State of Louisiana v. J.K., Jr. (In re: Ross Shacklette contempt proceedings)

Judgment rendered September 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,833-JAC

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF
J.K., JR. (IN RE: ROSS SHACKLETTE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS)

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Appealed from the
Caddo Parish Juvenile Court
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 168933-J

Honorable Ree Casey-Jones, Judge

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PLAISANCE LAW, LLC Counsel for Appellant,
By: Mark David Plaisance Ross Shacklette

INDIGENT DEFENDER BOARD
By: Michelle Monique AndrePont

STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
By: Remy Starns

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee,
District Attorney State of Louisiana

ASHLIN NICOLE THOMAS
Assistant District Attorney

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Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Ross Shacklette (“Shacklette”) appeals a judgment rendered by the

Caddo Parish Juvenile Court finding him in contempt of court on October

30, 2023, and ordering him to spend 24 hours in jail. Shacklette filed an

application for supervisory review on November 14, 2023. This court ruled

the order constituted a final judgment, remanded the application to the

juvenile court, and ordered the supervisory writ application be converted to a

devolutive appeal.

For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment finding

Shacklette in contempt is REVERSED, and his sentence is VACATED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shacklette is a public defender representing a minor in connection

with the charges of illegal possession of stolen things and principal to theft

of a motor vehicle. During the trial on the matter held on October 24, 2023,

Shacklette made numerous hearsay objections regarding the admission of

testimony regarding a police report. The court allowed the report, citing the

business record exception. Shacklette also objected to the admission of a

video and body cam footage on the grounds that it was not a record of the

police department or a part of the police report. Following the trial judge’s

overruling a hearsay objection by Shacklette regarding the police report and

reading the applicable code article and comments, La. R.S. 15:574.7,

Shacklette noted his objection and commented:

Because frankly your ruling emasculates the need for a trial
because all they have to do is prepare a police report and say
that’s the report they prepared … I’m arguing for the Court of
Appeals, Your Honor.

The judge expressed frustration at the numerous objections and Shacklette’s

statements, responding as follows:

Now, you have the right to do whatever you need to do as far as
a stay on these proceedings or whatever. But what we’re not
going to do is allow you to continue to object to something I’ve
already ruled on. We’re not going to do that.

Let me finish. Let me finish. I’m not going to continue to let
you do that. You have a few minutes. Five o’clock and I’m
ending this for the day and we’re going to continue it for another
day.

I’m not going to continue to go back and forth on this and you’re
not going to continue to be disrespectful to this Court. There are
ways in which you do things, and that’s not handled properly
right now. So if you want to stay of [sic] the proceedings, then
you request that accordingly. But we’re not going to continue to
go back and forth. We’re here all day unnecessarily at a case that
probably should have taken me probably an hour to listen to,
okay.

I’ve heard your objection. Overruled. Okay? Please don’t make
the same objection again.

The court adjourned the matter since it was approximately 5:00 p.m. and

continued it for October 30, 2023.

At the October 30 hearing, the minor was sentenced following

admission to an agreed-upon offense. After dismissing the defendant and

his mother, the court required Shacklette and other court personnel to remain

in the courtroom. At that time, the court held that Shacklette was in direct

contempt based on his actions at the October 24 trial. The following

interaction took place between the trial court judge and Shacklette:

THE COURT:…Last week we had some issues in this courtroom
during this trial when there was a great level of disrespect for this
Court by Mr. Shacklette. Last week I had to actually think about
this because I wanted to make sure that I was making a decision
that was not rash for something that was in the interest of justice
and nothing that could be construed as me trying to be vindictive
or doing something that was going against this child. Because
my main focus is to make sure every child and every family that

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comes in this courtroom is taken care of. But disrespect is
something I will not tolerate.

Mr. Shacklette, you were very disrespectful to this Court. You
insulted this Court by calling it a name. I don’t know where you
practice law on a regular basis, but that’s not how I do things,
okay?

I’ve never been disrespectful towards anyone in this courtroom.
Now, I will state my opinion, I will speak my mind, but I am very
respectful of everyone and their opinion in this courtroom.

And based on your actions last week, I am holding you in direct
contempt of court. I will fine you $100 --

SHACKLETTE: Which I will not pay.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, in that case I will order you serve 24
hours in the parish jail.

