State of Louisiana v. James Eric Parks

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,868-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JAMES ERIC PARKS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 373,499

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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OFFICES OF J. DHU THOMPSON, APLC Counsel for Appellant
By: J. Dhu Thompson

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

On August 10, 2020, James Eric Parks (“Parks”) was charged with

aggravated flight from an officer, operating a vehicle while intoxicated (third

offense), and simple criminal damage to property. The trial was continued

multiple times and was ultimately set for December 6, 2021. The State filed

an amended bill on the same day charging only one count of aggravated

flight from an officer, and Parks entered a plea agreement in which he

waived arraignment on the amended bill and entered a guilty plea without

sentencing. Sentencing was also continued and deferred multiple times until

May 5, 2022. Parks failed to appear and a bench warrant without bond was

issued for his arrest. He was arrested on the bench warrant June 7, 2022.

On June 15, 2022, a motion to set new bond was filed on Parks’

behalf by Kimberly Free (“Free”), Parks’ girlfriend, in which she claimed

that Parks was misrepresented in the “sentencing phase.” Sentencing was

again deferred and reset for June 27, 2022. Parks was sentenced to five

years at hard labor with credit for time served. Free filed a motion to

reconsider sentence on Parks’ behalf on July 18, 2022, which was denied ex

parte.1

Parks, through new counsel, filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal

on June 27, 2023. Per the trial court’s instruction, Parks filed an application

for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal on October 27,

2023, which was granted. For the following reasons, Parks’ conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

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Free is not a licensed attorney but filed both the motion to set new bond and motion to reconsider
sentence “on behalf of” Parks. No hearings were conducted for either motion. The ex parte denial of the
motion to reconsider sentence was by stamp on the proposed order that read, “On the showing made, the
requested relief cannot be granted.”

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 22, 2020, Parks was involved in an incident in which he

fled from officers following theft of alcohol from a store. He led them on a

car chase, left the roadway ignoring multiple traffic signals, and caused

property damage. Parks was arrested and later charged on August 10, 2020,

with aggravated flight from an officer, operating a vehicle while intoxicated

(third offense), and simple criminal damage to property.

Parks’ attorney, Dhu Thompson (“Thompson”), filed a motion for

continuance on January 27, 2021, for the hearing set for February 4, 2021,

due to Parks’ new job training. The matter was set for trial on July 12, 2021,

then reset for November 2, 2021. Another motion for continuance was filed

on the November 2 trial date, due to Parks’ additional job training, and trial

was reset for December 6, 2021. The State filed an amended bill on

December 6, 2021, charging only one count of aggravated flight from an

officer, and Parks entered a plea agreement in which he waived arraignment

on the amended bill and entered a guilty plea with the acknowledgement that

the sentencing range for the charge was zero to five years. Parks was

informed of his Boykin rights when entering his plea, responding that he

understood the sentencing range, the waiver of his rights to a trial and

conviction appeal, and affirming that he was not coerced into the plea.

Sentencing was set for January 18, 2022, but Parks filed a motion for

continuance on the grounds that he had just begun an inpatient rehab

program. Parks waived time delays for sentencing in court on February 23,

2022, and it was deferred until March 28, 2022. Parks waived delays again

on March 28, 2022, and sentencing was reset for April 26, 2022. Sentencing

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was deferred again to May 5, 2022, but Parks failed to appear. A bench

warrant without bond was issued and Parks was arrested on June 7, 2022.

Free filed the motion to set new bond on Parks’ behalf on June 15,

2022, in which she represented that Parks had actually been at the

courthouse on May 5, 2022, and had met with counsel. However, since he

had believed he would only receive probation, he left after being informed

that the sentence would be 3½ to 5 years. Free alleged that Parks was

misrepresented in the sentencing phase. Free requested that Parks be

released on bond or his own recognizance pending sentencing since he was

gainfully employed and wanted the opportunity to get his affairs in order.

She also represented that Parks had multiple health issues that required

treatment, though none were related to a brain injury or his mental capacity.

