State of Louisiana v. Skylar Sutton

Judgment rendered January 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,382-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

SKYLAR SUTTON Appellant

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Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2018-273F

Honorable Daniel Joseph Ellender, Judge

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ROBERT S. NOEL, II Counsel for Appellant

GLENN K. FLEMING

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JOHN GATES SPIRES
Assistant District Attorney

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Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the Fourth Judicial District Court,

Parish of Morehouse, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Daniel J. Ellender,

Judge, presiding. Defendant, Skylar Sutton, originally charged with two

counts of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first

degree murder, was allowed to plead guilty to one count of attempted second

degree murder and a subsequent charge of simple escape. Thereafter, Sutton

was sentenced to 50 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence on the attempted second degree murder

conviction, and three years at hard labor on the simple escape conviction,

with the sentences ordered to run consecutively. A timely motion for

reconsideration of sentence filed by Sutton was granted, and following a

hearing, the trial court amended the commitment order and provided that

Sutton’s sentence for attempted second degree murder would be with the

benefit of the possibility of parole eligibility after 25 years in accordance

with La. R.S. 15:574.4(J). Sutton has appealed his sentence as excessive.

Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts were recited by the ADA and agreed to by Sutton

at his guilty plea hearing:

[O]n March 1, 2018, at approximately 3:00 p.m., at a location
near the Family Laundromat, which is next door to Johnny’s
Pizza in Bastrop, Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, Jarius
Jimmerson, the victim in this matter, was there with his
expecting wife or fiancée and doing laundry. At that time video
surveillance revealed that the defendant was present with his
father, Mr. Frederick Sutton, Sr., and that a short time after
visiting with his father, Mr. Sutton got out of his car and

walked down the driveway to a location where his brother
Frederick Sutton, Jr., had just arrived with an acquaintance[.]
Skylar Sutton and his brother conferred at the vehicle in which
his brother had arrived at the end of the driveway. While Mr.
Skylar Sutton went into the vehicle to apparently retrieve
something, his brother seemed to, pursuant to the video, call
Mr. Jimmerson down to the car where they—he and his brother
were standing. Mr. Jimmerson had in fact been subpoenaed to
testify as a witness in the matter, State of Louisiana versus
Roderick Adams, and this is case number 17-790F, and that
subpoena had been previously issued and served upon Mr.
Jimmerson in open court directing him to appear the following
Monday. This was a Thursday afternoon of the shooting, the
following Monday Mr. Jimmerson was scheduled to testify as a
witness on behalf of the State. Mr. Sutton’s brother, Frederick,
Jr., called, apparently called Mr. Jimmerson over and as Mr.
Jimmerson walks down with his pregnant fiancée and another
acquaintance, he was called a “snitch” and then told he would
not be testifying in court Monday and at that point in time
Skylar Sutton pulled a gun and shoots Mr. Jarius Jimmerson in
the neck and other parts of the body, also wounding a third
party. The defendant then enters the vehicle with his brother
and drives away from the scene. He does turn himself in a few
days later … Mr. Jimmerson [passed away] several months
later—as a result of hospitalization caused by the gunshot
wound[.]

On April 23, 2018, Skylar Sutton was charged by bill of information

with the attempted first degree murder of Jarius Jimmerson, the attempted

first degree murder of Kenneth Jones, Jimmerson’s acquaintance, and

conspiracy to commit first degree murder with Frederick Sutton, Jr. After

Jimmerson’s death, which occurred several months after the shooting, the

matter was submitted to the grand jury, which issued an indictment charging

Sutton with the second degree murder of Jimmerson, the attempted second

degree murder of Jones, and conspiracy to commit murder. Pursuant to a

plea agreement, the State reduced the second degree murder charge, dropped

the other two charges, and allowed Sutton to plead guilty to the attempted

second degree murder of Jimmerson as well as a charge of simple escape.

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As noted above, a guilty plea hearing was held on March 3, 2022.

The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) and the defense

filed a sentencing memorandum on July 1, 2022, stressing that Sutton was

17 years old at the time of the offense. On July 18, 2022, the trial court

sentenced Sutton to 50 years at hard labor without benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence on the attempted second degree murder

conviction and three years on the simple escape conviction, with the

sentences ordered to run consecutively. Sutton was given credit for time

served. Sutton filed a motion to reconsider on July 22, 2022. A hearing on

the motion was held on November 3, 2022. While the trial court initially

denied the motion to reconsider, it requested more information from both

parties relative to the issue of whether Sutton should receive the benefit of

parole considerations granted to juvenile offenders who are found guilty of

first or second degree murder before making a final ruling on Sutton’s

sentence.

On December 8, 2022, the trial court filed an amended commitment

order on the attempted second degree murder conviction sentencing Sutton

to 50 years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of

sentence, but granting him parole eligibility after 25 years pursuant to La.

