Effie Bearden and Randy Bearden v. K & A of Monroe, LLC

Judgment rendered July 17, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,746-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

EFFIE BEARDEN AND RANDY Plaintiffs-Appellants
BEARDEN

versus

K & A OF MONROE, LLC, ET AL Defendants-Appellees

*****
Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Union, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 49471

Honorable Thomas Wynn Rogers, Judge

*****
LAW OFFICE OF TRACY WAYNE Counsel for Appellants,
HOUCK, LLC Effie Bearden and Randy
By: Tracy Wayne Houck Bearden

SMITH LAW OFFICES
By: Michael R. Smith

DAVENPORT, FILES & KELLY, LLP Counsel for Appellees,
By: Martin Shane Craighead K & A of Monroe, LLC,
and ANPAC Louisiana
Insurance Company

LAW OFFICE OF SARAH MURPHY BARRO Counsel for Appellee,
By: Candace Rachelle LeBlanc The Artesian Water
Company, Inc.

*****
Before STONE, COX, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STONE, J.

This civil appeal arises from the Third Judicial District Court, the

Honorable Thomas Rogers presiding. The plaintiffs are Effie Bearden and

her husband Randy Bearden. They brought this suit claiming damages for

personal injury to Mrs. Bearden (and for Mr. Bearden’s resultant loss of

consortium) resulting from her alleged slip and fall accident outside a gas

station. The defendants are: (1) K&A of Monroe, LLC, the gas station

owner/operator; (2) bagged ice vendor, Reddy Ice, LLC; (3) another bagged

ice vendor, The Artesian Water Company, Inc.; and (4) their insurers. The

trial court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs’ claims against the gas

station owner/operator, K&A of Monroe (the “store”), via a motion for

summary judgment (“MSJ”). The plaintiffs appeal that judgment. For the

reasons stated herein, we affirm.

FACTS

In July of 2019, Mrs. Bearden fell on a walkway adjacent to the outer

wall of a convenience store in Farmerville, Louisiana, as she walked in front

of a freezer used to store bagged ice. The fall occurred near the doorway

into the store. She filed suit alleging that there was a puddle in front of the

freezer, and that is why she slipped and fell. In her deposition, she drew an

“X” on a photograph of the location of the fall and indicated the puddle

covered several square feet.

Excerpts from Mrs. Bearden’s deposition were introduced for

purposes of summary judgment. Therein, Mrs. Bearden testified that it was

daytime when she fell (but could not recall whether it was morning or

afternoon), and that she noticed the water for the first time after she fell. She

admitted not remembering whether she had looked at the ground where she

was walking prior to the fall. Additionally, she admitted that, after she fell,

she looked and had “no trouble” seeing the water. She also admitted she

was not carrying anything in her arms that would occlude her vision.

Mrs. Bearden also testified that there was water in the spot where she

fell “every time… [she] went to the store, but that day…[she] just didn’t

notice it until…[she] fell.” Photographs that were discussed in and attached

to Mrs. Bearden’s deposition show that there are several freezers along the

front of the store.

The deposition of a store employee, Estela Lopez (“Lopez”), was also

submitted as summary judgment evidence. By the time of her deposition,

she had been promoted to store manager, but she was a store cashier when

Mrs. Bearden fell. Lopez testified that she recognized Mrs. Bearden as a

regular customer of the store. Lopez stated that the alleged water in which

plaintiff fell was not present when the store opened at 4 a.m. on the date of

plaintiff’s fall.1 Lopez explained that she would have seen the puddle if it

were there when she opened the store because that involved walking through

the spot where Mrs. Bearden fell, and that she would have placed a wet floor

sign had there been any water in front of any of the freezers. Lopez also

stated that Mrs. Bearden reported the accident around 12:30 p.m. that day,

but indicated it had happened that morning. She further stated that the store

had “hundreds of customers coming in and …[Mrs. Bearden is] the only one

that had a problem[,]…that…fell.”

