State of Louisiana v. Emmanuel Dewayne Johnson

Judgment rendered July 17, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,698-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

EMMANUEL DEWAYNE JOHNSON Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 384,251

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Holli Herrle-Castillo

EMMANUEL DEWAYNE JOHNSON Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

REBECCA A. EDWARDS
SAMUEL S. CRICHTON
CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J., dissents with written reasons.

COX, J.

This case arises from the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish,

Louisiana. Emmanuel Dewayne Johnson was convicted of second degree

murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Johnson appeals his conviction, arguing the State did not meet its burden in

proving he did not act in self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On October 20, 2021, a grand jury indicted Johnson for the second

degree murder of Patrick Lynn Goines. Johnson’s jury trial began on May

10, 2023, where the following testimony and evidence were presented.

Shuntina Goines first testified that she is Goines’ sister. She stated

that Goines had four children and was working in hotel maintenance when

he died.

Khrysten Belion then testified that she stopped for gas at a gas station

off Hilry Huckaby Road in Shreveport the morning of July 21, 2021. She

stated that she was texting on her phone as she went into the store to pay for

her gas when she heard someone say, “I don’t give a f*** about that. I ain’t

paying for that sh**.” Ms. Belion testified that after hearing those words,

she heard gunshots. She stated that the man who yelled that he was not

buying something was the same man who fired the gunshots, and he was

wearing baby blue clothes and a hat. Ms. Belion identified the man in the

surveillance video from the gas station.

Trooper Leann Hodges (“Trooper Hodges”) testified that she is

currently employed by the Louisiana State Police, but at the time of the

shooting, she was working as a homicide investigator for the Shreveport

Police Department. Trooper Hodges stated that she arrived on the scene

after the victim was taken to the hospital. She identified diagrams made of

the crime scene and the surveillance video from the gas station. The

surveillance videos, including the video of the shooting, were played for the

jury.

Trooper Hodges described the following from the surveillance video.

Johnson arrived at the gas station as a passenger in Roy Crew’s (“Crew”)

truck. Crew parked his truck at the gas pumps before he approached

Goines’ BMW, which was parked in front of the store entrance, and spoke to

the occupants.1 Johnson, wearing a blue shirt and blue pants, went into the

store, came out, and had a conversation with the passenger of the BMW,

Jebriel Davis, and went back into the store. Johnson again approached the

passenger side of the BMW. At this point, Goines was in the driver’s seat

and Davis was in the passenger seat. Goines was talking through the open

window to a man named Jeffery Speed (“Speed”) standing outside the

driver’s door.

All the doors to the BMW were closed when Johnson approached.

Johnson opened the passenger door and spoke with the occupants; then

Goines exited the driver door with a gun in his right hand and turned his

body toward Speed to his right. Johnson pulled the gun from his right

pocket and shot Goines from across the vehicle twice. Goines did not raise

the gun and kept it at his side. As Goines fell to the ground, his gun fell out

of his hand, and Johnson ran around the front of the BMW toward Goines

and shot Goines again.

1
Crews was killed a few months before Johnson’s trial.
2

During the shooting, Speed, who was standing next to Goines, ducked

and ran into the store. After the shooting, Davis, the passenger of the BMW,

exited the vehicle and walked into the store. Davis then left the store,

entered his own vehicle, and drove away with Johnson in the passenger seat.

Video surveillance from inside the store was also played for the jury.

Trooper Hodges identified Johnson inside the store and stated that he

maintained eye contact with the door in the direction of Goines’ vehicle,

only breaking eye contact to make a purchase. While in the store, Johnson

manipulated something in his right pocket and right pant leg. Johnson’s

hand disappeared behind his back as he exited the store. When Johnson left

the store, the clerk spoke to another customer; within one minute, the clerk

and customer stopped and looked out the window toward Goines’ vehicle.

Trooper Hodges testified that 51 grams of marijuana and a scale were

found in Goines’ vehicle, which is indicative of drug distribution. She stated

that Johnson came to the Shreveport Police Department the day following

the shooting and was interviewed by detectives. Johnson’s police interview

was played for the jury. Johnson stated that Goines lifted his firearm while

outside the vehicle and pointed it at him. He stated that he and Goines were

on good terms, and he hated “the way everything went.” He stated that he

previously had an altercation with Goines about a woman, in which Goines

pulled a gun on him, and he left. Johnson surrendered his .22 caliber Glock

pistol to investigators.

