State of Louisiana v. Tyson Cornelison

Judgment rendered November 20, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,957-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

TYSON CORNELISON Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2020F408

Honorable Bernard Scott Leehy, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

TYSON CORNELISON Pro Se

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JOHN GATES SPIRES
SEAN ALBERT SOUTHERN
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before COX, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the Fourth Judicial District Court,

Parish of Morehouse, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Scott Leehy, Judge,

presiding. Following a bench trial, the trial judge acquitted the defendant,

Tyson Cornelison, of aggravated arson and simple criminal property

damage, and convicted him of arson with intent to defraud, conspiracy to

commit arson with intent to defraud, and injury by arson in connection with

a structure fire in the Bastrop town square on April 15, 2020. The trial court

sentenced Cornelison to four years of imprisonment on the arson with intent

to defraud conviction, two years of imprisonment on the conspiracy to

commit arson with intent to defraud conviction, and 12 years of

imprisonment on the injury by arson conviction, with the sentences to be

served concurrently. Cornelison made a timely motion for appeal, which

was granted by the trial court. The only issue raised by Cornelison in his

appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing him to waive his right to

appointed counsel and represent himself. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY/FACTS

Procedural History

Three bills of information (one original, two amending) were filed

charging Tyson Cornelison in connection with the fire. First, on August 3,

2020, he was charged with one count of simple arson, a violation of La. R.S.

14:52. Thereafter, on March 16, 2021, an amended bill of information was

filed, charging Cornelison with one count of aggravated arson, a violation of

La. R.S. 14:51, and two counts of simple criminal damage to property,

violations of La. R.S. 14:56.

On February 7, 2022, a third amended bill of information was filed

charging Tyson Cornelison with:

COUNT 1—AGGRAVATED ARSON
On or about April 15, 2020,
[defendant did] wilfully and damage, by any explosive
substance or the setting fire, the structure located at 113 South
Franklin Street, Bastrop, Louisiana, whereby it was foreseeable
that human life might be endangered, contrary to the provisions
of [La.] R.S. 14:51;

COUNT 2—ARSON WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD
On or about April 15, 2020,
[defendant did] wilfully and intentionally set fire to, or damage
by any explosive substance, the structure at 113 South Franklin
[Street], Bastrop, Louisiana, with the intent to defraud, contrary
to the provisions of [La.] R.S. 14:53;

COUNT 3—CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ARSON WITH
INTENT TO DEFRAUD
On or about April 15, 2020,
[defendant did] wilfully and intentionally conspire with Derek
Cornelison and Othelia Cavazos to set fire to, or damage by any
explosive substance, the structure at 113 South Franklin
[Street], Bastrop, Louisiana, with the intent to defraud, contrary
to the provisions of [La.] R.S. 14:53 and 14:26;

COUNT 4—INJURY BY ARSON
On or about April 15, 2020,
[defendant did] wilfully and intentionally damage, by any
explosive substance or by setting fire, the structure or property
belonging to another, namely the property of Othelia Cavazoe
located at 113 South Franklin [Street], Bastrop, Louisiana,
where a firefighter present at the scene and acting in the line of
duty was injured as a result of the fire or explosion, contrary to
the provisions of [La.] R.S. 14:51.1; and

COUNT 5—SIMPLE CRIMINAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
On or about April 15, 2020,
[defendant did] wilfully and intentionally damage the building
of Ron Israel, located at 117 South Franklin [Street],
Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, without the consent of the said
Ron Israel, said damage amounting to a value of greater than
$50,000.00, contrary to the provisions of [La.] R.S. 14:56(A)
and (B)(3).

On June 23, 2020, Walter M. Caldwell was appointed to represent the

defendant, Tyson Cornelison. Thereafter, when Attorney Caldwell left the

2

Indigent Defenders’ Board (“IDB”) on January 12, 2021, Darrell Oliveaux

was appointed to represent Cornelison. Darren Adams, also represented by

Attorney Oliveaux, sent a letter to the District Attorney’s office, claiming to

have information on the fire in the Bastrop town square he had obtained

from Cornelison.1 At that time, the State filed a “Motion for Hearing on

Conflict of Defense Counsel,” which was set for a hearing on February 7,

2022.

