Once Ofc. Washington identified where the noise was coming from, he went

to David Raines Park, where he found Mims lying on the ground, bleeding,

and in pain. Ofc. Washington stated that he also saw the gun nearby, which

he moved away from the injured Mims in order to secure it. Ofc.

Washington testified the gun, a black, semi-automatic handgun, showed no

sign of being fired: it was not warm when he moved it, he could not detect

any lead-like odor typically associated with a weapon having been fired, and

he did not see any smoke coming from the gun. When questioned about the

lighting in the parking lot, Ofc. Washington observed that it was adequate

for him to be able to see.

At the conclusion of the trial on May 25, 2022, the jury returned a

responsive verdict of second-degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1.

On June 22, 2022, Braden filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal, alleging insufficiency of the evidence to establish him as the

shooter. The court denied the motion that same day.

The trial court also sentenced Braden on June 22, 2022. In

accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the court stated that Braden used

threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense; used a

dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense; and foreseeably

endangered human life by discharging the firearm during the commission of

the offense. Furthermore, the court noted Braden’s criminal history, which
4

included convictions for aggravated battery, possession with intent to

distribute schedule II CDS, and possession of marijuana in Arkansas, as well

as possession of schedule I CDS. The court found no mitigating factors and

sentenced Braden to serve eight years at hard labor, with credit for time

served.1 The court informed Braden of his right to an appeal and also noted

for the record that the instant offense was a crime of violence.

On July 19, 2022, Braden filed a motion to reconsider sentence; this

motion was denied on July 22, 2022. Braden filed a pro se motion for

appeal on August 10, 2022, and counsel filed a motion for appeal on August

18, 2022. The motion for appeal was granted on August 19, 2022.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first assignment of error, Braden argues that the State failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot Mims. The standard of

appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case is

whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.

C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.

1
We note that there was no limitation placed on his eligibility for probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence.
5

State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Burch,

52,247 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1190.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240

So. 3d 926.

Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example,

a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.

2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148

So. 3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157

So. 3d 1127. For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence,

that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.

R.S. 15:438; State v. Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. /16/16), 209 So.

3d 255, writ denied, 16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;
6

State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ

denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. Where there is conflicting

testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Ward, 50,872 (La. App.

2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 228, writ denied, 17-0164 (La. 9/22/17), 227

So. 3d 827. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of

fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Hust,

51,015 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La.

11/17/17), 229 So. 3d 928. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility

evaluation and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the

testimony of any witness; the reviewing court may impinge on that

discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due

process of law. State v. Sosa, 05-0213 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 94; State v.

Hust, supra.

A reviewing court accords great deference to a fact finder’s decision

to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Brown, 51,352 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So. 3d 88, writ denied, 17-1154

(La. 5/11/18), 241 So. 3d 1013. When a defendant challenges both the

sufficiency of the evidence to convict and one or more trial errors, the

reviewing court first reviews sufficiency, as a failure to satisfy the

sufficiency standard will moot the trial errors. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d

731 (La. 1992); State v. Patterson, 50,305 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 184

So. 3d 739, writ denied, 15-2333 (La. 3/24/16), 190 So. 3d 1190.

7

La. R.S. 14:34.1(A) states that second degree battery is a battery when

the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury; however, this

provision shall not apply to a medical provider who has obtained the consent

of a patient.

In State v. Johnston, 53,981 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 326 So. 3d 970,

the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant

was the perpetrator to support his conviction of simple burglary of an

inhabited dwelling because of the victim’s generic description as well as a

lack of DNA or fingerprint evidence. The state argued that the victim’s

testimony and unwavering identification of the defendant sufficiently

established him as the offender. Id. at 973-74. Testimony revealed that the

length of the encounter allowed the victim to repeatedly question the

perpetrator, and the interaction between them was close and physical. Id.

The victim identified the defendant in a photo lineup “almost immediately”

and “without hesitation” about a week after the burglary occurred. Id. at

975. The victim also identified the defendant in open court years after the

incident occurred. Id. Considering the victim’s physical encounter with the

defendant and the victim’s ability to identify the defendant after the incident

had occurred, this Court found no reason to overturn the defendant’s

conviction in light of the jury’s finding that the victim’s testimony was

sufficient to identify the defendant as the burglar. Id. at 976.

