State of Louisiana v. Tobias Williams

Judgment rendered September 27, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,290-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TOBIAS WILLIAMS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 360,400

Honorable Chris Victory, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: G. Paul Marx

TOBIAS WILLIAMS Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

WILLIAM JACOB EDWARDS
KODIE K. SMITH
BRITTANY B. ARVIE
JOHN CLAUDE PHILLIPS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STEPHENS, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.

HUNTER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.

ELLENDER, J.

The defendant, Tobias Williams, was convicted of aggravated flight

from an officer, and subsequently adjudicated a fourth felony offender and

sentenced to life imprisonment. Williams now appeals his habitual offender

adjudication and sentence. For the following reasons we affirm Williams’s

conviction and fourth felony offender status, but vacate his sentence and

remand for resentencing.

FACTS

Around 3:40 a.m. on August 17, 2018, Shreveport Police Department

(“SPD”) Officer Corey Rabalais was on patrol in the Highland-Stoner Hill

neighborhood of Shreveport when he observed an SUV with an obscured

license plate driving down Stoner Avenue. Officer Rabalais initiated a

traffic stop by turning on his lights and siren, then pulling his patrol car

behind the SUV; however, the driver, later identified as Tobias Williams,

refused to comply and continued to drive away. A chase ensued during

which Williams committed numerous traffic violations recorded by Officer

Rabalais’s dash camera in his patrol car. The footage showed multiple 25

and 35 mph speed limit signs on the roads which Williams traveled. The

footage further revealed Officer Rabalais was driving at times in excess of

60 mph in order to keep up with Williams. Williams is also seen operating

his vehicle on the wrong side of the road, failing to stop at multiple red

lights, and driving through numerous stop signs.

During this high-speed pursuit, Officer Rabalais was joined by

Corporal Jon Smith, also with the SPD. Cpl. Smith’s dash camera recorded

footage of a bicyclist on the same street as Williams and Officer Rabalais;

however, Williams and Officer Rabalais turned before ever reaching the

bicyclist’s position. Additionally, both recordings reflect this high-speed

chase lasted about 15 minutes, having occurred between 3:40 a.m. and 3:55

a.m. that morning.

Williams eventually encountered a construction roadblock which

forced him to stop his SUV. He immediately exited the vehicle and fled on

foot, but Officer Rabalais was unable to catch up to him. Another SPD

officer joined in the foot chase and, after spotting Williams, gave verbal

commands to put his hands up and get down on the ground, which Williams

ignored. At some point during the chase, Sergeant Dan Sawyer, a K9 officer

with the SPD, arrived to help apprehend Williams. Sgt. Sawyer’s K9 was

able to detain Williams by biting his arm and holding on until Sgt. Sawyer

arrived. He was arrested, then transported to the hospital for treatment of his

dog bite wounds.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following arrest, Williams was charged by bill of information with

one count of aggravated flight from an officer, La R.S. 14:108.1(C). Jury

trial began on December 14, 2021, and resulted in Williams’s conviction as

charged.

The state then filed an habitual offender bill of information asserting

Williams’s new conviction for aggravated flight from an officer was his

fourth felony offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1. Williams’s three prior felony

convictions were listed as follows:

1) January 28, 2008, guilty plea to Illegal Possession of Stolen
Things;

2) February 11, 2016, guilty plea to Aggravated Battery; and

3) February 11, 2016, guilty plea to Illegal Possession of Stolen
Firearms.
2

In a motion to quash, Williams argued his two February 11, 2016, guilty

pleas should only be treated as one prior felony conviction. On May 19,

2022, the trial court held a multiple offender hearing and found Williams

was a fourth felony offender. The trial court, noting its consideration of La.

R.S. 15:529.1, concluded the events which led to Williams’s February 11,

2016, convictions were not connected, were not a single criminal episode,

and would be treated as two separate felony convictions.

SENTENCING

On June 20, 2022, Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment at

hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, La.

R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). The trial court first listed Williams’s prior felony

convictions and reiterated its finding Williams was a fourth felony habitual

offender. The trial court also noted two of Williams’s four felony

convictions were for crimes of violence, aggravated battery and the instant

conviction for aggravated flight from an officer, La. R.S. 14:2(B)(5) and

(39). In support of the life sentence, the trial court stated it had considered

the sentencing guidelines, then thoroughly detailed Williams’s extensive

criminal record, expressed its belief Williams was not remorseful, and

concluded Williams did not understand the seriousness of his crimes, nor

would he in the future. The trial court also issued written reasons for

judgment.