Madam Bailiff. Thank you.

SHACKLETTE: Your Honor, I ask it be held in abeyance so that
I can --

THE COURT: Sir, I was trying to give you a fine. You’re still
disrespectful. You will serve 24 hours in the parish jail for direct
contempt of court. Thank you. Court is adjourned. You all have
a great day.

SHACKLETTE: By the way I will note Your Honor’s decision
is wrong. And I continue to insist that it was wrong, and that I
am --

THE COURT: Mr. Shacklette, I’m going to ask that you be quiet.
The next step is going to be a complaint to the Bar Association.

SHACKLETTE: Your Honor, you are not entitled to hold me in
contempt without giving me a chance to have a hearing with
counsel present.

[End of proceedings.]

The court described Shacklette’s actions of both October 24 and 30 in

its October 30 contempt order. It noted that on October 24, Shacklette

“continued to object and insulted the court by stating that the court’s ‘ruling

emasculates the need for a trial’ [and Shacklette] went on further to state that

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he would argue with the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals.” The court also

elaborated on the interaction that took place on October 30:

Mr. Shacklette slammed his hand on the desk he was near and
yelled that he would not pay [the fine]. He slammed his hand so
hard, the microphones shook and I jumped as well as several
other staff members. Mr. Shacklette was so out rate [sic] that the
Sheriff Deputies (bailiffs) immediately charged towards him and
I ordered him into the Parish Jail for 24 hours to calm the
situation. The Court felt threatened by Mr. Shacklette’s actions.

Mr. Shacklette continued to yell at the Court and was forcefully
removed from the courtroom by bailiffs as those they were trying
to gain control of him.

Per the October 30 contempt order, the court found Shacklette in direct

contempt “for his breach of the peace, boisterous conduct and violent

disturbance that interrupted and interfered with the business of the court”

and because he “impaired the dignity and respect for the Court’s authority”

and his “language and tone was insulting and discourteous.” It explained

that it was not given an opportunity to set a contempt hearing so that

Shacklette could defend his actions because it had been placed in a position

to regain control of the courtroom, resulting in Shacklette’s removal, but

noted that it did not object to setting the matter for a contempt hearing.

A contempt hearing was held on December 4, 2023 – after Shacklette

had served his jail time. Shacklette was represented by counsel, but elected

not to participate in the hearing since the contempt decision had already

been made and the sentence imposed and served. The court admitted into

evidence audio recordings and transcripts for the October 24 and 30

hearings. An off-the-record discussion was had and the hearing concluded.

The transcripts from all hearings were made part of the appellate record, but

no audio recordings were included.

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DISCUSSION

There are essentially two instances of contempt in this case, though it

appears that the trial court consolidated the two in its October 30 judgment.

The first contempt was for Shacklette’s actions during the October 24 trial,

in which the court found that Shacklette had been “very disrespectful to this

Court,” noting that he “insulted this Court by calling it a name.” The court

referred to Shacklette’s continuous objections, his statement that the court’s

evidentiary ruling admitting testimony regarding the police report

“emasculates the need for a trial because all they have to do is prepare a

police report and say that’s the report they prepared,” and his comment that

he was arguing for the appellate court.

The second instance of contempt was during the October 30 hearing

following the court’s statement to Shacklette that he was being held in

contempt for his actions on October 24. When Shacklette was informed that

he was being fined $100, he stated that he would not pay, prompting the trial

court judge to impose a 24-hour jail sentence. Although it is not apparent

from the transcript, and no audio recordings are in the record, the court

alleges that Shacklette was irate, yelling, and slammed his hand on the desk,

to the point that the court felt threatened, enough to warrant his forceful

removal by the bailiffs in order to gain control of the situation. Shacklette

asked that the sentence be held in abeyance, urged that the court’s decision

was wrong, and stated that the court was not entitled to hold him in contempt

without a hearing with counsel present; nevertheless, according to his

statement, he was “booked into Caddo Parish Jail, strip searched, deloused,

and placed into a jail uniform … [, and] photographed and issued state and

federal criminal ID numbers.”
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La. C.C.P. art. 222 provides the definition of “direct contempt,” the

applicable portions as follows:

A direct contempt of court is one committed in the immediate
view and presence of the court and of which it has personal
knowledge...