In the instant case, Mims identified Braden in a photo lineup six days

after the shooting and again at trial. When questioned on the stand, Mims

stated he was “one hundred percent” sure that Tyrone Braden had shot him.

Mims also recounted the verbal exchange he had with Braden when he

initiated contact with Mims. Similar to the victim in State v. Johnston,
8

supra, who gave a generic description of the defendant, Mims identified

Braden based on his head shape and goatee. Although Mims testified that

the parking lot was dark, Mims stated he could see the driver of the vehicle.

Ofc. Washington’s testimony regarding the lighting conditions in the

parking lot served to corroborate Mims’s ability to see the driver.

As evidenced by Braden’s conviction, the jury ultimately determined

that Mims’s testimony was credible, as was that of Ofc. Washington

regarding events after the shooting. Given Mims’s unwavering

identification of Braden as well as Mims’s statement about seeing Braden

around the neighborhood before the encounter, we find no reason to disturb

the fact finder’s conclusions. Therefore, this assignment of error is without

merit.

Admissibility of Photographic Lineup

Next, Braden contends that the trial court erred in admitting the

photographic lineup into evidence absent a proper foundation due to

noncompliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 251. Braden argues that the

prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation because the officers who

conducted the lineup did not testify as to the methods used in compiling the

lineup. In response, the State contends that nothing in La. C. Cr. P. art 251

addresses laying a foundation for admission of a photographic lineup.

Additionally, the State cites La. C. Cr. P. art. 253(E), which provides that

failure to conduct a photographic or live lineup identification procedure in

substantial compliance with the policy adopted under this article shall not

bar the admission of eyewitness identification testimony.

Having reviewed La. C. Cr. P. arts. 251-253 in their entirety, we find

that the plain language of these statutes provides that they govern how
9

lineups are to be prepared and administered–they2 do not address the

foundational requirements for the admissibility of photo lineups as evidence

at trial.3

Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence. La. C. E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is generally admissible.

La. C.E. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403.

Questions of relevancy and admissibility are discretion calls for the trial

judge, and determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not

be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Bradley, 53,550

(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 307 So. 3d 369.

With regard to foundation, an adequate foundation for a piece of

documentary evidence such as a photograph or a photo lineup is laid when it

is identified and authenticated. Authentication of a document occurs when

evidence is presented that demonstrates the document is what its proponent

claims. La. C.E. art. 901(A). Such evidence may include the testimony of a

witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be. La. C.E.

art. 901(B)(1); State v. Smith, 430 So. 2d 31 (La. 1983). It suffices if the

2
Article 251 contains the legislative intent for this Title; art. 252 contains the
definitions applicable to this Title; and, more specifically, art. 253 delineates the
eyewitness identification procedures to be adopted by each government agency.
3
It is beneficial to establish a foundation for a photo lineup through the testimony
of the police officer who prepared and/or showed the lineup to the victim. However, this
is not required.
10

foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is

one connected with the case. Id.

A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced

sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.

Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the

testimony of the witness himself. La. C. E. art. 602. A proper foundation

for admission into evidence of a photograph is laid when a witness having

personal knowledge of the subject depicted by the photograph identifies it.

State v. Bates, 397 So. 2d 1331 (La.1981); State v. Lewis, 478 So. 2d 665

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1985).

In State v. Anthony, 347 So. 2d 483 (La. 1977), the defendant made

the same argument as Braden in the instant case, urging that the trial court

erred in admitting a photograph of a lineup for which a proper foundation

had not been laid by the State. Before offering the photograph, the

prosecutor asked the witness whether she recognized the photograph, if she

received any prompting or suggestions as to selecting a suspect, and if she

identified any possible suspects in the photograph. Id. at 489-90. The

witness answered she recognized the photograph, she received no

promptings or suggestions in selection, and she identified two possible

suspects. Id. The State then offered the photograph into evidence, but the

defendant objected on the grounds no foundation existed to show the source

and origin of the photograph. Id. at 490. The Louisiana Supreme Court

determined a sufficient foundation for the photograph’s admission was

established because the witness identified the photograph depicting the scene

she viewed on the date of the lineup. Id.

