Crochet Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lincoln Parish Police Jury

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,981-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

CROCHET EQUIPMENT Plaintiff-Appellant
COMPANY, INC.

versus

LINCOLN PARISH POLICE Defendant-Appellee
JURY

*****

Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 61,501

Honorable Bruce E. Hampton, Judge

*****

HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, LLP Counsel for Appellant
By: Robert McCuller Baldwin
Jason Richard Smith

NELSON, ZENTNER, SARTOR Counsel for Appellee
& SNELLINGS, LLC
By: Douglas R. Nielsen

*****

Before PITMAN, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Crochet Equipment Company (“Crochet”) appeals the trial court’s

denial of its motion for summary judgment against the Lincoln Parish Police

Jury (“LPPJ”) and the grant of the LPPJ’s motion for summary judgment,

denying all of Crochet’s claims. Crochet filed a petition alleging the LPPJ

failed to pay the amount due Crochet as agreed upon in their contract for the

burning and disposal of vegetative debris and wood waste, breaching the

contract between the two parties. Both parties filed motions for summary

judgment seeking liability determinations in their respective favors. The

trial court granted the motion filed by the LPPJ and denied that filed by

Crochet, but reserved the determination of damages for trial at a later date.

For the reasons expressed below, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.

FACTS

Crochet began contracting with the LPPJ in 1980 to provide for

burning and disposal via an air curtain destructor (“ACD”) at the Lincoln

Parish landfill. The most recent contract for services was signed in 2012;

under this, Crochet agreed to provide the LPPJ with a “biomass facility”

containing an ACD within the confines of the Lincoln Parish landfill.

Crochet agreed the ACD would dispose of a minimum of 900 tons of wood

waste per month. In exchange, the LPPJ agreed to pay Crochet $13,000 per

month for the disposal of up to 12,000 tons of wood waste and vegetative

debris annually.

Crochet agreed to be responsible for obtaining all permits necessary

for the ACD’s operation, as indicated by the following contract provision:

Crochet agrees to be solely responsible for obtaining and
furnishing to Police Jury all necessary permits for the operation
of the Bio-Mass Facility as may be required by the Louisiana

Department of Environmental Quality, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and any other similar state or federal
regulatory agencies.

From May 2012 through August 2018, Crochet operated the ACD under the

LPPJ’s solid waste permit based on its location at the Lincoln Parish landfill

under an air permit and an administrative order of consent, both of which

were issued by the Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”).

The contract provided strict limitations on the accumulation of wood

waste and vegetative debris at the ACD site:

At no time will more than 200 tons of wood waste be allowed
to accumulate at the Bio-Mass Facility without prior approval
and written corrective plan submitted to Police Jury by Crochet.
All recyclable waste products created during the operations of
the Bio-Mass Facility are to become the property of the Police
Jury to be processed and disposed of by the Police Jury.

In the event Crochet was unable to fulfill the obligations set forth in

the contract, the following provision applied:

If Crochet is unable, for any cause, to carry out his duties under
the Contract, all liability of the Police Jury to Crochet under
this agreement shall cease and the Police Jury shall be free to
negotiate with other contractors for the operation of said
services and/or take the actions provided below for bankruptcy,
default and/or breach of contract. Failure to strictly and
promptly enforce these conditions shall not operate as a waiver
of the rights of Police Jury, said party expressly reserving the
right to always enforce or to cancel this contract, regardless of
any indulgences or extensions previously granted. Failure to
comply with any condition or obligation of this contract will
make Crochet liable for any loss or damages sustained by
Police Jury.

Additionally, the contract contained the following force majeure

provision:

Neither party is liable for failure to perform the party’s
obligation if such failure is a result of Acts of God (including
fire, flood, earthquake, storm, hurricane, or other natural
disaster), war, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities
(regardless of whether war is declared), civil war, rebellion,
revolution, insurrection, military or usurped power or
2

confiscation, terrorist activities, nationalism, government,
sanction, blockage, embargo, labor dispute, strike, lockout or
interruption or failure of electricity or telephone service.

