State of Louisiana v. Quinton Verdell Tellis

Judgment rendered April 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,609-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellant

versus

QUINTON VERDELL TELLIS Appellee

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2016-F-1796

Honorable Larry D. Jefferson, Judge

*****

ROBERT S. TEW Counsel for Appellant
District Attorney

HOLLY A. CHAMBERS-JONES
Assistant District Attorney

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellee
By: G. Paul Marx

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

PITMAN, J.

The State of Louisiana appeals the dismissal without prejudice of the

charge of second degree murder against Defendant Quinton Verdell Tellis

for alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. For the following reasons,

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and

remanded.

FACTS

Foreign exchange student Ming Chen Hsiao (“Mandy”) was

murdered in her apartment in Monroe, Louisiana on or about July 29, 2015,

but her body was not discovered until August 8, 2015. She had been

tortured and then stabbed to death. Within days of her death, Defendant used

Mandy’s debit card at an ATM machine, accessed her accounts and

withdrew several hundred dollars from them at different times. On August

20, 2015, he was arrested and in October was charged with unauthorized use

of an access card and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute.

In February 2016, three months prior to the trial scheduled in

Louisiana on the unauthorized use of the access card, the State of

Mississippi indicted Defendant for the December 2014 murder of Jessica

Chambers, who had been set on fire and died from her injuries.1

In Louisiana, a jury trial was to commence on the unauthorized use of

an access card and the marijuana charge in May 2016; however, prior to

trial, Defendant pled guilty to middle grade unauthorized use of an access

card pursuant to a habitual offender bill of information filed the same date.

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Defendant was tried for the Chambers murder in Mississippi in October 2017
and October 2018, but both trials ended in mistrials.

Defendant was sentenced to ten years hard labor. On July 7, 2016, while

Defendant was housed in the DeSoto County Adult Detention Facility in

Hernando, Mississippi, Louisiana issued an arrest warrant for Defendant for

Mandy’s murder.

On May 17, 2019, approximately four years after Mandy’s murder,

Defendant was charged with second degree murder, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:30.1. Between August 24, 2019, when 11 disks of discovery

materials were provided to Defendant’s counsel, and October 6, 2021, many

hearings and meetings were set and delayed, both at the request of the

Ouachita Parish assistant district attorney (“ADA”) and Defendant’s

counsel. In January 2021, Defendant filed a motion for speedy trial. It was

unsigned and not addressed.

On October 6, 2021, Defendant’s counsel filed a motion for a speedy

trial and claimed he was ready to proceed. The trial court ruled the

commencement of the statutory 120 days would begin on that date in

accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 701. A hearing was set for November 8,

2021, and the trial for January 3, 2022. On November 8, 2021, Defendant

informed the state that it intended to hire an expert on cell phone

triangulation; and on December 15, 2021, he informed the state that an

expert had been retained for trial testimony. At that time, the state provided

a supplemental DNA report. Defendant requested a continuance of the trial

of January 3, 3022. The matter was rescheduled for a hearing on January 19,

2022 and the trial for March 14, 2022.

Defendant filed a motion to waive the jury trial on January 18, 2022,

and asserted that the expert had given an oral opinion of his findings but had

not reduced the opinion to writing. The trial court suspended the running of
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time for the speedy trial request until such time Defendant was able to

provide the written report to the state. The state objected to the suspension

of the running of time only until Defendant provided it with a copy of the

expert’s opinion and argued the motion for speedy trial should be dismissed

in its entirety since Defendant had indicated he was not ready to go to trial as

he had alleged when he filed his motion. The trial court stated a ruling

would be rendered at a later date and continued the matter for hearings until

February 9, 2022.

From that date in February 2022 until October 13, 2022, this matter

was continued several times for different reasons having to do with

Defendant’s expert report, the state’s inability to read that expert’s report,

COVID-19 diagnoses, the unavailability of defense counsel during certain

months, the ADA’s planned vacation and the state’s expert being

unavailable for trial on one of the established days for the trial. During this

time, the time delays for speedy trial were suspended for 60 days for reasons

of both state and defense. A new trial date of October 24, 2022, was set.

The state filed a motion for continuance.

On August 29, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to quash the state’s

motion for continuance and claimed his right to speedy trial was being

violated. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant sought writs with

this court. Writs were denied on September 29, 2022. The state filed

another motion for a continuance.

Approximately six weeks later, on October 13, 2022, a hearing was

held on that motion to continue the trial set for October 24, 2022. At the

hearing, the state conceded that the 120-day time limit of the speedy trial

motion would expire on October 19, 2022, and that if the time expired, the
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appropriate remedy under La. C. Cr. P. art 701 would be to release

Defendant without bail. The ADA informed the trial court that, in the event

the continuance was not granted and the Defendant released without bail, the

State of Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) had a detainer on

Defendant requiring transfer there to serve an outstanding sentence.

Once again, the trial court stated it would take the matter under

advisement and that the state would be informed of its decision. The ADA

asked the court whether contact should be made with MDOC informing it

not to come to Louisiana, and the trial court stated, “[t]ell them whatever

you want.” Later that day, the trial court denied the motion to continue

without notice to the state and maintained the trial date of October 24, 2022.