Any of the following acts constitutes a direct contempt of court:

(1) Contumacious, insolent, or disorderly behavior toward the
judge, or an attorney or other officer of the court, tending to
interrupt or interfere with the business of the court, or to impair
its dignity or respect for its authority;

(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent
disturbance tending to interrupt or interfere with the business of
the court, or to impair its dignity or respect for its authority;

(3) Use of insulting, abusive, or discourteous language by an
attorney or other person in open court…in irrelevant criticism of
another attorney or of a judge or officer of the court.

La. C.C.P. art. 223 sets forth the procedure for punishing direct contempt:

A person who has committed a direct contempt of court may be
found guilty and punished therefor by the court forthwith,
without any trial other than affording him an opportunity to be
heard orally by way of defense or mitigation. The court shall
render an order reciting the facts constituting the contempt,
adjudging the person guilty thereof, and specifying the
punishment imposed. [Emphasis added.]

The procedural safeguards, including the right to a hearing and the right to

counsel, do not attach to direct contempt, because all of the facts constituting

a direct contempt are within the knowledge of the court. Meek v. Meek,

36,467 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 827 So. 2d 1191; Davis v. Harmony House

Nursing Home, 35,080 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So. 2d 92, writ

denied, 01-3162 (La. 2/22/02), 810 So. 2d 1143.

The appropriate standard of review depends on whether Shacklette

was subject to a civil or criminal contempt proceeding. Swan v. Swan,

35,393 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/7/01), 803 So. 2d 372. In a criminal contempt

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proceeding, the purpose is to punish a person for disobeying an order issued

by the court. Id.; In re Milkovich, 493 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1986); State in the

Interest of R.J.S., 493 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1986). The punishment is punitive

and intended to vindicate the court’s authority. Swan, supra. In a civil

contempt proceeding, the aim of the court is to force the person into

compliance with an order. Swan, supra; State in Interest of R.J.S., supra.

The punishment is remedial and intended for the benefit of the complainant.

Swan, supra. A sentence of imprisonment is considered remedial if the

defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act

required by the court’s order, but punitive if it is limited to imprisonment for

a definite period. Id. A fine is remedial when it is paid to the complainant,

but considered punitive when it is paid to the court, although such a fine is

also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by

performing the affirmative act required by the court’s order. Id.

A contempt proceeding ancillary to a civil proceeding assumes the

quality of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding only after a criminal

sentence is imposed. Id.; Fontana v. Fontana, 426 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1983), writ denied, 433 So. 2d 150 (La. 1983). When a determinate

sentence is rendered without setting conditions for the contemnor to avoid

the sentence imposed or purge himself of it, the punishment is criminal in

nature and cannot be imposed unless federal constitutional protections are

applied in the contempt proceeding. Swan, supra. This Court in Meek v.

Meek, supra, made a distinction between a civil and criminal contempt

proceeding based on whether the court imposed a criminal punishment in the

form of a determinate sentence. In Meek, the court found that the defendant

attorney had been held in civil contempt because the trial court’s sentence of
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incarceration was conditioned on the successful completion of a six-month

probation period that would effectively purge her of a jail sentence;

therefore, she was not entitled to the protections due a criminal offender.

Criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, and the

defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is entitled to the basic

constitutional protections such as the presumption of innocence, the right to

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right not to be compelled

to testify against himself. State in the Interest of R.J.S., supra; State v.

Davis, 52,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 05/22/19), 273 So. 3d 670, writ denied, 19-

00928 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 496. When a determinate sentence is

rendered without setting conditions for the contemnor to avoid the sentence

imposed or purge himself of it, the punishment is criminal in nature and

cannot be imposed unless federal constitutional protections are applied for

the contempt proceeding. Swan, supra. If punished under La. R.S. 13:4611

with jail, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, a contempt defendant is entitled to a rule for

contempt setting out the alleged contempt correctly, precisely, and explicitly

so that the defendant knows the nature of the charges against him. State in

the Interest of R.J.S., supra; DeGruy v. DeGruy, 98-1416 (La. App. 4 Cir.

01/27/99), 728 So. 2d 914.