After sentencing, Williams filed a motion to reconsider, which was

subsequently denied. This appeal followed.

3

DISCUSSION

Habitual Offender Status

In his first assignment of error, Williams argues he should only be a

third felony offender because his February 11, 2016, convictions for both

aggravated battery and illegal possession of stolen firearms occurred on the

same day, and should have been treated as just one prior felony for habitual

offender purposes.

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) defines who is an habitual offender, and then

goes on to provide the various sentencing enhancements depending on the

total number of felony convictions:

A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state
of a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws
of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign
government of a crime which, if committed in this state would
be a felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within
this state, upon conviction of said felony, shall be punished as
follows…

For a defendant to receive an enhanced penalty under La. R.S. 15:529.1, the

state must prove prior felony convictions and that the defendant is the same

person who committed the prior felonies. State v. Brown, 11-1656 (La.

2/10/12), 82 So. 3d 1232. Both the identity of the defendant, and the prior

convictions alleged, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. La. R.S.

15:529.1(D)(1)(b). The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that

the state is not required to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden

at a habitual offender hearing. Rather, prior convictions may be proved by

any competent evidence. State v. White, 13-1525 (La. 11/8/13), 130 So. 3d

298. Various methods of proof establishing identity have been recognized

as sufficient to sustain the state’s burden of proof, including testimony of

witnesses, expert opinion as to fingerprints, photographs contained in duly
4

authenticated records, and evidence of identical driver’s license number, sex,

race, and date of birth. State v. Payton, 00-2899 (La. 3/15/02), 810 So. 2d

1127.

Williams does not dispute the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that he is the same person who was convicted of illegal possession of stolen

things on January 28, 2008, aggravated battery on February 11, 2016, and

illegal possession of stolen firearms on February 11, 2016.1 Rather,

Williams argues the two February 11, 2016, convictions should only be

treated as one for habitual offender purposes.

In the seminal case of State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So.

2d 1233, the Louisiana Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of La. R.S.

15:529.1. Prior to Shaw, the court followed the principle that if multiple

convictions were obtained on one day, then they could only be treated as one

conviction for habitual offender purposes, See State ex rel. Porter v. Butler,

573 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1991). In Shaw, the court ultimately concluded a

departure from the “one day, one conviction” rule was necessary. The court

first noted the starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the

language of the statute itself. Id. In overturning Porter, the Louisiana

Supreme Court found that Porter had “deviated from well-settled rules of

statutory construction” in refusing to extend its holding to multiple

convictions arising out of a single criminal act. Id.

The Shaw court gave two reasons for overturning Porter. First, the

court stated the Porter court failed to give effect to the clear and

1
We have thoroughly reviewed this record and find the state has satisfied its
burden by proving that Williams was the same person who was convicted of these
offenses.
5

unambiguous language of La. R.S. 15:529.1. Id. The Shaw court reasoned

the statute is plain, straightforward, and reflects an intent to expose a person

who has previously been convicted of a felony to the imposition of habitual

offender penalties for any felony committed after the date of the prior felony

conviction. Id. Second, the court asserted Porter failed to construe La. R.S.

15:529.1 with its object and purpose, stating:

The purpose of the statue, to dissuade first offenders from
committing subsequent felonies and to punish more harshly
those who commit the most crimes, is served only when the
repeat offender is subject to sentence enhancement for each
subsequent felony. Enhancing the sentence on only one of
multiple convictions arising out of a single criminal episode
actually thwarts the goal of protecting society by removing the
most egregious offenders from its midst. Id.

The Shaw court ultimately held:

[T]he language of La. R.S. 15:529.1 contains no prohibition
against enhancing multiple sentences obtained on the same date
arising out of a single criminal act or episode. In clear and
unambiguous terms, the statute exposes a person who has
previously been convicted of a felony to enhanced penalties for
any felony committed after the date of the prior felony
conviction. There is no statutory bar to apply the habitual
offender law in sentencing for more than one conviction
obtained on the same date, whether the convictions result from
separate felonies committed at separate times or arise out of a
single criminal act or episode.

