State of Louisiana v. Quanittia Dennie (In Re: Michelle A. Charles Comtempt Proceedings)

Judgment rendered January 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,462-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

QUANITTIA DENNIS Appellant
(IN RE: MICHELLE A. CHARLES
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS)

*****

Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 21CR31639

Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge

*****

DICK “DAVE” KNADLER Counsel for Appellant
Michelle A. Charles

CHARLES BLAYLOCK ADAMS Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

EDWIN L. BLEWER, III
LISA D. LOBRANO
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Attorney Michelle A. Charles was found to be in constructive

contempt of court for her failure to appear at a criminal trial. Charles was

sentenced to serve 22 hours in the DeSoto Parish jail. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 25, 2022, Michelle Charles was scheduled to appear in

court for the misdemeanor trial of her then-client, Quanittia Dennis. The

trial was scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. Dennis and the 21 witnesses

subpoenaed by Charles were present; however, neither Charles nor her co-

counsel were present, and neither had called the trial court, opposing

counsel, or Dennis to apprise them of their absence or tardiness. When the

trial court discovered Charles and her co-counsel were not present, the

following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Ms. Dennis, where are your counsel?

[DENNIS]: I don’t know.

THE COURT Have you spoken with them?

[DENNIS]: Well, I spoke with her . . . day before
yesterday. She asked me to fire her.

THE COURT: She asked – let me get you to raise your
right hand for me, please.

[Dennis was sworn in by the Deputy Clerk of Court]

THE COURT: Okay. *** So, you said that she asked you to
fire her. Who is she?

[DENNIS]: Michelle Charles. I know, on two
occasions, she asked you to withdraw her off
the case. I’m asking for a strategy. I still
don’t know what the strategy is. I filed
motions to the Attorney General to ask for a
[quash] – motion to [quash] because I don’t

have effective counsel. In June, you asked
both of my attorneys are they gonna be
effective to do my trial. They both told you
yes. You asked them, but I don’t have an
attorney, and I don’t know what’s gonna
happen.

THE COURT: Okay. So, when you talked to her *** on
Sunday?

[DENNIS]: Yes, I called her and I text[ed] her. Then I
called her again, and I text[ed] her again.

THE COURT: And that’s all Ms. Charles, right?

[DENNIS]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so, she asked you to fire her.
Did you, in fact, fire her?

[DENNIS]: No, I didn’t. I told her to ask you.

THE COURT: Okay. And then have you spoken to Ms.
Page?

[DENNIS]: Ms. Page told you that she wasn’t coming.
This – they [were] serious. She was serious.
So.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, Ms. Page – we set today’s
court date –

[DENNIS]: Well –

THE COURT: Because this was a date when Ms. Page was,
in fact, available. So –

[DENNIS]: Well, you can see they [are] not here.

THE COURT: Okay. So, have you spoken – when’s the last
time you spoke with Ms. Page? When you
were last here –

[DENNIS]: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: And she appeared by Zoom?

[DENNIS]: Uh-huh.
***

2

THE COURT: Okay. And there has – they have filed
motions to withdraw, which I had denied.
*** None of those motions suggested that
you fired them, and so I just wanna make
sure *** you did not fire them.

[DENNIS]: No. I didn’t fire them. *** But they – I
mean, they – it’s like – I ain’t never seen
nothing like this, but, no, they [are] not here.
They ain’t here.
***
THE COURT: But I do note that Ms. Charles sent an email
to my office yesterday, that would be
October 24, 2022 *** In which she
mentioned that she had received so much
discovery that she had not reviewed it yet, I
believe. Let’s see. She says, “This case has
two jump drives of discovery with numerous
witnesses,” which would – have you been
made aware that there are two jump drives
of discovery?
***
[DENNIS]: I’m not – I didn’t see the two jump drives of
discovery.
***
THE COURT: I’m going to place the email in the record
for purposes of today’s hearing. Is there – I
mean, obviously, we can’t proceed.
***

At that point, the State orally requested a “writ of attachment” be

issued for Charles and expressed its intent to file a rule for constructive

contempt of court for Charles’s failure “to follow the Court’s orders and

failing to appear.”1 The trial court issued a writ of attachment for Charles,

ordering the DeSoto Parish sheriff to “safely keep and detain” Charles in the

parish jail, without bond, and “produce her in open court.”

