State of Louisiana v. Lester Jay Ramsey, Jr.

Judgment rendered February 28, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,491-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LESTER JAY RAMSEY, JR. Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 20CR001449

Honorable Bernard Scott Leehy, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Holli Herrle-Castillo

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

HOLLY A. CHAMBERS-JONES
KALEE M. MOORE
GARY A. BLAYLOCK
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Lester Ramsey appeals his unanimous jury conviction for second

degree murder and resulting life sentence for the killing of an acquaintance

whom he shot twice in the back of the head as the unarmed victim attempted

to crawl away from him. After killing the victim, the defendant then

wrapped the body in blankets, loaded it into his mother’s truck, and dumped

it into an alley in town. Following a police investigation, search of the

defendant’s residence, and several interviews, Ramsey disclosed the location

of the victim’s body, which had been missing for two weeks after the killing.

The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he

had not acted in self-defense and that the trial court erred in not declaring a

mistrial. Finding these arguments unpersuasive, and for the reasons set forth

below, we affirm his conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 20, 2020, Lester Ramsey (“Ramsey”) was at home with

his girlfriend, Journei Cyrus (“Cyrus”), who was eating her dinner in the

bedroom, when his friend Cadarion Buggs (“Buggs”) arrived at about 11:00

p.m. Buggs and Ramsey were in the living room, watching a movie,

smoking marijuana and talking when they got into an argument after

Ramsey asked Buggs to tell him who was responsible for a burglary that had

occurred previously at his home. Ramsey believed Buggs knew who had

robbed his home and taken his gaming system, television, money, and

clothing. The burglary was never reported to the police. Ramsey later stated

that he was angry because everyone, including Buggs, had been lying about

the burglary.

Ramsey testified that he hit Buggs, and they began wrestling. Ramsey

threw Buggs to the floor, removing a gun from Buggs’ pocket during the

struggle. Buggs attempted to leave the room, and Ramsey thought he was

going to get a gun that Ramsey had hidden in the couch in the adjoining

room. Buggs was crawling away when Ramsey shot at him four times,

striking Buggs twice in the back of the head and instantly killing him.

Faced with a dead body in his apartment, rather than call an

ambulance or the police, Ramsey borrowed his mother’s SUV, wrapped

Buggs’ body in blankets and a rug, put it in the vehicle, and drove around

until he found an alley in which he could dump it. After discarding Buggs’

body, Ramsey returned to his home and mopped up the blood with a bleach

solution. Neither Ramsey nor Cyrus ever contacted law enforcement about

the shooting of Buggs or disposal of his body.

Buggs was reported missing by his mother approximately two weeks

later. Detective Justin Cummings, with the West Monroe Police

Department, spoke with Buggs’ mother and aunt, who gave him information

they learned about Buggs’ disappearance. This information led Detective

Cummings to do a “knock and talk” at Ramsey’s home. Detective

Cummings described a “knock and talk” as a procedure by which detectives

knock on the door of a suspect and speak with whoever answers the door to

further their investigation. When Detective Cummings knocked on

Ramsey’s door, Ramsey answered and was mopping the floors of his home.

Detective Cummings asked if Ramsey would come to the detectives’ office

for an interview. The officers got permission to look for Buggs in Ramsey’s

home and then Ramsey accompanied them to their office for an interview.

2

Detective Cummings testified that the first time he Mirandized

Ramsey was a by verbal advisement at his home. Detective Cummings

Mirandized Ramsey again when he arrived at the station for the first time to

speak with detectives. Ramsey was given a written copy of his Miranda1

rights, the detective went over each Miranda right with him, and then

Ramsey signed a waiver of the rights form. The first interview was

conducted on March 4, 2020 at 5:00 p.m. Detective Cummings sought and

obtained a search warrant for Ramsey’s home after the first interview.

Utilizing the search warrant, the police gained entry into Ramsey’s

home. After discovering multiple areas of blood, the detective went to speak

with Ramsey again. At 7:37 p.m. on March 4, 2020, Detective Cummings

again provided Ramsey with his Miranda rights, and Ramsey signed the

second waiver form. Ramsey stated that the blood spatter in his house was

present because he shot a dog in his home and then dragged the body

outside. Police officers found the remains of an animal outside the home but

did not believe that the blood evidence matched an animal being shot. At

the beginning of the interview, Ramsey stated that Buggs was trying to help

him figure out who had robbed his house. By the end of the interview,

Ramsey admitted that he believed Buggs was involved in the robbery and

that they had engaged in an argument with him about it. Ramsey stated in

this interview that he hit Buggs with a hammer. Additionally, Detective

Cummings testified:

Q: Why did you ask Mr. Ramsey why he said the phrase
‘body’s whereabouts,’ why did that stand out to you?

