Katie King Alston v. Betty Jean Moore

Judgment rendered November 15, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,296-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

KATIE KING ALSTON Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

BETTY JEAN MOORE Defendant-Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Thirty-Seventh Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caldwell, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 30205

Honorable Ashley P. Thomas, Judge

*****

ROBERT ANDREW MOORE Counsel for Appellants
Betty Jean Moore and
Howard Moore Family
Trust

MIXON, CARROLL & FRAZIER, LLC Counsel for Appellee
By: James Eugene Mixon

*****

Before PITMAN, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This appeal arises from the 37th Judicial District Court, Parish of

Caldwell, the Honorable Ashley Paul Thomas presiding. Defendants, Betty

Jean Moore and the Howard Moore Family Trust, appeal the trial court’s

judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, Katie King Alston, declaring her the

owner of a tract of immovable property through acquisitive prescription.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 18, 2021, Katie King Alston (“Alston”) filed a petition to

establish title through acquisitive prescription. She named as defendant

Betty Jean Moore (“Betty”), individually, and as the independent

administratrix of the succession of Robert Howard Moore (“Robert”),

Betty’s husband (collectively, “the Moores”). The petition alleged that the

Moores were the record owners of an approximately one-acre tract of

immovable property located in Caldwell Parish, Louisiana; Alston provided

a description of the property in the petition.1 The property at issue, 128

Holman Road, Columbia, Louisiana, was a part of a larger piece of

immovable property owned by the Moores.

Alston alleged that her family had begun possessing the property over

70 years before and that she had sole possession of the property as the owner

for a period of time exceeding 30 years. Alston asked that the trial court

declare her the owner of the property described. Defendants answered,

1
It was later revealed at trial that the property description included in the petition
described a different piece of property and not the tract at issue. The petition was
amended at trial to include the correct property description.

denied Alston’s claims, and asked the trial court to evict Alston from the

property.

On October 10, 2022, a bench trial was held. At the beginning of the

trial, defense counsel stated that Robert and Betty acquired the disputed

property in 2014. Robert died in 2019 and his succession was closed by the

time of trial. Robert created the Howard Moore Family Trust in his will,

naming his and Betty’s children, Donald Glen Moore (“Don”) and Martha

Moore Reynolds (“Martha”), as trustees; the trust was recognized in the

succession proceedings. Don and Martha held power of attorney for Betty,

their mother.2 Martha executed a concurrence, granting Don authority to act

as her sole mandatary in the suit against Alston. By joint stipulation, the

parties added as defendants the Howard Moore Family Trust and Don

Moore, as trustee.

Alston testified that she had lived near the disputed property since

1951. Photographs from before 1975 were admitted, which depicted her

family, a single-wide trailer, and Holman Road. Alston originally lived

across Holman Road in a trailer on a different piece of property from the

tract at issue here.

Alston testified that she got permission from her godfather, J.S.

Holman (“Holman”), who had a house on the property and who she

presumed owned the property, to put her trailer “in that old pea field” on the

property, at 128 Holman Road. Alston placed a mobile home on the

property in 1982 and moved onto the land as owner at that time; the mobile

home has remained on the property since. She lived there from that time and

2
Betty was 91 or 92 years old at the time of trial.
2

mowed the grass on the property. No one told Alston that she had to leave

the property, move her home, or that she could not be there. A photograph

was admitted depicting Alston and her infant son on the property in 1982,

the year he was born, with her mobile home in the background. Other

photographs were admitted which were taken in 1995 and 1998, showing

Alston’s mobile home on the property. Alston received a homestead

exemption on the property.

Alston stated that Holman did not give her a deed to the property, but

she assumed she was the owner when he told her she could move in and stay

there. Holman was retired in 1982 when he gave her the property, and he

passed away in 1989 or 1990. Alston said that apart from mowing part of

the property, she did not put up any signs, paint any trees, or put up a fence

to mark the boundaries of the property, and she did not have a survey done

of the property. She affirmed that she could not identify the exact acreage

over which she was claiming ownership. Alston possessed the property for

herself and no one else, and she mowed around the property up to the tree

line.