Lopez testified that if a freezer was empty, it was the store practice to

disconnect that freezer from electricity upon closing the store for the night,

1
At that time, the store’s hours were from 4 a.m. until midnight.
2

and leave it disconnected until it was restocked. This would cause the

freezer to defrost and leak water. Lopez testified that she did not remember

ever seeing “a concerning amount of water” coming from any of the freezers

during store hours, and that the walkway was cleaned twice weekly. She

also denied algal growth on the walkway where the freezers leaked.

Plaintiff’s counsel showed Lopez photographs of the area where plaintiff

fell. All of these were taken over a year after the accident; some were taken

more than two years afterward. She agreed that these photos appear to show

discoloration on the ground in front of the freezer in front of which plaintiff

fell and in front of a different freezer. When shown a photograph depicting

water on the walkway, Lopez pointed out that it was not a “puddle” but

merely a wet spot — “just a stain of the water.”

Lopez also stated that the store is located near a lake and fishermen

would dump ice chests and break ice on the ground in front of the coolers

during store hours, and that third-party ice delivery workers would

sometimes get water on the ground in front of the freezers when stocking the

bagged ice. The ice delivery workers were instructed notify store personnel

if such occurred.

Lopez also testified that it was store policy to place a wet floor sign if

there was liquid present on the walkway where Mrs. Bearden fell (or

anywhere in the store), and to clean up such conditions. She also said store

employees walked through area of the fall every three hours to take out the

trash.

The defense filed a motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) asserting

that: (1) Mrs. Bearden could not produce prima facie evidence that the

defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged puddle in which
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plaintiff fell; and (2) because the puddle was open and obvious, Mrs.

Bearden could not produce prima facie evidence that the puddle was an

unreasonably dangerous condition. The trial court granted the defense’s

MSJ on the former ground and pretermitted the latter. Mrs. Bearden filed

this appeal and assigns as error the trial court holding that plaintiff would be

unable to prove that the defendant store created or had notice of the water in

which she slipped.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting

documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to

plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.

Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791, 814.

A genuine issue is one regarding which reasonable persons could disagree; if

reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a

trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Hines v. Garrett,

04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764. Furthermore, “[i]n determining

whether an issue is genuine, a court should not consider the merits, make

credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh evidence.”

Marioneaux v. Marioneaux, 52,212 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 254 So. 3d 13,

20-21. The prohibition on making credibility determinations on summary

judgment extends to expert affidavits admitted without objection. Aziz v.

Burnell, 21-187 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 329 So. 3d 963, writ denied, 21-
4

01790 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So. 3d 1177; Thompson v. Center for Pediatric and

Adolescent Med., LLC, 17-1088 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/15/18), 244 So. 3d 441,

writ denied, 18-0583 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1062. Finally, the court must

draw those reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts which are most

favorable to the party opposing the motion; likewise, all doubt must be

resolved in the opposing party’s favor. Wyrick v. Golden Nugget Lake

Charles, LLC, 20-0665 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/20), 317 So. 3d 708.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) allocates the burden of proof on a motion for

summary judgment as follows:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if
the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not
require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse
party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to
the court the absence of factual support for one or more
elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce
factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Only certain types of documents may be offered in support of or in

opposition to the MSJ. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). Likewise, the court may

consider only those documents filed or referenced in support of or in

opposition to the MSJ. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2).

Courts of appeal apply a de novo standard when reviewing trial court

decisions regarding a motion for summary judgment. Farrell v. Circle K

Stores, Inc., 22-00849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 467, 478.