A: That was the first time he did not refer to Mr. Buggs by his
name. He referred to him as ‘the body.’ That generally to me

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3

would indicate that the person is no longer with us and it’s just
a body.

Q: And at that point you still had not located Cadarion’s body,
right?

A: That’s correct.

After the second interview, detectives went to speak with Ramsey’s

girlfriend, Cyrus, and she told them that Ramsey had been using his

mother’s truck on the night of the incident. The police got a warrant to

search the vehicle and then Detective Cummings went to speak to Ramsey

again. They obtained another Miranda wavier from Ramsey prior to the

third interview. During the third interview, on March 4, 2020 at

approximately 9:51 p.m., Ramsey revealed the location of Buggs’ body, and

police were able to locate his remains, 13 days after he had been killed.

An arrest warrant was issued for Ramsey, and Cpl. Nick Olinger

transported Ramsey to the Ouachita Parish Correctional Center. During the

car ride, Ramsey asked Cpl. Olinger about his charges and the location of his

phone. Cpl. Olinger read Ramsey his charges from the probable cause

affidavit and told him that the detectives had probably put his phone into

evidence. Ramsey asked Cpl. Olinger if he could talk to the detectives so he

could get numbers from the phone. Cpl. Olinger said he would check and

asked Ramsey if he knew him, meaning the detective. Ramsey said that he

did not, but then asked whether Cpl. Olinger was talking about the detective

or “the dead guy.” Cpl. Olinger clarified he was talking about the detective.

Ramsey then confessed to Cpl. Olinger that he and Buggs were friends and

had gotten into a fight. He admitted to rolling his body into a rug, placing it

in his mom’s car, and dumping it. Cpl. Olinger asked how he decided where

to leave the body, and Ramsey responded he drove around until he found a
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“good spot.” Cpl. Olinger did not read Ramsey his Miranda rights before or

during the car ride.

Two days later, Detective Cummings went to the correctional facility

and interviewed Ramsey again. He again advised Ramsey of his Miranda

rights prior to this interview, and Ramsey signed a new waiver of rights

form. During this interview, Ramsey told Detective Cummings that he shot

Buggs because Buggs said he was going to shoot him and he was afraid, for

the first time raising any claims of self-defense or justification.

A jury trial was held on this matter in Monroe, Louisiana, on October

17-20, 2022. At trial, Detective Cummings testified about his investigation

and all of his interactions with Ramsey. Officer Brian May also testified

that he assisted with the crime scene. Ramsey’s girlfriend, Cyrus, testified

that she spent the night at Ramsey’s house the night of the confrontation

between Buggs and Ramsey. At one point, she heard two loud pops, and she

called her mother to come pick her up. Ramsey told her to lock the door.

When she left the house, she could see a bleach bucket with brown, dirty

water, and a rug and blanket were missing from the home. When she was

leaving the home, Ramsey told her that he got his mother’s truck stuck at the

levee.

Cpl. Matthew Gilliland, with the West Monroe Police Department,

testified that he processed Ramsey’s mother’s truck. Cpl. Anthony Walker,

who works for the crime scene investigation unit of the Monroe Police

Department, testified about processing the crime scene in the alleyway

where Buggs’ body was discovered. Also testifying was Dr. Frank Peretti, a

forensic pathologist, who testified that he performed the autopsy on Buggs,

concluding the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.
5

Cpl. Olinger, with the West Monroe Police Department, testified

regarding what was said during his car ride with Ramsey, as described

above. After questioning by the State was complete and the witness was

tendered, defense counsel requested that the jury be removed from the

courtroom. Defense counsel then argued to the trial court that the testimony

elicited from Cpl. Olinger was an interrogation that was not free and

voluntary and moved for a mistrial. The trial court noted that defense

counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection to the testimony, and the

mistrial was denied.

