55,762-CA Precedential Affirmed Processed

LaDeidra Jackson v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed July 17, 2024

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

Judgment rendered July 17, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,762-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

LADEIDRA JACKSON Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL Defendant-Appellee
CENTER, INC.

*****

Appealed from the
Monroe City Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2022-CV-01576

Honorable Jefferson Bryan Joyce, Judge

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OFFICE OF ANTHONY J. BRUSCATO Counsel for Appellant
By: Anthony J. Bruscato

BREAZEALE, SACSHE & WILSON, LLP Counsel for Appellee
By: Thomas Richard Temple, Jr.

*****

Before STEPHENS, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Plaintiff, LaDeidra Jackson, appeals a district court judgment which

sustained a peremptory exception of prescription filed by defendant, St.

Francis Medical Center, Inc, and dismissed her claims with prejudice. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On May 7, 2021, plaintiff, LaDeidra Jackson, was involved in an

automobile accident and sustained injuries caused by a third party. She was

treated in the emergency room at St. Francis Medical Center in Monroe (“St.

Francis”). At the time of her emergency room visit, plaintiff was insured

through the Louisiana Medicaid program (“Medicaid”).

Rather than filing a claim with Medicaid, St. Francis opted to assert a

medical lien against plaintiff’s recovery on any personal injury claim arising

from the automobile accident. On June 18, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel

received a letter (via facsimile) from MedFax, LLC, which stated: plaintiff

had “incurred charges of $3,873.00,” related to her emergency room

treatment St. Francis; St. Francis had “acquired a privilege for its bills for

treatment of [plaintiff],” pursuant to La. R.S. 9:4751, et seq.; and “[t]he

above-referenced patient has been turned over to this office for collection.”

The communication included an attachment from Franciscan Missionaries of

Our Lady Health System, which stated:

Your visit reflects total charges of $3,873.01 as of 05/27/21.
This is not a bill. This does not show your current hospital
balance, but rather is an itemization of the services provided
during your visit[.]

Further, the correspondence included an itemization for services provided to

plaintiff and contained the following notation: “THIS IS NOT A BILL. DO

NOT PAY. IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT THIS SERVICE OR A

PORTION OF THESE SERVICES IS NOT PAYABLE BY YOUR

HEALTH PLAN, YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE.” (Emphasis in

original).

On September 6, 2022, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against St. Francis,

asserting claims under the Health Care Consumer Billing and Disclosure

Protection Act/Balanced Billing Act (“BBA”) and/or the Louisiana Unfair

Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia:

(1) St. Francis failed to “disclose the schedule of charges to
trauma patients for the same services rendered to non-trauma
patients, following accidents where coverage is provided by
insurance companies, or with government programs, such as
Medicaid or Medicare, where such entities normally pay
medical charges for medical services furnished”;

(2) St. Francis failed to bill plaintiff’s health insurer, and,
instead, billed her and sent a lien to her attorney, “at the highest
rate the hospital charges to any payer, as opposed to the
schedule of charges [St. Francis] negotiated with insurance
companies, and substantially higher than schedule of payments
for medical services paid by Medicaid and Medicare” in
violation of the [BBA];

(2) Plaintiff is at risk in being forced to pay for all or most of
the medical charges due to St. Francis’s failure to bill her
insurer;

(3) St. Francis “typically charges different customers different
prices for the exact same service without prior notice before
services are rendered as to the charges for the same”; and

(4) St. Francis’s “conduct is contrary to the law in this state
which [plaintiff] seeks to prevent such unfair trade practice.

Plaintiff prayed for “general damages and reasonable attorney fees for unfair

trade practice with medical charges being charged as uncollectable due to

violations in billing practice and failure to post notice of comparable billing

practice.”
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In response, St. Francis filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of

action and prescription. St. Francis argued plaintiff’s claims were delictual

in nature and were subject to a one-year prescriptive period. St. Francis

asserted plaintiff’s claims have prescribed because her lawsuit was not filed

until one year and two months after the lien was filed. St. Francis also

argued plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the BBA or LUTPA.

According to St. Francis, Medicaid is a federal government plan, and

plaintiff, a Medicaid recipient, does not have a valid cause of action under

the BBA. Following a hearing, the trial court sustained the exception of

prescription and took “no position as to the exception of no cause of

action[.]”

