State of Louisiana v. Dewayne Willie Watkins

Judgment rendered July 17, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,702-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

DEWAYNE WILLIE WATKINS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 362,447

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Sherry Watters

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY JAN JOHNSON
WILLIAM JACOB EDWARDS
MEKISHA SMITH CREAL
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before THOMPSON, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Dewayne Willie Watkins appeals his convictions and consecutive life

sentences on two counts of noncapital first degree murder, arguing

insufficient evidence to convict and to exclude the reasonable probability of

misidentification, the improper admission of videotaped statements given by

him in custody, the exclusion of an essential jury charge, and excessive

sentences. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The victims were Kelly Jose, an airman at Barksdale Air Force Base,

and his wife, Heather Jose. On the evening of November 8, 2018, they took

Kelly’s two teenage children, Abby and Reagan, and Abby’s then-boyfriend,

Matt, to a pizza house for dinner and then to Mall St. Vincent, in Shreveport,

to shop. As they were exiting the mall, around 8:30 pm, a Black man in a

dark hoodie approached them and asked Heather if he could borrow her

phone, as he was stranded and needed to call someone for a ride. Heather

did not want to hand over her phone, but she offered to make the call for

him; when she did, there was no answer. Heather was a part-time Lyft

driver and wanted to help, so she offered to give him a ride to his

destination. She and Kelly, along with the stranger, got into her white Kia

Forte and rode off; the kids took Matt’s truck to Kelly and Heather’s

apartment, on Fairfield Avenue, and waited.

However, Kelly and Heather did not return. Around 9:30 pm, Abby

got a “ping” from Chase Bank advising that someone had withdrawn $800

from the joint account she held with Kelly and Heather. At this point, she

knew something was not right, and called the police to report the couple

missing.

After 11:00 pm that night, residents of Penick Street, in the

Queensborough neighborhood, were startled by the sound of a loud boom

and, looking, saw a car in flames under the carport of a vacant trap house on

the corner of Penick and San Jacinto Streets.1 They also saw someone in a

dark jacket riding away on a bicycle, carrying a gas can. They called the

police, who came to the scene and made the gruesome discovery that the car

was Heather’s white Kia Forte and, inside, were the charred bodies of Kelly,

in the front passenger seat, and Heather, in the driver seat. Forensic analysis

showed that each had been killed by a .22 bullet to the back of the head

before the car was doused with flammable accelerant and torched.

Using information from Abby, Reagan, and Matt, detectives quickly

secured surveillance videos from two stores at Mall St. Vincent, Elite

Jewelry and The Foot Locker; they also got video from the Clark gas station

a few blocks from the vacant house where the bodies were found. A man

matching the description of the person who approached the Joses and

accepted a ride with them, and the man fleeing the site of the fire, was seen

in the videos. Detectives developed Watkins as a suspect and learned that he

was staying at 3632 Penick St., about two blocks from the trap house.

Officers obtained an arrest warrant and, on the evening of November

10, assembled a SWAT team to surround the house and effect the arrest.

However, a standoff ensued. When officers knocked, they heard scuffling

and mad commotion inside; several minutes later, the tenant of the house,

1
Some witnesses referred to this house, at 3458 Penick St., as a “trap house,” a
vacant or rundown house where people meet to deal and use drugs.
2

Shawanna Hughes, answered the door but refused to come out. In the

ongoing commotion, officers saw someone punch a hole through the floor of

the pier-and-beam house and put something into the wet soil beneath.

Eventually, Shawanna and the other occupants exited, leaving just Watkins

inside. Officers fired tear gas into the house, and, in a short time, Watkins

climbed out a side window and ran. He clambered over a fence, ran into the

next yard, and tried to hide in brush next to a fallen tree, but a police canine

caught him, secured him by biting his right hand, and officers took him into

custody. He was given medical attention for his hand and then taken to

Shreveport Police Department for questioning.

Early that morning, Sgt. Angie Willhite and Detective Kenneth

Thompson conducted a videotaped interview. Watkins told them his hand

was hurting too bad for him to sign the Miranda form,2 but they both saw he

was able to use the hand to open a can of Sprite and drink it. He initially

denied knowing anything about the burning car or even going to Mall St.

Vincent the day before. However, after they confronted him with the videos

from the mall, he admitted being there and catching a ride with Kelly and

Heather. He said they dropped him off, that was the last he saw of them, and

he had nothing to do with their murders. Instead, he blamed it on somebody

named “Black,” and said he was afraid of “Black.”

Later, in January 2019, Watkins initiated an interview with Sgt.

Willhite and Det. Thompson. In this interview, he admitted being at the

mall and asking some people to borrow their phone; they called and got no

answer, and then they gave him a ride to Shawanna’s house on Penick St.

2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
3

At that point, he insisted, somebody named “Tyron” hopped in the car and

they drove off; Watkins never saw the couple again, and Tyron must have

killed them. Tyron was later found to be another name for “Black.”