Later that day, the State filed a “Rule for Contempt,” alleging Charles

should be held in constructive contempt of court, pursuant to La. C. Cr. P.

1
As noted above, Charles’s co-counsel did not appear for trial. However, the
State did not seek a writ of attachment or file a rule for contempt with regard to co-
counsel.

3

art. 23(2), for her failure to follow the trial court’s orders and to appear for

her client’s trial. The trial court issued an order setting the rule to show

cause for November 16, 2022.

Subsequently, Charles appeared at the DeSoto Parish Courthouse on

October 25, 2022, and she was detained and later brought into court for a

special hearing. Charles was served with notice of the constructive

contempt charge, and the colloquy was as follows:

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Charles, anything?

MS. CHARLES: Judge, I just – I do wanna apologize to the
Court for being late. I was – left home at
four o’clock this morning, in hopes to get
here at 9:00, because it is a four hour and
twenty-seven-minute drive. I stopped in
Alexandria to use the bathroom, which
probably delayed me about thirty – thirty to
forty-five minutes getting here. There was
rain on Atchafalaya Basin Bridge. That was
– it was a really bad rain storm, in pitch
black weather coming here. So, I do
apologize to the Court for being late. It was
never my intention to circumvent the
Court’s order to be present, Judge.

THE COURT: Well – and, of course, Ms. Charles, you did
not contact my office to say that you were
running late. Had you done that, I could
have recessed court, and we could’ve
reconvened when you would have arrived.
However, you did not do that. No one in my
office was contacted. You knew, well
before nine o’clock, that you were not going
to be here on time, and you chose not to
notify anyone of that. In light of that, not
only did your twenty-one witnesses show
up, in addition, to others, but the State had
witnesses here, as well. So, we will address
all of that when we come back for the
contempt hearing.
***

4

Charles was formally served with notice of the November 16, 2022, hearing

date.

On November 9, 2022, Charles filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal

Sentence Pursuant to [La. C. Cr. P. art.] 881.5,” motion to quash the rule for

contempt, and a motion for new trial. The following day, and prior to the

trial court’s ruling on her motions, Charles filed an application for

supervisory review and request for a stay, requesting this Court to exercise

its supervisory authority to vacate her “sentence” and to stay the proceedings

for constructive contempt of court. By order dated November 15, 2022, this

Court denied Charles’ application, finding she failed “to show there had

been a hearing, a finding of guilt, or the imposition of any sentence

regarding the trial court’s order that a writ of attachment.” Thereafter, the

trial court denied Charles’ motions, finding “there has been no trial.”

A rule for contempt was held on November 16, 2022. During the

hearing, Charles, through counsel, objected to the introduction of her email

to the trial judge’s secretary, arguing it was hearsay and the record is devoid

of proof she sent the email. The trial court overruled the objection, stating,

“The email is certainly a statement against interest in that it was sent by Ms.

Charles to Candice Williams in my office, who is my secretary. And the

Court, in fact, is the one who introduced it into the record on October the

25th.”

Charles also objected to the trial court’s questioning of Dennis on the

morning of October 25th, arguing Dennis was questioned “without the

presence of counsel,” she “was not apprised of her rights per Miranda,” and

“she was sworn in and then answers were then elicited to testify against her

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own counsel[.]” Charles argued Dennis “made answers that were against

her interest, and testified to things that were confidential communications

between her and Ms. Charles.” The State opposed the argument, noting

“The statement that defense counsel is talking about are in no way against

Ms. Dennis’ interest in any way.” The State also argued, “Ms. Dennis is the

one that controls attorney-client privilege, not Ms. Charles.” The trial court

overruled Charles’s objection, stating:

It’s due to [Charles’s] refusal to show up on time or to let the
Court know that she was not going to be able to make it on
time. That’s the entire reason that we’re here today. Ms.
Dennis – there was not a need for her to be Mirandized. She
was not testifying against her own interest. You don’t want the
statements in because they’re against your client’s interest ***
however, that is not a valid basis for the objection you’re
making. *** Ms. Dennis in fact controls the attorney-client
privilege. So, to the extent that Ms. Dennis desires to waive
that privilege as to some measure of communications that she
had with Ms. Charles, she’s capable of doing that. And this is
in fact what she chose to do that day.
***

Further, Charles argued she was not given notice a writ of attachment

would be issued. Thereafter the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: This is in line with a bench warrant. It’s not
the Court’s obligation to contact a person
who has notice to appear. They were given
notice. That’s why I don’t need to contact
them. *** Are criminal defendants given
notice that a bench warrant has issued,
which will cause them to be taken to jail?

[DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: Your Honor, that’s a bench warrant. That’s
not a writ of attachment.

THE COURT: It’s the same.
***
[DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: *** This was different. This was a writ of
attachment. Also, Your Honor *** no
notice was given to Ms. Charles that a writ

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of attachment was going to be issued [and]
there was another attorney who was co-
counsel in that case. Nothing was done to
co-counsel. So, we’re arguing it was all
selective prosecution against Ms. Charles.
***
[W]ell, what had happened after the writ of
attachment ordering the jailing of Ms.
Charles, uh, she was in effect already
punished for direct contempt of this Court.
And we’re arguing the fact that just by
merely trying to serve her with a Rule to
Show Cause later that morning for
constructive contempt doesn’t cure the fact
that double jeopardy is already attached per
[F]ifth [A]mendment.
***
We’re also pointing out, Your Honor, that
everything started about her failure to appear
at that hearing, not only was she the only
attorney disciplined or jailed, nothing was
issued against co-counsel who didn’t appear
at all. *** That was direct contempt. That
is not constructive contempt. Your Honor,
for Ms. Charles, and the Court even
admitted, she was – after she was jailed she
was here. She made statements to the Court
without counsel being present to represent
her. And everything that they’re arguing that
lead up to that morning of October 25th was
she was punished for it by the writ of
attachment ordering her jailed. With that
being said, that is the subsequent intervening
cause, which would invalidate anything
where Ms. Charles would be convicted of
constructive contempt. For everything that
has been argued, everything has been
introduced into evidence, has to do with her
failure to appear. That is direct contempt,
Your Honor, for which she has already been
punished.
***
THE COURT: Okay. And I also want to correct – in the
briefing there was a reference *** that no
one – no attorney has ever been jailed in the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for
behavior of this sort, and that is inaccurate.
And in fact, there have been two others who
were jailed within the last year in the Forty-
Second Judicial District Court. So, I do

7

want to make sure that that is also on the
record, that this is not treatment that is
specific or isolated to Ms. Charles.

The trial court denied Charles’s motions and took the constructive

contempt matter under advisement. The court reconvened December 7,

2022. After noting appearances, the trial court found Charles committed

constructive contempt of court and issued a written “Order,” stating:

[The Court] finds that despite the fact that attorney Michelle
Charles had been advised by the Court on more than one
occasion that the criminal trial in the matter of [State v.
Quanittia Dennis] would not be continued, Ms. Charles failed
to prepare for, attend, and participate in the trial of her client,
Ms. Quanittia Dennis.

Specifically, Ms. Charles failed to prepare for trial as confirmed
by her email, dated October 24, 2022, wherein she stated, “I
will not try this case on Tuesday [October 25, 2022] without
being properly prepared for trial.” Notwithstanding her lack of
preparation, Ms. Charles subpoenaed twenty-one (21) witnesses
to personally appear in court on October 25, 2022, at 9:00 a.m.
Most, if not all, of the subpoenaed witnesses were present in the
courtroom on the appointed day and time. Ms. Charles’s lack
of preparation in the matter of State v. Dennis is particularly
egregious considering that she first appeared in the matter on
Ms. Dennis’ behalf on September 16, 2021, more than a year
before the trial date.

While the State’s Rule for Contempt does not address the direct
contempt, which resulted from Ms. Charles’s failure to appear
for the trial setting, it is important to note that, even if she had
appeared for trial, the Court likely could not have proceeded
with trial due to Ms. Charles’s email the prior day declaring
herself unprepared and, therefore, ineffective.