The administrative order of consent allowing Crochet to operate under

the LPPJ’s solid waste permit was originally issued in August 2012. Crochet

was directed to return a signed copy to the DEQ in order to continue

operating the ACD under the LPPJ’s solid waste permit. Crochet failed to

do so, and DEQ then cited Crochet in January 2014 and November 2017 for

lacking the proper permits in order to operate the ACD. In August 2018, the

DEQ halted Crochet’s operations at the Lincoln Parish landfill and

prohibited Crochet from further operations until it obtained a solid waste

landfill permit for the site. At the same time, communications between

Ronnie Crochet, the owner of Crochet Equipment Company, and Courtney

Hall, the parish administrator, indicate a debris backlog in excess of 200 tons

already existed at the ACD site. Crochet was not allowed to burn any debris

from August 2018 through mid-April 2019.

The LPPJ paid Crochet $32,500 (half of the $65,000 owed under the

contract) while the ACD was inoperable, with the remaining $32,500 to be

used by the LPPJ to dispose of some of the accumulated debris. Scale

tickets and invoices submitted on behalf of the LPPJ indicate in November

2018, Murphy Brothers Trucking Company (“Murphy Brothers”) removed

687.77 tons of debris from the ACD site.

On April 25, 2019, shortly after Crochet was allowed by the DEQ to

resume its regular disposal operations, a tornado hit Ruston, resulting in an

additional 422.3 tons of debris being deposited at the Crochet site, with most

of the tornado debris routed to an emergency site authorized by the DEQ.

3

On August 11, 2020, nearly 16 months after the DEQ shutdown ended

and the tornado occurred, the LPPJ, through interim parish administrator

Doug Postel (“Postel”), notified Crochet via letter of the large amount of

debris present at the ACD site appearing to be in excess of 200 tons, as well

as his intention to retain the services of a third-party vendor to clear the

backlog. On August 27, 2020, Hurricane Laura made landfall. Around that

same time, Postel hired engineers employed by the Riley Company to

measure the accumulated debris, and on September 8, 2020, the Riley

Company estimated the debris measured approximately 5,333 tons. Postel

then retained Murphy Brothers to clear the backlog of debris and haul it to

the White Oak Landfill. According to the LPPJ’s scale tickets and invoices

issued by Murphy Brothers, over 9,700 tons of debris were removed from

Crochet’s ACD site between August 25 and October 23, 2020, at a cost of

$424,712. The LPPJ deducted the amount paid to Murphy Brothers from the

amounts owed to Crochet under the contract, and the Crochet team remained

on site and operational without pay until the contract ended.

Crochet filed suit alleging the LPPJ breached the contract between the

parties when it failed to pay invoices due for August 2018 through April

2019, and August 2020 through July 2022. In its responsive pleadings, the

LPPJ denied any liability for breaching the contract. Both parties then filed

motions for summary judgment seeking liability determinations in their

respective favors, as well as damages, and both parties also filed oppositions

to the motions for summary judgment filed against them.

Crochet argued it was excused from complying with the contract’s

200-ton limitation on accumulated debris because the backlog was the result

of a tornado and the DEQ shutdown, which Crochet argued were covered by
4

the Act of God and government sanction provisions contained in the force

majeure clause of the contract. Crochet characterized its failure to return the

signed administrative order of consent to the DEQ as a clerical error, and it

argued the DEQ’s requirement of a solid waste permit was unexpected and

unforeseeable, making its actions arbitrary and capricious. Crochet argued

the LPPJ’s refusal to pay the amounts owed constituted a breach of the

contract, and, in fact, the LPPJ owed Crochet payment for work done.

The LPPJ made the same arguments in its motion for summary

judgment and in its opposition to Crochet’s motion, arguing when Crochet

failed to abide by the 200-ton limit on accumulated debris, it breached the

contract, and because the accumulated debris at the ACD site was in excess

of the 200-ton limit, per the contract, the LPPJ was allowed to seek

assistance from a third party to clear the backlog. The LPPJ further argued

the contract obligated Crochet to pay the costs associated with outsourcing

the debris disposal. The LPPJ also argued Crochet’s reliance on the force

majeure clause was misplaced as reading those provisions in the manner

suggested by Crochet would render Crochet’s obligations to retain and

maintain all permits necessary to operate the ACD meaningless and

unenforceable.

The LPPJ argued the Act of God provision and the tornado in April

2019 did not excuse Crochet’s noncompliance with the contract’s 200-ton

accumulation limitation because the excess present in April 2019 continued

to grow until LPPJ hired Murphy Brothers to clean it up some 16 months

later. The LPPJ submitted an affidavit executed by Kerry Outley,

superintendent for the Lincoln Parish landfill, asserting that only 422.3 tons

of the debris was attributable to the tornado, as well as his deposition and
5

scale tickets from the landfill reflecting the same amount of tornado debris

being brought into the landfill. The LPPJ also attached Lincoln Parish

landfill summaries showing Murphy Brothers hauled off 678.77 tons of

debris in November 2018, and indicating 9,866.64 tons of vegetative debris

was deposited at the ACD site between April 2019 and August 2020.