PROCEDURAL HISTORY; MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A Caddo Parish grand jury indicted Watkins on two counts of first

degree murder in February 2019. The state filed notice of intent to seek the

death penalty but dropped this intent in March 2021. Meanwhile, the

Capital Defense Project assumed the case, filing numerous motions; of

importance to this appeal are its November 2020 motions to suppress

Watkins’s two statements to police.

These motions came to a hearing over three days in November 2021

and January 2022. Det. Thompson and Sgt. Willhite testified that at the first

interview, early in the morning of November 11, 2018, Watkins did not

appear intoxicated or impaired, he seemed to understand his rights, and they

used no threats, promises, etc., with him; however, after first denying

anything to do with the incident, he changed his story once they said he

could “get the needle.” They admitted they did not read him his Miranda

rights until several minutes into the interview. They also testified that

Watkins himself initiated the second interview, on January 23, 2019, in

which he laid the blame on “Black.” The videos of the interviews were

played for the court.

The defense’s lead witness was Dr. John Sawyer, a neuropsychologist

at Ochsner Health, in Shreveport, who performed a “Miranda Rights

Competency Evaluation” on Watkins and found “significant limitations”: an

IQ of under 70, speech and language disabilities, and dependence on others

for activities of daily life. He concluded Watkins was not competent to
4

waive his Miranda rights. Still, he admitted the interrogations were not

coercive, that some of Watkins’s jailhouse communications were much more

advanced than the testing would have suggested, and that prior experts had

found evidence of malingering.

The state’s expert, Dr. Todd Lobrano, a medical psychologist, did not

personally examine Watkins, but reviewed Dr. Sawyer’s report and the long

list of psychological exams performed on Watkins over the years. He found

Watkins was feigning illness, had comprehension somewhat better than the

IQ tests suggested, and understood the three prongs of Miranda.

The court ruled orally that the videos were the best evidence, and they

showed Watkins’s ability to understand and answer all questions, never

asking for an explanation. Although the timing was “questioned” by the

defense, the court found the officers properly advised Watkins of the

purpose of the interview and gave him his Miranda rights. Further, Watkins

“knew how to avoid answering questions,” including those of Dr. Sawyer;

the court discounted the expert’s opinion that Watkins was simply

incompetent to make a statement. Finally, the officers’ reference to “the

needle” was not an undue influence and did not negate the free and

voluntary nature of the statements. The motions to suppress were denied.

TRIAL EVIDENCE

The matter proceeded to trial over 14 days in August and September

2022. Kelly’s daughter and son, Abby and Reagan, and Abby’s then-

boyfriend, Matt, positively identified Watkins as the person who approached

them at Mall St. Vincent, asked to borrow their phone to call for a ride, and

was then offered, and accepted, a ride with Heather and Kelly. Other

witnesses, not connected with the Joses, confirmed seeing Watkins at the
5

mall that afternoon, as did surveillance video from Elite Jewelry and Foot

Locker. A video from the Chase Bank ATM on Greenwood Road showed

Heather using her card to withdraw money, a person slumped over in the

passenger seat of her car, and someone whose identity could not be

discerned in the backseat. Surveillance video from the Clark gas station

showed Watkins riding up on a bike later that night.

A large portion of the state’s case described the situation at 3632

Penick St. on the evening of the arrest. Sgt. Eric Ardoin, of SPD, led the

SWAT team surveilling the house for about an hour before Watkins drove

up in a Pontiac G5 and entered. The team encircled the house and, when

officers knocked on the door, two occupants, including Tyron “Black”

Bates, exited, but the tenant, Shawanna Hughes, and her daughter, Karinity,

would not. Officers negotiated for about an hour, during which they heard

great commotion in the house and saw Watkins punch a hole in the floor and

try to crawl out. Cpl. Gregory Gagneaux, of the SPD K-9 unit, was

equipped with a body cam that recorded movement under the house; this

was played for the jury and showed somebody placing something under the

house before crawling back inside. Eventually, the women exited the house,

officers lobbed tear gas into it, and Watkins crawled out a side window. He

then fled from the house, hopped a fence, and was caught by K-9 “Geus” in

debris near a fallen tree. Ofc. Peggy Elzie processed the scene, taking

photos and gathering evidence. Notably, she found a hole punched in the

floor of the house; under this, she seized a .22 caliber pistol, along with

many live rounds of .22 ammo inside the house.

The occupants of the house also testified. Shawanna Hughes, the

tenant, was in jail on a weapons charge at the time of trial. She testified
6

Watkins had come to stay with her a few weeks before the incident, and

even got mail delivered there, but he never had any money. Shortly before

the incident, Watkins told her somebody was coming over to sell him some

dogs, and he was going to “take something” from people to pay for them;

from this, she thought he needed money. The night of the incident, she

heard the explosion a few blocks away; shortly after that, Watkins and Tyron

came to her house, Watkins seeming nervous. Then, she gave Watkins some

money to go to the store, and he left on someone else’s (Eric Dorch’s)

bicycle. When the police pounded on her door, it was mass confusion, as

everybody inside was trying to hide their drugs. She said the holes in the

ceiling and floor were not there before the raid. She added that, shortly

before trial, Watkins called her from jail to say the reason she was in jail was

that “they” wanted her to testify against him.

