Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Sneed, 316 So. 2d 372.

55 citing documents.

  • State v. McElveen 73 So. 3d 1033 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011
    the Court determined that the admission of the defendant’s inculpatory statement at trial was not error even though the statement was not mentioned in the state’s opening statement where the defendant had been made aware of the statement through pre-trial discovery.
  • State v. Francis 809 So. 2d 1029 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001
  • State v. Hayes 726 So. 2d 39 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1998
  • State v. Sneed 571 So. 2d 735 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990
    Although Charles Wayne Sneed was convicted of second degree murder after originally being charged with first degree murder, we assume his conviction was by a unanimous jury, thereby obviating the need for a Goodley retrial.
  • State v. Worthen 550 So. 2d 399 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989
  • State v. Richardson 529 So. 2d 1301 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
  • State v. Hodges 526 So. 2d 406 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988
    interpreted this statute to mean that the State must give sufficient notice of each confession or inculpatory statement it intends to use, with sufficient specificity as to date or occasion and as to persons to whom given, as to afford adequate notice sufficient to permit the defendant a fair opportunity to
  • State v. Grant 517 So. 2d 1151 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987
  • State v. Delatte 506 So. 2d 898 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
  • State v. Cathey 493 So. 2d 842 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
  • State v. Smith 489 So. 2d 255 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
  • State v. Guarisco 466 So. 2d 1356 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985
    the court held that even in the absence of the written notice required by Article 768, a defendant is not prejudiced by the admission of statements if he had actual notice by other means.
  • State v. Maillian 464 So. 2d 1071 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
  • State v. Jackson 450 So. 2d 621 La. 1984
  • State v. Bellows 442 So. 2d 889 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
    the court held that even in the absence of the written notice required by Article 768, a defendant is not prejudiced by the admission of statements if he had actual notice by other means.
  • State v. Lastrapes 443 So. 2d 652 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
  • State v. Slate 440 So. 2d 191 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
    for the proposition that a general notice, as here, that the State intends to use unspecified confessions or inculpatory statements does not comply with the requirements of Article 768.
  • State v. Foster 437 So. 2d 309 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
  • State v. Parker 436 So. 2d 495 La. 1983
  • State v. Kohler 434 So. 2d 1110 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
  • State v. Russell 416 So. 2d 1283 La. 1982
  • State v. Williams 416 So. 2d 914 La. 1982
    this Court held that even in the absence of the written notice required by Art. 768, a defendant is not prejudiced by the admission of statements if he has had actual notice by other means.
  • State v. Chapman 410 So. 2d 689 La. 1982
    766, 769; State v. Robertson, No. 60,909, "
  • State v. Guiden 399 So. 2d 194 La. 1981
  • State v. Korman 397 So. 2d 1346 La. 1981
    However, a jury case in which error in the notice was ruled not prejudicial.
  • State v. Bodley 394 So. 2d 584 La. 1981
  • State v. Gautreaux 377 So. 2d 289 La. 1979
  • State v. Bonanno 373 So. 2d 1284 La. 1979
    Because the type of notice contemplated by the statute is virtually identical to that required in connection with oral statements by Code of Criminal Procedure Article 768 (La.
  • State v. Liner 373 So. 2d 121 La. 1979
  • State v. Nettleton 367 So. 2d 755 La. 1979
  • State v. Quincy 363 So. 2d 647 La. 1978
    the state failed to give notice sufficiently specific as to date and occasion so as to afford him a sufficient opportunity to meet the issue.
  • State v. Drew 360 So. 2d 500 La. 1978
    766, 769; State v. Robertson, No. 60,909
  • State v. Holstead 354 So. 2d 493 La. 1977
  • State v. Qualls 353 So. 2d 978 La. 1977
  • State v. Washington 353 So. 2d 258 La. 1977
    the defendant here was told when, where and to whom the statements were made.
  • State v. Alexander 351 So. 2d 505 La. 1977
    In State v. Sneed, La., (1975), we interpreted the intent of Article 768 as follows: ".
  • State v. Williams 346 So. 2d 181 La. 1977
  • State v. George 346 So. 2d 694 La. 1977
  • State ex rel. Gates 345 So. 2d 974 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
  • State v. Schamburge 344 So. 2d 997 La. 1977
    Relying upon State v. Sneed, La., (1976), the defendant specifically contends: that the notice given did not indicate who the police officers were, or where the statements were made; that the wording of the notice was ambiguous; that the notice did not inform him of the exact nature of the inculpatory statements, or of the number of statements that th
  • State v. Green 343 So. 2d 149 La. 1977
    Strictly speaking the opening statement need not detail the state's evidence but simply is designed to describe the state's case in general terms sufficient to enable the jury to understand the evidence as it unfolds as well as to inform the defendant
  • State v. Kinchen 342 So. 2d 174 La. 1977
    Art. 769; State v. Sneed, La., (1975); State v. Roquemore, La., (1974); State v. Himel, 260 La.
  • State v. Calloway 343 So. 2d 694 La. 1976
    State v. Sneed, La., (1975).
  • State v. Nicolaus 340 So. 2d 296 La. 1976
  • State v. Lawson 338 So. 2d 627 La. 1976
  • State v. Hills 337 So. 2d 1155 La. 1976
  • State v. Williams 338 So. 2d 672 La. 1976
  • State v. Turner 337 So. 2d 455 La. 1976
  • State v. Sneed 328 So. 2d 126 La. 1976
    a case arising out of this same transaction, approved the use of a very general opening statement, citing substantial authority therefor.
  • State v. Nix 327 So. 2d 301 La. 1975