Alston’s brother, James Earl King (“Mr. King”), testified that Alston

moved a double-wide mobile home onto the Holman Road property and no

one other than his sister possessed the property. Mr. King said that Alston

mowed the yard and that the part of the property she possessed was visible.

Betty King (“Mrs. King”), Mr. King’s spouse, testified that Alston

put a mobile home on the property more than 30 years before the trial. She

maintained the yard around the property and no one interfered with her

possession of the property. Mrs. King saw Alston about once a month.

3

Scott Meredith (“Meredith”), the Assessor for Caldwell Parish,

testified. A copy of an Assessment Sheet for Alston’s mobile home was

admitted, and it stated that the home was on 128 Holman Road and was

“located on Manville Property.” Meredith stated that he prepared a

description of the property that Alston was possessing, which was used in

the petition. He based his description upon a visual examination of the

property and aerial photographs. The description was admitted. Meredith

stated that prior to becoming the parish assessor, he assessed the property for

an oil and gas company, Hogan Exploration (“Hogan”), which had a lease

on the property from the owner, “the Manville Companies.” Meredith

testified that Hogan leased the property from the 1980s to 2000. When

Meredith viewed the property in the 1980s, Alston was living on it in a

mobile home and was occupying it as her home. Meredith said that the

property was owned at the time by “Plum Creek or Manville.”

On cross-examination, Meredith clarified that he only assessed the

mobile home to Alston, but the land the mobile home sat upon was assessed

to the Moores. The Assessment Sheet for the mobile home excluded “land

value.” Meredith affirmed that the property description provided in the

petition was inaccurate, as it listed the property as being on Elmo May Road.

Defendants then had admitted the correct legal description of the property

prepared by Meredith. He measured the property from aerial photographs,

but did not take ground measurements of the property. Meredith stated that

his measurements were approximate and not exact and he did not prepare a

survey for the tract of land.

Plaintiff stipulated that the incorrect property description was attached

to the petition, and the petition was amended to reflect the correct
4

description. Meredith stated that he provided a general estimate of feet and

direction in the property description and a surveyor could provide a metes

and bounds description. Plaintiff rested.

Dustin Reynolds (“Reynolds”) testified for the defense; at the time of

trial, he was employed by the Webster Parish Sheriff’s Office as the Chief of

Operations, and was a relative of defendants. Reynolds stated that he visited

the property at issue two to three times in the year prior to trial and he

evaluated the property, looking at the “boundaries or lack thereof.”

Defendants had admitted photographs Reynolds took of the property

showing Holman Road, a purported boundary of the property, and a mobile

home and mailbox. Additional photographs Reynolds took of the property

were admitted, which depicted various angles of the property and showed

mow lines. Reynolds stated that there were no features, vegetation, signs, or

fences, etc., to show any sort of boundary line to the property at issue,

nothing that would indicate Alston was claiming ownership of the property.

Reynolds stated that he was able to determine the parameters of the

land that Alston was mowing by the length of the grass; he agreed that it was

easy to determine, upon viewing the property, which part Alston occupied.

Reynolds said that he was not aware of anything the Moores did to maintain

the property and that he thought Alston mowing the grass was part of an

agreement she had with them. Reynolds stated that the Moore family had

never occupied the residence on the property. He testified that a sewer line

running from Alston’s home, which was depicted in one of the photographs,

was not something the Moores were using; the sewer line came from

Alston’s mobile home and emptied into a septic pit that was not on the

property Alston was claiming.
5

Don testified that he went to Caldwell Parish more than two dozen

times to view the Holman Road property. He said that Betty, the family

trust, and other relatives paid taxes, cut trees, bush hogged, fished the pond,

and hunted on the Holman Road property, but not the part of the property

that Alston maintained. Don stated that his family never saw fences or

signs, or received notice indicating that Alston claimed ownership of the

property. He acknowledged that there was a mobile home on the property,

part of the property was regularly mowed and maintained, and there was a

sewage line running from the mobile home to a septic pit. When the Moores

purchased the property, they were aware Alston was living there, and Don

was present one time that they visited her on the property. The defense

rested.

The trial court then provided an oral ruling. The trial court found that

Alston had acquired the land she occupied through acquisitive prescription

and that she had corporeal possession of the property from 1982 to 2012.