Additionally, the LPPJ provided estimates from the Riley Company

approximating the backlog at 5,333 tons, and landfill summaries and

invoices reflecting Murphy Brothers hauled 9,752.71 tons of debris from the

ACD site between August 25 and October 23, 2020.

As to Crochet’s reliance on the government sanction provision, the

LPPJ argued this did not cover Crochet’s failure to perform its obligations

because the shutdown by the DEQ was the result of Crochet’s own failure to

obtain the permits required to operate the ACD. In support, the LPPJ

attached a copy of the contract between the parties, as well as the deposition

of Ronnie Crochet, which acknowledged Crochet was responsible for

obtaining all permits required for the ACD’s operation. The LPPJ also

attached a letter from Ronnie Crochet to Courtney Hall, which

acknowledged the inoperative status of the ACD, his failure to return the

signed administrative order of consent to the DEQ as directed some five

years prior, and the backlog in excess of 200 tons. The LPPJ asked the trial

court to find Crochet responsible for breaching the contract.

In its opposition to LPPJ’s motion, Crochet re-urged the arguments

contained in its own motion, and in support of its opposition, attached a copy

of the compliance order from the DEQ ordering Crochet to cease and desist

its operations due to a lack of proper permits, a copy of the original

administrative order of consent, a copy of a letter sent from Courtney Hall to
6

Ronnie Crochet in August 2018, and Ronnie Crochet’s response to that letter

wherein he acknowledged his failure to return the signed administrative

order of consent as well as the backlog in excess of 200 tons.

In detailed written reasons for judgment, the trial court granted the

LPPJ’s motion for summary judgment and denied Crochet’s. The trial court

noted the backlog was at least 5,333 tons, only 422.3 tons of which were

attributable to the April 25, 2019, tornado, leaving Crochet in blatant

violation of the 200-ton maximum set out in the contract, even after

subtracting the 422.3 tons of tornado-related debris from the total amount.

The trial court found Crochet’s failure to comply with the DEQ’s permit

requirements caused the shutdown of the ACD site, which then resulted in a

large accumulation of debris at the staging area. The trial court concluded

reading the government sanction provision in the manner suggested by

Crochet would render its contractual obligation to obtain permits

meaningless as any such failure resulting in a government shutdown would

always be sheltered by the government sanction provision.

The trial court stated its ruling was only as to liability, with damages

to be determined at a later trial. Crochet appealed.

DISCUSSION

In its first assignment of error, Crochet contends the trial court erred

in denying the motion for summary judgment filed by Crochet; and in its

second assignment of error, Crochet contends the district court erred in

granting that filed by the LPPJ. In its third assignment of error, Crochet

argues the district court erred in holding the government sanction and Act of

God provisions of the contract did not apply; and in its fourth assignment of

error, Crochet argues the district court erred in misapplying the rules of
7

contractual construction. In its fifth and final assignment of error, Crochet

claims the district court erred in not entering judgment against the LPPJ.

In its brief, Crochet re-urges many of the same arguments contained in

its motion for summary judgment, arguing the Act of God and government

sanction provisions should excuse its noncompliance with the 200-ton

limitation. Crochet argues the Act of God provision should, because of the

April 2019 tornado, excuse the accumulation of debris in excess of 200 tons.

Crochet similarly argues the DEQ shutdown, which resulted in a substantial

accumulation of debris at the staging area, was arbitrary and capricious and

exactly the sort of situation contemplated by the government sanction

provision. Crochet argues the trial court misapplied La. C.C. art. 2046, and

inappropriately inquired into the meaning of the contract despite its terms

being clear and unambiguous. Crochet suggests the trial court’s improper

reading of the contract resulted in absurd consequences, thereby allowing the

LPPJ to breach the contract, as well as incur ridiculous and unnecessary

expenses it then passed on to Crochet.

Crochet contends it is owed $344,500 for the unpaid work performed

at the ACD site and asks this court to vacate the summary judgment in favor

of the LPPJ and grant its own motion for summary judgment.

