State of Louisiana v. Larrry James Rainey

Judgment rendered July 17, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,709-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LARRY JAMES RAINEY Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Thirty-Ninth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Red River, Louisiana
Trial Court No. C220227

Honorable Luke D. Mitchell, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

JULIE C. JONES Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

R. BENNETT LANGFORD, III
Assistant District Attorney

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Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Larry Rainey, who struck his girlfriend’s 16-year-old daughter with a

metal pipe, appeals his conviction of domestic abuse battery in violation of

La. R.S. 14:35.3(P). We affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On August 5, 2022, Rainey, his girlfriend, Felicia Henderson, and her

daughter, KD, were attending a party at a home in Coushatta in Red River

Parish. When Rainey tried to leave the party in Henderson’s vehicle after

she had told him that he could not drive it to get cigarettes, he backed into a

utility pole and caused damage to the vehicle. KD and other partygoers

began yelling at Rainey for what he had done. Rainey struck KD and

Henderson with a metal pipe. KD, who was hit once in the face, required

medical attention for a broken jaw.

Rainey was charged by an amended bill of information with (1) one

count of domestic abuse battery on KD by the intentional use of force or

violence with a dangerous weapon and by intentionally inflicting serious

bodily injury in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(P) by one household member

upon another, (2) one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle

belonging to Henderson in violation of La. R.S. 14:68.4, and (3) one count

of domestic abuse battery by the intentional use of force or violence with a

dangerous weapon upon Henderson in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(O) by

one household member upon another.

Trial

A jury trial began on May 3, 2023. Sergent Kenton Lacaze with the

Coushatta Police Department testified that he responded to a call on August

5, 2022, concerning a vehicle crash. When he arrived at the scene, he saw a

large group of people in the yard around Rainey. He observed Rainey

swinging a metal pipe that was two to three feet long.

Sgt. Lacaze heard what sounded like the pipe hitting something two to

three times. Rainey then ran toward him. Sgt. Lacaze found Rainey to be

cooperative, but he recalled that Rainey cursed at him. After Rainey was

detained, Henderson ran toward Rainey to attack him and screamed that he

had hit her child. Sgt. Lacaze used pepper spray to subdue Henderson.

Sgt. Lacaze recalled that Henderson told him that KD had “run up” to

Rainey at some point. KD, who said she was hurting badly, was transported

to the hospital.

Officer John Lacaze, Jr., who was also with the Coushatta Police

Department, testified that when he arrived on the scene, he saw Rainey in

the yard with a large group of people. Rainey was holding a metal pipe in

his hand. Officer Lacaze seized the pipe from Rainey and detained him.

Rainey did not give him any trouble. It was not long after Officer Lacaze

seized the pipe that Henderson ran toward them and tried to take the pipe.

Officer Lacaze testified that KD was transported to the hospital for

treatment. She was bleeding from the corner of her mouth and was crying

from pain.

Felicia Henderson testified that at the time of the incident, she lived

with Rainey, who was her boyfriend, and KD, who was her daughter. She

and Rainey arrived at the party in separate vehicles, with Rainey driving her

2004 Ford Expedition. When she heard Rainey say that he was leaving to

get cigarettes, she told him not to take her vehicle and argued with him about

not going to the store beforehand. She did not want him to leave in her

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Expedition because she thought he was drunk. Henderson testified that

everyone at the party had been drinking.

Henderson acknowledged that she became angry with Rainey after he

hit the pole. She denied telling officers that KD had “run up” on Rainey

because she did not witness what occurred. When she heard that KD was on

the ground, she went outside. She saw that KD was unconscious and ran to

where she was to find out what had happened. Rainey then struck her on the

head and arm. She fell, but then she got up and went after Rainey because

he had hit KD. According to Henderson, KD had two plates inserted in her

jaw.

Henderson agreed that KD and Rainey did not get along very well. If

they were arguing, KD would get up in Rainey’s face. Henderson also

agreed there was a large group of people outside after Rainey hit the pole.

Andrika Demery hosted the party where the incident took place. She

heard Henderson tell Rainey not to take her vehicle to get cigarettes.

Henderson told him to drive her vehicle home instead and then she would

get him. Demery witnessed Rainey hit the pole. She was angry with him

because she was worried it would cause an issue with her landlord and she

would have to pay for the damages. She recalled that there were several

people outside yelling at Rainey after the accident.

Demery testified that KD walked to the truck and told Rainey to get

out of it. They argued after Rainey left the truck, and then KD jumped at

him. When KD flexed at Rainey, he hit her once in the face with the pipe

and she fell. Demery went to check on KD, who was on the ground crying.

Meanwhile, Henderson was away from the vehicle as Demery’s brother tried

to calm her. When Henderson learned that KD had been hit, she ran toward
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Rainey and confronted him. Henderson and Rainey then began arguing.

She heard Henderson say that Rainey hit her, but she did not see that occur

as she was focused on KD. An ambulance transported KD to the hospital.