Sentencing was again deferred and reset for June 27, 2022. At the

hearing, Thompson filed into the record a certification showing Parks’

completion of anger management class and a letter reflecting his

participation in the program. Thompson called Free and Russell Drew

(“Drew”), Parks’ stepfather, to testify on behalf of Parks, as well as Parks

himself. Free claimed that Parks was remorseful, noting that he participated

in rehab and private counseling, as well as classes in defensive driving and

anger management. She referred to him being the only “bread winner” in

their family and stated that he was gainfully employed. Drew testified that

at one point, Parks had been a good worker and made good money, but that

he had become addicted to gambling and drinking. He stated his belief that

Parks’ drinking combined with past head concussions from stockcar racing

had altered Parks’ perceptions and caused him to act out and get in trouble.

Drew claimed that Parks’ failure to appear at the May 5, 2022, sentencing
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hearing was because he had gotten “confused by the plea offers that seemed

to be changing by the minute, and he left court, and he left town.” Drew

stated that Parks had a job waiting for him in Texas that he had gotten after

leaving town following the scheduled sentencing. Parks requested leniency

from the court by expressing his remorse, reiterating that he had gone

through multiple classes and rehab, and stating that he had a good job.

Thompson asked the court to recommend Parks for substance abuse

and reentry programs in light of the nature of the crime, his medical

conditions, the programs he had already completed, his ability to work, and

because he had a job waiting for him. He noted Parks’ remorse, resources,

family support, and employment, for the court’s consideration. He requested

that Parks’ failure to appear at sentencing be considered as a contempt

charge in lieu of additional time and recommended a sentence of 18 months

at hard labor with credit for time served.

The trial court noted that it had originally been prepared to consider

Parks’ participation in all the programs, but given that Parks removed his

ankle monitoring device and left the state with no intention to return, it

found that his behavior had not changed. The court reviewed the facts of the

offense, noting that Parks “drove at a high rate of speed through residential

and commercial neighborhoods, colliding with officers’ vehicles.” The

court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1(B), noting in particular that Parks had knowingly created a risk of

death or great bodily harm to more than one person, and finding no

mitigating factors.

Parks was sentenced to five years at hard labor with credit for time

served. Free filed a motion to reconsider sentence on Parks’ behalf on July
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18, 2022, which was denied. The court stated that the offense would be

designated a crime of violence and recommended Parks for any programs for

which he would be eligible, including substance abuse and reentry.

Parks, through new counsel, filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal

on June 27, 2023. Per the trial court’s instruction, Parks filed an application

for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal on October 27,

2023, which was granted.

DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Parks argues that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and

introduce mitigating evidence regarding his past head trauma at the time of

the plea and sentencing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution.

Parks refers to Drew’s testimony that Parks sustained past head

concussions from stockcar racing, he had fallen into a period of gambling

and drinking, and the combination of the injuries and drinking caused him to

get into trouble with the law. He also specifically refers to Drew’s

testimony that the reason that Parks had left the courthouse immediately

before the sentencing hearing was that he had become confused by the

changing plea offers. Parks claims that even though he had undergone

certain programs, he was still unable to fully comprehend his situation due to

the long-term effects of the previous concussions.

Parks asserts that Thompson failed to investigate his medical

conditions and/or introduce any evidence or argument regarding the effects

of the head injuries during sentencing to support mitigation, only vaguely
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referencing his “medical conditions” when requesting a reduced sentence.

He alleges that Thompson’s failure meets the standard for claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

Parks also claims that he did not receive effective assistance of

counsel during plea negotiations because Thompson failed to advise him of

his new plea offer and he never negotiated a sentence of probation. He

claims that his confusion by the plea offer and resulting flight from the court

supported that he was surprised by the new plea offer.

The State argues that Parks fails to satisfy the burden of the Strickland

test to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It claims that

there is no competent evidence that Parks suffered head trauma or any long-

term effects therefrom; rather, there is only speculation through an

unsubstantiated statement by a family member that the combination of

alleged concussions and drinking somehow altered Parks’ cognitive abilities.