The LPPJ contends the trial court correctly determined Crochet

breached the contract and is liable for damages to the LPPJ. The LPPJ

further contends Crochet was solely responsible for obtaining the relevant

operational permits for the ACD site and argues Crochet’s failure to do so is

not a government sanction as contemplated in the contract as Crochet’s

interpretation would render the permits and the maintenance and operation

sections of the contract completely meaningless.
8

The LPPJ argues evidence shows the LPPJ paid to have 678.77 tons of

wood waste hauled off during the shutdown, despite Crochet’s assertions to

the contrary, and the LPPJ contends the backlog greatly exceeded the 200-

ton limit following the shutdown but prior to the tornado. Further, the LPPJ

argues Crochet created and increased the stockpile when it was unable to

burn for approximately seven months and failed to burn the amounts agreed

upon in the contract when the DEQ allowed Crochet to resume operations,

making the LPPJ’s enforcement of its rights under the contract permissible.

The LPPJ asks this court to affirm the trial court’s ruling granting its motion

for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is favored and will be granted if the evidence is

sufficient to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966; Bank

of Am., N.A. v. Green, 52,044 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 249 So. 3d 219. A

ruling regarding a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo, using

the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether a

summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. Robinson, 18-0728 (La.

12/5/18), 265 So. 3d 740; Franklin v. Dick, 51,479 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17),

224 So. 3d 1130.

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting

documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is

before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden

on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
9

adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court

the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the

adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The

burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,

affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal

dispute. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So. 3d

876, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 869, 135 S. Ct. 197, 190 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2014).

A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could

disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no

need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate.

Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So. 2d 773; Bloxham v.

HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 52,177 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 251 So. 3d 601.

In determining whether an issue is genuine, a court should not consider the

merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh

evidence. Chanler v. Jamestown Ins. Co., 51,320 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17),

223 So. 3d 614, writ denied, 17-01251 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So. 3d 1230.

When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no

absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the

parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046. A court must give effect to the ordinary

meaning of words and may not create ambiguity where none exists. Id.;

Campbell v. Melton, 01–2578 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 69. Each provision

in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each

10

is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. C.C. art.

2050.

When a contract may be construed from the four corners of the

instrument, that interpretation is a matter of law for the court to determine.

City of Ruston v. Womack & Sons Constr. Grp., Inc., 55,328 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 311, writ denied, 24-00086 (La. 3/5/24), 380 So. 3d

571; Scott v. Red River Waterway Comm’n, 41,009 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/12/06), 926 So. 2d 830, 834, writ denied, 06-1153 (La. 9/15/06), 936 So.

2d 1269; NAB Natural Res., L.L.C. v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 28,555 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So. 2d 477.

While five assignments of error are contained in Crochet’s brief, the

argument behind each is the same: the trial court erred in granting the LPPJ’s

motion for summary judgment and denying Crochet’s. Because the

assignments of error are so closely tied together, we will address them as one

in an attempt to avoid repetitive discussions.

Crochet’s contention that it provided sufficient proof of the LPPJ’s

liability for breaching the contract to warrant summary judgment in its favor

is unsupported by the attachments submitted in support of its motion.

Crochet attached a copy of the contract, which established Crochet was

responsible for obtaining all permits necessary to operate the ACD, for

burning a minimum of 900 tons of debris per month, with a maximum of

12,000 tons of debris burned per year, and establishing a strict limitation of

200 tons of accumulated debris at the ACD staging area. Crochet also

attached in support of its motion an affidavit executed by Ronnie Crochet

with attachments, as well as the depositions of Courtney Hall, Danny Young,

Kerry Outley, and Doug Postel.
11

Crochet agrees it was in violation of the 200-ton limit on accumulated

debris as of September 2020, and each deposition submitted by Crochet

confirms this. None of the depositions or the exhibits attached establish the

LPPJ in any way violated the contract between the two; and, in fact, in their

respective depositions, Courtney Hall, Danny Young, Kerry Outley, and

Doug Postel each acknowledged Crochet was in violation of the 200-ton

limit in September 2020 when Murphy Brothers was retained to clear the

backlog of debris.

Crochet argued the Act of God provision contained within the force

majeure clause should excuse the accumulated debris in excess of 5,000 tons

as of September 2020. However, the first Act of God to which Crochet

points is the April 2019 tornado that occurred some 16 months prior and

resulted only in 422.3 tons of debris being brought to the ACD staging area.