When the jury returned and the trial resumed, Ramsey testified on his

own behalf. Ramsey described for the jury the prior burglary of his home

and stated that he did not call the police but did ask his friends about the

robbery. He testified he considered Buggs a good friend. Despite that

friendship, the two began fighting because Ramsey was angry that Buggs

had not found the person who broke into his home. Ramsey testified that

they were arguing, then he got in Buggs’ face, and hit him. The two men

began wrestling, and Ramsey threw him to the ground. Buggs began

crawling toward the living room. Ramsey testified that Buggs was known to

carry a gun and had a gun in his pocket while at Ramsey’s home. Ramsey

testified that he took the gun away from Buggs, and “he started like crawling

like trying to run, get away from me towards the living room.” Ramsey

testified that when Buggs was crawling away from him, he “just started

shooting.”

Ramsey stated that there was also another gun in the living room, the

direction Buggs was crawling, but admits that he did not know if Buggs was

trying to get the gun. He testified, “I got scared and I just started shooting
6

it.” Ramsey testified how he then wrapped up and loaded Buggs’ body in

his mother’s car, and drove around for about 10 minutes. After finding a

suitable alleyway, Ramsey testified he dumped the body and then returned

home to begin cleaning up the scene. Ramsey testified that he did not call

the police because he did not want to go to jail or for his stepson to see what

he had done.

After deliberation, the jury unanimously found Ramsey guilty of

second degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison, without the

possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, as mandated by

Louisiana statute. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Ramsey asserts two assignments of error regarding his conviction for

second degree murder, being the insufficiency of evidence and the failure to

grant a mistrial.

First Assignment of Error: The evidence was insufficient to uphold the
conviction for second degree murder.

In his first assignment of error, Ramsey argues that the evidence was

insufficient to uphold his conviction for second degree murder. Ramsey

contends that the evidence established that he acted in self-defense and was

in fear for his life, which he argued at trial and which issue was presented to

the jury for consideration. In the alternative, he argues that the evidence

established that he committed the offense in sudden passion or heat of blood,

warranting the responsive verdict of manslaughter.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

7

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v.

Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310

(La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),

775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d

62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v.

Green, 49,741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. A reviewing court

accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony

of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

Relevant to this case, second degree murder is “the killing of a human

being ... [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great

bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind

which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively

desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to

act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Specific intent may be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.

State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434. Specific intent to
8

kill may also be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries.

State v. Bull, 53,470 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1175, writ denied,

20-00797 (La. 12/22/20), 307 So. 3d 1040.

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) states that manslaughter is:

A homicide which would be murder under ... Article 30.1
(second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden
passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation
sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and
cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to
manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood had
actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have
cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]

A defendant who claims provocation as a means of reducing murder

to manslaughter bears the burden of proving these elements by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. McGee, 51,977 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/3/19), 316 So. 3d 1196, writ denied, 19-00761 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1066. Provocation and the time for cooling are questions for the jury to

determine according to the standard of the average or ordinary person. Id.,

citing State v. Leger, 05-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So. 2d 108, cert. denied,

549 U.S. 1221, 127 S. Ct. 1279, 167 L. Ed. 2d 100 (2007).

“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood,” which distinguish

manslaughter from homicide, are not elements of the offense, but mitigatory

factors exhibiting a degree of culpability less than is present when the

homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So. 2d 644

(La. 1981); State v. Arnold, 30,282 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/21/98), 706 So. 2d

578; State v. Armstrong, 32,279 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 743 So. 2d 284,

writ denied, 99-3151 (La. 4/7/00), 759 So. 2d 92. A defendant who shows

by a preponderance of the evidence that these mitigatory factors are present

is entitled to the verdict of manslaughter. State v. Lombard, 486 So. 2d 106

9

(La. 1986). However, the defendant is not obligated to establish the factors

affirmatively; instead, the jury may infer them from the overall evidence

presented. State v. Jackson, 34,076 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So. 2d

1046. The reviewing court’s function is to determine whether a rational trier

of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could

have found that the mitigatory factors were not established by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lombard, supra.

Provocative acts held to rise to the level of mitigating conduct involve

physical threats or actions on the part of the victim. State v. Heard, 22-378

(La. App. 3 Cir. 11/23/22), 353 So. 3d 326, writ denied, 22-01829 (La.

4/18/23), 359 So. 3d 508. Mere words or gestures, however offensive or

insulting, will not reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter. State v.

Mitchell, 39,202 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04), 889 So. 2d 1257, writ denied,

05-0132 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So. 2d 1063.