Merchant slip and fall statute

La. R.S. 9:2800.6, the so-called “slip and fall” statute applicable to

claims against “merchants,” was originally enacted in 1988 and the last

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amendment thereto was effective as of May 1, 1996. In relevant part, it

currently provides:

A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his
premises to exercise reasonable care to keep his aisles,
passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition.
This duty includes a reasonable effort to keep the premises
free of any hazardous conditions which reasonably might
give rise to damage.
B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a
person lawfully on the merchant’s premises for damages
as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained because of
a fall due to a condition existing in or on a merchant’s
premises, the claimant shall have the burden of proving, in
addition to all other elements of his cause of action, all of
the following:
(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm
to the claimant and that risk of harm was reasonably
foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or
constructive notice of the condition which caused the
damage, prior to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In
determining reasonable care, the absence of a written or
verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient,
alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.

C. Definitions:
(1) “Constructive notice” means the claimant has proven
that the condition existed for such a period of time that it
would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised
reasonable care. The presence of an employee of the
merchant in the vicinity in which the condition exists does
not, alone, constitute constructive notice, unless it is
shown that the employee knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, of the condition.
(Emphasis added).

Thus, a merchant cannot be liable for a slip and fall injury on its

premises unless the plaintiff proves all three elements set forth in La. R.S.

9:2800.6(B). First, under subsection (B)(1), the plaintiff must prove that the

condition that caused the harm was unreasonably dangerous. Second,

subsection (B)(2) may be satisfied by proving that the merchant “created”

the unreasonably dangerous condition. Additionally, regardless of whether

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the merchant created the unreasonably dangerous condition, the plaintiff

may establish this element by proving the merchant had actual or

constructive notice of the unreasonably dangerous condition. (Constructive

notice is defined in subsection (C)(1)). Third, subsection (B)(3) requires the

plaintiff to prove that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care

regarding the condition. Finally, it must be noted that all elements of an

ordinary negligence claim must be satisfied in addition to the specific

requirements of the statute. La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B).

Unreasonably dangerous condition –La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(1)

“[I]t is well settled that the existence of…a condition which presents

an unreasonable risk of harm, cannot be inferred solely from the fact that the

accident occurred.” Dufour v. E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 98-996

(La. App. 5 Cir. 3/30/99), 731 So. 2d 915, 918. Pryor v. Iberia Par. Sch.

Bd., 10-1683 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So. 3d 594, 596–97 explains:

In determining whether a defect presents an unreasonable
risk of harm, the trier of fact must balance the gravity and
risk of harm against the individual and societal rights and
obligations, the social utility, and the cost and feasibility
of repair. In determining whether a condition is
unreasonably dangerous, courts have adopted a risk-utility
balancing test. This test encompasses four factors: (1) the
utility of the thing; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of
harm, which includes the obviousness and apparentness of
the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4)
the nature of the plaintiffs’ activities in terms of its social
utility, or whether it is dangerous by nature.

If the harm-causing condition should be open and obvious to all

reasonable people who encounter it, that may dictate that the condition is not

unreasonably dangerous. Recently, in Farrell, supra, the Louisiana

Supreme Court articulated the open and obvious inquiry as follows:

For a hazard to be considered open and obvious, it must be
one that is open and obvious to all who may encounter it.
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The open and obvious concept asks whether the
complained of condition would be apparent to any
reasonable person who might encounter it. If so, that
reasonable person would avoid it, and the factor will
weigh in favor of finding the condition not unreasonably
dangerous. Whether the plaintiff has knowledge of the
condition is irrelevant in determining whether the thing is
defective. (Emphasis added).

The emphasized language in the above block quote dovetails with the

principle that “a pedestrian has a duty to see that which should be seen and is

bound to observe his course to see if his pathway is clear.” Bufkin v.

Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 14-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 855.

Farrell clarified that whether the condition is open and obvious

inquiry is merely a factor in determining whether the defendant breached a

duty of care, “not a consideration for determining the legal question of the

existence of a duty.” Id.