The court stated that Alston was not a precarious possessor. The trial court

found Meredith’s description of the property that was included in the

amended petition sufficient to describe the property that Alston possessed.

Defendants objected.

On November 3, 2022, the trial court signed a written judgment

declaring Alston to be the owner of the following described property:

From NW/4 of Section 25, T13N, R3E; thence East
approximately 1,000 feet to the centerline of La. Hwy. 4; thence
Southeasterly approximately 900 feet along the centerline of
La. Hwy. 4 with its intersection with Holman Road; thence
Northeasterly approximately 225 feet along the centerline of
Holman Road to the Point of Beginning; thence continue
Northeasterly 300 feet along the centerline of Holman Road;
thence Southeasterly (at right angle) 220 feet; thence
Southwesterly (at right angle) 300 feet; thence Northwesterly
6

(at right angle) 220 feet to the Point of Beginning. All as
depicted on Exhibit P-8 introduced into evidence in these
proceedings and attached hereto.3

Defendants now appeal.

DISCUSSION

Extent of Possession

In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that it is impossible

to discern the boundaries of the property Alston possessed other than the

area where she mowed the yard. Appellants claim that Meredith’s

description of the property is inadequate, because he did not perform ground

measurements, but rather mapped out the property line using aerial

photographs. Appellants state that a surveyor is required here to determine

with specificity Alston’s inch-by-inch possession within enclosures, but,

under the law, the description cannot be corrected post-judgment.

Appellants contend that testimony at trial established that two of the

purported boundaries were allegedly set by the existence of a tree line and

Alston mowing grass, but such evidence lacks the specificity the law

requires.

Appellee argues that it is undisputed that Alston moved her mobile

home onto the property in question in 1982 and preserved the property by

mowing the grass and maintaining the premises for more than 30 years.

Appellee contends that she possessed the property for herself and no other.

Meredith viewed the property on more than one occasion with Alston living

there. Appellee states that the current law has a relaxed view of

3
Exhibit P-8 is an aerial photograph of the Holman Road property with Alston’s
property outlined in yellow.

7

“enclosures” for the purposes of delineating property lines. A survey is not

required to determine the extent of Alston’s ownership, because the

description provided by Meredith used monuments to establish and describe

the location of her property. Appellee argues that while possession must be

proved inch-by-inch, there is no requirement in the law that the description

of the property must be to the inch.

Ownership and other real rights in immovables may be acquired by

the prescription of 30 years without the need of just title or possession in

good faith. La. C.C. art. 3486. For purposes of acquisitive prescription

without title, possession extends only to that property which has been

actually possessed. La. C.C. art. 3487. Actual possession must be either

inch-by-inch possession or possession within enclosures. Pinola Pres.,

L.L.C. v. Star B Ranch, L.L.C., 53,823 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/21), 361 So. 3d

991, writ denied, 21-00861 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d 1069. An enclosure

is any natural or artificial boundary. La. C.C. art. 3426, comment (d). The

party who does not hold title to the disputed property has the burden of

proving actual possession within enclosures sufficient to establish the limits

of possession with certainty, by either natural or artificial marks, giving

notice to the world of the extent of possession exercised. Pinola Pres.,

L.L.C. v. Star B Ranch, L.L.C., supra.

The possessor must have corporeal possession, or civil possession

preceded by corporeal possession, to acquire a thing by prescription, and the

possession must be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and

unequivocal. La. C.C. art. 3476.

To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as owner and take

corporeal possession of the thing. La. C.C. art. 3424. Corporeal possession
8

is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a thing.

La. C.C. art. 3425. Possession may be exercised by the possessor or by

another who holds the thing for him and in his name. La. C.C. art. 3429.

Thus, a lessor possesses through his lessee. A precarious possessor, such as

a lessee, is presumed to possess for another although he may intend to

possess for himself. La. C.C. art. 3438.

The requisite possession to support a possessory action is identical to

the possession required to commence the running of acquisitive prescription.

Pinola Pres., L.L.C. v. Star B Ranch, L.L.C., supra. The question of

whether acts constitute possession is a factual determination that will not be

disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Strain v. Aaron, 49,647 (La. App.

