23rd Psalm Trucking, L.L.C v. Madison Parish Police Jury

Judgment rendered May 22, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,658-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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23RD PSALM TRUCKING, L.L.C. Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

MADISON PARISH POLICE JURY Defendant-Appellee

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Appealed from the
Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Madison, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2020132

Honorable Laurie Reis Brister, Judge

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MILLER, HAMPTON & HILGENDORF Counsel for Appellant
By: Gregory John Miller

DANNIE P. GARRETT, III Counsel for Appellee

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Before STONE, COX, and THOMPSON, JJ.

STONE, J.

This civil appeal arises from a contract dispute, where Plaintiff-

Appellant, 23rd Psalm Trucking Company, L.L.C. (“Psalm Trucking”),

appeals the summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Appellee, Madison

Police Jury (“Police Jury”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case stems from a written agreement between a sanitation

provider and a local police jury. Pursuant to the terms of the contract,

Psalm Trucking was to collect and dispose of residential refuse in Madison

Parish. The terms of the contract provided that “[t]he contract shall be for a

four (4) year period beginning upon the performance of the contract and

ending four (4) years thereafter.” Additionally, “[t]his agreement will

automatically renew itself for one additional three-year term unless either

party, within thirty (30) days of the expiration of the agreement, provides

written notice to the other party of its intent to discontinue the agreement.”

The parties executed the contract on July 14, 2014, and Psalm Trucking

began work that very day. The contract expired in July of 2018, without the

Police Jury sending notice of any intent to terminate the agreement; as a

result, the contract was renewed for an additional three-year term as

provided in the original contract.

Citing fiscal reasons, the Police Jury decided to rebid the sanitation

contract in 2020. Although Psalm Trucking participated in the bidding

process another contractor was awarded the contract. The new contractor

was to replace Psalm Trucking and commence work on August 1, 2020.

Psalm Trucking reminded the Police Jury that its contract was not due to

expire until July 14, 2021; in turn, the Police Jury continued the contract

terms and allowed Psalm Trucking to continue providing services until the

fiscal year ending December 31, 2020. Although Psalm Trucking did not

agree to this term, it continued to provide garbage collection and disposal

services until the new contractor began on January 1, 2021.

On August 4, 2020, Psalm Trucking filed suit against the Police Jury

for breach of contract and unfair trade practices. On April 14, 2023, the

Police Jury filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the contract

was null and void pursuant to La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A) because it was neither

submitted to nor approved by the Louisiana State Bond Commission (the

“Commission”). On May 23, 2023, the trial court ruled in favor of the

Police Jury, granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing

Psalm Trucking’s lawsuit with prejudice. Psalm Trucking now appeals,

asserting two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in failing to find

that the contract was controlled by La. R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3), as opposed to

La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A), and (2), the trial court erred in failing to find that

the doctrine of detrimental reliance applied to the case.

DISCUSSION

La. R.S. 39:1410.60

In its first assignment of error, Psalm Trucking argues that the trial

court failed to find that the contract with the Police Jury was controlled by

La. R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3) rather than La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A). La. R.S.

39:1410.60(A) provides:

No parish, municipality, public board, political or public corporation,
subdivision, or taxing district, and no road or subroad district, school
district, sewerage district, drainage or subdrainage district, levee
district, waterworks or subwaterworks district, irrigation district, road
lighting district, harbor and terminal district, or any other political
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subdivision, taxing district, political or public corporation, created
under or by the constitution and laws of the state shall have authority
to borrow money, incur debt, or to issue bonds, or other evidences of
debt, or to levy taxes, or to pledge uncollected taxes or revenues for
the payment thereof, where they are authorized by the constitution or
laws of the state so to do, without the consent and approval of the
State Bond Commission. (emphasis added).

Furthermore, La. R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3) provides:
A. The governing authority of every parish or municipality shall have
the following powers:

(3) To enter into time contracts for the collection and
transportation of garbage or trash for a term of up to ten years,
and for disposal of garbage or trash for a term of up to twenty-
five years.

Psalm Trucking argues that the Commission does not need to approve its

contract with the Police Jury because La. R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3) is an

exception to La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A). We disagree.

Under Louisiana law, political subdivisions do not have the authority

to incur debt without the Commission’s prior consent and approval.

Considering that the Police Jury did not obtain consent and approval from

the Commission prior to the contract with Psalm Trucking, the contract is

void ab initio, and the obligation underlying the agreement is, thus,

unenforceable. We decline to accept Psalm Trucking counsel’s position that

La. R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3) is an exception to La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A). The

Police Jury is correct that the two statutes should be read in tandem.

Therefore, the statutes should be read to convey that the Commission’s

approval is required for multi-year contracts that do not contain a non-

appropriation clause. La. R.S. 39:1410.60(A). However, such time

contracts may not exceed the 10-year and 25-year limitations outlined in La.

R.S. 33:4169.1(A)(3). The failure of governmental agencies to obtain the

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requisite consent and approval of the Commission is not rare. While it is the

law, we are aware that this statute opens the door for potential abuse by

government agencies that are fully cognizant of their requirement to obtain

the proper consent and approval of the Commission prior to the incurrence

of debt on the part of the municipalities and other political subdivisions.

Nonetheless, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Detrimental Reliance: Non governmental vs. Governmental

Secondly, Psalm Trucking argues that the trial court failed to find that

the doctrine of detrimental reliance applied to this case. In support of this

argument, Psalm Trucking cites Murray v. Bostwick, 52,802 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/14/19), 276 So. 3d 1120. In Murray, supra, this court stated, “[t]o recover

under the theory of detrimental reliance, a plaintiff must prove the following

three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by

conduct or work; (2) justifiable reliance thereon; and (3) a change in position

to one’s detriment because of the reliance.” Psalm Trucking asserts that all

three elements are met. They argue that (1) the Police Jury represented its

desire to contract with them, (2) their reliance was justified, and (3) they

were damaged by relying on the Police Jury’s representations. They explain

that under the contract, the Police Jury was to pay $13 per residential unit

per month, plus a fuel charge of $0.45 per gallon if fuel reaches $4.15 per

gallon. Psalm Trucking claims that this amounts to $59,267 per month, and

therefore, the contract ending 6 1/2 months early has cost them an estimated

$385,000.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Luther v. IOM Co., LLC, 13-0353

(La. 10/15/13), 130 So. 3d 817, held that “... proving detrimental reliance

against a governmental agency should be more burdensome, requiring: (1)
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unequivocal advice from an unusually authoritative source, (2) reasonable

reliance on that advice by an individual, (3) extreme harm resulting from

that reliance, and (4) gross injustice to the individual in the absence of

judicial estoppel.” The record is devoid of any proof showing Psalm

Trucking met the elements required for detrimental reliance by a

governmental entity. Based on this absence of proof, this assignment of

error also lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

All costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Psalm Trucking.

AFFIRMED.

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