At this hearing, Cornelison was advised that his appointed counsel

also represented a potential witness, Darren Adams. Cornelison was advised

by the trial court of his right to have conflict-free counsel appointed, and the

implications that his waiver of this right might have on appellate or post-

conviction relief he may seek in the future. Nonetheless, Cornelison

informed the trial court that he wanted to waive the conflict and proceed

with Attorney Oliveaux.

Cornelison then filed a waiver of his right to jury trial, which the State

initially objected to before withdrawing its objection. A hearing on

Cornelison’s motion to waive jury trial was held on September 8, 2022.

Thereafter, Cornelison filed 13 pro se motions notwithstanding his ongoing

representation by Attorney Oliveaux. One such motion was a request to be

appointed as his own co-counsel, which the trial court denied. Thereafter,

1
At trial, Adams testified that Cornelison admitted setting the building on fire.
The reason was so $500,000 in insurance proceeds could be collected by Ms. Cavazos,
who was allegedly married to Cornelison’s brother Derek. According to Adams,
Cornelison was given a blue Ford truck and $50,000 for setting the fire. Adams testified
that Cornelison started the fire in a utility closet by “short-circuiting” the lithium battery
of an electric vacuum cleaner.

3

Cornelison moved to relieve appointed counsel and represent himself, which

the trial court allowed following a hearing.2

A bench trial was held on June 13 and 15, 2023. The trial court

acquitted Cornelison of Counts 1 and 5, but convicted him of arson with

intent to defraud, conspiracy to commit arson with the intent to defraud, and

injury by arson. Motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and new trial

filed by Cornelison were denied by the trial court, and thereafter, the trial

court sentenced the defendant to four years of imprisonment on the arson

with intent to defraud conviction, two years of imprisonment on the

conspiracy to commit arson with intent to defraud conviction, and 12 years

of imprisonment on the injury by arson conviction, with the sentences to be

served concurrently. This appeal ensued.

Facts

On April 15, 2020, Investigator Jeremy Defee of the Bastrop Fire

Department requested the assistance of the Office of the State Fire Marshal

in determining the cause and origin of a structure fire at 113 South Franklin

Street in Bastrop, Louisiana. The fire department received the call earlier

that morning at 6:02 a.m., and by the time firefighters arrived, flames were

venting through the structure’s roof. Investigator David Shidiskis of the Fire

Marshal’s Office testified that the downstairs of 113 South Franklin Street

was split into two units for commercial use, and the upstairs was for

residential use. After walking around the building’s exterior and speaking

with the responding firefighters, Inv. Shidiskis began his investigation of the

2
Actually, while the trial court did relieve Attorney Oliveaux as counsel of record,
the trial court then ordered him to remain available to Cornelison at trial to answer any
questions he might have.
4

interior of 113 South Franklin Street. He noted that the bottom floor had

received water damage only. As he made his way up the stairs, he could see

heat and smoke damage, which became more pronounced as he approached

the rear of the building. The area with the most damage was the workout

room, which he concluded was the area of the fire’s origin. According to

Inv. Shidiskis, there was charring in the workout room all the way down to

and including the floor. He was unable to find any competent ignition

source or accelerant to indicate what had caused the fire.

Having noticed a surveillance camera on an adjacent building on his

perimeter walk-around, Inv. Shidiskis had the owner, Steve Perry of KWL

Properties, provide him with the footage from around the time of the fire.

Investigators also had video footage from Constable David Laing’s truck

from the same time. Because Laing’s wife used to rent a space in the

building, Laing “kept an eye on it,” and looked over that morning as he was

driving by it on his way to go get donuts. Something caught his eye, so

Laing pulled over; he saw a truck in the rear of the building that he identified

as a blue Ford Raptor F-150, which investigators learned was the make and

model of a vehicle allegedly owned by the owners of 113 South Franklin

Street. Investigators viewed both videos, which showed a blue Ford Raptor

pulling up to 113 South Franklin Street at 4:43 a.m. and a man exiting

wearing what appeared to be gloves. The man looked through the fence,

then disappeared to the right out of camera view. At 5:20 a.m. the man is

seen exiting through the gate, getting back into the blue Ford Raptor, and

leaving the property.

5

Inv. Shidiskis spoke with the owners of the building by telephone.3

Olivia Cavazos and her partner, Derek Cornelison, were in Hawaii on

business, having flown there on February 7, 2020. According to Ms.