Plaintiff appeals.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding her claims under

LUTPA and BBA are barred by prescription. She concedes LUTPA and

BBA claims are governed by a one-year prescriptive period. However,

plaintiff argues it is unclear from the record what date “the transaction or act

which gave rise to plaintiff’s cause of action” occurred: (1) the date St.

Francis decided to attempt to collect payment, while treating its billing

information as confidential; or (2) the date plaintiff knew or should have

known she had a potential cause of action against St. Francis.

The exceptor bears the burden of proof at trial of the peremptory

exception of prescription. In re Med. Rev. Panel of Heath, supra; McDonald

v. Orr Motors of Little Rock, Inc., 52,225 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 256 So.

3d 1132; McKinley v. Scott, 44,414 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/15/09), 17 So. 3d 81.

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However, when prescription is evident from the face of the pleadings, the

plaintiff bears the burden of showing the action has not prescribed. Id.

Prescription begins “when a plaintiff obtains actual or constructive

knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the

victim of a tort.” In re Med. Rev. Panel of Heath, 21-01367 (La. 6/29/22),

345 So. 3d 992, 996, quoting Campo v. Correa, 01-2707, (La. 6/21/02), 828

So. 2d 502, 510. Constructive knowledge is “whatever notice is enough to

excite attention and put the injured person on guard and call for inquiry.”

Campo v. Correa, at 510-11. A plaintiff is then imputed with whatever

knowledge a reasonable inquiry or investigation would reveal. Id.

A LUTPA cause of action is based on La. R.S. 51:1405(A), which

states, “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared

unlawful.” A private LUTPA action is subject to a liberative prescription

period of one year, running from the time of the transaction or act which

gave rise to the right of action. La. R.S. 51:1409(E); Law Industries, LLC v.

Dept. of Education, 23-00794 (La. 1/26/24), 378 So. 3d 3; McDonald v. Orr

Motors of Little Rock, Inc., supra.

The BBA prohibits a medical care provider from directly or indirectly

billing an insured for any amount in excess of the contracted rate under its

member provider agreement. See La. R.S. 22:1874.1 Claims arising from the

BBA are delictual in nature and are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.

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Under the BBA, if a hospital or other health care provider has negotiated a
schedule of prices with a patient’s health insurer, then the hospital cannot charge the
patient more than the negotiated amount; an attempt to charge sch an amount is a
violation of the patient’s rights under the Act. The BBA provides a private right of action
for any violations of the statute and authorizes health care providers to recover reasonable
charges or fees from third party tortfeasors. Rabun v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., Inc., 50,849
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 206 So. 3d 323 (“Rabun I”).
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DePhillips v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa Par., 19-01496 (La.

7/9/20), 340 So. 3d 817; Rabun v. St. Francis Medical Center, Inc., 54,086

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/21), 324 So. 3d 1116, writ denied, 21-01335 (La.

11/17/21), 327 So. 3d 993 (“Rabun III”). In Rabun III, this Court concluded

as follows:

The violation of the Balance Billing Act as alleged in her
petition – St. Francis’s attempt to collect amounts in excess of
the contracted reimbursement rate – occurred when the hospital
issued the lien letter dated March 21, 2013, to Ms. Rabun’s
attorney. No allegations were made and no evidence was
introduced that St. Francis has done anything other than the
filing of the lien, which . . . does not constitute a continuous
cause of injury giving rise to successive damages, but instead,
is one original, wrongful act that has ill effects continuing
therefrom.”

Id., at 1122 (footnote omitted).

In the instant case, in her petition for damages, plaintiff alleged, “A

lien was filed by MedFax Recovery, LLC by letter dated June 18, 2021[.]”

Consequently, plaintiff had until June 18, 2022 to assert her claims under

LUTPA and the BBA. Plaintiff’s petition was filed September 6, 2022,

more than one year after June 18, 2021. Therefore, her claims have

prescribed, and the district court did not err in sustaining the peremptory

exception of prescription filed by St. Francis.

Plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in failing to overrule the

peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by St. Francis. The trial

court did not rule on the exception; therefore, the issue is not properly before

this Court. Further, having found the district court did not err in sustaining

the exception of prescription, we do not reach plaintiff’s assignments of

error related to the peremptory exception of no cause of action.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court sustaining

the exception of prescription and dismissing plaintiff’s petition is affirmed.

Costs of the appeal are assessed to plaintiff, LaDeidra Jackson.

AFFIRMED.

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