Eric Dorch, who lives on SSI benefits and admitted being “a little

slow,” testified that he was also staying at Shawanna’s house and had seen

Watkins there with a .22 pistol. On the night of the incident, he rode there

on a bike; Watkins told him he “got two dead peoples in the car” and wanted

Dorch’s help to drive them away, dump the bodies, and then clean up the

car. When Dorch refused, Watkins took Dorch’s bike to go to the store,

carrying a jug “to get some gas.” Dorch testified he saw the surveillance

video from the Clark gas station and confirmed that it showed Watkins

riding up on his (Dorch’s) bike and putting gas in the container. When

Watkins got back, Tyron told Watkins to get out of the house, because “you

got a murder charge.” Dorch testified that he saw “them people’s phone” on

the couch next to Watkins, and that Watkins later sold it to somebody called

Bill Ester. Dorch added that he had his own phone with him at the house the
7

whole evening, and admitted he had previously told the defense he

remembered nothing about the incident.

Karinity Hughes, Shawanna’s daughter (and Watkins’s cousin),

testified that when police came to the house, it was a panic situation, with

everyone trying to hide their drugs. Watkins was “suicidal,” trying to hide

in the ceiling and under the floor, and saying he needed to run. Kareem

Hughes, Karinity’s father, testified that he did not see Watkins break into the

attic, but saw him fall out of it. Detrick Bates, Shawanna’s son, testified that

Watkins had come by earlier wearing a green hoodie, which he later put in

the washing machine. The final occupant of the house, Tyron “Black”

Bates, did not testify.

Two witnesses described Watkins’s efforts to buy a dog. Bryan

Adler, who was in jail on domestic abuse and child endangerment charges at

the time of trial, testified that on November 7, he had some pit bull rescue

puppies he wanted to sell. He drove to the Job Corps office to pick up his

daughter, and Watkins walked up to ask about the dogs, saying he would get

one once his girlfriend got home. They exchanged phone numbers and, later

that afternoon, Watkins called. Adler and his daughter loaded up the

puppies and drove to meet Watkins at a house on Penick Street. When they

got there, however, Watkins’s conduct was bizarre: he walked up to the side

of the truck and tried to open the door. When Adler would not let him in,

Watkins jumped into the bed of the truck, crossed to the other side, and then

hopped out, walking away down the street. Watkins called Adler again,

about 8:00 or 9:00 that night, asking Adler to meet him at a vacant house on

San Jacinto Street. However, as Adler was driving up and keeping Watkins

on the phone, Watkins grew suspicious that Adler might have somebody else
8

with him; at that point, Watkins “tripped” and told Adler he was running

from the cops. The next day, Watkins called Adler about 2:00 or 3:00 pm to

say he was stranded at Mall St. Vincent and needed a ride. By this point

Adler wanted nothing more to do with the situation and told Watkins he had

already sold all the puppies.

Adler’s daughter, Tyler Denmon, confirmed that she rode with her

dad to Penick Street that afternoon, where Watkins told them he wanted the

puppies for his “homegirl,” but he acted strangely. Further, she never saw

any money or any girlfriend.

Forensics evidence showed that Kelly and Heather were each killed

by a single .22 bullet to the back of the head. Carla White, a firearms

examiner with the North La. Crime Lab, found that the bullet in Heather’s

body had been fired from the RG .22 seized under the house at 3632 Penick

Street, and the bullet in Kelly’s body could not be excluded as being fired

from the same gun. Charles Menefee, a fire investigator with Shreveport

Fire Department, testified the fire in the Kia started inside the passenger

compartment and was intentionally set by an accelerant and a fire starter.

Dr. James Traylor, a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on Heather.

Somewhat morbidly, he testified he could not tell if she was yet dead from

the gunshot when she was incinerated.

The state also offered cell phone forensics. Linda Hollifield, an

investigator with the Caddo Parish DA’s office, used “Cellhawk” technology

to gather data from the phones of various people involved in the case.

Shannon Mack, an expert in cell phone forensics, traced Heather’s cell

moving from Mall St. Vincent at 8:31 pm, through the Queensborough area,

and terminating its signal at 9:08 pm. Ms. Mack further found that Tyron
9

“Black” Bates’s phone did not move between 8:34 pm and 9:30 pm; Eric

Dorch’s phone was at a location consistent with 3632 Penick Street between

8:00 pm and 11:55 pm; and Heather’s and Dorch’s phones did not intersect

at the relevant times.