Further, based upon the statements of Ms. Dennis on October
25, 2022, attorney Charles sought to avoid trial by asking Ms.
Dennis to fire Ms. Charles on October 23, 2022. According to
Ms. Dennis, she did not fire Ms. Charles and, therefore, Ms.
Charles was tasked with continuing her representation of Ms.
Dennis on October 25, 2022.
***

Charles waived sentencing delays, and the trial court sentenced her to

serve 22 hours in the parish detention center, stating the “22-hour sentence

8

represents one hour for each of the witnesses that Ms. Charles subpoenaed to

appear for trial, as well as one hour for Ms. Dennis, who was forced into the

unfortunate position of appearing for the criminal trial without the benefit of

counsel.” Charles was ordered to serve her sentence before January 15,

2023.2

Charles appeals.

DISCUSSION

Charles contends the district court erred in finding her guilty of

constructive contempt on December 7, 2022, after issuing a writ of

attachment on October 25, 2022, and double jeopardy had attached. Charles

argues her conviction and sentence should be vacated pursuant to the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in State in the Interest of

Panagoulopoulos, 22-00559 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So. 3d 150. Charles also sets

forth multiple arguments in which she asserts her constitutional rights were

violated. Her arguments are summarized as follows:

• She received no notice a writ of attachment would be
issued, and she was not afforded a hearing prior to her
detainment pursuant to the writ of attachment.

• After the November 16, 2022 hearing concluded and
Charles and her counsel exited the courtroom, the trial
court allowed Dennis, who, by then was Charles’s former
client, to “testify.” Dennis informed the court she had
been “harassed by J. Florence and Michelle [Charles]”
and received “death threats because they told people that
I had y’all put her in jail.”

• The issuance of the writ of attachment and order to detain
her in the parish jail without bond was improper because
her right to due process was abridged. She maintains she
was “found guilty and jailed” without being afforded a

2
In her brief, Charles asserts she “served her complete and entire [22]-hour
sentence in the DeSoto Parish jail” in January 2023.

9

hearing and without any evidence of her willful violation
of a court order. She asserts neither the State nor the trial
court “made any attempt to contact [her] concerning her
whereabouts once court started.” Charles also contends
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when
the court issued the writ of attachment without ensuring
she was represented by counsel.

• The trial court used the evidence adduced on October
25th to find her guilty of constructive contempt on
December 7th, without taking any additional evidence.
Additionally, the court jailed her “for being late,” and did
not allow her to defend herself. She was ordered to be
jailed (pursuant to the writ of attachment) before the
contempt hearing was conducted, which deprived her of
her due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution.

• Neither the trial court nor the State notified her she
would be arrested if she appeared late. Further, no
hearing was conducted prior to her arrest on the writ of
attachment. Due process requires notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and an impartial tribunal. Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94
L. Ed. 865 (1950).

• The trial court erred in denying her motion to quash the rule for
contempt and her motion to stay the proceedings. She asserts
when the writ of attachment issued, she was jailed without
bond. Thus, she had been punished for her actions.
Nevertheless, the trial court conducted a contempt hearing,
found her guilty of the same offense for which the writ of
attachment had been issued, and ordered her to be jailed again.
As a result, Charles asserts she was convicted and sentenced
twice for the same offense (being late for court).

• Her arrest and detainment violated her Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.
She declares she was treated in an “arbitrary and high-
handed manner,” and the severity of her punishment was
“degrading to the human dignity.” Charles argues being
jailed for showing up late for court is now a public record
and could possibly affect her license to practice law.
Such result would, again, violate the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, U.S. v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S. Ct.
1099, 79 L. Ed. 2d 361 (1984) (the prohibition on double
jeopardy extends to civil sanctions when applied in a
manner that is punitive in nature). Charles asserts when

10

the trial court ordered her arrested and jailed on the writ
of attachment, the State was precluded from charging her
with constructive contempt.

La. C.C.P. art. 371 provides:

An attorney at law is an officer of the court. He shall conduct
himself at all times with decorum, and in a manner consistent
with the dignity and authority of the court and the role which he
himself should play in the administration of justice.

He shall treat the court, its officers, jurors, witnesses, opposing
party, and opposing counsel with due respect; shall not ***
otherwise impose upon *** the court.

For a violation of any of the provisions of this article, the
attorney at law subjects himself to punishment for contempt of
court, and such further disciplinary action as is otherwise
provided by law.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 17 provides:

A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful
orders, including authority to issue such writs and orders as
may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. It has the
duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted
with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so
control the proceedings that justice is done. A court has the
power to punish for contempt.

Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 20, a contempt of court is any act or

omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of

justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or respect for its authority. La.

C. Cr. P. art. 23 provides:

A constructive contempt of court is any contempt other than a
direct one.

A constructive contempt includes, but is not limited to any of
the following acts:

***
(2) Willful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order,
mandate, writ, or process of the court;
***

11

In order to find a person guilty of constructive contempt, it is

necessary for the trier of fact to find the contemnor violated the order of the

court intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justification. In re

T.S., 45,194 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/10), 32 So. 3d 1026; State v. Brooks,

42,846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/05/07), 972 So. 2d 1197. Willful disobedience

means a consciousness of the duty to obey and an intent to disregard that

duty. Dauphine v. Carencro High Sch., 02-2005 (La. 4/21/03), 843 So. 2d

1096. In a criminal contempt proceeding, the court seeks to punish a person

for disobeying a court order; the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable

doubt. Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S. Ct. 1423,

99 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1988); Billiot v. Billiot, 01-1298 (La. 1/25/02), 805 So. 2d

1170.

Criminal contempt is a crime, and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal proceeding

against conviction of a crime except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt

of every fact necessary to constitute the contempt charge. Billiot v. Billiot,

supra; R.J.S., 493 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1986). On appellate review of criminal

contempt, the reviewing court must determine that the evidence, viewed in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier

of fact to conclude that every element of the contempt charge was proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

A proceeding for contempt in refusing to obey the trial court’s orders

is not designed for the benefit of the litigant, though infliction of a

punishment may inure to the benefit of the mover in the rule. The object of

the proceeding is to vindicate the dignity of the court. Davidson v. Castillo,

12

52,727 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 276 So. 3d 1157, writ denied, 19-1472 (La.

11/12/19), 282 So. 3d 233; Martin v. Martin, 37,958 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/10/03), 862 So. 2d 1081, writ not cons., 04-0481 (La. 3/12/04), 869 So.

2d 807. The trial court is vested with great discretion in determining

whether a party should be held in contempt for disobeying the court’s order,

and its decision will only be reversed when the appellate court can discern

an abuse of that discretion. Martin v. Martin, supra; Mizell v. Mizell, 37,004

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/07/03), 839 So. 2d 1222.

The federal and state constitutions both provide that no person shall

twice be put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. See U.S.

Const. amend. V; La. Const. Art. I, § 15. The federal and state double

jeopardy provisions protect against three distinct abuses: a second

prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the

same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same

offense. State v. Grasser, 22-00064 (La. 6/1/22), 346 So. 3d 249; State v.

Hill, 54,644 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 348 So. 3d 1283.

Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that

trial is identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the

defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial. La. C. Cr. P. art. 596. When the

same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory

provisions, “the test to be applied to determine whether there are two

offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact

which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304,

52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).

13

This is not a matter of first impression. Our review has revealed other

cases in which a writ of attachment or an instanter subpoena was issued to

compel an attorney’s appearance in court. In re Merritt, 391 So. 2d 440 (La.

1980), a defense attorney failed to appear for a hearing on a writ of habeas

corpus he had filed on behalf of his client. The trial court issued a writ of

attachment for his arrest. A short time later, a deputy saw the attorney on

another floor in the courthouse. When the attorney refused to accompany

the deputy to the appropriate courtroom, the deputy handcuffed him and

escorted him to the courtroom. The trial court found he was in direct

contempt of court and ordered him to pay a fine of $100, in default of which

he was to serve 24 hours in the parish jail. The Supreme Court reversed the

finding of direct contempt and remanded the matter for a rule to show cause,

finding the attorney’s conduct “falls within the scope of constructive

contempt.” Id., at 444.