This holding evidences the Louisiana Supreme Court’s departure from the

previous “one day, one conviction” rule and clarified that habitual offender

enhancement applies to multiple felonies committed on the same day, even

if they arise out of a single criminal act or episode. The Shaw court closely

examined the legislative intent of La. R.S. 15:529.1 and concluded its intent

is to punish repeat offenders for each of their subsequent felonies. It is with

this interpretation and holding in mind that we address the arguments made

by Williams in this case.

6

Williams erroneously relies on our holding in State v. Cass, 44,411

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/19/09), 17 So. 3d 486, where multiple convictions arising

out of a single criminal episode were counted as only one prior felony for

purposes of La. R.S. 15:529.1. While the holding in Cass was correct,

Williams’s case is clearly distinguishable. The defendant in Cass was

initially convicted of his first two felonies on the same day, September 14,

1974. In 2008, Cass was convicted of a subsequent felony and the state then

sought to adjudicate him a third felony offender. Id. This Court upheld the

trial court’s ruling that Cass was only a second felony offender and reasoned

that since the defendant did not have any felonies prior to committing his

two felonies on the same day in 1974, his third conviction in 2008 was

merely his first subsequent felony, and second overall, for habitual offender

purposes. Id. The reasoning in Cass is consistent with a clear and

unambiguous reading of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A), which provides that any

person who subsequently commits another felony after having first been

convicted of a felony, becomes an habitual offender. In Cass, the state was

attempting to use that defendant’s first and second felony convictions,

obtained on the same day, to classify him as a third felony offender,

something that is prohibited by a clear reading of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

Further, this Court noted La. R.S. 15:529.1(B) specifically provides that

multiple convictions obtained on the same day prior to October 19, 2004, are

to be counted as one conviction, which was factually applicable in Cass

because that defendant’s predicate offenses all occurred in 1974.

The case sub judice is distinguishable from Cass for two reasons.

First, Williams received his first felony conviction in 2008, followed by his

two subsequent felony convictions on February 11, 2016. Unlike the
7

defendant in Cass, Williams committed two additional felonies between his

first felony conviction in 2008 and his most recent felony. Additionally,

unlike in Cass, all of Williams’s felony convictions occurred well after

October 19, 2004, the cutoff date provided in La. R.S. 15:529.1(B) for

preservation of the “one day, one conviction” rule. In light of these two

reasons, we do not find the Cass holding applicable here. Consequently, we

are left with the interpretation of La. R.S. 15:529.1 provided by the

Louisiana Supreme Court in Shaw and must adhere to that analysis in

examining the issues related to Williams.

Williams argues his two February 11, 2016, felony convictions are not

sufficiently separate and distinct because the state failed to adequately prove

they were not part of the same course of criminal conduct, and therefore can

only be counted as one predicate offense. As detailed above, the Shaw court

held the habitual offender statute can apply to convictions that occurred on

the same day, regardless of whether the felonies were committed at separate

times or arose out of a single criminal act or episode. Consequently, it does

not matter whether Williams’s February 11, 2016, convictions were separate

and distinct criminal episodes for habitual offender purposes. On this basis

alone, we find Williams is a fourth felony offender.

However, even if a separate and distinct aspect for each crime is

required, which we specifically find it is not, this record sufficiently supports

these were separate and distinct criminal episodes. Williams’s first

conviction on February 11, 2016, was for aggravated battery, a charge he

received after accompanying another individual during a shooting which

8

occurred around 9:00 p.m. on December 9, 2010.2 Approximately three

hours after the shooting, at 12:05 a.m. the next day, police arrived at the

home of Williams’s girlfriend searching for him. While there, they located

Williams and, in his possession, a semi-automatic handgun which had

already been reported stolen. This led to Williams’s conviction of illegal

possession of stolen firearms.