The second Act of God to which Crochet points is Hurricane Laura, which

occurred in August 2020. However, testimony from Kerry Outley, which

Crochet attached in support of its motion, established a separate site was

created for Hurricane Laura debris, and Crochet offered no proof any debris

attributable to Hurricane Laura was deposited at the ACD staging area.

Crochet failed to prove the contract’s Act of God provision would or should

excuse the estimated accumulated debris in excess of 5,000 tons.

Crochet’s reliance on the government sanction provision of the

contract is similarly misplaced. The provisions of a contract must be read in

light of one another. La. C.C. art. 2050. In this contract, the government

sanction provision cannot be read in a way that negates Crochet’s contractual

obligation to obtain and maintain all permits required for the ACD’s

operation. Further, Crochet’s assertion it should be sheltered from a
12

government sanction it caused in failing to comply with the DEQ’s

permitting requirements is meritless. As the trial court stated, any failure of

Crochet to comply with the terms of the contract resulting in the DEQ

revoking its permits could be sheltered by the government sanction

provision if the contract was read as Crochet urges it should be.

For these reasons, Crochet’s assignments of error pertaining to the

trial court’s alleged mistake in failing to grant Crochet’s motion for summary

judgment, improper interpretation of the Act of God and government

sanction provisions within the force majeure clause, and misapplication of

the rules of contractual construction lack merit.

We turn to the LPPJ’s motion for summary judgment. Unlike

Crochet, as the nonmoving party, the LPPJ needed only to point out the

absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to Crochet’s

claim. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). When viewed collectively, the evidence

submitted in support of LPPJ’s arguments does prove a lack of factual

support for Crochet’s claims. The LPPJ attached a copy of the contract

between the parties. The LPPJ also attached the deposition of Ronnie

Crochet, who acknowledged the excessive accumulation of debris at the

ACD site as well as his failure to return the signed administrative order of

consent to the DEQ as directed. The LPPJ also attached the deposition of

Kerry Outley, the landfill summaries and scale tickets showing amounts

deposited at the ACD site, the deposition of Courtney Hall, invoices

submitted to the LPPJ by Murphy Brothers for debris hauled from the ACD

site, letters from Mr. Hall to Ronnie Crochet, the deposition of Ronnie

Crochet, letters from Ronnie Crochet to Mr. Hall and to the LPPJ, the

deposition of Danny Young, the deposition of Robert Myers with the Riley
13

Company, and the Riley Company’s measurement of the accumulated debris

performed in September 2020, estimated to be approximately 5,333 tons.

The documents listed above and attached in support of the LPPJ’s

motion proved the 200-ton limitation on accumulated debris, Crochet’s

obligation to obtain all required permits to operate the ACD, and Crochet’s

obligation to burn a minimum of 900 tons of debris per month, with a

maximum of 12,000 tons per year, and the LPPJ’s obligation to pay Crochet

$13,000 per month for those services. The LPPJ established a backlog of at

least 5,333 tons, and at most 9,752.71 tons, in September 2020, which far

exceeded the 200-ton limitation. Further, the LPPJ established only 422.3

tons of tornado debris were ever brought into the ACD staging area, and it

established a separate site was approved for debris associated with Hurricane

Laura. The LPPJ additionally established the contract permitted it to retain

the services of a third-party vendor to remediate any excessive backlog, as

well as Crochet’s obligation to pay for any such remedial services.

Once the LPPJ pointed out the absence of factual support for

Crochet’s claims, the burden then shifted to Crochet to produce factual

support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact or that LPPJ was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P.

art. 966(D)(1). In its opposition to the LPPJ’s motion, Crochet re-urged the

same arguments raised in its motion, and as further support, attached a copy

of the compliance order from the DEQ, as well as a copy of the

administrative order of consent (which Ronnie Crochet acknowledged

several times he did not sign and return to the DEQ), a letter from Courtney

Hall to Ronnie Crochet from August 2018, wherein Mr. Hall discusses the

DEQ’s shutdown of the ACD site due to a lack of permits, and a copy of
14

Ronnie Crochet’s response to Mr. Hall’s letter, acknowledging his failure to

return the signed administrative order of consent, agreeing the contract

limited the backlog to 200 tons, and noting the backlog was in excess of the

200-ton limitation. None of these items proved the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact, nor did they prove the LPPJ was not entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.

For these reasons, the assignments of error contending the trial court

erroneously granted the LPPJ’s motion for summary judgment and failed to

enter judgment against the LPPJ are without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed, and this

matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. All costs are to be paid by Crochet Equipment Company.

AFFIRMED.

15