Johnson told police that he thought Goines got a shot off during the

exchange outside the store. Trooper Hodges stated that Goines had a 9 mm

handgun and Johnson had a .22; the only shell casings found at the scene

were from a .22.
3

Kimberly Skyles testified that she is a victim coordinator for the

Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office. She stated that she was involved in

communicating with Speed to be a witness at this trial. She testified that

Speed was uncooperative, arrived the first day of court, returned the morning

of the second day, left the afternoon of the second day, and did not return to

court. Speed did not testify at trial.

Michael Stelly (“Stelly”) testified that he works for the North

Louisiana Crime Lab. Stelly was accepted as an expert in forensic firearm

analysis. Stelly described how a fired gun leaves marks on the cartridge and

bullets that are shot. He stated that he uses microscopes to compare the

markings on ejected cartridges and bullets recovered at a crime scene to

those shot in a lab to determine if they were fired from the same weapon.

Stelly testified that he analyzed the cartridges from the crime scene, and they

matched the markings from the .22 caliber Glock pistol he received from

investigators. Stelly stated that the bullets he was given did not contain

sufficient individual markings to make a positive identification of the exact

gun from which they were fired. He testified that he was certain that three

of the four bullets had the same characteristics as bullets being fired from a

.22 caliber Glock pistol; and the fourth bullet had similar characteristics but

was severely damaged.

On cross-examination, Stelly testified that he did not fire the 9 mm

Glock pistol that was found at the crime scene. He stated that by just

looking at the 9 mm from across a room, it is not possible to tell whether it is

loaded.

Dr. Long Jin (“Dr. Jin”) was accepted as an expert in forensic

pathology. He testified that he performed the autopsy on Goines. Dr. Jin
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stated that Goines’ cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. He

testified that Goines had four penetrating gunshot wounds: back left side of

head; top of left shoulder; left anterior shoulder; and left chest. Dr. Jin noted

that he found all four bullets in Goines’ body while performing the autopsy.

He stated that bullets passed through Goines’ heart, aorta, lung, and brain.

Dr. Jin testified that the gunshot wound to Goines’ left chest occurred while

Goines was lying on the ground and was a fatal shot. However, he stated

that he was unable to determine the order in which the gunshot wounds

occurred.

On cross-examination, Dr. Jin testified that the shot to the back of

Goines’ head stuck his brain, which would cause a victim to collapse. He

stated that sort of shot to the head is fatal. He testified that the shot to

Goines’ left anterior shoulder also punctured Goines’ lung, which would

have been a fatal shot. Dr. Jin stated that the shot to Goines’ left chest is the

only one he knows for sure happened while Goines was lying on the ground;

he could not say whether the other three shots occurred while Goines was

standing. Dr. Jin testified that Goines’ toxicology report showed positive for

methamphetamine and marijuana.

The jury unanimously found Johnson guilty as charged of second

degree murder. Johnson filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove that he was not acting in self-

defense, and the evidence against him was insufficient to convict him of

second degree murder. The trial court denied the motion in open court.

Johnson waived his sentencing delays and the sentencing hearing

commenced.

5

The trial court considered the factors listed in La. Cr. C. art. 894.1.

The trial court found that Johnson needs corrective treatment, and a lesser

sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. In considering the

aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court found the following facts

to be aggravating factors: Johnson used a firearm in the commission of

second degree murder; he fired a gun at a public gas station, endangering the

lives of others; and the victim died as a result of his injuries. The trial court

did not find any mitigating factors to apply. The trial court sentenced

Johnson to the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Johnson filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that his life

sentence was excessive, and the trial court has discretion to reduce the

mandatory minimum sentence when the sentence would be constitutionally

excessive. He argued that his sentence is excessive given that “it was

carried out after Patrick Goines had pulled a gun and acted aggressively

towards Emmanuel Johnson.” The trial court denied Johnson’s motion to

reconsider sentence on June 11, 2013. Johnson now appeals.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Johnson argues that the evidence was

insufficient to uphold a conviction for second degree murder because the

State failed to prove the homicide was not committed in self-defense.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the case in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658
6

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Mathis, 52,500 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19),

263 So. 3d 613. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its

own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. Mathis, supra.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442; State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ

denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. A reviewing court affords

great deference to a trial court’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of

a witness in whole or in part. Mathis, supra; Steines, supra.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence

and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a

rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d

471 (La. 1983); Steines, supra.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243

So. 3d 1064. The rule as to circumstantial evidence is: assuming every fact

to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must
7

exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S. 15:438. The

appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and determines whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently

reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417;

Mathis, supra; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d

584, 587, writ not cons., 12-0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1).