In Kidd v. Caldwell, 371 So. 2d 247 (La. 1979), an attorney, who was

representing a defendant in a felony trial, failed to appear in court following

a recess. The trial court ordered the courthouse searched, and the attorney

was not found in the building. Thereafter, the court issued a summons

ordering the attorney to appear at 4:00 p.m., or within two hours of service,

to answer charges of contempt. The attorney failed to appear. The court

found him guilty of two counts of direct contempt (one for his conduct in

court and one for his failure to appear in court following the recess). The

court imposed a fine and a 24-hour jail sentence for the first count, and a

fine and a sentence of 10 days in the parish jail “or until further orders of

this Court.” The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. On

14

rehearing, the Court confirmed its ruling on the first count of direct

contempt. With regard to the second conviction for direct regarding the

attorney’s failure to appear in court, the Court set aside the conviction and

sentence and remanded for a rule to show cause for constructive contempt.

In Leimkuhler v. Leimkuhler, 07-2397 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 2008

WL 2068071 (unpublished), the attorney was representing the wife in a

contested divorce proceeding. The matter came before the court on October

16, 2006; however, counsel was not present when the case was called. The

court directed the bailiff to “sound the building” to attempt to locate counsel;

however, the bailiff was unable to locate counsel. The court issued an

instanter subpoena to compel the attendance of counsel, yet counsel could

not be found. Thereafter, the court issued a rule for contempt of court and

ordered the attorney to show cause why she should not be held in contempt

of court for her failure to appear. Subsequently, counsel was found to be in

constructive contempt and sentenced to serve 30 days in the parish jail. The

court of appeal found the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive

contempt of court, stating:

At the hearing and in brief, Ms. Tessier admits that when she
did not see the client at the courthouse by 10 a.m. she left
“thinking the client had settled things out with her husband.” In
brief, Ms. Tessier attempts to justify her departure with a litany
of excuses, including the following: 1) Her representation of
Ms. Leimkuhler was pro bono, 2) the representation was more
involved than she first anticipated that it would be, 3) Ms.
Leimkuhler did not contact Ms. Tessier to advise Ms. Tessier
which witnesses would be at the hearing, and 4) she thought
that Mr. and Mrs. Leimkuhler may have worked things out.

On review, we find no error by the trial court in rejecting the
explanations offered by Ms. Tessier. She admits that although
she knew of the hearing, she left the courthouse before the case
was called. She therefore was not present at the time of the
hearing and failed to represent her client.

15

In Carvajal v. George, 07-2366 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 2008 WL

2065920 (unpublished), counsel for a party (again Ms. Tessier) failed to

appear at a hearing in her client’s criminal case. The trial court found her in

contempt, stating, “[Y]ou were noticed for the [pauper hearing] and you

failed to appear . . . whether you can contact your client or not, you as an

officer of the court have an obligation to be present[.]” The court sentenced

her to serve 30 days in the parish jail, suspended, and ordered her to pay the

costs of the contempt proceedings. The court of appeal affirmed the

conviction and sentence.

In McKee v. McKee, 03-254 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/1/03), 856 So. 2d

135, an attorney represented a mother in a child custody matter and did not

file a motion to withdraw after the matter was resolved. Thereafter, the

father filed a rule against the mother for failing to abide by the custody

agreement. The mother consulted with the attorney but did not retain him.

After the attorney did not appear in court for the hearing, the trial court

continued the case and ordered a rule to show cause why the attorney should

not be held in contempt for failure to appear. The trial court concluded the

attorney was in contempt of court “for failure to appear[,] for not having

filed a motion for continuance, and not having filed a motion to withdraw.”

Id. at 137. The court of appeal reversed, finding La. C. C. P. art. 224 did not

apply because the attorney “was not served with ‘an order, mandate, writ, or

process of the court’ which commanded his appearance on [the mother’s]

behalf.” The court reasoned the attorney had fulfilled his obligation to

16

represent the mother upon resolution of the matter for which he was

retained.3

In support of her arguments, Charles relies on the Supreme Court’s

ruling in State in Interest of Panagoulopoulos, supra. In that case, the

attorney left the courtroom after he was instructed to remain in court because

his client’s case would proceed to trial. He did not notify the trial judge or

her staff he was leaving. The attorney was found to be in direct contempt of

court, in violation of La. C. Cr. P. art. 21, for his failure to appear in court.

The Supreme Court found the evidence was insufficient to support the

conviction for direct contempt and vacated the conviction and sentence.