[W]hether a condition is open and obvious is embraced
within the breach of the duty element of the duty/risk
analysis and is not a jurisprudential doctrine barring
recovery, but only a factor of the risk/utility balancing test.
Specifically, it falls within the ambit of the second factor
of the risk/utility balancing test, which considers the
likelihood and magnitude of the harm, and it is not a
consideration for determining the legal question of the
existence of a duty. Thus, although this Court has so stated
before, it is inaccurate to profess that a defendant generally
does not have a duty to protect against an open an obvious
condition…

Ultimately, the Farrell court held that the defendant, a gas station,

was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs could not prove that

the puddle in which she fell was unreasonably dangerous, stating:

Although the breach of the duty element involves a mixed
question of law and fact, summary judgment is not
necessarily precluded. Summary judgment, based on the
absence of liability, may be granted upon a finding that
reasonable minds could only agree that the condition was
not unreasonably dangerous; therefore, the defendant did

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not breach the duty owed. In such instance, the plaintiff
would be unable to prove the breach element at trial.

Id. Farrell held that the puddle in which the plaintiff fell was not

unreasonably dangerous because: (1) it was quite large—and thus obvious;

witnesses compared its size to that of an automobile and even an 18-

wheeler; and (2) it was at the edge of the parking lot, i.e., an area “not

customarily traversed” by customers. Farrell so held despite evidence that

there was slippery algae in the puddle, and that the algae may have been

hard to see in the “dirty ‘brownish-gray’” water.

Merchant created or had notice of the condition— La. R.S.

9:2800.6(B)(2)

As previously explained, subsection (B)(2) may be satisfied by three

different means, namely, proof that the merchant: (1) had constructive notice

of the unreasonably dangerous condition; (2) had actual notice of it; or (3)

created it.

Constructive notice. Recently, we reiterated the plaintiff’s burden of

proof regarding constructive notice:

Where a claimant relies upon constructive notice, as
defined in La. R.S. 9:2800.6(C)(1)…the claimant must
establish that the damage-causing condition existed for a
period of time sufficient to place the merchant on
constructive notice of the condition’s existence. To prove
constructive notice, the claimant must show that the
substance remained on the floor for such a period of time
that the defendant merchant would have discovered its
existence through the exercise of ordinary care.
Though the time period need not be specific in minutes or
hours, constructive notice requires that the claimant prove
the condition existed for some time period prior to the fall.
The evidence required to prove the temporal element may
be either direct or circumstantial.
Thus, a claimant who simply shows that the condition
existed without an additional showing that the condition
existed for some time before the fall has not carried the

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burden of proving constructive notice. (Internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).

Bourn v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 54,977 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So.

3d 538, 544–45.

Creation of hazard. As a threshold matter, a plaintiff arguing that the

merchant created a slipping or tripping hazard must show the source of the

substance or object constituting the hazard. Dufour, supra, illustrates this

principle in holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that the plaintiff

failed to carry his burden of proving creation under La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2)

where there was an unreasonably dangerous puddle in front of an “ice

cooler” inside a convenience store, but no evidence that the puddle came

from the ice cooler.

In Matlock v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 53,069 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/20/19), 285 So. 3d 76, 82, writ denied, 20-00259 (La. 4/27/20), 295 So.

3d 389 this court addressed what constitutes “creation” of a hazard under

subsection (B)(2). Therein the plaintiff slipped and fell in some watermelon

juice on the floor of a grocery store and argued that the grocer “created” the

hazard by failing to take reasonable precautions against watermelon juice

leaking onto the floor, despite knowing that such was a recurring problem.

We rejected that argument, explaining:

This argument blurs the lines of the elements of proof
required by La. R.S. 9:2800.6. Matlock’s assertions
regarding Brookshire’s creation of the puddle actually
address the reasonable care element of subsection B(3).
Matlock’s argument suggests a merchant’s failure to
exercise reasonable care is the equivalent of a merchant
creating a dangerous condition. However, such an
interpretation would nullify subsection B(3) of the statute.
…

Matlock has simply failed to present any factual support
for his speculation that Brookshire’s employees or
10

methods were responsible for creating the puddle of
watermelon juice Matlock slipped in. Matlock offers no
evidence remotely supporting the notion that but for
Brookshire’s procedure for purchasing, storing, inspecting,
and displaying the watermelons, the puddle of watermelon
juice on which he slipped would not have been created.