Cavazos, they had been planning to return to Bastrop, but the Coronavirus

pandemic had delayed them. Ms. Cavazos told Inv. Shidiskis that she and

her husband Derek had a blue Ford Raptor which they had left secured

behind the fence behind the building. They had sold the truck to her brother-

in-law Tyson Cornelison although no money or paperwork had changed

hands. Tyson had picked the Raptor up in March. At that point, Tyson

Cornelison became a person of interest with whom the investigators wanted

to speak.

With the license plate number from the blue Ford F-150, investigators

did a license plate reader search which showed that the vehicle traveled from

Louisiana to Clinton, Mississippi, on the day of the fire. On April 20, 2020,

a Carfax report showed that the Raptor had gotten an oil change in

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Investigators contacted Oklahoma State Police

and troopers viewed video footage from a Take 5 Oil Change which showed

the blue truck getting an oil change and a white male the troopers positively

identified as Tyson Cornelison. He also matched the description of the male

subject seen on the video footage from South Franklin Street in Bastrop

around the time of the fire. An arrest warrant was issued for Cornelison for

simple arson. On May 21, 2020, a license plate reader search showed that

the blue Ford Raptor was near Junction City, Kansas. Junction City Police

3
After Inv. Shidiskis’ initial interview with the couple, law enforcement officials
had not been able to get in touch with the owners of the building until the week of the
defendant’s preliminary examination, held on May 4, 2021, when the couple contacted
them to find out the “status” of the investigation.

6

were contacted, and they located the truck at a local Starbucks. Cornelison,

confirmed to be the sole occupant of the vehicle, was taken into custody.

At trial, Darren Adams testified that in June 2020, he was a “resident”

of the Madison Parish jail at the same time as Derek Cornelison. When

asked if the two were cellmates, Adams noted that there are not individual

cells, but one big “dorm” room with bunks; he and Cornelison had beds next

to each other at some point. They played cards together and talked

sometimes. After having “vague” conversations about insurance,

Cornelison, who was “an insurance adjuster or something,” began talking

about the building in Bastrop that had burned. Prior to that, Adams hadn’t

heard anything about the fire since he had been locked up “for a while.” The

reason for the fire was so $500,000 in insurance proceeds could be collected

by Ms. Cavazos, who was married to Cornelison’s brother Derek. Adams

testified that Cornelison told him he started the fire in a utility closet by

“short-circuiting” the lithium battery of an electric vacuum cleaner.

According to Cornelison, his brother was giving him a Ford truck and

$50,000 for setting the fire.4 Adams wrote a letter to the district attorney

with this information in it; the D.A. forwarded a copy of the letter to the

officers investigating the fire.

Lieutenant Jason Armstrong with the State Fire Marshal’s Office

testified that he and his K-9 were called in to investigate the fire at 113

South Franklin Street. The K-9, who is trained specifically to identify

4
On cross-examination, Adams stated that he told investigators that Cornelison
offered him $1,000 if he could find someone to retrieve from “property” [the sheriff’s
custody] his phone, which Cornelison had told him communicated with another phone in
Colorado. Adams also told investigators his “opinion” that together those phones
probably had “a lot of incriminating evidence on there.”

7

ignitable liquids, did not find anything. However, Lt. Armstrong also

communicated with Baton Rouge regarding locating the blue Ford truck,

went to Junction City for the extradition once the defendant was located, and

spoke to Adams, the writer of the letter to the D.A.

Lt. Armstrong testified that he found Adams to be credible, as there

were several things in the letter that someone not involved in the case should

not know, such as the location of the fire in the building, the amount of

insurance on the building, and the blue Ford truck at the scene, as none of

that information had been made public. Adams’ letter also firmed up in Lt.

Armstrong’s mind the area of origin and the “how” of the fire. While they

did not find the battery, due to the amount of damage and the floor in that

area being burned away, lithium batteries are becoming a major deal in fire

investigations. Lt. Armstrong stated that he has had some training regarding

lithium battery fires. He explained that what happens is that the damaging

of the cells in a lithium battery causes a thermal runaway to overheat and

produce a very intense fire. The larger the battery, the more water it takes to

put out the resultant fire. Investigators were unable to locate the blue Ford

F-150. Junction City officers had it towed from the Starbucks, and someone

came to the towing yard to pick it up. No one has been able to find it since.