Finally, Det. Thompson and Sgt. Willhite testified about their

interviews with Watkins, as noted above. The videos of the interviews were

played for the jury.

For the defense, Det. Jason Saiz, of SPD, testified that he stopped two

persons at the liquor store near where the bodies were found; one of these

was Bill Ester. Bill Ester testified that he was also at Shawanna’s house the

night of the incident, as was Tyron “Black” Bates. Watkins did not testify.

OBJECTION TO PATTERN JURY CHARGE

After the parties rested, the court had a bench conference regarding

the jury charge. The defense offered pattern instruction 5:1, regarding

voluntariness of statements, and asked that it be included.3 This provided:

If the state offers evidence of a statement by the
defendant, you must first determine whether the statement was
in fact made. You must then consider whether the statement, if
made, was accurately recorded or repeated.

If you find that defendant made a statement, you must
also determine the weight or value that the statement should be
accorded, if any. In determining the weight or value to be
accorded a statement made by the defendant, you should
consider all the circumstances under which the statement was
made. In making that determination, you should consider
whether the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without
the influence of fear, duress, threats, intimidation, inducement,
or promises.

3
The pattern is taken from Cheney C. Joseph Jr. & P. Raymond Lamonica, 17 La.
Civ. L. Treatise, Criminal Jury Instructions & Procedures, 3 ed., § 5.1 (Thomson Reuters
©2012).
10

The state objected to the italicized portion, arguing that it “goes to the

admissibility of the statement, which is the trial court’s determination, which

has already been made.” The state argued the jury is to assess only the

weight of the statement, not its admissibility.

The court agreed, saying the last sentence “may give the jury the

indication that they are to determine whether or not the statements were

freely and voluntarily made. That has already been litigated by the court and

* * * it may cause confusion to the jury as to their responsibility.” Over

defense objection, the court excised that portion from the pattern instruction.

VERDICT AND SENTENCE

After deliberating 1½ hours, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as

charged on both counts of first degree murder. On polling, the court found

the verdict was unanimous.

Watkins filed several posttrial motions, including one for downward

departure from the mandatory life sentences. The court held a sentencing

hearing in October 2022, at which it received testimony from Heather’s

father and sister and from Kelly’s daughter, Abby. The defense called no

witnesses, but counsel argued that Watkins suffered from a mild mental

disability and was the father of three children. The court imposed the

mandatory life sentences and ordered them to be served consecutively.

Watkins has appealed, raising three assignments of error.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence, Identification

By his first assignment of error, Watkins urges the state failed to

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the exclusion of every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence in this circumstantial evidence case; it
11

also failed to negate the reasonable probability of misidentification beyond a

reasonable doubt. He cites the standard of appellate review, Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), the state’s burden to negate

any reasonable probability of misidentification, State v. Bright, 98-0398 (La.

4/11/00), 776 So. 2d 1134, and the state’s burden, in a circumstantial case, to

exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, La. R.S. 15:548.

He argues the case against him was purely circumstantial, with no

eyewitnesses, no video, and no fingerprints or DNA at the scene. He

contends the evidence showed only that the victims accepted a ride with him

at 8:30 pm, and their bodies were discovered at 11:48 pm, but there was

little about their movement, other than video showing Heather’s car at the

Chase Bank around 9:30 pm. He concedes he is the person on the video at

the gas station around 11:30 pm but argues this shows him in no hurry –

conduct inconsistent with trying to cover up a crime – and shows him on a

white or orange bike, putting gas in a clear jug, and wearing a gray or white

hoodie – all points inconsistent with trial testimony.

He suggests the killer could have been Billy Moton or Bill Ester, both

of whom were detained by police at the liquor store two hours after the

bodies were discovered. In support, he shows that Moton was pushing a

black bike and Ester was wearing a dark hoodie, items that witnesses

described on the fleeing suspect; also, Heather’s phone was later discovered

at Moton’s house. Watkins suggests this is “strong circumstantial evidence”

that Moton and Ester were the killers. He also suggests it could have been

Tyron “Black” Bates, a known drug dealer and gun thief who lived at

Shawanna’s house and spent a lot of time at the vacant house where the

bodies were found. Finally, he suggests it could have been Eric Dorch, an
12

associate of Bates’s, whose phone pinged in an area consistent with the

Chase Bank ATM and who eluded the police for five months after this

crime.

He proposes that after Heather and Kelly dropped him off at a house

in Queensborough, one of these other people could have carjacked them or

got in the car with them, and this prospect is strong enough to overcome the

circumstantial case against Watkins.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, supra; State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert.

denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604 (2004). The Jackson standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517; State v. Galloway, 55,591 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), __ So.

3d __.

The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

13

doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Galloway, supra.