KD testified that she was 16 years old on August 5, 2022. She and

her mother lived with Rainey. Henderson told Rainey to drive the vehicle

home and then she would get him. Rainey asked her mother if he could

drive her vehicle to go to the store, but she said no. After Rainey hit the

pole, KD got into it with him and told him to give her the keys. She did not

recall if she got up in his face. Rainey then came at her with the pipe and

knocked her out. She was unconscious for a few seconds, then felt extreme

pain. Her left mandible was broken, which required the insertion of screws

and two plates. It took almost eight weeks for her injury to heal.

KD acknowledged that she and Rainey did not always get along.

They would get into arguments, and she would also support her mother

when the couple argued. On one occasion, she hit Rainey with an ashtray.

She also acknowledged that there were a lot of people at Demery’s home for

the party and that everyone had been drinking. She recalled that Demery

and her husband were mad at Rainey because they were concerned the

damage to the pole would cause problems with their landlord.

After the prosecution rested, Rainey testified on his own behalf. He

stated that as soon as he got out of the truck after hitting the pole, Henderson

began yelling at him about the damage. KD joined the argument and began

telling her mother what to do about the situation. Rainey recalled that

multiple people were around him, and they started telling him that they were

going to kick his ass. Those people, which included adult men, were related

to Henderson and were trying to get to him. He became concerned for his
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safety, so he grabbed the pipe and told them that he would hit them if they

came at him. He started swinging the pipe as they steadily came upon him,

but he did not realize that he had struck someone.

Describing what happened on August 5, Rainey testified, “So, next

thing I know she done ran all the way up on me. So, bam, boom, I done hit

her and her momma.” Nevertheless, Rainey insisted that he did not try to

intentionally break KD’s jaw and really did not even try to hit her. He added

that he felt the need to defend himself because everyone was angry with him

and he had people coming upon him. He believed that defending himself

with a pipe was reasonable because he was concerned for his safety from the

crowd of angry people around him.

Rainey claimed that he did not know it was Henderson when he

swung the pipe at her because it was nighttime. He also claimed that he did

not know it was KD that he had hit until he made contact. He just saw

someone coming at him and then he swung the pipe. He did not hit anyone

else in the crowd.

Rainey testified that he and KD had had issues before August 5, and

she had hit him on a prior occasion with a candle holder, which caused

stitches and a scar. However, he agreed that he did not need a metal pipe to

defend himself from a 16-year-old girl.

The jury rendered a verdict finding Rainey guilty of domestic abuse

battery with a dangerous weapon with serious bodily injury. He was found

not guilty of the other two charges. Although defense counsel declined the

opportunity to have the jury polled, the jury foreperson responded in the

affirmative when the trial court asked him if everyone agreed with the

verdict.
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On July 31, 2023, Rainey’s trial counsel filed motions for a new trial

and for a post verdict judgment of acquittal. Both motions were denied.

Rainey was sentenced to 11 years at hard labor. A motion to

reconsider sentence was denied.

DISCUSSION

Rainey argues on appeal that his conviction must be reversed because

he established by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-

defense. He argues in the alternative that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence

failed to show that he specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury to

KD.

Self-defense

Rainey maintains that his claim of self-defense was established

through Sgt. Lacaze’s testimony that: (1) Rainey was surrounded while

swinging the pipe, (2) Rainey ran toward him and surrendered the pipe, and

(3) he used pepper spray to prevent Henderson from attacking Rainey.

The burden of proving self-defense in a nonhomicide case rests with

the defendant to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Barron, 51,491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/17), 243 So. 3d 1178, writ

denied, 17-1529 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1063. The use of force or violence

upon the person of another is justifiable in a nonhomicide case “[w]hen

committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the

person . . . provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and

apparently necessary to prevent such offense. La. R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(a).

In a nonhomicide situation, a claim of self-defense is subject to a two-

part inquiry. State v. Barron, supra; State v. Lynn, 55,210 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6

2/28/24), 380 So. 3d 812. First, there is an objective inquiry into whether

the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Second, there is

a subjective inquiry into whether the force used was apparently necessary.

Id.

Rainey contends that the undisputed evidence showed that he was

surrounded by a crowd of angry people, including adults and teenagers who

had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day, and that he swung the pipe

around after warning the mob that he would defend himself. Rainey

maintains that his limited use of force was followed by a retreat to police

officers and the surrender of the pipe to them.

We disagree with Rainey’s assessment of the evidence. There is no

doubt that the partygoers were angry after Rainey wrecked Henderson’s

vehicle. However, Rainey decided to arm himself with a pipe of significant

heft and length against what was apparently an unarmed crowd, and the two

people who were struck just happened to be his girlfriend and her daughter.