R.S. 15:574.4(J) should he meet all criteria contained therein.

Sutton has filed the initial appeal, urging excessiveness of his

sentence.

DISCUSSION

Sutton’s counsel points out that, at the time of the offense, Sutton was

17 years old, a juvenile by definition. In this case, the sentence imposed, 50

years’ imprisonment, was the maximum sentence for attempted second
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degree murder, and is excessive given Sutton’s age, personal history, and

lack of a criminal record.1 Sutton notes that maximum and near maximum

sentences should be imposed only for the most egregious offenses, the worst

of offenders, and the worst of offenses. This offense, attempted second

degree murder, was not the most egregious of offenses. Counsel asserts that

while tragic, the incident happened quickly, and there were no other

surrounding offenses.

On the other hand, the State notes that at the sentencing hearing, the

trial court extensively reviewed and considered Sutton’s background, family,

and criminal history, which includes a conviction of simple escape, a charge

which arose after Sutton had been arrested and detained for the shootings

and for which a three-year sentence was imposed (to be served consecutively

with the sentence imposed on the attempted second degree murder

conviction).2 The trial court found no evidence of provocation on the part of

the victim, who was scheduled to be a witness in an upcoming criminal

proceeding. Finding no justification for Sutton’s actions, the trial court

determined that he was in need of correctional treatment, and that any

sentence lesser than 50 years would deprecate the seriousness of the crime.

The State urges that the trial court followed the sentencing guidelines

and sentenced Sutton within the statutory range for attempted second degree

murder. Sutton entered into a plea agreement with the State where, in

exchange for a reduction of the principal charge of second degree murder

and a dismissal of two additional charges, he was allowed to plead guilty to

1
As a juvenile, Sutton had no adult criminal history that could be
considered for purposes of sentencing.
2
The State points out that no argument on appeal has been made by Sutton
as to this sentence.
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attempted second degree murder and simple escape. The State points out

that Sutton acknowledged in the plea that he could receive the maximum

sentence for attempted second degree murder.

The State also points out that a legitimate consideration in this case is

that, as noted above, Sutton received a substantial benefit from his plea

agreement. The State dismissed two counts, attempted second degree

murder and conspiracy, and Sutton avoided the probability of a life sentence

for second degree murder and the possibility of consecutive sentences for the

dismissed counts.

Finally, the State points out that the trial court ordered Sutton’s

sentence amended to delete the restrictions on parole and ordered parole

eligibility in accordance with La. R.S. 15:574.4(J).

In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, an appellate court uses a

two-step process. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Second, the

court must determine whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A

sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime or nothing more than a purposeless and needless

infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La.

1993); State v. Green, 54,955 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So. 3d 546; State

v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307. A sentence is

considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.

State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Bell, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as
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excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Green, supra; State

v. Bell, supra. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore,

is given broad discretion in sentencing. Id. On review, the appellate court

does not determine whether another sentence may have been more

appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.

Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not

adequately describe his conduct or has received a significant reduction in

potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has

great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the

pled offense. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. Harper,

54,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/12/22), 332 So. 3d 799; State v. Minnieweather,

52,124 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 251 So. 3d 583; State v. Robinson, 49,825

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So. 3d 403.

The record in this case indicates that the trial court gave due

consideration to all relevant factors required by the sentencing guidelines of

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when it found that Sutton was in need of correctional

treatment and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the

defendant’s crime. The sentence, although the maximum, is within the

statutory limits and within the range of punishment to which Sutton

expressly agreed at his guilty plea hearing. Furthermore, Sutton received a

benefit by being allowed to plead guilty to one count of attempted second

degree murder when he was facing a life sentence had he gone to trial and

been convicted of second degree murder. In front of his own father, Sutton

intentionally fired his weapon at multiple targets in an unprovoked attack,
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wounding one and causing severe injury to his intended target, who

ultimately passed away from his wounds. While in jail for the instant

charges, Sutton and two other inmates escaped and evaded arrest for several

days before being arrested in a Monroe motel. The punishment, considered

in light of the harm suffered by Sutton’s victims and those left behind to

mourn their loved one, is not grossly disproportionate, does not shock the

sense of justice, and is therefore not constitutionally excessive.

Additionally, the trial court amended the sentence to reflect the

applicability of La. R.S. 15:574.4(J), which, as recognized by the Louisiana

Supreme Court in State v. Adams, 20-00056 (La. 9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 15 (per

curiam), provides Sutton with a meaningful opportunity for parole. While

this does not reduce Sutton’s 50-year sentence, it does provide him with

eligibility for parole consideration after serving 25 years of his sentence

pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4(J) should he meet all of the considerations

listed thereunder.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentence of the

defendant, Skylar Sutton, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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