We find State in Interest of Panagoulopoulos, supra, is

distinguishable from the instant case, as Panagoulopoulos was erroneously

charged with direct, rather than constructive, contempt of court for his

3
Our review of cases in other jurisdictions yielded similar results. For example,
in King v. State, 400 Md. 419, 929 A. 2d 169 (2007), an attorney was representing a
client in a criminal matter. The trial in the matter was scheduled to begin June 27, 2006.
However, when the case was called, the client was present, but his attorney was not. The
court issued a “contempt show cause” for the attorney, and contempt proceedings ensued.
At the hearing on the contempt rule, the attorney admitted she was aware of a scheduling
conflict; however, she did not “understand it was her responsibility to notify the court
whether a jury was needed. She also stated she had called the court on the morning of the
trial and “left a voice mail message informing the court that she would not be able to
attend the proceeding[.]” The trial court found the attorney was in direct contempt of
court, reasoning she “deliberately, intentionally, declined to show up.” The attorney was
ordered to pay a $2,500 fine and was placed on unsupervised probation for a period of
two years, subject to certain conditions.

In In re Hampton, 919 So. 2d 949 (Miss. 2006), the attorney for a defendant in a
civil matter failed to show up for a hearing. The trial court telephoned the attorney at her
law office, on her cellular phone, and at her residence. The court also sent an employee
to the business owned by the attorney’s husband. The attorney’s whereabouts remained
unknown. The trial court issued a subpoena to compel the attorney and her client to
appear at a hearing. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted, and the attorney was found to
be in direct contempt for her “willful, deliberate, and contumacious” failure to attend the
hearing. She was fined $100 and sentenced to serve three days in jail. The attorney
appealed, asserting multiple constitutional deprivations. The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and sentence.

17

failure to appear, in direct contradiction to Louisiana’s long-held

jurisprudential rule: the failure of an attorney to appear in court is considered

a constructive, rather than direct, contempt. State v. Darrow, 513 So. 2d 278

(La. 1987); Kidd, supra; In re Merritt; supra; McKee, supra. In the instant

case, Charles was charged with constructive contempt for her failure to

appear.4

Further, we see no merit to Charles’ claims with regard to any

deprivation of her constitutional rights. As a result of Charles’

nonappearance, the trial court exercised its discretion by issuing a writ of

attachment to secure Charles’ presence in court after Charles failed to appear

for the misdemeanor trial of her client. Charles received notice of the writ of

attachment when she appeared later that morning, and she was brought

before the court and notified of the rule for constructive contempt. Nothing

in the law mandates Charles receive notice of the issuance of a writ of

attachment prior to the writ being issued. Further, the issuance of the writ of

attachment for Charles’ failure to appear in court is not equivalent to the

criminal charge of contempt of court or a finding of guilt thereof. At the

time the writ of attachment was issued, Charles had not been charged with

constructive contempt. Thus, the evidence of record reveals Charles was not

4
See also Ex parte Sheffield, 120 So. 3d 1091 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). In Sheffield,
the attorney was held in direct contempt of court for failing to appear at a scheduled
hearing and was fined $100. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, stating, “[A]n
attorney’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing generally subjects that attorney to a
finding of constructive contempt, not direct contempt.” Id. at 1096. Likewise, in Quick
v. State, 699 So. 2d 1300 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), the trial court erroneously found the
attorney was in direct contempt for failing to appear at his client’s sentencing “without
good reason” and imposed a fine. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, finding
the trial court erred in finding the attorney in direct contempt, rather than constructive,
and imposing a fine without affording him with due process protections.

18

tried or punished twice for the same offense; consequently, jeopardy did not

attach.

Additionally, the record demonstrates Charles knew the misdemeanor

trial of her client, Ms. Dennis, was scheduled to begin October 25, 2022, at

9:00 a.m. In fact, she had subpoenaed 21 witnesses, most of whom were

present when the case was called. It is undisputed Charles was not present

to represent her client when the case was called. It is also undeniable

Charles did not notify the court, the assistant district attorney, or her client

she would not be present or she would be late.

Based on our review of this record, we find the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient for a

rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Charles

intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justification, failed to

appear at 9:00 a.m. for her client’s trial. The facts establish Charles was

conscious of her duty to appear in court to represent her client, intended to

disregard her duty, and acted with intent to defy the authority of the court.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s great discretion in finding

Charles was in constructive contempt of court for her failure to timely

appear. This assignment lacks merit.