Because the law required Defendant to be released without bail when

the 120-day time limit lapsed for speedy trial, the ADA contacted the

MDOC; and on Monday, October 17, 2022, Defendant was transferred from

Ouachita Parish to the MDOC. Because Defendant had been removed from

the jurisdiction, the state removed the Defendant’s trial from the court’s

docket under La. C. Cr. P. art. 61.

On October 24, 2022, the day scheduled for trial, Defendant filed a

“Motion to Dismiss or In the Alternative Release From Bond Obligation.”

The motion alleged that he filed a motion for speedy trial on January 18,

2022; that continuances were granted to the state on three trial dates,

including August 29, 2022, over his objection. He also noted that he had

been transferred to Mississippi without notice on the order of the district

attorney’s office, that he had been deprived of the ability to perpetuate

testimony and that the lack of notice violated his U.S. Constitution Sixth

Amendment rights. Defendant claimed that the actions by the state were so
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egregious as to merit dismissal for violation La. C. Cr. P. art. 701 and the

Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He also filed a motion to have

the Ouachita Parish District Attorney’s office pay the cost of bringing his

expert witness from Montana to court.

A hearing was held that day and the trial court took umbrage with the

fact that Defendant had been removed from the jurisdiction by MDOC at the

request of the ADA and that the ADA had the case removed from the docket

pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 61 without informing the court. The trial court

accused the ADA of engaging in some form of “design” to prevent the case

from going to trial and chastised her for being unprepared for court on the

day set for trial. The state’s motion for continuance was denied.

The trial court heard Defendant’s motion to dismiss or in the

alternative release him from the bond obligation.2 The trial court stated that

it found the state had acted in bad faith in seeking continuances, in removing

Defendant from the jurisdiction of the court and in removing the trial from

the docket. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss or in the

alternative release from bond obligation and found that 1) the actions of the

ADA were in bad faith; 2) that there was a violation of Defendant’s speedy

trial rights pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 701; and 3) that Defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights had been violated. The trial court ordered that the “above

captioned numbered and entitled case be and the same is hereby dismissed,

without prejudice,” and that the bond obligation of Defendant “be relieved

and any detainer in relationship to this case be removed.”

2
Defendant has argued that his motion to dismiss is actually the same as a motion
to quash the bill of indictment, and that is how the trial court treated it. The state
objected and claimed that the two motions were not the same.
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The state appeals this judgment dismissing the case without prejudice

against Defendant for violating his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The

release without bond is not challenged by the state, which had acquiesced at

the hearing that the time limit for speedy trial had already lapsed under La.

C. Cr. P. art. 701.

DISCUSSION

The state argues the trial court erred in dismissing Defendant’s case

when his speedy trial rights were not violated and the sole statutory remedy

was pretrial release without bail. The state also argues that while Defendant

has a constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, it was error for the trial court to

dismiss the case against Defendant because his constitutional right to a

speedy trial was not violated.

Defendant argues that the trial court had the authority to dismiss the

case because the state interfered with his constitutional rights while he was

under indictment for murder. He also argues that the ADA’s defiance of the

trial court’s ruling on October 24, 2022, was contemptuous and prejudicial,

making trial impossible because Defendant was transferred to Mississippi

without notice. He argues that the ADA’s actions impaired the trial court’s

authority to conduct the business of the court and required the court to grant

a motion to quash.

Defendant further argues that the ADA’s authority under La. C. Cr. P.

art. 61 to choose whom, when and how people are prosecuted does not allow

the state to spirit defendants to far away jails so that trial cannot be held. He

also questions whether trial courts are limited to statutory provisions of relief

under La. C. Cr. P. art. 701 when the prosecution has “manipulated
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defendant housing to moot the court’s denial of a continuance.” Last, he

argues that he had a constitutional right to a speedy trial and that his rights

were violated when the ADA removed him from access to counsel and

denied him a trial when the multiple fixings were upset solely by the ADA’s

preferences.

It is well settled that there are two separate and distinct bases for a

defendant’s right to a speedy trial: a statutory right granted by La. C. Cr. P.

art. 701 and a constitutional right embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution of

1974. State v. McGill, 50,994 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 213 So. 3d 1181.

The two are not equivalent. Id.

Both the state and the defendant have the right to a speedy trial. La.

C. Cr. P. art.701. La. C. Cr. P. art. 701(D)(2) states that failure to commence

trial within the time periods provided shall result in the release of the

defendant without bail or in the discharge of the bail obligation, if after

contradictory hearing with the district attorney, just cause for the delay is not

shown. The sole remedy for failure to commence trial within the mandated

time period is pretrial release without bail. State v. McGill, supra.

The state has not challenged the portion of the trial court’s judgment

based on La. C. Cr. P. art. 701 which relieved Defendant of his bail

obligation upon the running of the time period for speedy trial. Therefore,

that portion of the judgment is affirmed.