Likewise, if a case rests essentially on circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438. The appellate court will review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution and determine whether an alternative hypothesis

is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09),

1 So. 3d 417; State v. Galloway, supra.

Where there is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the

resolution of which depends on a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982); State v. Galloway,

supra. The appellate court neither assesses the credibility of witnesses nor

reweighs evidence. State v. Kelly, 15-0484 (La. 6/29/16), 195 So. 3d 449;

State v. Galloway, supra. Rather, the reviewing court affords great

deference to the jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness

in whole or in part. State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So. 2d 66,

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125 S. Ct. 658 (2004); State v. Galloway, supra.

In a case where a defendant claims he was not the person who

committed the offense, the Jackson standard requires the prosecution to

negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Young, 20-

01041 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 356; State v. Galloway, supra.

We have closely reviewed the evidence, which is extensive and at

times digressive. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it

shows that Watkins had no money on November 7, 2018, when he
14

approached Brian Adler in an apparent effort to rob him, luring him to 3458

Penick St., the same place where the charred bodies of Heather and Kelly

were later found. Watkins followed this plan to return his victims to that

house on November 8. He spotted and followed the victims at Mall St.

Vincent, and then approached them just outside the mall. The victims were

last seen alive with Watkins. Heather was forced to withdraw $800 from a

Chase Bank ATM on Greenwood Road, an act captured on video showing

Kelly lying dead on the console of their Kia and some person visible in the

back seat. Both victims were killed by a single gunshot wound to the head.

The bullet from Heather’s body was forensically matched with the .22

caliber revolver recovered under the house at 3632 Penick St., where

Watkins was arrested. The gun was found in the hole through the floor

opened and used only by Watkins; officers saw Watkins reach under the

house and place some object there. One of the other occupants of the house,

Eric Dorch, identified the gun as one he saw in Watkins’s possession. Dorch

also testified Watkins tried to pay him to help remove prints from the car

with two dead people in it. When Dorch would not agree, Watkins

borrowed his bike, ostensibly to get something to eat. Dorch stated that

Watkins rode away on his bike with a backpack and a fruit punch jug; he

identified Watkins as the person seen on the gas station video, riding his

(Dorch’s) bike. A man on a bike was seen leaving the scene of the fire with

a gasoline jug; forensics experts identified gasoline as the accelerant used to

burn the victims’ bodies. Dorch also testified Watkins had “them people’s

phone” and a wallet with him on the night of the incident. Cell phone data

excluded the phones of Dorch and of Tyron “Black” Bates from intersecting

with Heather’s phone at the operative times. After the SWAT team
15

surrounded the house at 3632 Penick St., and used tear gas to flush out

Watkins, he fled in an effort to avoid apprehension. From this synopsis of

the evidence, we find the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt every

essential element of two counts of second degree murder.

Because the identity of the offender was contested, the state was

required to negate the reasonable probability of misidentification, State v.

Bright, supra. Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence

easily met this standard. Watkins was the last person seen with the victims

alive; later, he sought help to dispose of the bodies and clean up the car.

These circumstances are highly incriminating. State v. Quinn, 19-00647

(La. 9/9/20), 340 So. 3d 829, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1406, 209 L. Ed. 2d

139 (2021). The gun that fired the lethal shots was identified as one being

carried by Watkins; occupants of the house saw him punch a hole in the

floor, through which police officers saw him reach and deposit something

under the house. People in the house saw Watkins with “them people’s

phone.” Watkins left the house carrying a container; he was seen buying

gasoline at the Clark gas station; gasoline was the accelerant used in the fire.

After police surrounded Shawanna’s house and used tear gas to flush

Watkins out, he fled and concealed himself. These are all markers of

Watkins’s guilt. State v. Trammell, 46,725 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/9/11), 78 So.

3d 205, writ denied, 12-0053 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1269. These

circumstances easily excluded any reasonable probability of

misidentification.

As in any case of this size and complexity, and using the testimony of

sometimes unwilling witnesses, there are minor gaps and inconsistencies in

the narrative. For instance, some witnesses thought the bike Watkins was
16

riding did not match Dorch’s bike, but Dorch clearly identified it as his own.

There was inconsistency whether Watkins was carrying a clear, fruit-juice

container to fill with gasoline, or a more conventional red plastic gas can.

There was testimony that later in the evening Watkins was not wearing the

same hoodie and pants that he was seen wearing at the mall when he left

with the Joses. These small evidentiary “problems” do not diminish the

thrust of the state’s case and do not create a reasonable hypothesis of

innocence.