11

Similar to the witness in Anthony, in the instant case, Mims testified

that the picture fairly and accurately depicted the lineup he was shown, the

officers told him to take his time and not to guess, and the officers did not

force or coerce him to pick a suspect from the lineup. Mims also described

his signature on the bottom of the photograph as well as other markings he

made on the lineup. Mims’s testimony revealed that he had a personal

knowledge of the photograph and the contents of the photograph. As a

result, we conclude there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its

determination that, through Mims’s testimony, the State laid the proper

foundation for the photographic lineup. Braden’s second assignment of

error is without merit.

Excessiveness of Sentence

In his third assignment of error, Braden urges that the eight-year

sentence imposed by the trial judge, which is the maximum penalty for

second degree battery, is excessive by constitutional standards. In support,

Braden suggests that the court failed to comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1

because it found no mitigating circumstances. Braden contends the trial

court had no proper insight into Braden’s personal history because no

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report was ordered. According to Braden,

a PSI report would have shed light on relevant factors for consideration in

sentencing. Furthermore, Braden alleges that he is not the “worst kind of

offender,” and this is not the most serious violation of Louisiana’s second-

degree battery statute.

In response, the State contends that the record reflects compliance

with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and Braden is neither entitled to a PSI report

nor is the court required to order one. In support of the trial court’s
12

compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the State points to its consideration

of Braden’s criminal history as well as his use of threats or actual violence in

commission of the offense.

In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, an appellate court uses a

two-step process. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Bell,

53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307; State v. Kelly, 52,731 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 855, writ denied, 19-01845 (La. 6/3/20),

296 So. 3d 1071. The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or

mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that it adequately

considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La.

1983); State v. Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,

623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bell, supra. A sentence is considered

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Bell, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Bell, supra. A trial
13

judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in

sentencing. Id.; State v. Allen, 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So. 3d

519, writ denied, 15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289. On review, the

appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been

more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Bell, supra; State v. Kelly, supra.

A PSI report is an aid to help the court, not a right of the defendant,

and the court is not required to order a PSI. La. C. Cr. P. art. 875; State v.

Houston, 50,126 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 188. La. R.S.

14:34.1(C) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of second degree battery shall be fined
not more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without
hard labor, for not more than eight years, or both. At least eighteen
months of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence if the offender knew or
should have known that the victim is an active member of the United
States Armed Forces or is a disabled veteran and the second degree
battery was committed because of that status.

In giving reasons in support of Braden’s sentence, the trial court

opined that there was an undue risk that, during the period of a suspended

sentence or probation, Braden would commit another offense as well, and

noted a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of Braden’s crime.

Similarly, the court stated that Braden needed correctional treatment or a

custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his

commitment to an institution. The trial court found no mitigating

circumstances applied, but articulated the following aggravating

circumstances in determining what sentence to impose:

14

1) Braden used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the
offense;
2) Braden used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense;
3) Braden foreseeably endangered human life by discharging a firearm
during the commission of an offense which has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another and which by its very nature involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of
committing the offense; and
4) Braden used a firearm or other dangerous weapon while committing
or attempting to commit an offense which has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another and by which its very nature involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of
committing the offense.

The trial court also noted Braden’s convictions of aggravated battery in

1993; possession with intent to distribute CDS II in the early 2000s;

possession of marijuana in Washington County, Arkansas, in 2006; and

possession of CDS I in 2012.

The record reflects that the trial court adequately complied with La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1 when sentencing Braden. The court discussed the facts of

the case and cited the factors it specifically considered before imposing the

eight-year hard labor sentence. According to the record, the trial court

exercised its discretion in finding no mitigating circumstances, and the law

does not entitle Braden to a PSI report. As such, the first inquiry in

determining whether a sentence is excessive is satisfied.

The second step in reviewing a sentence or excessiveness is a

determination of whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. The

trial court sentenced Braden to eight years at hard labor as a result of his

conviction of second-degree battery. We find that this eight-year sentence,

as noted above, although the maximum, is within the statutory range and is

not unconstitutionally excessive. The instant offense was a senseless crime

of violence—Braden fired shots at and wounded the victim in both of his
15

legs, all over Mims’s choice to use a shortcut to get to his cousin’s house.

Given these facts, Braden’s sentence is neither grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime nor a purposeless and needless infliction of pain

and suffering. La. Const. art. I, § 20; State v. Dorthey, supra; State v. Bell,

supra. As such, we cannot say that this eight-year sentence shocks the sense

of justice. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, the conviction and sentence of the

defendant, Tyrone Terry Braden, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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