Matlock relied on Ross v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 98-

1036 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/99), 734 So. 2d 910, writ denied, 99-1741 (La.

10/1/99), 748 So. 2d 444, wherein the First Circuit affirmed the grant of

summary judgment in favor of a grocer in a slip and fall case because the

plaintiff could not satisfy La. R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(2). The defendant offered

free samples of crab salad at the seafood counter, and the plaintiff slipped

and fell in a small amount of crab salad on the floor 10 to 12 feet from the

seafood counter. Seeking to obviate her burden of proving notice, the

plaintiff argued that the defendant “created” the hazard:

The Frenzel [i.e., plaintiff’s expert] affidavit asserts
Schwegmann failed to have reasonable inspection
procedures. According to Frenzel, spillage or droppage by
customers participating in unsupervised sampling is
foreseeable and highly likely to occur. Accordingly,
Frenzel concludes Schwegmann failed to exercise
reasonable care in creating the crab salad floor hazard
where it was known that customers who sampled the crab
salad would spill or drop it on the floor.

The Ross court rejected that argument, stating:

The condition which caused Ross’s fall was not the
sampling station offering samples of crab salad to
Schwegmann’s customers, but the portion of crab salad on
the floor some ten to twelve feet away from the sampling
station. The affidavit submitted by Frenzel contends that
due to the foreseeability and likelihood that the customers
would drop portions of the crab salad sample on the floor
means that Schwegmann created a situation which led to
Ross’s fall. However, we find Frenzel’s assertions address
the element of proof required by LSA–R.S. 9:2800.6 B(3),
instead of whether Schwegmann was responsible for the
actual spill or drop of the crab salad.

Id. at 913. Ross explained its construction of the statute:
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If the requirements of a plaintiff’s burden of proof under
LSA–R.S. 9:2800.6 B are read as Ross suggests, a
merchant’s failure to exercise reasonable care is the
equivalent of a merchant creating a dangerous condition.
Such an interpretation would nullify Section B(3) of the
statute. Instead, we find that the wording of LSA–R.S.
9:2800.6 B(2) which requires plaintiff prove that “the
merchant ... created ... the condition which caused the
damage” means there must be proof that the merchant is
directly responsible for the spill or other hazardous
condition. In this case, there is no evidence that would
establish that the crab salad found its way onto the floor
because of an act by a Schwegmann employee. (Emphasis
added).

Id.

Recently, in Salzman v. Matherne’s Supermarket at Riverlands,

L.L.C., 22-404 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/22/23), 367 So. 3d 897, 905–06, reh’g

denied (July 13, 2023), writ denied, 23-01116 (La. 11/15/23), 373 So. 3d 73,

the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal deviated from Matlock, supra,

and Ross, supra. In Salzman, the defendant, a grocer, undertook packaging

of raw chicken products in its butcher shop. The plaintiff slipped in a puddle

of “chicken juice” that apparently leaked onto the floor of a shopping aisle

while such package was being handled by a customer. Salzman held that

this was prima facie evidence of that the grocer “created” the slipping

hazard.2

Arguments

2
Similarly, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Wal-Mart
store’s leaky roof, which the merchant knew had episodically leaked water onto the floor,
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the merchant’s “creation” of the hazard under
Louisiana law, despite any affirmative acts by Wal-Mart employees in causing the leaks.
Deshotel v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C., 850 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2017).