Watkins’s effort to shift the blame to other people is equally

unavailing. A possible hypothesis is not sufficient, State v. Captville, 448

So. 2d 676 (La. 1984). Watkins’s hypothesis is that all he did was to stalk

the Joses, ask to borrow their phone, accept a ride with them, and they

dropped him off somewhere in Queensborough; then, some other person or

persons hopped in their car, carjacked them, forced them to drive him to the

ATM and withdraw money, and then shot them and incinerated the bodies;

but then, in spite having no involvement in the actual crimes, it was Watkins

who solicited help to dispose of the bodies, went to get gasoline, and tried to

hide the gun under the house. This does not approach a reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. Notably, aside from the fact that Moton and Ester

were detained by police at a nearby gas station shortly after the incident,

there is no other evidence placing them in contact or proximity with the

victims. Ester was in possession of Heather’s phone, but Dorch testified

Watkins sold it to him. Forensic evidence showed that Tyron “Black”

Bates’s phone did not move between 8:34 and 9:30 pm the night of the

crime, and Dorch’s phone was in a location “consistent” with Shawanna’s

17

house from 8:00 to 11:55 pm; these findings make their participation purely

theoretical.

The state proved every element of the offense and the identity of the

offender beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Admissibility of Statements

By his second assignment of error, Watkins urges the court erred in

finding his statements to be voluntary and allowing them into evidence

where there was evidence of threats, intoxication, and low intellectual

ability. He cites the state’s burden to prove the defendant received his

Miranda rights, understood them, and knowingly waived them, State v.

Lewis, 53,122 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 661, and to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that any confession was free and voluntary, State

v. Hills, 354 So. 2d 186 (La. 1977). He asserts the statements did not admit

guilt but were nonetheless prejudicial.

Factually, he argues that his expert, Dr. Sawyer, established a

longstanding mild intellectual disability and that officers used deception,

evasion, and threats. While the officers took off his handcuffs and gave him

water, he argues no exigent circumstances existed for interviewing him

predawn, they did not advise him of the reason for his arrest until an hour

into the interview, and they did not even use the word “murder” until 3:54

am; they used terms like “death penalty” and “needle” at least four times.

He argues the totality of the circumstances rendered his initial statement

inadmissible, State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 382, and

giving him his Miranda rights only mid-interview was “ineffective,”

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
18

Regarding the second statement, he argues he thought he “had to”

talk, the officers made no attempt to find out if he had a lawyer, they gave

him a rights form but made no attempt to see that he truly understood it; in

short, he did not understand the situation. He argues that diminished mental

capacity is a factor in assessing the statement, State v. Deidrich, 19-1481

(La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 489, the court should consider the totality of the

circumstances, State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So. 2d 485,

and anyone with an IQ between 50 and 69 cannot waive Miranda, State v.

Anderson, 379 So. 2d 735 (La. 1980). He also argues the court should not

have relied on Dr. Lobrano’s view of his relative competence, as that doctor

never actually examined Watkins and he should not have counted his prior

Boykin hearings as proof that he understood his Miranda rights.4

Before a confession can be introduced in evidence, the state must

affirmatively show that it was free and voluntary and not made under the

influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or

promises. La. R.S. 15:451; State v. Sparks, 88-1107 (La. 5/11/11), 68 So. 3d

435, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2023); State v. Lewis,

53,122 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 661, writ not cons., 20-00410

(La. 5/3/22), 337 So. 3d 156. The state must also establish that an accused

who makes a statement during custodial interrogation was first advised of

his Miranda rights and that he understood and knowingly waived those

rights. State v. Deidrich, supra; State v. Lewis, supra. The Miranda

warnings must inform the person in custody that he has the right to remain

silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he

4
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
19

has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. State

v. Hunt, 09-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So. 3d 746; State v. Lewis, supra.

A confession obtained by any direct or implied promises, however

slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence must be considered

involuntary and inadmissible. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 97 S. Ct. 202

(1976); State v. Lewis, supra. However, a mild exhortation to tell the truth,

or a remark that if the defendant cooperates the officer will “do what he can”

or “things will go easier,” will not negate the voluntary nature of a

confession. State v. Blank, 04-0204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So. 2d 90, cert.

denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S. Ct. 494 (2007); State v. Lewis, supra. The test

of voluntariness is whether the confession was the product of an essentially

free and unconstrained choice by its maker; it is assessed on a case-by-case

basis under a totality-of-the-circumstances standard. Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973); State v. Lewis, supra. In

addition to age, some factors that have been considered in assessing the

totality of the circumstances include the accused’s experience, education,

background, intelligence, and capacity to understand the warning given at

the time of the waiver. State v. Fernandez, supra.

Moderate mental retardation and low intelligence or illiteracy do not

of themselves vitiate the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive

constitutional rights and make a free and voluntary statement. State v.

Deidrich, supra; State v. Tart, 93-0772 (La. 2/9/96), 672 So. 2d 116, cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S. Ct. 310 (1996). The critical question is

whether the defendant has the capacity to understand his constitutional rights

and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive them.

20

The admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial court.

State v. Hunt, supra. The trial court’s conclusions on the credibility and

weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the defendant’s

confession are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless they

are not supported by reliable evidence. State v. Deidrich, supra. Testimony

of the interviewing officer alone may be sufficient to prove that the

statement was free and voluntary. State v. Lewis, supra, and citations

therein. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress a

statement, the reviewing court is not limited to the evidence adduced at the

suppression hearing, but may consider all pertinent evidence adduced at

trial. State v. Sparks, supra; State v. Lewis, supra.