2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 553.

When one party relies on title and the other party on acquisitive

prescription, the party relying on title will prevail unless the adversary

establishes his ownership by acquisitive prescription. Pinola Pres., L.L.C. v.

Star B Ranch, L.L.C., supra; Bowman v. Blankenship, 34,558 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So. 2d 134, writ denied, 01-1354 (La. 6/22/01), 794 So. 2d

794.

Appellants rely on the following cases in support of their argument

that the evidence was insufficient to determine the boundaries of the

property Alston possessed: Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., 444 So. 2d 105 (La.

1983) and Leonard v. Meraux Land Dev., LLC, 02-0863 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/26/03), 840 So. 2d 1238, writ denied, 03-0854 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So. 2d

1055.

In Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., supra, a group of riparian land owners

filed a possessory action against the Louisiana State Mineral Board,
9

claiming they had possessed the riverbed of the Amite River to the

centerline of the river. The supreme court determined that the land owners

were required to prove possession by enclosures, meaning that they

maintained possession only to the extent of the boundaries within which they

proved actual, physical, and corporeal possession. Id.

The supreme court noted that it was a unique case, because the

immovable property at issue was partially submerged land, the bed and

bottom of a non-navigable river that still carried running water. Because

running water is a public thing, a riparian land owner may not interfere with

its use by the general public. Therefore, the supreme court said, the

possessor of the riverbed could not fence or enclose the land so as to impede

the flowing water’s use. There was also testimony at trial that the Amite

River would wash out any signs or monuments placed within. Id.

Several of the property owners testified that they posted signs which

said “Keep Out. Private Property,” evicted those using the land without

permission, and advertised in the local newspaper that the area was private

property. They testified about sand and gravel dredging operations that were

conducted on the riverbed to the centerline and the recreational and other

activities for which the Amite was used, including wading, fishing,

skimming rocks, digging for clams, and baptisms. The owners commonly

recognized that the possession of each extended to the centerline of the river,

which they described as the midway point between the edges of the flowing

water. Id.

The supreme court found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden

of proving that they were the legal possessors of the riverbed. The court said

that the use to which the plaintiffs put the riverbed was insufficient “to give
10

definite notice to the public … of the character and extent of possession, to

identify fully the property possessed and to fix with certainty the boundaries

or limits thereof.” Id. at 111. The court went on to state that the activities to

which the plaintiffs testified were natural things done in any river in the state

and did not give definite notice to the public that they were possessing the

riverbed as owners rather than the general public using the running waters of

the state as members of the general public. The court also found that the

centerline of the Amite River was an invisible line subject to natural change,

and that the river was a meandering stream dotted irregularly with sandbars

and islands, around which water moved with varying frequency and speed

depending upon the changing river stages. Chaney v. State Mineral Bd.,

supra.

The court said that posting signs was inadequate to show third parties

that the river bed itself was private property divided co-equally at an

invisible centerline between riparian land owners from either side. The

court finally said:

Furthermore, even if the thread of the river were adopted as a
natural boundary, no side boundaries of the riparian properties,
no cross-river indicators of enclosure or the extent of
possession, were proven in this case. There was no testimony
of visible marks, either artificial or natural, extending from the
bank to the thread or centerline of the river. No evidence was
introduced regarding any survey which delineated the
boundaries or the extent of possession between the alleged
neighboring riparian possessors or owners along the disputed
tract. No cross-boundaries were established conclusively either
on the riverbank or to the thread or centerline of the river itself
to give notice to the public or the world at large of the extent of
the respective separate possessions of each of the adjoining
riparian tract owners.

Accordingly, there has been no showing of corporeal
possession of the bed of the river either by enclosure by natural
or artificial marks or by inch by inch possession.

11

Id. at 112.