Although the offenses which led to Williams’s February 11, 2016,

convictions both occurred within a relatively short period of time, they did

not arise out of a single criminal act or course of conduct. Williams’s first

offense took place at a separate location and involved his being an

accomplice to a shooting that led to his guilty plea as a principal to

aggravated battery. The gun used in that shooting was purported to be a

revolver. The second offense, though only taking place a few hours after the

first, actually occurred the following day after midnight. Additionally, the

second offense took place at an entirely different location, the apartment of

Williams’s girlfriend. The gun seized was not a revolver, but a semi-

automatic weapon. Further, Williams’s second offense was based on his

possession of a stolen firearm, which had been reported stolen several days

prior. As such, these offenses, though close in time, were not part of a single

criminal act or course of conduct. Even if Shaw were not controlling law,

which it is, the trial court here did not err in counting Williams’s two

February 11, 2016, convictions as separate offenses for habitual offender

purposes.

2
The record does not reveal why such a significant period of time elapsed from
the date of the offense in December of 2010 to the date of the plea in February 2016.
9

Furthermore, designating Williams’s February 11, 2016, convictions

as separate offenses accomplishes the legislative intent of La. R.S. 15:529.1.

As the Shaw court explained, the purpose of the statute is both to deter

subsequent felonies from being committed and to punish more severely

those who commit multiple crimes. To accomplish this purpose, a repeat

offender should be subjected to an enhancement for each subsequent felony

he commits. Shaw, supra. If Williams’s February 11, 2016, convictions

were counted as one, and he were merely adjudicated a third felony

offender, Williams would be receiving only one enhancement for two crimes

committed after his first felony conviction. As the Shaw court pointed out,

enhancing a sentence for only one of multiple felony convictions occurring

on the same day subsequent to a previous conviction thwarts the goal of

protecting society, and the defendant avoids the more severe consequences

of committing additional crimes. Williams has been convicted of four

felonies and his enhanced sentencing exposure rightly reflects the

consequences of his habitual felonious behavior.

Williams was properly adjudicated a fourth felony offender and this

assignment of error lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

In his second assignment of error, Williams argues his sentence of life

imprisonment is constitutionally excessive in light of the nature of his prior

felony convictions and the circumstances surrounding his instant conviction.

He maintains that aggravated flight from an officer should not be classified

as a crime of violence since he did not create a risk of harm or injury, as

there were no vehicles present during the offense and no injuries were

reported. Williams also points out the trial court did not order a presentence
10

investigation report (“PSI”), so the record is limited regarding his personal

history.

In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, an appellate court uses a

two-step process. First, the record must reflect the trial court took the

criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. into account. The goal of La.

C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence,

not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos,

419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982). The trial court is not required to list every

aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so long as it adequately considered

them in particularizing the sentence to the defendant. State v. Smith, 433 So.

2d 688 (La. 1983). The important elements which should be considered are

the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health,

employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and

the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);

State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. These

elements are consistently utilized by this Court when evaluating a sentence

for constitutional excessiveness. See State v. McFarlin, 54,754 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/25/23), 354 So. 3d 888; State v. McCarthy, 55,038 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/28/23).

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Trotter, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. State v. Trotter, supra; State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir.
11

1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307. On review, an appellate court does not determine

whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the

trial court abused its discretion. State v. Trotter, supra; State v. Bell, supra.

The second step in reviewing a sentence for excessiveness is a

determination of whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A

sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime or nothing more than a purposelessness and

needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276

(La. 1993); State v. Trotter, supra. A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-

0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166. As a general rule, maximum or near

maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst

offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v.

Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 22-

00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So. 3d 1053.

For the crime of aggravated flight from an officer, the longest

sentence Williams could have received was five years at hard labor, La. R.S.

14:108.1(E)(1). However, as a fourth felony offender, Williams faced up to

life in prison. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a)-(c) provides the following

sentencing ranges for fourth felony offenders:

(4) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first
conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment
for any term less than his natural life than the following
sentences apply:

(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the
fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not
less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but

12

in no event less than twenty years and not more than his
natural life.

(b) If the fourth felony and no prior felony is defined as a
crime of violence under R.S. 14.2(B) or as a sex offense
under R.S. 15:541, the person shall be imprisoned for not
less than twenty years nor more than twice the longest
possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. If
twice the possible sentence prescribed for a first
conviction is less than twenty years, the person shall be
imprisoned for twenty years.