The most significant evidence was the videotape of the interviews

themselves. In the first interview, officers entered at 3:46 am, asked

Watkins if he knew why he was being questioned, then asked about his

health, identified themselves, asked if he was on drugs or alcohol, and, at

3:54, advised him why he was being questioned. Contrary to the assertion in

brief, we do not find a delay of “over half an hour” before advising him of

the purpose of the interview. At this point, Watkins had made no statements

about the case; officers did not extract a confession first and give Miranda

later, as occurred in Missouri v. Seibert, supra. Moreover, Sgt. Willhite

advised him early on, “I have to read you your rights before I talk to you

about it.” The transcript shows that officers ascertained Watkins’s level of

understanding, and the fact that he was not impaired, before giving him his

Miranda rights. This was totally appropriate. State v. Blank, supra. We

find no denial of Watkins’s Miranda rights.

21

Watkins strongly argues the officers used deception, evasion, and

threats; for instance, Det. Thompson told him, “That’s what’s gonna

determine, you know, if you’re gonna get the death penalty or just whether

you’re gonna spend the rest of your life in jail. I mean, it’s up to you.”

However, this was after Watkins denied he had been at the mall in the past

few days, a claim refuted by surveillance video. Det. Thompson’s remarks

were merely admonitions to tell the truth and, if he did so, his outcome

might be better. This interrogation method is perfectly permissible, State v.

Blank, supra; State v. Lewis. We find no promises, direct or implied, or any

improper influence.

The second interview was initiated by Watkins, and Sgt. Willhite

immediately told him, “I’m gonna go back to your rights? You know what

you’re here for.” After reading him the Miranda card, she asked, “No[w],

with this understanding and waive [sic] those rights, do you want to take –

make a statement and talk about this with me and Det. Thompson?”

Watkins responded, “Yes, ma’am.” The record shows a timely delivery of

Miranda rights, a clear waiver, no promises, direct or implied, and no

improper influence.

Watkins’s principal argument is that his expert, Dr. Sawyer, found a

mild intellectual disability, a full-scale IQ of 64, a historical range of 55 to

62, a first- or second-grade reading level, and speech and language

difficulties going back to 1996. Dr. Sawyer concluded that Watkins could

not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. By contrast, he

asserts, Dr. Lobrano never personally examined Watkins, relied solely on

old data, and “cherry-picked” information from earlier reports to reach the

opposite conclusion. Of course, the trial court’s decision to accept the view
22

of one expert over another is subject to great discretion. State v. Sparks,

supra; State v. Lewis, supra. It is noteworthy that the district court watched

the videos and saw that Watkins, though defensive and reluctant, was not the

borderline defective depicted by Dr. Sawyer. It is also notable that Dr.

Sawyer disregarded the recurring diagnosis of malingering that permeated

Watkins’s psychiatric record. Dr. Lobrano also testified that Watkins had

been through 21 prior arrests and, from this experience, appeared to be very

familiar with the process. On this record, we cannot say the district court

abused its discretion in denying the motions to suppress the custodial

statements. This argument lacks merit.

Denial of Pattern Jury Charge

By his second assignment of error, Watkins further urges the district

court erred in denying his jury charge on the determination of the weight to

be given to the statements. As noted, he requested pattern jury charge 5:1,

which included, “In making that determination, you should consider whether

the statement was made freely and voluntarily without influence of fear,

duress, threats, intimidation, inducements, or promises.” He contends that

this charge required no qualification, limitation, or explanation, La. C. Cr. P.

art. 807, and he was entitled to offer evidence of the circumstances

surrounding the confession, State v. Williams, 01-1650 (La. 11/1/02), 831

So. 2d 835; State v. Cope, 48,739 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 137 So. 3d 151,

writ denied, 14-1008 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 440. The proposed charge,

he argues, would have allowed the jury to consider the level of

psychological intimidation exerted by the officers and the general

“mishandling” of the statements. Specifically, he contends the jury should

have been allowed to consider whether he was, or believed he was, coerced,
23

threatened, or induced to make the statement. Finally, he submits this

cannot be harmless error, as the verdict was not “surely unattributable to the

error,” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967); State v.

Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 368.

The state and the defendant have the right before argument to submit

to the court special written charges for the jury. A requested charge “shall

be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or

explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent.” La. C. Cr. P. art. 807;

State v. Perkins, 13-1917 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So. 3d 206; State v. Haire,

55,289 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 230. The charge, however,

must be supported by the evidence. State v. Perkins, supra; State v. Haire,

supra. Failure to give a requested jury charge constitutes reversible error

only when there is a miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights

of the accused, or a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 921; State v. Perkins, supra; State v. Haire, supra.