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The trial court granted summary judgment because it found plaintiffs

could not prove the defendant had notice of the water in which Mrs. Bearden

slipped. The plaintiffs invoke Salzman and Deshotel as authority for her

contention that her summary judgment evidence establishes a genuine issue

of material fact regarding whether the defendant, a gas station operator,

“created” the hazard because: (1) the defendant was aware of recurring

episodes of water puddling on the ground in front of the third-party freezers

as they defrosted; (2) a freezer would defrost when the defendant unplugged

it (because it was out of ice); and (3) the defendant failed to take adequate

remedial measures. The plaintiffs conclude that, accordingly, they need not

prove that the defendant had notice of the water in which Mrs. Bearden

slipped to defeat summary judgment.

The defendant-appellee, in its brief to this court, contends that

summary judgment was appropriate because the summary judgment

evidence does not constitute prima facie proof: (1) that the water in which

Mrs. Bearden actually fell came from the freezer; or (2) that the water

constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition, because it was open and

obvious. The plaintiffs do not address the open and obvious issue in their

brief to this court, despite it being raised in the defense’s MSJ.

Analysis

The trial court was correct. To defeat the store’s MSJ, the plaintiffs

had to produce summary judgment evidence sufficient for a reasonable

factfinder to conclude that, more likely than not, the defendant had actual or

constructive notice of the puddle in which she slipped, or the defendant

created the puddle in which Mrs. Bearden slipped. The plaintiffs failed to

prove either. The plaintiffs have no evidence to show that the water in
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which she slipped came from the defrosting of the freezer as a result of the

store unplugging it (instead of some other source or some other reason for

the freezer leaking water). This defeats their argument that the store created

the puddle. Dufour, supra. Likewise, the evidence provides no

approximation whatsoever of how long the puddle existed before Mrs.

Bearden fell in it. Accordingly, the plaintiffs cannot prevail on a theory of

constructive knowledge. La. R.S. 9:2800.6(C)(1); Bourn, supra. Nor is there

any evidence that any store employee had actual knowledge of the puddle.

The plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof regarding La. R.S.

9:2800.6(B)(2). This alone requires us to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

However, the plaintiffs likewise failed to carry their burden of proving

that the puddle was an unreasonably dangerous condition as required by La.

R.S. 9:2800.6(B)(1). The puddle was in an outdoor location during daylight

hours, and covered an area of several square feet (per Mrs. Bearden’s

drawing on a photograph of the location of her fall). All evidence on point

indicates that there was “no trouble” seeing the puddle, and that the only

reason Mrs. Bearden did not see it before falling is that she had not looked

where she was stepping. All evidence on point indicates that the puddle

would have been obvious to reasonable person traversing the area. Bufkin,

supra.

Furthermore, nowhere in the summary judgment evidence does Mrs.

Bearden say that stepping in the puddle is what caused her to fall, i.e., she

never claimed that she slipped in the puddle. On the contrary, Mrs. Bearden

in her deposition said that every time she went to the store, there was a

puddle in the location where she fell, but she had never fallen in “that water”

before the incident in question. Additionally, Lopez testified that there had
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been no other slip and fall incidents at the store, and that the walkway was

cleaned twice per week. Further yet, there was no evidence presented

regarding whether the concrete surface of the walkway was smooth or

abrasive. Under these circumstances, the mere fact that Mrs. Bearden fell in

the puddle cannot reasonably support the inference that she fell because it

was slippery. Dufour, supra; Farrell, supra. It is common human

experience that not all puddles of water on concrete are slippery; rather,

some are slippery while others are not.3

Given the open and obvious nature of the puddle, Mrs. Bearden’s

testimony indicating she had walked through a puddle in that location

without incident multiple times in the past, the complete nonexistence of

testimony that the water caused plaintiff to fall, and the regular cleaning of

the walkway, the plaintiffs have failed to produce prima facie evidence that

the puddle was unreasonably dangerous. For this additional, independent

reason, we are constrained to affirm the trial court judgment.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. All costs of this

appeal are taxed to the plaintiffs.

3
The plaintiff’s theory that the puddle in which she fell was slippery because it
had algae growing in it is completely unsupported by evidence (aside from her lawyer’s
speculation based on pictures taken over a year after the accident).
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