As a result, Thompson would have no reasonable indication to further

investigate Parks’ medical issues and Thompson’s performance would not

be deficient.

The State also points out that the trial court heard Drew’s reference to

Parks’ alleged head trauma, but did not find it to be persuasive to justify a

lesser sentence. The trial court explained its sentencing considerations,

including Parks’ fleeing from court despite his participation in certain

programs, his noncompliance with monitoring, and the severity of his

crimes. Parks does not show that any further investigation from Thompson

would have had any effect on his sentence.

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The State also asserts that the record is sufficient in this case to

resolve and dispose of Parks’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on

appeal. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly raised

in an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court than by appeal

because it creates the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C.

Cr. P. art. 930. State ex rel. Bailey v. City of West Monroe, 418 So. 2d 570

(La. 1982); State v. Davis, 52,517 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 670,

writ denied, 19-00928 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 496; State v. Williams,

33,581 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 764 So. 2d 1164; State v. McGee, 18-1052

(La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 445, writ denied, 19-00761 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So.

3d 1066; State v. Jackson, 52,606 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d

1217, writs denied, 19-00699 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 560 and 19-00797

(La. 1/28/20), 291 So. 3d 1056. However, where the record is sufficient,

such claims may be resolved on appeal to serve the interests of judicial

economy. Jackson, supra; State v. Nixon, 51,319 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/17),

222 So. 3d 123, writs denied, 17-0966 (La. 4/27/18), 239 So. 3d 836, 18-

0591 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d 289, and 18-1631 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d

293; State v. Smith, 49,356 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 218, writ

denied, 14-2695 (La. 10/23/15), 179 So. 3d 597; Davis, supra. The burden

of proof for an ineffective assistance claim is set forth in Strickland, supra.

In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Parks

refers to testimony by Drew, his stepfather, and Free, his girlfriend,

regarding his alleged past head trauma and resulting confusion of the plea

and sentencing process. Aside from this testimony, the record indicates that

Parks participated in multiple self-help programs, including the New Day

Recovery program. Free testified that Parks admitted himself into, and
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completed, the 28-day inpatient rehabilitation program, which was followed

by a 12-week intensive outpatient program. She also testified that Parks

participated in a defensive driving course, anger management, and private

counseling, and he goes to AA meetings regularly. Pleadings by both

Thompson and Free, and Parks’ own testimony, indicated Parks was

gainfully employed. In fact, Parks was granted multiple continuances

related to his employment. Further, the record provides sufficient insight as

to Thompson’s court appearances, including Parks being adequately

informed of his Boykin rights and what arguments were made for his

defense. We find that the record is sufficient to resolve Parks’ claim of

Thompson’s ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.

In Strickland, supra, the United States Supreme Court established a

two-part test for review of a convicted defendant’s claim that his counsel’s

assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction. First, the

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id.

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it falls below the standard of

reasonableness and competency as required by prevailing professional

standards demanded for attorneys in criminal cases as evaluated from

counsel’s perspective at the time of the occurrence. Id. Second, the

defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance,

meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different. Id.; State v. Zeigler, 55,099 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/28/23), 367 So. 3d

918; Jackson, supra. This refers to a substantial, not simply conceivable,

likelihood of a different result. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.

Ct. 1388, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011). While both prongs must be satisfied to
8

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court need not

address both prongs when a defendant fails to satisfy one prong of

Strickland. State v. Chatman, 21-1356 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/22), 344 So. 3d

131; State v. Eason, 19-0614 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/19), 293 So. 3d 61.

The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant has the guaranteed

right to effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal

proceedings. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L.

Ed. 2d 955 (2009). Sentencing is one such stage. Missouri v. Frye, 566

U.S. 134, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012). The entry of a guilty

plea is also a critical stage. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct.

157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct.

2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). Further, in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), the United States Supreme Court

established that the two-part test of Strickland applied during plea

negotiations. Anything less than representation by effective counsel at the

plea negotiation stage could deny the defendant his constitutionally

guaranteed rights “at the only stage when legal aid and advice could help

him.” Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 1202, 12

L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964).