(c) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are
felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S.
14:2(B), or a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 when
the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of
commission of the offense, the person shall be
imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

As set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(c), two prior felonies, as well as the

fourth felony, must be crimes of violence to subject a defendant to a

mandatory life sentence as a fourth felony offender. While Williams’s

fourth felony is defined as a crime of violence, only one of his prior three

felonies, aggravated battery, meets that criterion, La. R.S. 14:2(5) and (39);

therefore, his sentencing range was 20 years to life pursuant to La. R.S.

15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

Considering the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of life

imprisonment, this Court must determine whether the sentence imposed is

constitutionally excessive in light of the record before us. After a thorough

review of the record, we are constrained to find it is inadequate to make such

a determination. The first step in evaluating a sentence for excessiveness, to

ensure it is particularized for the defendant, is evaluating whether there was

adequate compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art 894.1. As set forth by the

Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Jones, supra, and recently reiterated by

this court in State v. Trotter, supra, State v. McFarlin, supra, and State v.
13

McCarthy, supra, there are four general categories that should be considered

by the trial court before imposing a sentence:

1) Personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health,
employment record),

2) Prior criminal record,

3) Seriousness of the offense, and

4) Likelihood of rehabilitation.

The trial court thoroughly considered Williams’s extensive criminal record

and also opined it believed Williams could not be rehabilitated; however,

there is no mention of anything about his personal history, nor is there an

evaluation of the seriousness of the instant offense and his prior felonies.

At sentencing, the trial court read into the record its written reasons

for judgment, stating the following:

In determining the length of the sentence to be imposed, this
court considered, in addition to the sentencing guidelines, the
following factors:

1) The defendant has a long criminal history dating back to
2008. He has been arrested and charged at least 18 different
times from 2008 to the present. He has three prior felony
convictions, not including the latest for aggravated flight
from an officer in the instant case. Two of the four felony
convictions are crimes of violence.

2) The defendant has been arrested, charged and/or convicted
of multiple gun related crimes.

3) The defendant has been arrested and charged with multiple
crimes which show violent tendencies, those being resisting
an officer, four counts of simple battery, one count of
aggravated second degree battery.

4) The defendant further has been arrested for attempted first
degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree
murder in 2016, one count of second degree murder in 2016,
and for three counts of second degree murder as late as
2020.

14

5) The defendant has been sentenced to different hard labor
sentences only to be released and commit additional crimes,
the latest of which is a crime of violence.

6) The defendant does not appear to be remorseful for his
actions nor take any responsibility for them.

7) His criminal behavior, including four felonies and nearly
twenty arrests and charges, lead this court to believe he has
not understood the seriousness of his crimes and has no
reason to believe he will in the future.

Although the trial court did not specifically reference Art. 894.1 while

imposing Williams’s sentence, the trial court did say it had considered the

sentencing guidelines. As stated in State v. Smith, supra, the trial court is

only required to consider the Art. 894.1 factors, not list every aggravating or

mitigating circumstance. The trial court did thoroughly summarize

Williams’s significant criminal history and its belief concerning the

possibility of rehabilitation. We note that in addition to his four felony

convictions, Williams’s multiple arrests for murder are particularly

concerning. The record is unclear as to whether any murder charges are

pending.

The trial court made no mention of two of the four important elements

for consideration set forth in State v. Jones, supra, and State v. Trotter,

supra, namely Williams’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status,

health, employment record) and the seriousness of his offense.

Consideration of these important elements was especially warranted here

since Williams was exposed to a such a vast sentencing range, 20 years to

life in prison, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). No PSI was ordered and, while

we recognize that La. C. Cr. P. art. 875 does not mandate one, in light of this

large potential sentencing range, a PSI might have shed some light on the

reasons and justifications for Williams’s maximum life sentence. Certainly
15

it would have given this Court a more complete record to review in

determining whether the sentence imposed is properly tailored to this

defendant. See State v. Parks, 54,888 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/22), 352 So. 3d

166.

In addition to the lack of consideration of Williams’s personal history,

the trial court did not articulate its consideration of the seriousness of the

instant offense, along with Williams’s prior felonies, in evaluating whether

Williams is one of the worst offenders, and these are the worst offenses,

warranting a maximum life sentence. While we will vacate this sentence

and pretermit a discussion of whether a life sentence is constitutionally

excessive, we do note the following regarding Williams’s convictions for

consideration by the trial court at resentencing.