Moreover, the jury could have viewed Rainey running to the police as him

escaping a crowd that was no longer angry just about the accident, but also

angry about Rainey having struck a teen-aged girl with a metal pipe. In

addition, the jury could have considered Henderson’s conduct that led to her

being pepper sprayed as no longer just her reaction to the damage to her car

but as a mother’s reaction upon learning what had happened to her daughter.

The force used was not reasonable under the circumstances, nor was it

apparently necessary. The jury correctly rejected Rainey’s claim of self-

defense.

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Sufficiency of the evidence

Rainey argues the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury to KD. He maintains

there was no evidence that he intentionally struck KD, that he intended to

cause serious physical injury to her, or that he intended to hit her on the head

or on any specific part of her body.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.

C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.

State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie,

43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La.

11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),

775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d

62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v.

Green, 49,741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. A reviewing court

accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony

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of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of

a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something.

State v. Lilly, 468 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Alexander, 51,918 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 981, writ denied, 18-0805 (La. 2/11/19),

263 So. 3d 436. Circumstantial evidence provides proof of collateral facts

and circumstances, from which the existence of the main fact may be

inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, supra;

State v. Alexander, supra. When the state relies on circumstantial evidence

to establish the existence of an essential element of a crime, the court must

assume every fact that the evidence tends to prove and the circumstantial

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; State v. Lilly, supra; State v. Green, supra. Specific intent may be

established by circumstantial evidence alone if every reasonable hypothesis

of innocence is excluded. State v. Mosley, 46,756 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/16/11), 80 So. 3d 1164, writ denied, 12-0117 (La. 5/4/12), 88 So. 3d 462.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Robinson,

50,643 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 717, writ denied, 16-1479 (La.

5/19/17), 221 So. 3d 78; State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08),

975 So. 2d 753.

Domestic abuse battery is the intentional use of force or violence

committed by one household member or family member upon the person of
9

another household member or family member. La. R.S. 14:35.3(A). Rainey

was convicted under Subparagraph (P), which states:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the
intentional use of force or violence is committed with a
dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts
serious bodily injury, the offender, in addition to other penalties
imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard
labor for not more than fifteen years.

La. R.S. 14:35.3(P).

Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the

circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1).

Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Walker, 53,975 (La. App.

2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334 (La. 11/23/21), 328

So. 3d 83. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a

criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of this determination is to

be guided by the standards of Jackson v. Virginia. Id.

Appellate counsel contends that the state was required to prove that

Rainey specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury. In support of

this position, counsel refers to the crime of second degree battery, which,

like La. R.S. 14:35.3(P), has the same element of “intentionally inflicts

serious bodily injury.”1

Second degree battery is a specific intent crime; therefore, the

evidence must show that the defendant intended to inflict serious bodily

injury. State v. Fuller, 414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982); State v. Walker, supra.

1
Second degree battery is defined as “a battery when the offender intentionally
inflicts serious bodily injury[.]” La. R.S. 14:34.1(A).
10

We note that under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant can be

convicted for the unintentional injury of one person if he specifically

intended to injure someone else. See State v. Creel, 2014-0680 (La. App. 1

Cir. 12/23/14), 2014 WL 7332121.

While Rainey claimed that he only swung the pipe in order to keep

those threatening him at bay, the only two people struck happened to be his

girlfriend and her daughter, KD, who suffered a serious injury to her jaw

from the blow. Rainey struck no one else who was supposedly threatening

him. The evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt

that when Rainey swung the pipe, he had the specific intent to inflict serious

bodily injury.

Rainey further argues that the trial court did not instruct the jury that

the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the

specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on KD. We disagree.

First, the trial court’s instructions to the jury were sufficient. The trial

court told the jurors that to convict Rainey of the charged offense, they must

find that Rainey “had a specific intent to commit domestic abuse battery

with a dangerous weapon inflicting serious bodily injury.” (Emphasis

added.)

Second, nothing in the record indicates that trial counsel objected to

the jury instructions. Regarding the contemporaneous objection rule and

jury instructions, this court has stated:

A party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give a
jury charge or any portion thereof unless an objection thereto is
made before the jury retires or within such time as the court
may reasonably cure the alleged error. La. C. Cr. P. art.
801(C). However, jury instructions may be reviewed on appeal
even without a contemporaneous objection when the alleged
error violates a fundamental right. State v. Roth, 52,359 (La.
11

App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1230. To fall under the
exception, the error must cast substantial doubt on the
reliability of the fact-finding process. State v. Matthews,
50,838 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 895, writ denied,
16-1678 (La. 6/5/17), 220 So. 3d 752. An invalid instruction on
the elements of an offense is harmless if the evidence is
otherwise sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and the jury
would have reached the same result if it had never heard the
erroneous instruction. State v. Matthews, supra.

State v. Kelly, 52,731, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 855, 861,

writ denied, 19-01845 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So. 3d 1071. We discern no error in

the jury instructions, and if there were one, it was harmless.

CONCLUSION

Rainey’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

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