When a defendant raises self-defense as an issue, the burden is on the

State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not

perpetrated in self-defense. In determining whether a defendant had a

reasonable belief that the killing was necessary, factors that may be

considered include the excitement and confusion of the situation, the

possibility of using force short of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of

the assailant’s bad character. The question on a sufficiency of the evidence

review is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or in the defense

of others. State v. Lensey, 50,242 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d

1059, writ denied, 15-2344 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So. 3d 1066.
10

We find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ramsey

of second degree murder. The evidence is undisputed that Ramsey shot at

Buggs four times, striking him twice in the back of the head, as Buggs

crawled away from him. While he may have been crawling in the direction

of the living room, where Ramsey asserts another gun was located, Ramsey

admitted during cross-examination that he was not sure where Buggs was

going or what he was going to do. While the two men had been arguing and

wrestling prior to the shooting, the evidence revealed that Buggs, who was

5’2”, was on the ground, unarmed, and attempting to get away from

Ramsey, who is 6’1”, when he was shot twice in the back of the head.

Ramsey could not answer why he shot four rounds or why he continued to

shoot at Buggs after Buggs had been hit with the first bullet. This and other

evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the homicide was not committed in self-defense or in the defense of

others.

Furthermore, any rational trier of fact could have found that the

mitigating factors of “sudden passion” and “heat of blood” were not

established by a preponderance of the evidence. While Ramsey testified that

he and Buggs had an argument, that argument was based on Ramsey’s anger

that Buggs may have had something to do with the burglary at his home.

Moreover, Ramsey’s testimony reveals that he was the aggressor in the

situation. He struck Buggs, who was almost a full foot shorter than him,

knocking him to the ground. He took Buggs’ gun from his pocket and then

used the weapon to shoot Buggs twice in the back of the head as the much

smaller man, already on the ground and facing away from him, attempted to
11

crawl away. This Court is not convinced that these were circumstances

sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of their self-control or cool

reflection such that Ramsey should have been convicted of manslaughter

rather than second degree murder.

Considering the above, Ramsey’s first assignment of error is without

merit.

Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in failing to declare
a mistrial.

In his second assignment of error, Ramsey argues that the trial court

erred in failing to declare a mistrial after the testimony of Cpl. Olinger

regarding his conversation with Ramsey. Ramsey argues that his confession

to Cpl. Olinger during the car ride to the correctional center was a custodial

interrogation and he should have been read his Miranda rights prior to

speaking. Ramsey notes that the trial court only denied his motion for

mistrial because his trial counsel did not timely object to Cpl. Olinger’s

testimony. He asserts that Cpl. Olinger’s testimony before the jury was so

prejudicial that the trial was unfair and resulted in a suspect verdict.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 775 provides that a mistrial may be ordered, and in a

jury case, the jury dismissed, when “prejudicial conduct in or outside the

courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial, or

when authorized by Article 770 or 771.”

In the case sub justice, the alleged inappropriate testimony came

during the State’s questioning of Cpl. Olinger. In pertinent part, Cpl.

Olinger testified:

Q: Okay. Did he say anything else about what – why he – why
anything happened between him and the victim?

12

A: Yes. He said that he began to suspect the victim of stealing
some of his property, and he asked him about it. He told me the
victim would never admit to it and began disrespecting him.
He said a fight began. That he rolled the victim in a rug.
Placed him in a vehicle and dumped his body in an alley.

Q: Okay. So, he told you there was a fight between himself and
the victim?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And then he went straight to talking about robbing -- rolling
the victim in a rug?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: He did not say how the victim ended up in that rug?

A: No, ma’am.

Q: Okay. Was – did – did he say anything else after that?

A: So, after he gave that statement, I asked how he decided
where to leave the body?

…

A: He said that he didn’t know the area well, and that and I’ll
quote it again, he said, he drove around until he found a quote,
good spot, end quote.

After this testimony, defense counsel requested that the jury be

removed and asked for a mistrial because Cpl. Olinger’s testimony described

a non-Mirandized interrogation of Ramsey.

Before the state may introduce a confession into evidence, it must

demonstrate that the statement was free and voluntary and not the product of

fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises. La.

