State of Louisiana v. Ladarrius R. Torbor

Judgment rendered January 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,376-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LADARIUS R. TORBOR Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 76,613

Honorable Bruce Edward Hampton, Judge

*****

LOUSIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

LADARIUS R. TORBOR Pro Se

JOHN FITZGERALD BELTON Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

LEWIS ALLEN JONES
TRACY WAYNE HOUCK
Assistant District Attorneys
*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant, LaDarius R. Torbor, was charged by bill of information

with violating the Peeping Tom statute, La. R.S. 14284, third offense.

Following a trial, a unanimous jury found him guilty as charged.

Subsequently, defendant pled guilty to being a fourth-felony offender, and

pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment at

hard labor. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 10, 2022, at approximately 11:28 p.m., the Ruston Police

Department received reports in reference to a person peeping through the

windows of residences. One caller, Maria Woods-Andrews, informed the

dispatcher she saw someone looking into the window of her mother’s

residence. 1 Police officers were dispatched to the residence and

encountered defendant, LaDarius Torbor, wearing the clothing described by

Woods-Andrews. Defendant told the officers he had been running from

“some people” who were chasing him.

Some of defendant’s actions were captured by the Ring doorbell

camera of Woods-Andrews’ mother. The video depicted defendant

approaching the residence, squatting down with his pants partially pulled

down with his right hand inside the front of his pants. The camera also

showed defendant approaching the kitchen window of the residence;

however, defendant walked outside the view of the camera and was not seen

actually looking into the window.

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The police officers noted Woods-Andrews’ complaint was the third complaint
made that night concerning defendant peeping into windows in the area.

Defendant waived his right to counsel and proceeded to represent

himself with standby counsel. The State introduced as evidence two prior

Peeping Tom convictions, and Woods-Andrews and Officer Joshua Aldridge

testified regarding the events which occurred on the night of January 10,

2022.

Defendant was found guilty, as charged, of violating the Peeping Tom

statute, third offense. He subsequently pled guilty to being a fourth-felony

offender. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant agreed he would receive

the minimum sentence of 20 years, and he was sentenced to 20 years at hard

labor in accordance with the plea agreement.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he is guilty

of violating the Peeping Tom Statute. He argues the State did not introduce

any physical evidence, such as fingerprints, DNA, or video footage, to prove

he peeped through the window at the residence of Woods-Andrews’ mother.

Defendant maintains the entire case “hinges on Maria Woods-Andrews’

testimony she saw [defendant] peeping through the kitchen window.”

According to defendant, Woods-Andrews’ testimony was inconsistent

because she initially stated she saw “somebody” at the window, but she later

definitively identified defendant as the person she saw. Defendant asserts “it

is not possible for [Woods-Andrews] to know whether he had been walking

past the window when he saw her and froze.” He could have merely glanced

into the window because Woods-Andrews only observed defendant for a

brief moment before she turned and ran, and the State did not make any

attempt to establish why defendant was at the window. Consequently,
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defendant maintains the testimony was insufficient to establish defendant

was near the house “for the purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy

of persons spied upon[.]”

In a pro se brief, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, he peeped through a window. He argues

Woods-Andrews, the district attorney, and the jury believe he committed

this offense due to his prior violations of the Peeping Tom statute. He also

asserts the State failed to prove he “peeped” into the window, and he did so

“for the purpose of spying.”

When a defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict and one or more trial errors, the reviewing court first reviews

sufficiency, as a failure to satisfy the sufficiency standard will moot the trial

errors. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992); State v. Patterson,

50,305 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 184 So. 3d 739, writ denied, 15-2333 (La.

3/24/16), 190 So. 3d 1190.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

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922 So. 2d 517; State v. Burch, 52,247 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So.

3d 1190.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State

v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240 So. 3d

926.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;

State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ

denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. Where there is conflicting

testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weights of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Ward, 50,872 (La. App.

2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 228, writ denied, 17-0164 (La. 9/22/17), 227

So. 3d 827.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of

fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Hust,

51,015 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La.
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11/17/17), 229 So. 3d 928. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility

evaluation and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the

testimony of any witness; the reviewing court may impinge on that

discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due

process of law. State v. Sosa, 05-0213 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 94; State v.

Hust, supra. A reviewing court accords great deference to a fact finder’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Brown, 51,352 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So. 3d 88, writ denied,

17-1154 (La. 5/11/18), 241 So. 3d 1013.

La. R.S. 14:284 provides, in relevant part:

A. No person shall perform such acts as will make him a
“Peeping Tom” on or about the premises of another, or go upon
the premises of another for the purpose of becoming a “Peeping
Tom.”

B. “Peeping Tom” as used in this Section means one who peeps
through windows or doors, or other like places, situated on or
about the premises of another *** for the purpose of spying
upon or invading the privacy of persons spied upon without the
consent of the persons spied upon. It is not a necessary element
of this offense that the “Peeping Tom” be upon the premises of
the person being spied upon.
***

In the absence of a qualifying statutory provision, the terms “intent”

and “intentional” in criminal statutes have reference to general criminal

intent. La. R.S. 14:11; State v. Godeaux, 378 So. 2d 941 (La. 1980); State v.

Copeland, 52,742 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So. 3d 848, writ denied, 19-

01646 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So. 3d 89. General intent exists when the

circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human

experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as

reasonably certain to result from his acts or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10. In

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a general criminal intent crime, the very doing of the acts, which have been

declared criminal, shows criminal intent, which is necessary to sustain a

conviction. State v. Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980); State v. Copeland,

supra.

In the instant case, Maria Woods-Andrews testified she was leaving

her mother’s home at approximately 11:00 p.m., and as she was exiting the

residence, she saw a person standing at the window of the house. She ran

back inside the house, told her mother to call the police, and watched as the

person entered a gray vehicle. While on the telephone with dispatch,

Woods-Andrews saw the person walking back towards her mother’s house.