In Leonard v. Meraux Land Dev., supra, the plaintiffs, who were

brothers, claimed possession of riparian land beside two bayous to which

they purchased title in 1955. The acts of sale did not include descriptions of

the properties. The plaintiffs claimed they made improvements to the

properties by constructing wharfs around an existing boat shed, inserting

pilings, and building a boat hoist, pier, and bulkheads. Plaintiffs stored

pilings on the properties and began to operate a commercial fishing business,

which later included a boat launch and convenience store. They also

constructed a paved road for access to the properties. The plaintiffs testified

that they did not erect any type of structure to outline the boundaries of the

properties, but testified that a natural boundary line existed. Id.

The trial court found that the plaintiffs had acquired the land by

acquisitive prescription of 30 years. The trial court ordered a survey be

conducted post-judgment to fix the property lines to the bayous’ edges. The

court of appeal reversed, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to show a

visible boundary line existed to establish what land along the bayous they

actually possessed. The plaintiffs did not testify where any of the

improvements they constructed were located on the bayous, or “if any of

them constituted the sort of boundary contemplated by the Civil Code

articles and related jurisprudence. There is only a vague reference that the

improvements were located on the bayou lots.” Id. at 1245.

The court found that the plaintiff’s testimony lacked specificity

regarding where the improvements were made at any particular point in time

and that it was impossible to determine from the record if the improvements

made were so obvious as to put anyone on notice that they possessed the
12

bayou lots as owners. Leonard v. Meraux Land Dev., supra. The court of

appeal also found that the trial court erred by ordering a survey post-

judgment to determine the boundaries possessed by the plaintiffs, stating that

they should have submitted a survey or have been able to establish inch-by-

inch the land possessed with specificity. Id.

This court finds the following case instructive: Beals v. New

Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church of Delhi, Inc., 51,868 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 701. In that case, the defendant church claimed

ownership by acquisitive prescription of a strip of land located within a tract

of land owned by the plaintiffs. The trial court ruled that the church

acquired ownership of the disputed land through 30 years’ acquisitive

prescription, and this court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on appeal. This

court first stated that there were painted stakes placed in certain corners of

the church’s property. This court then found that witness testimony

established that a wall of the church, its bathrooms, and septic tank had been

in place on the disputed land for more than 30 years. This court added:

Most importantly, it was clear from the record that the church
had been mowing and maintaining the disputed property for
more than 30 years. The wall, indoor plumbing, and natural
boundary created by mowing gave notice of the character and
extent of New Fellowship’s adverse possession. It is clear from
the testimony at trial that New Fellowship possessed the
property without interruption, within visible bounds, more land
than their title called for, and the boundary should be fixed
along these bounds. (Emphasis added).

In the instant case, testimony shows that Alston moved her home onto

the Holman Road property more than 30 years prior to when defendants

acquired title to the land. Her septic line runs across the property, and

witnesses testified that it was apparent where she mowed the grass, which

she stated she had done since she moved into her home in 1982.
13

Defendants’ reliance on Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., supra, and

Leonard v. Meraux Land Dev., supra, is misplaced. In Chaney v. State

Mineral Bd., supra, the landowners sought by acquisitive prescription a

riverbed that had flowing water running through it. The supreme court

found that (1) the riverbed was subject to constant change; (2) there were

multiple landowners who did not state with adequate specificity where the

boundary lines between their properties were and the extent of their

possession; and (3) the activities the landowners engaged in on the land were

insufficient to provide notice to the public of their possession as owners

rather than the general public using the running water recreationally. In

Leonard v. Meraux Land Dev., supra, the plaintiffs made improvements to

the properties, but the court of appeal determined that they were incapable of

showing that a detectable boundary line existed in order to ascertain what

land along the bayous they truly possessed.

Here, Alston is a single property owner claiming ownership of land

that is not subject to change as is a flowing river. She also did not testify

that she only made improvements to the property. Alston stated that she

placed a house and septic line on the property and mowed the area around

her property since she first moved there in 1982. Meredith, Don, and

Reynolds testified that the area where the grass was mowed was discernible.

The presence of her home, the septic line, and visible boundary shown by

the mowed grass are sufficient to show that she possessed the property

without interruption for 30 years and to give definite notice to the public of

the character and extent of her possession, identifying fully the property she

possessed. This assignment of error lacks merit.