Applying the Jackson standard to the evidence established in this

case, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State

carried its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson acted

with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon Goines. Johnson

does not deny that he killed Goines; instead, he claims that his actions were

justified because he acted in self-defense based on his belief that Goines was

armed with a firearm when he exited his vehicle. On appeal, Johnson asserts

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide

was not committed in self-defense.

A homicide is justified when committed in self-defense by one who

reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or

receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself

from that danger. La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). When self-defense is raised as an

issue by the defendant, the State has the burden of proving, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense.

State v. Bratton, 49,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So. 3d 937, writ
8

denied, 15-0303 (La. 11/20/15), 180 So. 3d 317. When the defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in such a case, the question

becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. Id.

In this case, the evidence supports the jury’s unanimous conclusion

that Johnson did not act in self-defense. Although he did not testify,

Johnson gave a statement to police the day after the shooting. Johnson told

detectives that Goines got mad, pulled his weapon out inside the vehicle,

exited his vehicle, and “came up with” the gun. Johnson stated that he

thought Goines was going to shoot him and he was scared so he shot him.

He also stated that he and Goines were on good terms, although they had a

prior incident over a woman where Goines pulled his gun on Johnson and

Johnson left the situation.

However, the surveillance video contradicts Johnson’s version of

events. The video shows Johnson approach Goines’ vehicle on the

passenger side, have a 1 ½ minute conversation with the occupants, smile

during the conversation, and then enter the store; Johnson approached the

passenger side door again after leaving the store. When he approached after

leaving the store, he was heard by Ms. Belion shouting that he was not

buying “that sh**.” Goines exited his vehicle on the driver’s side and turned

slightly right, toward the back seat of his vehicle talking to Speed. Goines

can be seen with a gun in his right hand. Although he did turn his head

toward Johnson, he never turned his body toward Johnson nor did he raise

his gun. Goines’ right arm stayed straight down by his side with his right

index finger on the slide of the gun.
9

While Goines was still turned toward his right, Johnson began

shooting Goines. Johnson fired his gun, ran around the vehicle to Goines’

side of the vehicle, and continued to shoot. Goines began falling to the

ground before Johnson ran to Goines’ side of the vehicle. Goines dropped

his gun when he fell. Johnson fired four total shots at Goines. Three of the

shots would have been fatal shots and at least one was fired while Goines

was lying defenseless on the ground. Goines never lifted his arm to return

fire and all the shots are on Goines’ left side of his body as he turns away

from the shooting. The shot to Goines’ head entered on the back, left side,

which reinforces that he was turned away from Johnson.

The State also highlighted the surveillance video inside the store,

where Johnson was seen watching Goines’ vehicle and fumbling with

something in his right pocket, the same side from which he pulled his gun.

In addition, Johnson managed to shoot only Goines, missing Speed, who

was standing right beside Goines.

Based on the surveillance video and Johnson’s statement, which was

contradicted by the video, a reasonable jury could find that the State proved

the shooting was not in self-defense. Other than declining to purchase what

Goines’ was selling, the exchanges between the men appeared to be

amicable. Johnson stated that Goines raised his weapon first, which did not

happen. Based on the videos, autopsy report, and Johnson’s contradicted

statement to police, the jury reasonably found that Johnson was not acting in

self-defense. We give great deference to the jury’s finding of fact and will

not substitute our own appreciation of the evidence for that of the jury. For

these reasons, we affirm Johnson’s conviction for second degree murder.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, we affirm Johnson’s conviction for

second degree murder.

AFFIRMED.

11

STEPHENS, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The United States

Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct.