In assessing whether a defendant shows deficient performance, the

“reviewing court must give great deference to the trial counsel’s judgment,

tactical decisions and trial strategy, strongly presuming he has exercised

reasonable professional judgment.” Zeigler, supra; State v. Robertson,

53,970 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 322 So. 3d 937. General statements and

conclusory charges do not suffice to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. State v. Grant, 41,745 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So. 2d 823,
9

writ denied, 07-1193 (La. 12/7/07), 969 So. 3d 629. Counsel has a duty to

make a reasonable investigation, and a decision not to investigate must be

assessed for reasonableness under the circumstances. State v. Tyson, 53,724

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/23/21), 321 So. 3d 1134, writ denied, 21-0186 (La.

1/26/22), 331 So. 3d 901. Counsel’s investigative actions and choices may

be influenced by information and decisions from the defendant and, under

the circumstances of a case, might diminish or eliminate the need for further

investigation. Id.

As discussed hereinabove, the record is sufficient to resolve Parks’

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. In particular, the record

is sufficient to determine whether Thompson had a duty to make a

reasonable investigation into Parks’ mental capacity to knowingly and

voluntarily make a guilty plea.

It is apparent that Parks and/or his family had been in communication

with Thompson from the onset of the charges filed against Parks. First,

Thompson filed multiple continuances on Parks’ behalf due to circumstances

involving Parks’ personal obligations that conflicted with scheduling. Two

motions for continuance were filed prior to the guilty plea hearing based on

Parks’ need to be at job training. Following the guilty plea hearing but prior

to sentencing, an additional motion for continuance was filed because Parks

had begun an inpatient rehabilitation program. Free also filed multiple

pleadings on Parks’ behalf prior to trial, while Thompson still represented

Parks. Thompson also arranged for Free, Drew, and Parks to testify at trial.

At the plea hearing, the trial court adequately informed Parks of his

Boykin rights in advance of his guilty plea. Parks repeatedly responded

affirmatively to the court’s questions as to whether the factual basis of the
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plea was correct and whether he understood his waiver of rights and the

sentencing range, and he affirmed that he was not coerced into a plea – all in

the presence of Thompson. In particular, Parks specifically recognized the

sentencing range for the crime charged of up to five years. Parks failed to

appear for the sentencing hearing and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

Following Parks’ arrest, but prior to the sentencing hearing, Free filed a

pleading on Parks’ behalf explaining that he had left after being informed

that his sentence would be 3½ to 5 years when he believed he would only

receive probation, and alleging he had been “misrepresented in the

sentencing phase.” Notably, despite referencing some health issues, Free’s

pleading contained no allegations concerning Parks’ mental capacity.

Thompson continued to represent Parks during the sentencing hearing.

It was not until then that Parks’ mental capacity was allegedly called into

question by Drew’s testimony that Parks’ “drinking and I assume combined

with the past head concussions from stockcar racing began to alter his

perceptions.” Parks’ testimony consisted of a statement expressing remorse

for his actions, confirming he had a job waiting for him in Texas upon

release, and stating that he “really just had to hit rock bottom just to really

see my actions and what I’ve done.” Thompson presented an argument for a

lenient sentence for Parks, requesting that his fleeing from court be

considered a lesser charge of contempt in lieu of additional sentencing for

the underlying charge, and focusing on Parks’ completion of programs since

his guilty plea, his claimed remorse, his family support, and his employment.

Thompson regularly communicated with Parks and his family

members during his representation of Parks. The family provided

Thompson with documentation and even filed pleadings on Parks’ behalf.
11

There was ample opportunity for Parks and/or his family to raise any

question of mental capacity, yet they failed to do so. Further, Thompson had

documentation of Parks’ participation in multiple programs and evidence of

his employability. The question of Parks’ capacity to make a knowing and

voluntary plea was not raised prior to or during the guilty plea hearing or the

sentencing hearing, but only after Parks received a sentence he opposed. It

was not until the sentencing hearing that Drew referred to Parks’ alleged

concussions and the possibility they may have “altered his perceptions.”