Woods-Andrews identified defendant, LaDarius Tobor, as the person she

saw looking into her mother’s window. She recognized him because she had

known him “his entire life” because his family lived in close proximity to

her mother’s house. Woods-Andrews watched as defendant walked to the

house across the street, stood in front of a window, then reclined under the

carport. The video footage obtained from the Ring doorbell camera was

played for the jury during Woods-Andrews’ testimony.

The jury also heard testimony from Beatrice Woods, who testified she

did not see defendant peeping into her window. However, she stated her

daughter, Woods-Andrews, came back inside the house that night and stated

“someone was on the porch looking in the window.” She also testified no

one gave defendant permission to look into her window.

Our review of the record reveals there was sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding defendant guilty of violating the Peeping Tom

statute. The jury, as fact finder, weighed the credibility of the state’s

witnesses, and the verdict suggests the jury found the witnesses credible.
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The testimony reveals defendant was standing in the victim’s yard looking

into her window. The length of time defendant looked into the window is of

no moment. Defendant’s general intent to invade the privacy of the victims

can be inferred from his actions, i.e., standing in in the victim’s yard and

looking into her window at 11:00 p.m. Based on this record, we find the

evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. This assignment lacks

merit.

Defendant also contends the trial court failed to properly arraign him

on the charge of Peeping Tom, third offense. He argues the bill of

information was not read in open court. He asserts he appeared for

arraignment, waived his right to counsel, and elected to represent himself.

According to defendant, he did not waive formal arraignment or the reading

of the bill of information, and he was not informed of the nature of the

allegations in the bill of information. He maintains he knew he had been

charged with violating the Peeping Tom statute; however, he did not know

the specific address of the house where the alleged offense occurred.

Defendant asserts he was in no position to subpoena the appropriate

witnesses or prepare for cross-examination of witnesses, and was, therefore,

prejudiced by the failure to properly arraign him.

The purpose of an arraignment is to inform the defendant of the

substance of the crime he is charged with. State v. Montero, 18-397 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/19/18), 263 So. 3d 899. La. C. Cr. P. art. 551 provides:

A. The arraignment consists of the reading of the indictment to
the defendant by the clerk in open court, and the court calling
upon the defendant to plead. Reading of the indictment may be
waived by the defendant at the discretion and with the
permission of the court. The arraignment and the defendant’s
plea shall be entered in the minutes of the court and shall
constitute a part of the record.
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B. The court may, by local rule, provide for the defendant’s
appearance at the arraignment and the entry of his plea by way
of simultaneous transmission through audio-visual electronic
equipment.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 555 provides:

Any irregularity in the arraignment, including a failure to read
the indictment, is waived if the defendant pleads to the
indictment without objecting thereto. A failure to arraign the
defendant or the fact that he did not plead, is waived if the
defendant enters upon the trial without objecting thereto, and it
shall be considered as if he had pleaded not guilty.

The record demonstrates defendant appeared via video for

arraignment on February 16, 2022. The colloquy was as follows:

***
THE COURT: Mr. Torbor, you need to understand that in
addition to the two charges of Peeping Tom,
which are both felonies, if you’re convicted
of either one of those, the State is going to
pursue you as a Habitual Offender which
means at least a minimum twenty-year
sentence and I believe that would be without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of
sentence. If you’re gonna represent yourself
you need to be – well, you just need to
understand that you’ll be representing
yourself and you risk going to jail for at
least twenty years. And I – I would advise
you that that is a very foolish proposition on
your behalf.
***
THE COURT: All right. You’re charged as a Peeping Tom
which is found in Louisiana Criminal Code
under Miscellaneous Crimes under Article
284. It says, “Peeping Tom as used in this
Section means one who peeped through
windows or doors or other like places
situated on or about the premises of another
or uses an unmanned aircraft system for the
purpose of spying upon or invading the
privacy of persons spied upon without the
consent of the person spied upon. It is not a
necessary element of this offense that the

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Peeping Tom be upon the premises of the
person being spied upon.”
***
THE COURT: On the charge of Peeping Tom – two counts
of Peeping Tom, how do you wish to plead?

[DEFENDANT]: I’d like to plead Not Guilty, Your Honor.
***

We find no reversible error in defendant’s arraignment. The record

demonstrates the trial court informed defendant of the charges against him

by reading the Peeping Tom statute and the potential penalties he would face

if convicted and subsequently adjudicated a habitual offender. The court

also called upon defendant to enter a plea, and defendant entered a plea of

“not guilty.” Further, the record reflects defendant proceeded to trial

without raising any objections regarding any irregularities in the arraignment

or plea. This assignment lacks merit.

In a pro se assignment of error, defendant contends the 20-year

sentence is excessive and makes no measurable contribution to acceptable

goals of punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain

and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.

State v. Lobato, 603 So. 2d 739 (La. 1992). Nevertheless, he concedes he

agreed to a minimum sentence of 20 years as a habitual offender.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from appealing a

sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement which was set forth

in the record at the time of his plea. State v. Young, 96-0195 (La. 10/15/96),

680 So. 2d 1171. Here, the record reflects after being advised of his

constitutional rights, defendant waived his rights and pled guilty to the

habitual offender adjudication. Further, the plea agreement included a

sentence of 20 years at hard labor, and defendant was informed by the trial

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court he was waiving his right to appeal the habitual offender adjudication

and sentence. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to the agreed-upon

sentence of 20 years. Thus, pursuant to Young, supra, defendant is barred

from appealing his sentence, which was imposed in conformity with a plea

agreement set forth in the record at the time of the plea.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, defendant’s conviction and sentence

are affirmed.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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