State of Louisiana v. Timothy R. Morrison

Judgment rendered November 20, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,869-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TIMOTHY R. MORRISON Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 391,652

Honorable Katherine Clark Dorroh, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

TIMOTHY R. MORRISON Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

KENDRA S. JOSEPH
JASON W. WALTMAN
MARGARET RICHIE GASKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before HUNTER, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Timothy Morrison appeals his conviction of aggravated battery and

sentence of six years at hard labor, with a fine of $1,000, plus court costs.

For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Morrison’s conviction and

sentence, but remand to the trial court for a financial hardship hearing in

accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1.

FACTS

On July 28, 2022, Ms. Johnny Walker was sitting in her yard on

Devaughn Street in Shreveport, Louisiana, with her daughter, Lisa Colquitt,

several grandchildren, and her son-in-law, Richard Espinoza. Morrison,

whom Walker, Colquitt, and Espinoza each knew as “the watermelon man,”

pulled up in his truck, hauling his produce trailer. Morrison exited his

vehicle, spoke with Walker and Colquitt, then turned to greet Espinoza.

When the two men spoke, they began arguing about an encounter they had a

few days prior when Espinoza approached Morrison to buy a watermelon.

In that encounter, Morrison believed Espinoza walked away after simply

being asked how he could be helped, while Espinoza was adamant it was

Morrison who walked away after refusing to sell him a watermelon. As the

argument about what actually happened a few days before escalated,

Morrison bent down, picked up a broken metal table leg lying in the yard,

and swung it, hitting Espinoza in the head. When Espinoza fell to the

ground, bleeding profusely from a head wound, Morrison dropped the table

leg, walked to his truck, and left. Espinoza was transported to the hospital,

where he received a number of staples and stitches to close his head wound.

Morrison was subsequently arrested and charged by bill of

information with one count of aggravated second degree battery. The case

proceeded to jury trial where Walker, Colquitt, and Espinoza each identified

Morrison as the man who struck Espinoza with a metal table leg in Walker’s

yard. Walker testified she saw Morrison pick up the table leg and strike

Espinoza in the head with it, causing Espinoza to fall to the ground bleeding

profusely. Colquitt testified she did not witness the actual battery because

she was looking down at her phone, but when she looked up, she saw

Morrison drop the table leg and leave. Colquitt estimated the verbal

altercation between Morrison and Espinoza lasted approximately 30 to 45

minutes before Morrison hit Espinoza. Colquitt was the only witness who

estimated how long the argument lasted.

Espinoza testified that when Morrison began walking toward him and

picked up the table leg, he stood and put his hands up in a defensive stance

just prior to Morrison hitting him. Espinoza said he fell down after being hit

by Morrison, paramedics treated his head wound, and he received staples

and stitches at the hospital following his injury. On cross-examination,

Espinoza acknowledged a prior felony conviction for domestic abuse battery

with strangulation. Detective Hunter DeLoach with the Shreveport Police

Department testified about his investigation, and the State introduced

photographs of the yard, the metal table leg, and Espinoza’s head wound.

The defense called several witnesses, with Morrison choosing to

testify in his own defense. He stated he owned and operated Morrison’s

Quality Produce and sold his goods at various stands in Louisiana and Texas

as well as out of a trailer attached to his truck. He previously served in the

U.S. Army as a medic and was honorably discharged in 1982, then worked
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with computers for many years. Morrison began treating at the VA Hospital

for prostate cancer in 2019, and said he was currently receiving medical

treatment for an enlarged prostate requiring very strong medicine which

negatively affected his appetite, caused liver damage, and generally made

him feel weaker than normal. Morrison admitted he picked up a metal table

leg from Walker’s yard and hit Espinoza with it, but claimed he did this in

self-defense. Morrison testified that because of his weakened physical

condition, he was scared of Espinoza, who was much larger than him and

unreasonably angry about their prior interaction. He believed Espinoza

meant to harm him when Espinoza approached in a threatening manner. On

cross-examination, Morrison admitted he had prior convictions in 2008 for

possession of cocaine and illegal carrying of a weapon.