Pattern charge 5:1 apparently encompasses the notion that the jury is

not absolutely barred from considering an involuntary statement. Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). This court has

previously approved the use of pattern charge 5:1, as written. State v. Grady,

47,622 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13), 108 So. 3d 845, writ denied, 13-0294 (La.

10/4/13), 122 So. 3d 551. In Grady, however, the defendant did not argue

that the jury could use the circumstances of the statement to overrule the

court’s finding as to admissibility.

Here, the court found the contested language “may give the jury the

indication that they are to determine whether or not the statements were

freely and voluntarily made.” Finding this was a legal determination to be
24

made by the court, not by the jury, the court struck the contested language.

The remaining charge correctly advised the jury to determine the weight or

value the statement should be accorded, if any, and to consider “all the

circumstances under which the statement was made.” On these particular

facts, we detect no abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the statements contained no confession or admission of

guilt. At worst, they showed Watkins changing his story, admitting certain

peripheral details, and sounding perhaps evasive or uncandid. Given the

strength of the state’s case, we find the verdict was surely unattributable to

the use of Watkins’s statements. Chapman v. California, supra; State v.

Seals, supra. This argument lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

By his third assignment of error, Watkins urges that his consecutive

sentences are excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment. He concedes that

life without benefits is mandatory for noncapital first degree murder, La.

R.S. 14:30 (C)(2), but argues that even a sentence within statutory limits

may still violate a defendant’s constitutional right against excessive

punishment, State v. Kennon, 19-00998 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So. 3d 881.

Chiefly, he argues that concurrent sentences are the rule for offenses that

arise out of the same act or transaction, or constitute parts of a common

scheme or plan, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883; State v. Gaspard, 09-1516 (La. App. 3

Cir. 10/13/10), 49 So. 3d 971. While any homicide is violent, he asserts a

gunshot wound to the head is “instant,” and the burning of the bodies,

“though grotesque,” was postmortem and caused no additional pain. He

submits these facts warrant concurrent, instead of consecutive, sentences.

25

Review of sentences for excessiveness is usually a two-prong process,

the first prong being a check of the trial court’s compliance with the

guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. However, when there is a mandatory

sentence, there is no need for the trial court to justify, under Art. 894.1, the

sentence it is legally required to impose. State v. Parker, 54,947 (La. App. 2

Cir. 3/1/23), 358 So. 3d 220, writ denied, 23-00417 (La. 10/3/23), 370 So.

3d 1073, and citations therein. The mandatory sentence for noncapital first

degree murder is life at hard labor without benefits, R.S. 14:30 (C)(2). A

defendant may attempt to rebut the presumption that a mandatory minimum

sentence is constitutional, but he must show, clearly and convincingly,

“because of unusual circumstances, he is a victim of the legislature’s failure

to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the

offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.”

State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672; State v. Parker,

supra. The mere fact that a defendant’s criminal history is nonviolent does

not meet this burden. State v. Wilson, 01-2815 (La. 11/22/02), 836 So. 2d 2.

Watkins’s criminal history, though nonviolent, is extensive; his mild mental

disability and parental status do not strike us as justifying a downward

departure from the mandatory life sentence.

The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates

La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the

crime or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and

suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno,

384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). When two or more convictions arise from the

same act or transaction, or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the

terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently “unless the court
26

expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively.” La. C. Cr. P. art.

883. However, concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of

conduct are not mandatory, and consecutive sentences are not necessarily

excessive. State v. Jamison, 55,361 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/29/23), 375 So. 3d

619, and citations therein.

In imposing sentence, the court took judicial notice of Watkins’s

mental health, but found this negated by the facts of the crime:

[T]he victims were tortured by the defendant with the
wife, * * * as we could see on the bank cameras at the ATM,
that the husband appeared to be already deceased being shot by
the defendant and having the wife drive around * * * and
continue to drive to the bank with her husband lying deceased
in the car. * * *

[W]hen the victims were found, it caused a tremendous
amount of suffering on the [survivors,] and I believe that they
will be suffering for the rest of their lives on this matter.

The crime itself was committed in such a cruel and
heinous and violent nature and this is all after the victims totally
complied with the defendant and were attempting to help the
defendant because they were sympathetic to him and he simply
stalked them, as we could see on video, picked them out,
recognizing their kindness and targeted that particular family.

The defendant showed no mercy toward the victim[s].
The victims were in terror, I suppose, as this was going on,
knowing what could happen, but the defendant, without
remorse, carried out to the fullest extent and even went further
by buying gasoline, setting the car on fire with the victims
inside, possibly one victim may still have been alive at the time.

These reasons amply justify the selection of consecutive sentences for

these offenses. Nothing in the record supports concurrent sentences. To the

contrary, this record supports the finding of Watkins’s utter disregard for the

dignity of human life. He is one of the worst offenders. There was no abuse

of discretion.

This assignment lacks merit.

27

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

28