On cross-examination, Lt. Armstrong also stated that the phone Cornelison

had on him when he was extradited from Junction City, Kansas, disappeared

before fire investigators could get any data from it after it was checked into

“property” at the Madison Parish jail.

Barry Mitchell, owner of Southern General Agency, testified that he

wrote a commercial general liability insurance policy on the property at 113

South Franklin Street in Bastrop, Louisiana, with limits of $500,000. The
8

policy holder’s name was Othelia Cavazos, and the coverage date was

December 23, 2019, through December 23, 2020.

Chief Timothy Williams of the Bastrop Fire Dept. testified that the

call reporting the fire at 113 South Franklin Street came in right after shift

change, around 6:02 a.m., on April 15, 2020. This was a big fire, and it had

the potential to burn down one side of the town square. There were 11 units

that responded, and from the time of the call until the fire was extinguished,

it took approximately four hours for them to extinguish the fire. Assistant

Chief Damon Carroll received injuries while fighting the fire that morning.

Assistant Chief Carroll testified that he received burns to one side of

his face while fighting the fire on the roof of the building at 113 South

Franklin Street. Because he had Silvadene at home, he did not go to the

hospital, but instead treated the burn without seeking medical treatment from

a doctor.

Thereafter, the State rested its case. After the trial court granted an

acquittal on two of the five charges with which the defendant was charged,

Cornelison made several other motions that were considered and denied by

the trial court. Closing arguments were made, and the trial court found

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cornelison was guilty of Counts 2, 3, and 4.

The court then ordered a presentence investigation report and set the

sentencing hearing for September 26, 2023.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, after considering

the facts in this case, the strength of the evidence, and the contents of the

presentence investigation, as well as the sentencing guidelines in Article

894.1, it was imposing the following sentences upon Cornelison: four years’

imprisonment at hard labor with credit for time served on the arson with
9

intent to defraud conviction; two years’ imprisonment at hard labor with

credit for time served on the conspiracy to commit arson with the intent to

defraud conviction; and 12 years’ imprisonment at hard labor with the first

two years being without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence with credit for time served on the injury by arson conviction, with

the sentences to run concurrently. The instant appeal was filed by the

defendant’s appellate counsel.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in allowing

Cornelison to waive appointed counsel and represent himself without

ensuring he had the capacity to do both.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Defendant’s Argument

Appellate counsel concedes that the trial court explained to

Cornelison some of the disadvantages of proceeding to trial without an

attorney. However, stresses counsel, the trial court did not: (1) inquire into

the defendant’s age, education, ability to comprehend, read and write; (2)

verify that he understood the charges against him, the order of trial, and the

potential penalty; (3) and determine that he understood the presumption of

innocence and his right to testify regardless of his choice to represent

himself or have the assistance of counsel. See, State v. Edwards, 54,055, p. 5

(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 327 So. 3d 1079, 1083.

Because the record does not show that the trial court ensured

Cornelison had the capacity to waive his right to appointed counsel, and that

he had the capacity to represent himself, and/or that he understood the

importance of waiving his right to be represented by an attorney, appellate

10

counsel contends that this Court should reverse the defendant’s convictions,

vacate his sentences, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

The State’s Argument

The State argues that there is no merit to Cornelison’s assignment of

error. It points out that on three separate occasions, Cornelison was told of

and waived his constitutional rights. First, when a potential conflict arose as

to his court-appointed attorney and that attorney’s representation of the

witness to whom Cornelison allegedly confessed his role in the arson for

money scheme, the trial court went over Cornelison’s rights, and the

defendant made a “willing and informed” decision to waive conflict-free

counsel.

Second, at the hearing on Cornelison’s motion to waive jury trial, the

trial court made an inquiry into the defendant’s level of education and was

told that he went to college. The trial court further asked Cornelison

whether he was “taking anything” or had any mental or physical condition

which would prevent him from understanding the nature of the proceedings.

Cornelison answered the judge’s questions, then freely and voluntarily

waived his right to a jury trial.