Tongon Price, Eddie Dean, Cindy McDole, Elizabeth Buchanan, and

Kiya Thomas were called by the defense. Each testified they worked

regularly with Morrison and witnessed many of Morrison’s business

interactions, but never saw him engage in any argumentative or disrespectful

behavior with his customers. Dean did say he witnessed some sort of

physical altercation between Morrison and Espinoza, but was unclear when

and where that may have occurred. Price and Thomas both testified they

regularly saw Morrison give produce away for free to children in the

neighborhoods where he did business.

Some of the testimony at trial was inconsistent. For example, Walker

insisted she did not remember discussing cigarettes with Morrison prior to

his verbal altercation with Espinoza; Morrison and Espinoza said they did.

Also, Walker maintained Espinoza was seated when Morrison struck him

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with the metal table leg, while Morrison and Espinoza both testified he was

standing. Morrison testified Espinoza began walking toward him, requiring

him to pick up the table leg and swing it, while Espinoza testified he stood

up, but did not move from that spot when Morrison approached him with the

metal table leg.

The six-person jury unanimously convicted Morrison of aggravated

battery, a lesser and included offense of aggravated second degree battery.

SENTENCING

Prior to sentencing, Morrison filed a motion requesting the court

impose a minimum sentence, or suspension of sentence entirely, and

probation, arguing this was supported by his employment, his service as a

medic in the army, and the jury’s verdict of a lesser included offense. At

sentencing, the district court noted its obligation to consider the aggravating

and mitigating factors set out in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court found a

term of imprisonment appropriate because Morrison’s conduct during the

commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty toward the victim,

actual violence was utilized in the commission of the offense, the offense

resulted in significant permanent injury and economic loss to the victim or

his family, and a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of the

offense. The district court found no mitigating factors as set out specifically

in the statute but noted it deemed Morrison’s apology sincere, and therefore

considered it mitigating. The district court then sentenced Morrison to six

years at hard labor, and also imposed a fine of $1,000, plus court costs, all to

be paid through inmate banking. Morrison was advised his conviction is

classified as a crime of violence.

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Two motions to reconsider sentence were filed. The first, filed by

counsel, argued the six-year sentence was unconstitutionally excessive. The

second, pro se, argued the district court failed to consider Morrison’s

ownership and operation of his own business, his prostate cancer and current

treatment for related issues, and the high likelihood he would benefit from

probation based on his previously completed four-year probationary term.

He then filed a pro se motion to nullify the trial court’s ruling on counsel’s

motion to reconsider sentence as he had since terminated counsel. All three

motions were denied.

DISCUSSION

Morrison raises three assignments of error on appeal: the evidence

presented by the State at trial was insufficient to prove he committed an

aggravated battery, the six-year hard labor sentence imposed by the district

court was unconstitutionally excessive and not tailored to his individual

circumstances, and the district court erred in denying his motions for

reconsideration of sentence.

Sufficiency of the evidence

Morrison argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

support his conviction for aggravated battery, pointing specifically to

inconsistencies in the testimony provided by Walker directly contradicting

his own testimony and that of Espinoza. Morrison argues Walker’s

testimony should be considered wholly unreliable as proof of what occurred,

and Colquitt’s testimony should be disregarded because she did not see

Morrison strike Espinoza. Morrison contends his own testimony proved he

acted in self-defense and reasonably believed he was in danger of being

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harmed by Espinoza, who had a history of violence as evidenced by his

conviction for domestic abuse battery with strangulation. Morrison argues

this same evidence cannot be sufficient to prove he committed an aggravated

battery upon Espinoza because it shows his own actions were reasonable and

in defense of his person. In turn, the State argues the evidence at trial, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was more than sufficient

to sustain Morrison’s conviction for aggravated battery as all witnesses,

including Morrison, testified he struck Espinoza with a metal table leg,

which was clearly a dangerous weapon as evidenced by the injuries it

caused.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). The Jackson standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517; State v. Galloway, 55,591 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So.

3d 1167.

Where there is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the

resolution of which depends on a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982);
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State v. Galloway, supra. The appellate court neither assesses the credibility

of witnesses nor reweighs evidence. State v. Kelly, 15-0484 (La. 6/29/16),

195 So. 3d 449; State v. Galloway, supra. Rather, the reviewing court

affords great deference to the jury’s decision to accept or reject the

testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La.

