55,553-KA Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Ryan K. Manasco

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed February 28, 2024

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

Judgment rendered February 28, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,553-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RYAN K. MANASCO Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 21-CR-31529

Honorable Amy Burford McCartney, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula Corley Marx

CHARLES B. ADAMS Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

EDWIN L. BLEWER, III
RHYS E. BURGESS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Ryan Manasco appeals his concurrent sentences of 30 years at hard

labor, without benefits, on two counts of pornography involving juveniles

under the age of 13, La. R.S. 14:81.1. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early 2021, Louisiana State Police learned that Manasco was

receiving and possessing pornography involving young children. On March

11, 2021, agents executed a search warrant at his house, in southern DeSoto

Parish. On his electronic devices they found over 2,000 images and videos,

some of which were extremely disturbing. For instance, some depicted adult

males engaging in sexual intercourse with very young children, or young

boys being anally penetrated by dogs; one, labeled “Bed, cowgirl, hard core

a*s f**king,” depicted a nude man lying on a bed with a young girl sitting

on his privates; another showed an adult man anally penetrating a child who

appeared to be under the age of 10. Some of his internet searches included

“little girls peeing,” “pee madness,” “pee for Daddy,” “pee madness XX,”

“progressive fingering,” “getting off on anal,” “slave master dungeon,”

“kindergarten SX,” and “how to have sex with very young girls safely.”

Manasco was arrested and charged by bill of information with 228

counts of possession of pornography involving juveniles and three counts of

distribution of pornography involving juveniles. An amended bill added

2,076 counts of pornography involving juveniles and 30 counts of sexual

abuse of an animal, by possessing images of a person engaging in sexual

contact with an animal.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Manasco was allowed to plead guilty to

two counts of possession of pornography involving juveniles under the age

of 13. The state dismissed all other counts but left sentencing to the

discretion of the district court.

At the sentencing hearing, the court received testimony from the 35-

year-old Manasco himself, from his wife of 15 years, his mother and father,

his sister-in-law, and a family friend. The court also received a report from

the U.S. Sentencing Commission regarding the sentencing of offenders who

possessed but did not produce the pornography. The court noted the

statutory range of 10 to 40 years, discussed the personal data in the

presentence investigation report, and noted the benefit of the plea bargain.

The court then sentenced Manasco to 40 years at hard labor, without

benefits, but suspended 10 years and probated five, and made the sentences

concurrent. The court also imposed the usual sex offender notification

measures, monitoring, and internet restrictions.

Manasco appealed his sentences as excessive, but this court found, on

its own motion, that they were illegally lenient, as the “benefits” (probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence) were not allowed when the victim is under

the age of 13, La. R.S. 14:81.1 (E)(5)(a). State v. Manasco, 54,942 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 995. The case was remanded for

resentencing.

At resentencing, in May 2023, the court said the basic facts were well

developed and already in the record, and reiterated the substantial benefit of

the plea bargain. The court sentenced him to 30 years at hard labor, without

benefits. The court made the sentences concurrent, with sex offender

provisions similar to those imposed earlier.1

1
The court deleted the restriction on internet usage, which had been held
unconstitutionally overbroad, Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012).
2

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Manasco now appeals, raising two assignments. First, the sentences

are excessive for a “remorseful, 36-year-old first felony offender who needs

treatment, rather than 30 years in prison.” Second, the district court did not

particularize the sentence to the offender and his offenses, provide a factual

basis, or otherwise comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. He shows that legal

findings are subject to de novo review, State v. Wells, 08-2262 (La. 7/6/10),

45 So. 3d 577, and quotes a passage, “excessiveness of a sentence becomes a

question of law,” from State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993).

However, he concedes that review of sentences is for abuse of discretion, as

discussed in State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d

1116.

He contends the court simply did not consider certain relevant facts:

he is now 36 years old, has no other criminal history, has never physically

harmed a child; he admits he needs help and has found a Christian physician

for treatment; his wife and mother testified they need his financial and

material support; he has a strong employment history, including

maintenance and cleaning at Walmart, forestry at Bear Powell Enterprises,

installation at DirecTV, and ecommerce on eBay. He suggests the court

overstated the benefit of the plea bargain and the role of passive viewers,

like himself, in perpetuating the child-porn industry.

Finally, he urges that similar facts supported a only 10-year sentence

for 49 counts of possession of child pornography in State v. Jack, 51,428

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So. 3d 492, writ denied, 17-1281 (La.

4/27/18), 239 So. 3d 838; a 12½-year sentence for 200 counts in State v.