R.S. 15:451; La. C. Cr. P. art. 703 D; State v. Ashley, 44,655 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So. 3d 1045, writ denied, 09-2305 (La. 4/23/10), 34 So. 3d

271; State v. Freeman, 45,127 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/10), 34 So. 3d 541, writ

denied, 10-1043 (La. 11/24/10), 50 So. 3d 827. If a statement is the product

13

of custodial interrogation, the State additionally must show that the person

was advised before questioning of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,

supra. A trial court’s finding as to the free and voluntary nature of a

statement carries great weight and will not be disturbed unless not supported

by the evidence. State v. Freeman, supra. Testimony of the interviewing

police officer alone may be sufficient to prove that the statement was given

freely and voluntarily. State v. Ashley, supra.

Spontaneous and voluntary statements made while the defendant is in

custody and not given as a result of police interrogation or compelling

influence are admissible as evidence even when made without the Miranda

warning. State v. Caston, 40,054 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/05), 912 So. 2d 413.

A trial court’s determination on the credibility and weight of testimony

relating to the voluntariness of a confession will not be overturned unless

clearly contrary to the evidence. Id.

In the present matter, the trial court did not rule on the free and

voluntary nature of Ramsey’s confession to Cpl. Olinger. Instead, the trial

court ruled that counsel’s objection was not made contemporaneously and

noted that had defense counsel objected at the beginning of Cpl. Olinger’s

testimony, he could have prevented the jury from hearing the testimony. For

this reason, the court denied the motion for mistrial.

The determination as to whether a remark has resulted in denying a

defendant a fair trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a

denial of a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed on appeal absent an

abuse of that discretion. State v. Smith, 418 So. 2d 515 (La. 1982); State v.

Bean, 582 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 567

(La. 1991); State v. Matthews, 552 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989), writ
14

denied, 559 So. 2d 137 (La. 1990); State v. Fielding, 37,943 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/10/03), 862 So. 2d 420, writ denied, 01-0249 (La. 12/14/05), 889 So. 2d

256.

Even if a mistrial was warranted under article 770, 771, or 775, the

failure to grant a mistrial would not result in an automatic reversal of

defendant’s conviction, but would be a trial error subject to the harmless

error analysis on appeal. State v. Smith, 43,136 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/23/08),

981 So. 2d 200; State v. Bradley, 43,593 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/08), 997 So.

2d 694, writ denied, 08-2997 (La. 9/18/09), 17 So. 3d 384, cert. denied, 559

U.S. 1068, 130 S. Ct. 2093, 176 L. Ed. 2d 723 (2010). Trial error is

harmless where the verdict rendered is surely unattributable to the error. Id.

We find that the trial court’s denial of the motion for mistrial was not

in error. The record reflects the fact that Ramsey had been read and waived

his Miranda rights three times before speaking to Cpl. Olinger. Ramsey was

asking questions of Cpl. Olinger and any statements he made appear to be

unsolicited statements against interest. Ramsey knew Cpl. Olinger was a

police officer and willingly initiated and engaged in the conversation with

him.

Moreover, the statements made by Ramsey when speaking to Cpl.

Olinger were later confirmed by Ramsey himself, in his own testimony at

trial before the jury. Ramsey himself testified that he and Buggs were

friends, that “we had a little fight,” and “I got in his face and then I hit him

and then we was wrestling [sic]. I threw him to the ground.” Ramsey also

testified:

Q: Okay. And did you in fact put Mr. Buggs in your mother’s
car?

15

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what did you do after that?

A: I just remember – drove around for about ten minutes or so
trying to find somewhere. That’s it.

Q: So, you did in fact leave the body in Monroe?

A: Yes, sir.

Finally, Ramsey testified:

Q: Why did you put so many blankets on him?

A: I don’t know.

We find no abuse of discretion or reversible error in refusing to

declare a mistrial on the testimony of a police officer regarding the

statements made by Ramsey that were later confirmed by Ramsey himself in

his testimony before the jury. This assignment of error is without merit.

ERROR PATENT

A review of the record reveals that the trial court failed to state that

Ramsey’s life sentence must be served at hard labor. The failure to include

the requirement that the life imprisonment be served at hard labor is an

illegally lenient sentence. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time

by the court that imposed the sentence of by an appellate court on review.

La. C. Cr. art. 882(A). Further, the appellate court may notice sentencing

errors as error patent. State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d

790. Because La. R.S. 14:30.1 is a mandatory felony, requiring any

sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and self-correcting.

State v. Evans, 51,811 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1112, writ

denied, 18-0281 (La. 11/20/18), 256 So. 3d 992.

16

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lester Jay Ramsey, Jr.’s conviction is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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