4/14/04), 874 So. 2d 66, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125 S. Ct. 658, 160 L.

Ed. 2d 499 (2004); State v. Galloway, supra.

An aggravated battery is a battery committed with a dangerous

weapon. La. R.S. 14:34(A). Whoever commits an aggravated battery shall

be fined not more than five thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without

hard labor for not more than ten years, or both. La. R.S. 14:34(B).

In order to prove Morrison committed an aggravated battery, the

prosecution needed to establish that he used a dangerous weapon in the

commission of a battery. By his own admission, Morrison picked up the

metal table leg and struck Espinoza in the head, causing a wound that

required staples and stitches. We find the evidence presented at trial was

sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude that Morrison committed

an aggravated battery upon Espinoza.

We next turn to Morrison’s theory of self-defense. The fact that an

offender’s conduct is justifiable, although otherwise criminal, shall

constitute a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. La.

R.S. 14:18. The use of force or violence upon the person of another is

justifiable when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense

against the person provided that the force or violence used must be

reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense. La. R.S.

14:19(A)(1)(a).
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The jurisprudence of this court is that, in a nonhomicide case, the

burden of proof rests with the defendant to prove the defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 50,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 178 So. 3d 1051, citing State v. Ford, 42,928 (La. App.

2 Cir. 2/13/08), 976 So. 2d 321, writ denied, 08-0605 (La. 10/3/08), 992 So.

2d 1010. The Louisiana legislature recently enacted La. C. Cr. P. art. 390,

effective August 1, 2024, which provides “where a defendant claims self-

defense as a justification for his actions, the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in self-defense.” This apparently

overrules our prior statement of the burden of proof in nonhomicide cases.

The legislature did not, however, state whether the new law was to be

applied retroactively; if so, this would raise the State’s burden of proof

against this defendant, Morrison. After consideration, we pretermit the issue

of retroactivity at this time, as we find that on this record the claim of self-

defense would fail under either standard.

The issue of self-defense requires a dual inquiry into whether the

force used was reasonable under the circumstances, and a subjective inquiry

into whether the force was apparently necessary. State v. Satterfield, 53,809

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 315 So. 3d 425; State v. Barron, 51,491 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/9/17), 243 So. 3d 1178, writ denied, 17-1529 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d

1063; State v. Williams, supra.

Beyond his self-serving testimony, none of which detailed any actual

attempt by Espinoza to harm him, there was no evidence his actions were

reasonable or necessary. No other witnesses testified Espinoza threatened

Morrison. Further, while there were some inconsequential inconsistencies in

the testimony, they were too insubstantial to create reasonable doubt.
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The testimony of Walker, Colquitt, and Espinoza refuted Morrison’s

claim of self-defense. This testimony, with the other evidence, was

sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, under Jackson v. Virginia,

supra. This assignment of error is without merit.

Excessive sentence/Motions to Reconsider

Morrison argues his six-year hard labor sentence is unconstitutionally

harsh and excessive. He argues the district court inappropriately accepted

Espinoza’s testimony as to his injuries, in lieu of certified medical records,

and the court erred in considering facts as aggravating factors that are

already essential elements of the underlying crime. He further claims the

lack of a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report prevented the district court

from individually tailoring his sentence, leading the court to disregard his

personal history, employment history, or criminal history. Morrison

contends the district court also failed to consider any of the mitigating

factors he asserted in his presentencing motion as well as in his motions for

reconsideration of sentence. Morrison argues a sentence does not have to be

a maximum or near-maximum sentence to be unconstitutionally excessive

and that the district court was unduly harsh in sentencing him given his

history.

The State responds that the sentence imposed is not unconstitutionally

excessive given the seriousness of the crime, the location of the crime and

the proximity to bystanders, the extent of Espinoza’s injuries, and the

apparent escalation in Morrison’s criminal behavior from his previous

nonviolent convictions. The State also points out the trial court was well-

aware of Morrison’s personal, employment, and criminal history, as

Morrison himself provided these details at trial.
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Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged

inquiry. State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d 114.