Williams’s instant conviction of aggravated flight from an officer is

defined, in pertinent part, in La. R.S. 14:108.1(C) and (D), as:

C. The intentional refusal of a driver to bring a vehicle to a
stop, under circumstances wherein human life is endangered
knowing that he has been given a visual and audible signal
to stop by a police officer when the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the driver or operator has committed
and offense.

D. Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be
any situation where the operator of the fleeing vehicle
commits at least two of the following acts:

1. Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave
the road way.

2. Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.

3. Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five
miles per hour.

4. Travels against the flow of traffic or in the case of
watercraft, operated the watercraft in a careless manner
in violation of R.S. 34:851.4 or in a reckless manner in
violation of R.S. 14:99.
16

5. Fails to obey a stop sign or a yield sign.

6. Fails to obey a traffic control signal device.

Williams does not dispute the record contains sufficient evidence to support

that he committed at least two of the acts set forth in La. R.S. 14:108.1(D).

Instead, he argues his conviction should not be considered a crime of

violence since human life was not endangered as his flight from an officer

occurred in the early morning hours when no one else was on the street.

While Williams is correct that the roads were empty, other than a bicyclist

on an adjacent street not directly in the roadway where the pursuit occurred,

multiple officers’ lives were endangered, at a minimum, by their 15-minute

high-speed chase of Williams. Thankfully, Williams did not cause anyone

serious bodily injury. Additionally, the legislature has classified aggravated

flight from an officer as a crime of violence without regard to whether

someone was actually injured, La. R.S. 14:2(39). Anytime an individual

chooses to flee from police and leads officers on a high-speed pursuit, it is

dangerous and potentially life-threatening conduct. Williams’s argument

may lend itself more to possible mitigation as to the relative seriousness of

his offense when compared to other high-speed chases where multiple

bystanders are actually put in harm’s way or accidents occur. The trial court

will need to evaluate the facts of this case to determine the relative

seriousness of Williams’s conduct, in addition to the relative seriousness of

his prior convictions.

On this record, considering the vast sentencing exposure Williams

faced, we simply cannot determine whether the maximum life sentence

imposed is constitutionally excessive. Consequently, we are constrained to

17

vacate Williams’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for

resentencing consistent with the aforementioned considerations.

Pro se brief

Williams submitted an untimely pro se brief in which he lists six

assignments of error, with each having been thoroughly evaluated and

considered by this court.3 We find, on the record before us, that these pro se

assignments lack merit and do not warrant any further discussion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, Tobias Williams’s conviction and his

fourth felony habitual offender adjudication are affirmed. We vacate the

sentence imposed and remand for resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED;

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

3
As to pro se assignments of errors (1) and (2), which are nearly identical
arguments, Williams alleges his right to a speedy trial was violated, but there is no
motion for speedy trial in the record; assignment (3) alleges his attorney failed to advise
him felons could serve as jurors, and that his attorney and the prosecutor acted in cohort
to ensure his conviction, claims that are more appropriate for post conviction relief
(“PCR”); assignment (4) alleges instructing the jury to return a unanimous verdict was
unfair as they should have been instructed on the law in effect when he committed his
crime in 2018, that a verdict of 10-2 was all that was required to convict him; assignment
(5) alleges his 2008 conviction should not have been used as a predicate offense to
enhance his sentence because the five-year cleansing period set forth in La. R.S.
15:529.1(C)(1) had lapsed; however, the record reveals there was never a five-year period
as defined in the article in which Williams did not commit a subsequent felony offense;
assignment (6) claims ineffective assistance of counsel, but Williams makes no argument
as to why and, even if he did, it would be more appropriate for PCR.
18

HUNTER, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the defendant’s sentences

and remand for resentencing, as the record is inadequate to determine

whether the sentence imposed is constitutionally excessive.

However, based on the record before us, I do not believe the evidence

was sufficient to support the habitual offender adjudication. The proper

action for an appellate court faced with a habitual offender adjudication

based on insufficient evidence is to reverse the habitual offender

adjudication, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing. State v.

Taylor, 54,110 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1141; State v.

Meadows, 51,980 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 1018.

Consequently, I would reverse the habitual offender adjudication, vacate the

sentence, and remand for resentencing.

1