The State next points out that Cornelison filed a number of pro se

motions with the trial court, which further indicated his understanding of the

legal process. The third time that Cornelison chose to intelligently and

knowingly waive his rights was at the hearing on his motion to waive

counsel and represent himself. At that hearing, the trial court asked the

defendant whether he understood that there were disadvantages and dangers

of proceeding as his own counsel, further indicating that Cornelison would

not have his attorney’s years of experience and knowledge of the Code of
11

Criminal Procedure or Code of Evidence, which might prejudice him not

just at trial but in the future in appellate and post-conviction relief filings.

Also at this hearing, Cornelison’s appointed counsel told the trial court that

he felt that the defendant could adequately defend himself based on their

interactions as well as the pro se motions he had filed.

The State insists that the trial court in this case ensured that

Cornelison made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive

counsel and represent himself. Thus, there is no merit to the defendant’s

assignment of error, and this Court should affirm Cornelison’s convictions

and sentences.

Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee an accused in a

criminal proceeding the right to assistance of counsel. U.S. Constitution

amendment VI; Louisiana Constitution art. I, § 13. In Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), the Supreme Court

recognized a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense

by making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel and

thereby asserting his right to represent himself. Assertion of that right “must

also be clear and unequivocal.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, p. 6 (La.

7/01/11), 68 So. 3d 1015, 1018; State v. Bell, 09-0199, p. 17 (La. 11/30/10),

53 So. 3d 437, 448, writ denied, 564 U.S. 1025, 131 S. Ct. 3035, 180 L. Ed.

2d 856 (2011) (citing State v. Hegwood, 345 So. 2d 1179, 1181-82 (La.

1977)).

A trial court has the discretion to appoint a standby counsel to aid the

accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to

represent him in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-

representation is necessary. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46, 95 S. Ct. at
12

2541, State v. Mathieu, supra; State v. Bell, supra. In the instant case, this is

exactly what the trial judge did.

At the beginning of trial, the following exchange between the

prosecutor, trial court, and appointed counsel took place:

MR. SOUTHERN: Mr. Cornelison is present representing
himself. Mr. Oliveaux I see is seated
as advisory counsel.
Is that correct, Mr. Oliveaux?

MR. OLIVEAUX: Well, I think, I don’t know the proper
term for it. I think the judge had ruled
that Mr. Cornelison could represent
himself but the judge had extended
my appointment to be here if Mr.
Cornelison had a question—

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. OLIVEAUX: —that I could answer for him.

THE COURT: That’s right.

The minutes show that on April 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing

on, inter alia, Cornelison’s motion for self-representation and to withdraw

appointment of counsel. While both motions were granted by the trial court,

Attorney Oliveaux was ordered to remain available throughout trial to

Cornelison to answer any legal questions.

“If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then

it just may be a duck.” Clearly Attorney Oliveaux’s role was that of standby

counsel in this case, notwithstanding the fact that he was not “officially”

designated as such.

The minutes from the trial reflect that Attorney Oliveaux was in fact

present in court with Cornelison “for questions,” “for defendant’s

questions,” and “as standby counsel” through trial and sentencing until the

13

trial court’s appointment of the Louisiana Appellate Project for the handling

of the instant appeal.

The record itself shows that Attorney Oliveaux was consulted and

utilized by Cornelison at several points during trial. At the conclusion of the

State’s case, Cornelison made a motion for a partial judgment of acquittal as

to Count 1, aggravated arson. According to the defendant, the State failed to

present any evidence that it was foreseeable that a human being would be

present at the time of the fire’s commencement. He also presented the trial

court with case law in support thereof. The State made an argument in

opposition, and the trial court took a brief recess to consider the motion.

Thereafter, the trial court granted the motion and acquitted Cornelison of

aggravated arson, then noted that arson as a responsive verdict “still

remain[ed] on the table.” After consulting with Attorney Oliveaux,

Cornelison called the trial court’s attention to another case and pointed out

that since the State failed to include the words “belonging to another” and

“with damage amounting to $ (blank) dollars” in the indictment, arson was

not properly a responsive verdict. The trial court agreed and acquitted

Cornelison of arson as well.

Cornelison’s motions for acquittal as to Counts 2, 3, and 4 were

denied by the trial court, which pointed out that each count, although it arose

out of the same transaction and occurrence, alleged a separate and stand-

alone charge, tracked the law of each statutory provision verbatim, and as to

each crime, the State put on evidence sufficient to withstand the motion.