The constitutional right to a speedy trial is fundamental and is

guaranteed to an accused. U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV; La. Const.

art. I, § 16; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101

(1972); State v. Jordan, 35,643 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/03/02), 813 So. 2d 1123,
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writ denied, 02-1570 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So. 2d 1067. The right attaches

when an individual becomes an accused, either by formal indictment or bill

of information or arrest and actual restraint. State v. Bodley, 394 So. 2d 584

(La. 1981); State v. McGill, supra. The underlying purpose of this

constitutional right is to protect a defendant’s interests in preventing

oppressive pretrial incarceration, limiting possible impairment of his defense

and minimizing his anxiety and concern. State v. Love, 00-3347 (La.

5/23/03), 847 So. 2d 1198. The four factors to be considered when

considering whether a defendant’s right to speedy trial has been violated are

length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his

right and prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, supra.

The first of the Barker factors, the length of the delay, is a threshold

requirement for courts reviewing speedy trial claims. State v. Love, citing

United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.

970, 97 S. Ct. 1656, 52 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1977). This factor serves as a

“triggering mechanism.” State v. Love, supra. Unless the delay in a given

case is “presumptively prejudicial,” further inquiry into the other Barker

factors is unnecessary. Id. However, when a court finds that the delay was

“presumptively prejudicial,” the court must then consider the other three

factors. Id.

Under Barker, the peculiar circumstances of the case determine the

weight to be ascribed to the length of the delay and the reason for the delay.

State v. Love, supra, citing State v. Reaves, 376 So. 2d 136 (La. 1979). The

manner of proof must also be considered, as must the gravity of the alleged

crime. State v. Love, supra. The amorphous quality of the right also leads to

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the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the

right has been deprived. Barker v. Mingo, supra.

An appellate court is allowed to reverse a trial court judgment on a

motion to quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion. State v. Love, supra. In situations where it is evident that the

district attorney is flaunting his authority for reasons that show that he wants

to favor the State at the expense of the defendant, such as putting the

defendant at risk of losing witnesses, the trial court should grant a motion to

quash and an appellate court can appropriately reverse a ruling denying a

motion to quash in such a situation. Id.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 576 provides that when a criminal prosecution is

timely instituted in a court of proper jurisdiction and the indictment is

dismissed by a court for any error, defect, irregularity, or deficiency, a new

prosecution for the same offense or for a lesser offense based on the same

facts may be instituted within the time established by this Chapter,

Limitations Upon Institution of Prosecution, or within six months from the

date of dismissal, whichever is longer. A new prosecution shall not be

instituted under this article following a dismissal of the prosecution by the

district attorney unless the state shows that the dismissal was not for the

purpose of avoiding the time limitation for commencement of trial

established by article 578. Id.

Because the complementary role of trial courts and appellate courts

demands that deference be given to a trial court’s discretionary decision, an

appellate court is allowed to reverse a trial court judgment on a motion to

quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

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State v. Gray, 16-0687 (La. 3/15/17), 218 So. 3d 40. However, the trial

court’s legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. Id.

Where the charge is murder there is no time limitation upon the

institution of prosecution for that crime. La. C. Cr. P. art. 571. Where a

necessary incident of the crime of murder is itself a crime and part of the res

gestae, it is not a valid objection that the time for prosecuting the related

offense has run. State v. Sterling, 377 So. 2d 58 (La. 1979). The reason for

this is that a prosecution for murder has no limitation, and the statute of

limitations does not apply to facts which are relevant and admissible to

prove murder. Id.

Applying the first factor found in Barker, we do not find the length of

delay from the October 6, 2021 motion for speedy trial until the trial date of

October 24, 2022, to be presumptively prejudicial. All of the motions for

continuance by both the state and Defendant were granted for good cause

until the very end of the period when the trial court refused the last request

by the state. The state was aware that the time limitation was about to run,

informed the trial court and noted that MDOC was planning on transporting

him as a result of the detainer. Having found the delay not to be

presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to discuss the other factors in

Barker; however, even if the three other Barker factors are considered—the

cause for the delays, Defendant’s assertion of his right and prejudice to

him—they were insufficient to warrant the dismissal of his case when he

was charged with second degree murder that could result in imprisonment

for life.

Defendant, for whom a detainer in the State of Mississippi was

waiting, was not prejudiced by the delay which exceeded 120 days. Were he
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to be released without bond into freedom in the State of Louisiana, there

might have been some reason to find he was prejudiced by the lengthy time

between the filing of the motion for speedy trial and trial; but because he

was simply taken to prison in Mississippi, he suffered no prejudice. The

judgment of dismissal without prejudice is reversed and the matter remanded

for reinstatement of the prosecution by the Ouachita Parish District

Attorney. The assignment of error has merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court correctly released

Defendant Quinton Verdell Tellis without bail under La. C. Cr. P. art. 701

and that portion of the judgment is affirmed. We further find Defendant’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and the dismissal

without prejudice of the murder charge was an abuse of discretion. That

portion of the judgment is reversed and the matter remanded.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

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