14

Property Description

In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial

court’s judgment included a legal description of the property that did not

comply with La. C.C.P. art. 2089, because it did not describe the property

with particularity. Appellants claim that the judgment only provided a

general description made from aerial measurements inside a tree line view,

without ground measurement, used the word “approximately” three times,

and “measures direction ‘Southeasterly’ and ‘Northeasterly’ six times, with

absolutely no degree of measurement particularity.” Appellants ask this

court to reverse the trial court and dismiss Alston’s demands with prejudice

at her cost.

Appellee contends that the parties acknowledged that the extent of

Alston’s possession was evident by a visual examination of the property.

Meredith used a visual examination to prepare a legal description to reflect

the area occupied by Alston. Appellee states that La. C.C.P. art. 2089 does

not require that a property description be supported by a survey, but only

requires that immovable property be described in a manner that one can

determine the location of the same. Appellee states that the requirement

from La. C.C.P. art 2089, that judgments affecting title to immovable

property describe the affected property with particularity, serves to assure

the general public, title examiners, successful litigants, officials charged

with the execution of judgments, and surveyors, who actively deal with

immovable property. Appellee states that the property description found in

the judgment is adequate to determine the location of the property and the

trial court’s ruling should be affirmed.

15

La. C.C.P. art. 1919 states that all final judgments which affect title to

immovable property shall describe the immovable property affected with

particularity. La. C.C.P. art. 2089 states that all judgments and decrees

which affect title to immovable property shall describe with particularity the

immovable property affected. The judgment must include the legal

description of a property, with reference to landmarks such as roads,

benchmarks, or other monuments which can be located, or a survey

commencing at some established point. Young v. Tolintino, 44,631 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 12/2/09), 26 So. 3d 835, writ denied, 10-0005 (La. 4/9/10), 31

So. 3d 391.

The purpose of describing immovable property with particularity is to

assure that the general public, title examiners, successful litigants, officials

charged with executions of judgments, and surveyors in particular can

accurately deal with the immovable property. Burch v. Burch, 51,780 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1138. The failure to describe a property,

however, does not nullify or affect the judgment rendered. Hooper v. Hero

Lands Co., 15-0929 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/16), 216 So. 3d 965, writ denied,

16-0971 (La. 9/16/16), 206 So. 3d 205.

Appellants complain that the legal description of the property uses the

word “approximately” twice, which they argue does not comply with the

particularity requirement of La. C.C.P. arts. 1919 and 2089. The term

“approximate” means “close to the actual, but not completely accurate or

exact.” The first time “approximately” is used in the legal description of

Alston’s property is when it states that the centerline of La. Hwy 4 is

“approximately 1,000 feet” from the northwest quarter of Section 25,

Township 13 North, Range 3 East. The use of the word “approximately”
16

there is of no consequence, because the description goes on to describe the

intersection of the centerlines of La. Hwy. 4 and Holman Road, which is a

fixed point.

The description then states that from the intersection of the centerlines

of those two roads, the “Point of Beginning” is located “Northeasterly

approximately 225 feet along the centerline of Holman Road.” That is the

starting point from which the description outlines the boundaries of Alston’s

property.4 The use of the word “approximately” means that the Point of

Beginning is close to 225 feet, but not exactly 225 feet along the centerline

of Holman Road. However, the legal description in the judgment references

Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-8, which is an assessor’s map with Alston’s property

outlined in yellow. We find that the public, litigants, title examiners,

officials charged with executions of judgments, and surveyors can read the

property description provided in the judgment and review the attached

assessor’s map and accurately deal with the immovable property. See Hall

Ponderosa, LLC v. State Through La. State Land Office, 54,678 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/10/22), 345 So. 3d 537, writ denied, 22-01550 (La. 1/11/23), 352 So.

3d 984. This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs are assessed to

appellants.

AFFIRMED.

4
Appellants also complain that the description of the boundaries of Alston’s
property includes use of the words “Northeasterly,” “Southeasterly,” “Southwesterly,”
and “Northwesterly,” which in appellants’ view is not specific enough. We disagree.
The description of the boundaries of Alston’s property also includes the words “at right
angle” three times with measurements in feet. A right angle is 90 degrees exactly;
therefore, the description of the boundaries of Alston’s property describe the immovable
property with particularity.
17