An appellate court reviewing a conviction of criminal contempt must

determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant willfully disobeyed a lawful order of the

court. State in the Interest of R.J.S., supra. In a civil contempt, the stringent

criminal burden of proof and standard for appellate review do not apply.
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Meek, supra. The burden of proof for civil contempt is by a preponderance

of the evidence and appellate review is by the manifestly erroneous standard.

Id.; Davis, supra.

In the first instance of Shacklette’s alleged contempt, the trial court’s

reasoning was that he had been disrespectful to the court by way of his

continuous objections and his statements that the court’s evidentiary ruling

“emasculated the need for a trial” and he was arguing for the appellate court.

The court did not find him in contempt during the hearing in which the

conduct took place; rather, it unilaterally informed Shacklette of the

contempt finding and $100 fine in the hearing six days later, without any

rule of contempt or other notice, and imposed the fine without any

conditions. Shacklette had no opportunity to be heard before imposition of

the fine. Although only a fine had been issued at this point, it was

nevertheless a criminal contempt because the punishment was punitive and

intended to vindicate the court’s authority, and it was to be paid to the court.

When Shacklette stated that he refused to pay the $100 fine and

allegedly engaged in “a breach of the peace, boisterous conduct and a violent

disturbance that interrupted and interfered with the business of the court,”

the court imposed the 24-hour jail sentence. Review of the transcript alone

indicates the trial judge stated that Shacklette would be sentenced

immediately after stating he would not pay the fine. The sentence was

clearly punitive such that the contempt would be criminal in nature, and like

the fine, had no conditions that would purge him of the sentence.

As a criminal contempt matter, this Court must determine whether the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was

sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
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that the defendant willfully disobeyed a lawful order of the court. In In re

Milkovich, supra, an attorney’s repetitious legal argument during his

opening statement in a criminal trial, after the court had ordered him not to

argue the case at that stage of the trial and had sustained four objections to

his argument, was found not to support a contempt conviction because the

evidence was legally insufficient to show that the attorney intended to defy

the court’s authority. Further, in In re Masinter, 355 So. 3d 288 (La. 1978),

the offending attorney stated at one point that “nobody seems to want to get

to the truth here,” and when later asked by the court if he was accusing the

court of suppressing the truth, the attorney stated, “I may just have to do that

later.” The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the statements were

improper and unwise, but not contemptuous under the circumstances. Also,

in Meek, supra, this Court held that the comment, “you’re the one that wears

the black robe judge that’s your call,” was neither flippant, an insult to the

court, nor intended to impair the court’s dignity or respect for the court’s

authority, and reversed the applicable fine and jail time.

It is clear that Shacklette strenuously objected throughout the trial, in

particular to the admission of testimony regarding a police report. Without

delving into unnecessary detail regarding the admissibility of police reports

and testimony or information related thereto, since it is not the subject of the

appeal, Shacklette rightfully objected to the court’s rulings. His statement

that the court’s ruling “emasculates the need for a trial” was an

understandable response, and it was not so disrespectful that it would rise to

the level of contemptuous. He merely explained his stance on the effect of

the ruling, and did not impair the dignity of the court in doing so. The court

even agreed with him that he should make certain objections to preserve the
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record. As for Shacklette’s conduct at the October 30 hearing, the only

evidence in the record of such is his statement that he would not pay the fine

– which should not have been imposed to begin with. The court gave no

conditions to the sentence, such as paying the fine to avoid a sentence.

There is no additional evidence of his actions in the record to support a

finding that his conduct was contemptuous.

Further, because the contempt matters were both criminal in nature,

the court should have precisely identified Shacklette’s conduct that gave rise

to the contempt finding and afforded him his constitutional right to an

opportunity for a hearing assisted by counsel. The trial court failed to do so

neither prior to the initial finding of contempt and imposition of the fine, nor

after he was sentenced in response to his statement that he would not pay the

fine. Instead, when Shacklette asked for an abeyance to presumably file a

writ, he was told by the trial judge that he was still being disrespectful and

she did not respond to his statement that he could not be held in contempt

without giving him a hearing with counsel. The court’s subsequent hearing

after the contempt finding was made and sentence carried out in no way

satisfied the requirement of due process.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court REVERSES the trial court’s

judgment finding Shacklette in contempt and VACATES his sentence.

REVERSED and VACATED.

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