Finally, Cornelison requested a partial judgment of acquittal as to Count 5,

urging that the State failed to present any evidence that he caused any

damage to the building by means other than by fire or explosion as required
14

by La. R.S. 14:55. The trial court agreed and acquitted Cornelison as to

Count 5. At that point, Cornelison told the court he needed a minute to

“speak with my counsel.” Several other motions were made by Cornelison

and denied by the trial court before closing arguments. Attorney Oliveaux

continued his role as standby counsel through sentencing, at which point the

Louisiana Appellate Project was appointed to represent Cornelison.

At no point in this matter was this defendant without the assistance of

counsel. In fact, as pointed out by the State, defendant began filing motions

without any help from (or apparently the knowledge of) his appointed

counsel on January 23, 2023. However, after April 6, 2023, Cornelison

began acting as his own counsel, with his former court-appointed attorney

transitioning to the role of standby counsel during trial (through sentencing)

to “explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or assist [him] in

overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant’s

achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465

U.S. 168, 183, 104 S. Ct. 944, 954, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984); State v.

Mathieu, 10-2421, p. 8, 68 So. 3d at 1019. As noted by this Court in State v.

Conner, 49,351, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 209, 216, a

proper Faretta inquiry is required to permit a defendant to proceed with pro

se representation with the assistance of standby counsel.5

5
A criminal defendant does not have the constitutional right to act both as
“represented and representative” due to the potential for disruption of the trial process.
State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 30 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 1, 22, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022,
126 S. Ct. 1569, 164 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2006), citing State v. Bodley, 394 So. 2d 584, 593
(La. 1981). See also, State v. Boettcher, 338 So. 2d 1356 (La. 1976). A district court,
however, has the discretion to appoint an attorney to assist a pro se defendant; this is
standby counsel. State v. Manuel, 17-1145, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 247 So. 3d 766,
768. When the trial court allows this kind of arrangement, the defendant acts as his only
legal representative. “Hybrid” representation allows a defendant the right to defend
himself as co-counsel, while standby counsel is an attorney who explains and enforces
basic courtroom rules but does not participate to the extent that it would undermine the
defendant’s appearance of self-representation before a jury. State v. Brown, 03-897, p.
15

Although no minimum requirements have been established for

judging the sufficiency of a waiver of counsel, there must be a sufficient

inquiry to establish on the record a knowing and intelligent waiver under the

overall circumstances. See State v. Strain, 585 So. 2d 540, 542 (La. 1991).

Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally

asserted the right to self-representation must be determined on a case-by-

case basis, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, which

includes the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. State v.

Bell, supra; State v. Edwards, supra. While a specific inquiry by the judge

expressly addressing the disadvantages of self-representation is clearly

preferable, the critical issue on review of the waiver is whether the defendant

understood the waiver. State v. Strain, 585 So. 2d at 543.

Because there are no inflexible criteria or a magic word formula for

determining the validity of a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel, the

inquiry into the validity of the waiver must take into account the totality of

the circumstances in each case. State v. Stevison, 97-3122 (La. 10/30/98),

721 So. 2d 843, 845; State v. Strain, supra. There must be a showing of

clear abuse of discretion for a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s right to

counsel to be upset, as the trial court has the opportunity to observe the

defendant in court appearances and become familiar with the defendant.

State v. Holley, 53,405, p. 12 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 297 So. 3d 180, 188.

This record supports the trial court’s determination that the defendant

was fully capable of making a knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal choice

29, 907 So. 2d at 22. When the trial court’s appointed legal counsel serves only in an
advisory role, the accused is abandoning his right to be represented by counsel; at the
same time he is exercising his right to self-representation. State v. Manuel, supra.
Therefore, when an attorney is appointed as an advisor or standby counsel, the accused
must knowingly waive his right to be represented by counsel. Id.
16

to waive counsel and represent himself knowingly, intelligently, and

unequivocally, notwithstanding the fact that there was no formal Faretta

“question and answer” type colloquy. Although a defendant need not

himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently

and intelligently choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record

establishes that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes

open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541, citing Adams v. United

States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942).