First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so long

as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines. State v.

Benavides, supra. When the record shows an adequate factual basis for the

sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even in the absence of full

compliance with the article. Id. No sentencing factor is accorded greater

weight by statute than any other factor. Id.

As to the first prong, the district court found all three factors listed in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) applicable to Morrison’s case, and explicitly

applied several of the aggravating factors listed in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1(B). Morrison’s conduct manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim,

actual violence was used in the commission of the offense, significant

permanent injury and financial loss were incurred by the victim, and a

dangerous weapon was used to commit the offense. As to mitigating factors,

the court found none but deemed Morrison’s apology to Espinoza sincere

and mitigating. The district court then imposed a midrange sentence of six

years’ imprisonment. It is apparent from the record the district court

adequately complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

The second prong is unconstitutional excessiveness. A sentence

violates La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the

seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless

imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Benavides, supra. A sentence is

deemed grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice or
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makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals. Id. The

sentencing court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory

limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence

of manifest abuse of that discretion. Id. The issue is not whether some other

sentence might have been more appropriate, but whether the district court

abused its discretion. Id.

On review, we find no abuse of the district court’s sentencing

discretion and no violation of La. Const. art. 1, § 20. The six-year sentence

is only midrange, clearly giving weight to Morrison’s individual

circumstances. Certainly, a six-year sentence does not shock the sense of

justice when considering the facts of this case and Morrison’s criminal

history. Morrison struck Espinoza in the head with a metal table leg,

causing a substantial head wound requiring medical treatment in the form of

staples and stitches. Espinoza described how his injuries have continued to

interfere with his ability to maintain employment and that his hearing was

permanently and substantially impaired. We find adequate support in the

record for the sentence imposed by the district court, and we find the

sentence imposed to be constitutional.

Similarly, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying

Morrison’s motions to reconsider sentence. Though Morrison argued the

trial court failed to provide him with a sentence particularized to his

individual circumstances by not ordering a PSI, the trial court was aware of

Morrison’s history as he described it in detail at trial. Morrison’s motions to

reconsider failed to contain any information previously unknown to the trial

court at sentencing and were properly denied.

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These assignments of error concerning Morrison’s sentence are

without merit.

Error Patent

A review of the record indicates there is an error patent regarding the

trial court’s imposition of a $1,000 fine and court costs. La. R.S. 14:34

authorizes the imposition of a fine of not more than $5,000 upon conviction

of the crime of aggravated battery. The trial court imposed a $1,000 fine on

Morrison, plus court costs, but the record contains no indication that a

determination of financial hardship was made as required by La. C. Cr. P.

art. 875.1.

The purpose of imposing financial obligations on an offender who is

convicted of a criminal offense is to hold the offender accountable for his

actions, to compensate victims for any actual pecuniary loss or costs

incurred in connection with a criminal prosecution, to defray the cost of

court operations, and to provide services to offenders and victims. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 875.1(A). These financial obligations should not create a barrier

to the offender’s successful rehabilitation and reentry into society. Id.

Financial obligations in excess of what an offender can reasonably pay

undermine the primary purpose of the justice system, which is to deter

criminal behavior and encourage compliance with the law. Id.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1(C)(1) provides that the court shall conduct a

hearing to determine whether payment in full of the aggregate amount of all

the financial obligations to be imposed upon the defendant would cause

substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents. However,

the defendant or the court may waive the judicial determination of a

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substantial financial hardship required by the article. La. C. Cr. P. art.

875.1(C)(2).

La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1 became effective on August 1, 2022, and,

although Morrison’s offense occurred before then, it is a procedural statute

that applies to all actions subsequent to its effective date. State v. Adams,

55,696 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 914; State v. Smith, 53,827 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 315 So. 3d 407. As there is no evidence in the record

that Morrison or the district court waived the determination of financial

hardship, we must vacate the $1,000 fine, plus court costs, and remand the

matter to the district court for the required hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, we affirm Timothy Morrison’s aggravated

battery conviction and the six-year hard labor sentence, but vacate the

$1,000 fine, plus court costs, and remand with instructions to conduct a

financial hardship hearing pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.

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