Charles also argues the trial court erred in placing her then-client, Ms.

Dennis, under oath and inquiring about Charles’ whereabouts. Charles

asserts the court’s actions constituted a “gross departure from proper judicial

proceedings,” and “the State took advantage of the testimony of the

unrepresented Ms. Dennis and used her testimony (which divulged

19

privileged communications between attorney Ms. Charles and Ms. Dennis)

against Ms. Charles[.]”5

A trial court has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be

conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to

control the proceedings so that justice is done. La. C. Cr. P. art. 17. Where

the law is silent, the court has the inherent authority to fashion a remedy

which will promote the orderly administration of justice. Id.; State v. Mims,

329 So. 2d 686; State v. Bowers, 42,390 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/19/07), 965 So.

2d 959.

As stated above, when the State v. Dennis matter was called, Charles

was not present, and no one present was aware of her whereabouts. It is

evident from the exchange between the trial court and Ms. Dennis the court

was seeking to gain a clear understanding of Charles’s absence. The trial

court did not inquire about anything regarding the Dennis matter; the court

limited its inquiry to the whereabouts of Charles. The circumstances were

extraordinary: the defendant and 21 witnesses called by the defense were

present in court; defense counsel was not. We see no abuse of discretion in

5
Charles also asserts after she and her attorney left the courtroom on November
16, 2022, the trial court swore Dennis in and allowed her to further testify against
Charles. During the hearing, Dennis accused Charles and others of harassing her, and she
stated, “I didn’t send [Charles] to jail. I didn’t – I didn’t do that. I waited. I waited on
her. I didn’t know she wasn’t going to come to court.” There is no evidence Charles
ever harassed Dennis, and Charles was denied her right to confront Dennis, her accuser.
However, the record reveals the statements made by Dennis were not made in connection
with the proceedings against Charles. After the Charles matter concluded, the next case
on the docket was State v. Dennis. The trial court did not refer to Dennis’ remarks
regarding threats and harassment in its ruling finding Charles in contempt, and there is no
evidence Charles was prejudiced by Dennis’s comments. Thus, the record is devoid of
evidence of any deprivation of Charles’s right to “confront her accuser” in the contempt
proceedings.

20

the trial court’s actions, and we see no prejudice to Charles as a result of the

trial court’s questioning of Ms. Dennis.

Charles further contends the trial court erred in allowing the State to

introduce into evidence her email to the trial judge’s secretary, in which she

stated, “I will not try this case *** without being properly prepared for trial.”

Charles argues the email was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court relied

on the hearsay evidence to prove she was not ready to proceed with the

Dennis trial and to find her guilty of constructive contempt.

Generally, any out-of-court statement of the accused constitutes

hearsay unless subject to an exception. La. C.E. art. 802; State v.

McDonald, 387 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957, 101 S.

Ct. 366, 66 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1980); State v. McGee, 51,977 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/3/19), 316 So. 3d 1196, writ denied, 19-00761 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1066. A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party

and is his own statement, in either his individual or representative capacity.

La. C.E. art. 801(D)(2)(a). The trial court is granted broad discretion in its

evidentiary rulings, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear

abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 54,489 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So.

3d 1108; State v. Smith, 50,268 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/16), 186 So. 3d 703.

Here, contrary to Charles’ assertion, the email was not hearsay. The

record reveals the email was sent from the same email address from which

Charles had been using to communicate with the court and the parties in this

matter. The email contains Charles’ own statements and was offered against

her. Accordingly, we find the email was admissible, pursuant to La. C.E.

21

art. 801(D)(2)(a), as a personal admission, and the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in allowing it to be admitted into evidence.6

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

All costs of the appeal are assessed to appellant, Michelle A. Charles.

AFFIRMED.

6
We note Charles did not appeal her sentence. According to the assertions in her
brief, she has served the sentence in its entirety. We are cognizant of the trial judge’s
duty to maintain the integrity of the court, and we cannot overlook the trial court’s
statutory authority to impose a jail sentence for constructive contempt of court.
However, jail time, no matter how brief, imposed upon an officer of the court, is the most
severe punishment available and should be reserved for the worst offenders.

22