2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), held, inter alia, that the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution conferred an individual right

to keep and bear arms. The Supreme Court in Heller further recognized that

the Second Amendment guarantees the individual the right to possess and

carry weapons in case of confrontation, a meaning strongly confirmed, not

granted, by interpretation and analysis of the historical background of the

Second Amendment. Id., 554 U.S. at 592, 128 S. Ct. at 2797 (2008). “It has

always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First

and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very test of the

Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and

declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’” Id.2 This state likewise gives

credence to the theory that self-defense is not a creation of government, but

an inherent right. In its analysis leading to its holding, which was that an

insured beneficiary could collect proceeds on the policy of a person whose

life she took “in order to protect her own life or avoid great bodily harm,” a

Louisiana appellate court in National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Turner, 174

So. 646 (La. App. Orl. 1946), acknowledged that the right of self-defense is

a natural right. Id. at 647.

My two esteemed colleagues have, in affirming the defendant’s

conviction for second degree murder, emphasized the minutia of the

2
The Supreme Court expressly noted that it did not read the Second Amendment
as protecting the right, inter alia, of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.
Id., 554 U.S. at 595, 128 S. Ct. at 2799.
1

shooting, particularly the number of shots fired by the defendant and the fact

that he fired at the victim after he had fallen, to find that the State met its

burden of proving that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. The

problem with this analysis is that is impermissibly grafts onto the statutory

requirements of justifiable homicide an additional inquiry not present in

homicide cases, but one which is mandatory in non-homicide cases—

whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. See, State

v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (La. 1983), wherein the Supreme Court

observed that different statutory standards exist to justify the use of force or

violence under La. R.S. 14:19 and R.S. 14:20 depending upon whether a

homicide results.3

The video footage clearly shows the events immediately surrounding

the shooting, as well as the shooting itself. The video time counter shows

that everything took place within a span of two minutes—from Johnson’s

approach to the white BMW until he and Davis pulled out of the gas station

parking lot in the red Trailblazer onto North Hearne Avenue.4 In fact, the

3
La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1) provides that a homicide is justifiable when committed in
self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his
life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from
that danger. On the other hand, in non-homicide cases, La. R.S. 14:19(A)(1(a) provides
that the use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable … when
committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person, provided
that the force or violence used must be reasonable and necessary to prevent such
offense. (emphasis added).

4
10:46:04 Johnson is at the passenger’s side door of the white BMW.
10:46:09 Goines moves around in the car, apparently having words with
Johnson. Goines pushes his driver’s side door open, with his left
hand on the steering wheel, and begins rotating his body to exit his
vehicle. Johnson has begun to stand up and push away from the
vehicle (apparently having seen the .9 mm Glock in
Goines’ hand).
10:46:13 Johnson takes a step back from the white BMW and his right hand
starts going towards his pocket.
10:46:14 Johnson begins firing at Goines.
10:46:16 Goines falls to the ground after the first three shots. Johnson
2

shooting itself took only two seconds. It is unreasonable to hold a person

who must make an instantaneous life-or-death decision to the same standard

as a judge or jury who, after the fact, has unlimited time within which to

consider the facts and circumstances and pass judgment.

From a more pragmatic standpoint, any shots fired after Johnson ran

around the vehicle were superfluous, Goines having already met his demise.

As Dr. Jin told the jury, the first three shots entered Goines’ body while he

was standing. Dr. Jin also described shots one and three as lethal or “kill”

shots. There was no testimony to contradict this evidence. Detached

reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Brown v.

United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S. Ct. 501, 502, 65 L. Ed. 961 (1921).

A last shot, which is intentional and unnecessary when considered in cold

blood will not necessarily cause a defendant to lose his immunity if it

followed close upon others fired in the heat of conflict if the defendant

believed [he] was frightened for [his] life. Id., 256 U.S. at 344, 41 S. Ct. at

502 (1921). The prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that Johnson did not kill Goines in self-defense. In this case, the State

fell woefully short of doing so. For this reason, I dissent.

does not stop, but keeps on going, running around the white car.
As he does so, Johnson fires another shot in Goines’ direction.
10:46:22 Johnson reaches Crew’s Tahoe.
10:46:31 Johnson walks to Discount Tire before going back to Crew’s
vehicle.
10:47:04 Johnson is denied entry to Crew’s vehicle a second time.
10:47:35 Johnson approaches the red Trailblazer. Davis is inside, with the
doors locked.
10:47:49 Davis lets Johnson into the Trailblazer.
10:48:09 Davis and Johnson, in the red Trailblazer, exit the gas station
parking lot onto North Hearne Avenue.

3