The trial court got to know Cornelison through the numerous pro se

motions he filed before, during, and after trial and his arguments at the

hearings on these motions, which sought the trial court’s ruling or

intervention on such issues as the defendant’s: waiver of the right to jury

trial; right to further discovery from the State; request to serve as co-counsel;

entitlement to a preliminary examination on newly added charges; denial of

access to his legal mail and limitations on use of court-approved documents

for drafting his pleadings while in the parish jail; right to a speedy trial; right

to withdraw appointment of counsel and for self-representation; and requests

for severance, acquittal, and new trial. The trial court also engaged with the

defendant during hearings on Attorney Oliveaux’s motions on the issue of

conflict of counsel and waiver of jury trial, and at the trial itself, where

Cornelison was his own counsel.

At several of the hearings, the trial court specifically questioned

Cornelison as to his capacity, as noted by the State. At the hearing on the

motion to determine whether a conflict existed on February 7, 2022,

Attorney Oliveaux stated that he was appointed to represent both Cornelison
17

and the confidential informant, Darren Adams, in December 2020. On

December 28, 2020, Adams sent the district attorney a letter informing him

that he had information about Cornelison’s case. Atty. Oliveaux stated that

he learned of the existence of Adams’ letter in early 2021 and informed the

IDB several times about the potential conflict. He was relieved of his

appointment as Adams’ attorney on January 11, 2022. The trial court

informed Cornelison of the situation and advised him of his right to conflict-

free representation. The trial court asked the defendant whether he wanted

to continue with Attorney Oliveaux by waiving the conflict or have another

attorney appointed. The court specifically stated that if Cornelison waived

the conflict, he could not come back later on appeal or post-conviction relief

and claim ineffective assistance or prejudice because of the conflict.

Cornelison’s response was, “I’m making a willing and informed decision.

I’d like to keep Mr. Oliveaux as my counsel.”

At a motions hearing on April 19, 2022, Cornelison made an oral

motion to appoint Atty. Oliveaux as co-counsel in his defense. The reason

the defendant gave was that the joinder of offenses (after the second

amending bill of information) was causing him and Attorney Oliveaux to

have “separate ways” to handle the trial strategies of his defense. The trial

court pointed out to Cornelison that this was the very reason it could not

allow him to serve as co-counsel with his court-appointed attorney—their

difference of opinions as to trial strategies put Attorney Oliveaux in an

impossible position in a co-counsel role.

The solution in such a situation, noted the trial court, was that the

defendant could represent himself, hire his own counsel, or assist his counsel

as long as Cornelison understands his attorney would be the one making
18

strategic decisions based on his knowledge, experience, and training.

Cornelison explained to the trial court that he and his attorney had discussed

this, as well as the option of waiving a trial by jury, and he wished to waive

his right to trial by jury. Atty. Oliveaux then informed the trial court that the

defendant had decided to waive jury trial and be tried by the court, against

the advice of counsel.6

On May 26, 2022, the trial court confirmed Cornelison’s waiver of

conflict; Atty. Oliveaux made an on-the-record statement that he apparently

had never met Adams so there was not even an actual conflict. On

September 6, 2022, the State withdrew its objection to the defendant’s

waiver to jury trial, but asked the trial court to make sure Cornelison did so

knowingly and intelligently. During the colloquy, the trial court determined

Cornelison’s level of education (allegedly college),7 lack of physical or

mental conditions or being under the influence of any medication affecting

his ability to understand or make an intelligent decision regarding his right

to trial by jury, his knowledge and understanding of how a trial works and

what a jury trial is, and that he knew the difference between a jury and judge

trial.8 Both the State and defense counsel were satisfied with the colloquy

and Cornelison was allowed to waive his right to trial by jury.

At the April 6, 2023, hearing on Cornelison’s pro se motions, the

defendant’s motion to withdraw appointment of counsel and for self-

6
The motion to waive trial by jury was filed on April 21, 2022.
7
This conflicts with the information contained in the defendant’s PSI report.
8
The trial court explained that a trial by judge means that it is only the court that
will hear all of the evidence, apply the law to the evidence, and make a decision at the
end of the trial as to whether the State has proven his (the defendant’s) guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as to each and every element of the crimes with which he has been
charged.
19

representation was taken up first. Attorney Oliveaux informed the trial court

that he felt that Cornelison’s motions demonstrated his understanding of

“what he is doing” and that “if I’ve ever had an IDB client that is capable of

representing himself it would probably be Mr. Cornelison.” Both the State

and trial court agreed with this sentiment.9 The trial court and Cornelison

had the following exchange:

TRIAL COURT: Mr. Oliveaux has indicated that if anybody
that he’s dealt with in the past is capable of
self-representation, you’re the one. But you
do understand that you have the right to
counsel, and Mr. Oliveaux has been
appointed to represent you, and he’s a
trained attorney. He’s got a law degree, and
he’s got years of experience in handling
criminal cases, and that he would be able to
use that training to represent you and to
identify any defenses you may have, to
assert those defenses at trial, subpoena
witnesses, interview witnesses, potential
witnesses, and to understand the procedures
at trial and to properly file motions that may
be appropriate and to cross-examine any
witnesses called against you by the State.
And by representing yourself you’re losing
that benefit … There are certain dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding without
counsel. Because of the fact that your
attorney has a formal legal education and
experience in dealing with these type cases
… he can also understand procedurally and
factually whether there might be questions
that he needs to ask the witnesses and maybe
questions he needs to stay away from that
can impact not only the outcome of the case
but also any appellate issues you might have
that need to be preserved during trial. In
other words, if he’s sitting there, he
understands that maybe the questions asked
he knows to object and what evidence that
might be admissible and what’s not
admissible. And if evidence gets in if you’re
representing yourself because you don’t

9
Something that this Court finds particularly relevant to this analysis the fact that
the defendant’s case was set for judge, not jury trial.
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object and you can’t come back later before
the appellate court and say this shouldn’t
have come in. . . . Do you understand that
you might be waiving the right to counsel
and you might be subjected to certain
dangers or disadvantages that go along with
self-representation, okay, you understand
that?

CORNELISON: I do.

TRIAL COURT: And you still wish to waive counsel and go
forward?

CORNELISON: I believe that Mr. Oliveaux could benefit me
as standby counsel but if it’s the choice of
me representing myself or being represented
by an appointed counsel, I choose to
represent myself.

TRIAL COURT: Apparently, that’s a problem because Mr.
Oliveaux might not agree to certain things
that you do in your trial strategy or your
preparation for trial. And he may have to
give advice to you that would be contrary to
what you think you ought to have. So
standby counsel can be tricky for your
attorney and for you.

CORNELISON: My understanding of standby counsel is
[Atty. Oliveaux] would be there to answer
any of my legal questions, I’m not asking
that we co-counsel.

TRIAL COURT: Mr. Oliveaux, are you willing to do that?

OLIVEAUX: I think what [Cornelison] is referring to,
judge, I’ve seen on occasion that the court
would allow the defendant to represent
themselves, “relieve” counsel of that
responsibility, except [for them to] be there
at the trial of the matter to address a
question if a question arose on Mr.
Cornelison’s behalf. I think that’s what he’s
referring to.

TRIAL COURT: Is that correct?

CORNELISON: Well, he would also address any legal
questions that I have at any stage of this
proceeding, not just at trial.
21

STATE ATTY.: Your Honor, Mr. Cornelison is asking to
represent himself. I believe he either has to
make a choice, either he goes it by himself
or he represents himself and he takes on the
burden of an attorney or he continues the
representation with Mr. Oliveaux.

TRIAL COURT: You want to waive your right to counsel?

CORNELISON: I do, your honor.

Thereafter, the trial court relieved Atty. Oliveaux from his role as

court-appointed counsel, then reappointed him as standby counsel for

Cornelison, who, as noted in the above exchange, succinctly and

intelligently showed his knowledge of the very nuanced distinction between

co-counsel/hybrid representation and standby counsel to both attorneys and

the trial court. Following a brief discussion of a few other pending pro se

motions, the trial court found that Cornelison had freely and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel and granted his motion to waive counsel and for

self-representation.

This record makes it patently obvious that it was the defendant

himself who knowingly, voluntarily, and emphatically chose the

arrangement which put him at the helm of his own defense in a trial by

judge, with his former attorney ready to assist him in the role of standby

counsel.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no error in the

trial court’s determination that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel and chose to exercise his right to self-

representation.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the convictions and

sentences of the defendant, Tyson Cornelison.

AFFIRMED.

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