Paulson, 15-0454 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/30/15), 177 So. 3d 360, writ denied, 15-
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2009 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So. 3d 79; and a 10-year sentence for 23 counts in

State v. Dominick, 13-0270 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So. 3d 250. He

concedes he needs punishment, but argues that 30 years is upper-range and

makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals.

DISCUSSION

An appellate court uses a two-pronged test to review sentences for

excessiveness. First, the court must find that the sentencing court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

sentencing court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating

circumstance, so long as it adequately considered them in particularizing the

sentence to the defendant. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The

goal of Art. 894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence,

not to achieve rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v.

Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. There is no requirement that any specific factor

be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La.

12/3/03), 861 So. 2d 144. As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum

sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State

v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665. However, when the

defendant has pled guilty to an offense that does not adequately describe his

criminal conduct or has received a significant reduction in sentencing

exposure through a plea bargain, the sentencing court has great discretion in

imposing even the maximum sentence for the pled offense. State v.

Guzman, 99-1753 (La. 5/16/00), 769 So. 2d 1158; State v. Hearnsberger,

54,906 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 594.

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At the initial sentencing hearing, the court discussed Manasco’s

personal situation (parents and wife), his health (no complications or

substance abuse), his educational status (completed ninth grade), his

employment history (noted above), and the documents filed by defense

counsel; the court also cited the significant benefit of the plea bargain. At

the second hearing, the court added that Manasco was 34 years old at the

time of his arrest, and that the other facts were well developed at the first

hearing.

On review we find the district court’s application of the facts to the

guidelines of Art. 894.1 was appropriate, thoughtful, and easily adequate.

The large, and perhaps unprecedented, number of images and videos found

on Manasco’s devices obviously justified the court’s heavy emphasis on the

benefit of the plea bargain. The district court properly found that even

though an end user like Manasco may not have laid his own hand on any of

the victims, his prurient interest fueled the system whereby minors were

degraded by child porn. Without consumers like Manasco, this

reprehensible industry would not exist. His desire for psychological help,

belatedly expressed only after being caught, does not outweigh the need for

correctional treatment. We find no violation of the sentencing guidelines of

Art. 894.1.

The second prong is review for constitutional excessiveness. A

sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to

the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and

needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, supra. A

sentence is deemed grossly disproportionate if, when crime and punishment

are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.
5

State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166. The sentencing

court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limits, and

such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest

abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/23/04), 893 So.

2d 7. The reviewing court may consider a comparison of the punishment in

the appealed case with sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Fruge,

14-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So. 3d 579; State v. Durham, 53,922 (La. App.

2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 525.

The offense of pornography involving juveniles carries a basic penalty

of not less than 5 nor more than 20 years at hard labor, without benefits, R.S.

14:81.1 (E)(1)(a). However, when (as here) the victim is under the age of

13, the statute carries the enhanced penalty of not less than one-half the

longest term, nor more than twice the longest term, for the basic offense, or

10 to 40 years at hard labor, all without benefits. R.S. 14:81.1 (E)(5)(a).

The imposed sentences of 30 years, concurrent, fall exactly two-thirds of the

way up this range.

The issue is not whether this court, sitting as the sentencing court,

would have imposed the same sentence, but whether the sentence imposed is

shocking and an abuse of discretion. The district court stressed the sheer

number of images and videos seized from Manasco’s devices, finding this to

show a deep and alarming involvement in child porn. The original charge of

over 2,000 counts was, through skillful negotiation, reduced to two, resulting

in an exceptional benefit to Manasco. We also note the original charge of

three counts of distribution, suggesting a deeper involvement than mere

possession, was dismissed as part of the plea bargain. While all of his

internet searches are abhorrent, “how to have sex with very young girls
6

safely” is particularly troubling and exemplifies the dark depths of

Manasco’s prurient interest.

For an offender who had no other criminal conduct and appears to

have been primarily a possessor, 30 years presses the upper limit of

justifiable sentencing. However, it is commensurate with the 25-year

sentences affirmed in the more recent cases of State v. Bell, 23-85 (La. App.

5 Cir. 10/31/23), __ So. 3d __ (involving over 2,700 images and videos), and

State v. Bradley, 22-381 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/1/23), 360 So. 3d 562 (about 70

videos and images). In light of the district court’s vast discretion, and the

huge number and disturbing nature of the images saved to Manasco’s

devices, we cannot say the sentence is shocking or an abuse of discretion.

This assignment does not present reversible error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, we affirm Ryan Manasco’s convictions and

sentences.

AFFIRMED.

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