However, Parks’ testimony that he “had to hit rock bottom just to really see

my actions and what I’ve done” indicates that he was fully aware of his

actions and contradicts the assertion that he lacked capacity.

The record does not indicate that Thompson had reasonable grounds

to believe Parks lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary plea,

or even to investigate. It was more than reasonable under these

circumstances that Thompson may not have further investigated Parks’

mental capacity. Parks was also adequately informed of the sentencing

range prior to entering his guilty plea and he was ultimately sentenced

within range. In addition, he had benefited from negotiations resulting in the

removal of the original charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated

(third offense) and simple damage to property, so that he was only subjected

to penalties for the charge of aggravated flight from an officer. Therefore,

Parks failed to show that Thompson’s performance was deficient.

Parks failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. Although

not necessary, since Parks did not satisfy the first prong, we will briefly

address the second prong, that the defendant must show he was prejudiced

by the deficient performance of counsel. There must be a substantial, not
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simply conceivable, likelihood of a different result. Cullen, supra. Parks is

required to show a reasonable probability that, but for Thompson’s deficient

performance of failing to investigate and introduce the issue of capacity at

sentencing, his sentence would have been different. Chatman, supra; State

v. Dunnagan, 16-0187 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/20/16), 277 So. 3d 378.

A defendant does not have an absolute right to the appointment of a

sanity commission simply upon request. State v. Cretian, 17-0777 (La. App.

4 Cir. 1/24/18), 238 So. 3d 473, citing State v. Volson, 352 So. 2d (La.

1977). A trial judge is only required to order a mental examination of

defendant when there are reasonable grounds to doubt the defendant’s

mental capacity to proceed. Id. “Reasonable grounds” exist where one

should reasonably doubt the defendant’s capacity to understand the nature

and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to

assist in preparing his defense. Id. Questions regarding a defendant’s

capacity must be deemed by the court to be bona fide and in good faith

before a court will consider if there are “reasonable grounds” to doubt

capacity. Cretian, supra.

Parks only makes the general assertion that had Thompson fully

investigated the alleged head injuries and presented evidence of their effect

on his behavior, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different. There is no evidence that Parks

actually incurred any head injuries or that he lacked any capacity as a result

thereof. There is actually evidence of the opposite – that Parks did have

sufficient mental capacity. There are no reasonable grounds to believe that

the failure to further investigate the issue prejudiced Parks, especially given

that he and his family had ample opportunity throughout Thompson’s
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representation to bring the issue to Thompson’s and the court’s attention.

Knowing and Voluntary Plea

Parks also claims that his plea agreement was not made knowingly

and voluntarily due to his reduced cognitive function from his previous

concussions, outside the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel. He claims that his history of medical issues was apparent in the

record, and was to such an extent that he was unable to waive his due

process rights.

The State points out that there were no more plea negotiations at the

time of sentencing because Parks had already accepted his plea offer and

entered the guilty plea, with the information regarding the sentencing range.

Therefore, his confusion after he accepted the plea deal would have no

impact on whether his plea was knowing and voluntary.

Where the record establishes that the defendant was informed of and

waived his rights to trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against self-

incrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove his guilty plea was

involuntary. State v. Welsh, 50,567 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So. 3d 1;

State v. Wooten, 49,710 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 937; State v.

Martin, 48,045 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 115 So. 3d 750. Parks was

adequately informed of and waived his Boykin rights. The court informed

Parks of his sentencing range and he responded that he understood and it

was his intent to plead guilty. Parks only refers to self-serving testimony

regarding a possible, speculative mental impairment, without offering any

medical evidence or other information to support the claim. The remainder

of the record and even Parks’ own testimony supports that there were no

grounds to doubt his capacity in regard to his ability to make a knowing and
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voluntary plea. Therefore, there is no basis for Parks’ withdrawal of the

guilty plea.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated hereinabove, Parks’ guilty plea and sentence are

hereby AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.

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