Demetrice Underwood and Shannon Underwood, Husband and Wife v. Geico Secure Insurance Company, Mack A. Hill, and Jesse C. Eldridge

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,095-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

DEMETRICE UNDERWOOD Plaintiffs-Appellants
AND SHANNON UNDERWOOD,
HUSBAND AND WIFE

versus

GEICO SECURE INSURANCE Defendants-Appellees
COMPANY, MACK A. HILL,
AND JESSE C. ELDRIDGE

*****
Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2022-2856

Honorable Jefferson Bryan Joyce, Judge

*****

THE DOWNS LAW FIRM, APC Counsel for Appellant,
By: Earl Ross Downs, Jr. Demetrice Underwood
Earl Ross Downs, III
Emily Wynn Downs
Hayden Sierra Downs

THE LAW OFFICES OF STREET & STREET Counsel for Appellant,
By: Daniel Randolph Street Shannon Underwood

COOK, YANCEY, KING & Counsel for Appellees,
GALLOWAY, APLC GEICO Secure Insurance
By: Jordan B. Bird Company and Jesse C.
David L. Wilkes Eldridge
Gregg A. Wilkes

COTTON, BOLTON, HOYCHICK Counsel for Appellee,
& DOUGHTY, LLP Orr Motors of Little
By: David P. Doughty Rock, Inc., d/b/a Sparks
Nissan Kia

LIGHTFOOT, FRANKLIN & WHITE, LLC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Joel Chandler Bailey Onstar, LLC
Rachel M. Lary

HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, LLP
By: Jay P. Adams

MACK A. HILL In Proper Person

*****

Before PITMAN, STONE, and ROBINSON, JJ.

STONE, J.

This civil appeal involves a motor vehicle accident and arises from the

Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Jefferson Joyce presiding. The

plaintiffs, Demetrice Underwood and Shannon Underwood, appeal the trial

court’s summary judgment dismissing with prejudice their claims against

three of the five defendants, namely: (1) Jesse Eldridge (“Eldridge”), the

owner of the vehicle that was stolen and crashed into the plaintiffs’ vehicle;

(2) Geico Secure Insurance Co. (“Geico”), in its capacity as Eldridge’s auto

insurer; and (3) Sparks Nissan Kia (“Sparks”), in its capacity as Eldridge’s

employer. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The plaintiffs filed suit alleging they were injured in a motor vehicle

crash involving their vehicle and a vehicle owned by Eldridge but driven by

a car thief, Mack Hill (“Hill”). At the time of the incident, Hill was driving

while intoxicated and was the subject of a high-speed police chase for

stealing Eldridge’s vehicle. Hill had already caused one collision moments

before he rammed the stolen vehicle into the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Eldridge

had left the motor of his personal vehicle running with the doors apparently

unlocked in the parking lot at his place of employment, Sparks in Monroe,

Louisiana. This gave Hill the opportunity to steal the vehicle. However,

Eldridge testified that he had the key fob in his pocket and had tried to lock

the vehicle remotely and thought he had successfully done so. Eldridge

actually witnessed Hill stealing the vehicle and quickly reported it stolen to

the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Officer Erika Spivey (“Ofc. Spivey”) of the Monroe

Police Department; Eldridge also advised there was a loaded pistol in the

(unlocked) center console of his vehicle.

Ofc. Spivey testified regarding the pistol in the car as follows:

Q. OK. And then let me ask this. In one of the tapes, I believe I
overheard Mr. Eldridge, the owner of the vehicle, say there was a
pistol in the console. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. And does that do anything to the nature of the pursuit or the
seriousness of it?
A. Yes.
Q. Explain.
A. He could have— Like if Mr. Eldridge didn’t tell us that, the guy
that had stole [sic] the vehicle could, you know, start shooting at my
officers. So when you hear me say, “Hey, there’s a gun in the vehicle,”
that’s for her to tell the officers there’s a gun in the console. So they’ll
know what they’re— You know, in case they do stop him and they
approach the vehicle, they have their safety, you know, that they
know, they approach him because there’s a gun in the vehicle. You
don’t know whether he’s reached in the console and gotten the gun
out to shoot at them. You don’t know. (Emphasis added.)

Ofc. Spivey also explained that it was the supervisor on duty who had the

authority to stop the high-speed pursuit but could not remember which

supervisor was on duty at the time of the incident. She further advised that

plaintiffs’ counsel(s) could contact Captain Vince Brown (“Capt. Brown”) to

possibly ascertain the identity of the supervisor in charge regarding the

incident, but the plaintiffs introduced neither an affidavit nor deposition

testimony from the supervisor, nor did they introduce an affidavit asserting

they had not had an adequate opportunity to discover the identity of the

supervisor on duty.

Officer Zachary Osbon (“Ofc. Osbon”) of the West Monroe Police

Department joined the pursuit and worked the scene of the accident; he

created a police report of the incident. Ofc. Osbon testified that “as far as

our policy [regarding high-speed pursuits] goes, it basically is on a case-by-

case basis and is usually depending on the supervisors…[I]f we get in a

pursuit, it would be up to the supervisors given like time of day, traffic and

the offense, whether we would pursue or not.” Regarding the pistol being in

the vehicle during the chase, Ofc. Osbon stated:
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Q. And with regard to the stolen vehicle, in your experience, if a call
comes in that there’s a stolen vehicle but then the call is supplemented
with additional information that in that stolen vehicle, there is a pistol
in an unlocked console by the owner of the vehicle, you know, it’s his
pistol, does that change the seriousness of the issues involved in
whether to pursue or not?
A. Yes, it could. But, as you know, it’s just based on the information
we’re given. As far as this one goes, we weren’t given that much
information actually. We didn’t realize that Monroe [Police
Department] had actually gotten in a pursuit with the vehicle. I was
actually sitting on South 5th at one of our businesses, and they all
come in front of me. So like as they’re crossing me was whenever our
dispatch told us that Monroe was in pursuit with that stolen vehicle.
(Emphasis added.)

There is no allegation in any witness testimony that Hill knew about

the gun, removed it from the console, or fired it.

Eldridge, Geico, and Sparks filed motions for summary judgment

“(MSJs”) arguing that the plaintiffs could not produce prima facie evidence

to support their claim. These defendants, in their MSJs (and briefs to this

court), cite Louisiana Supreme Court and second circuit jurisprudence

holding that the owner or custodian of a vehicle parked on private property

is not liable for injuries caused by unauthorized use of the vehicle, even if

the owner/custodian left the keys inside. In opposition, the plaintiffs argue

that the gun in the console distinguishes these cases; alternatively, the

plaintiffs ask that these cases be overruled. In support of their arguments

regarding the gun as a (supposedly) distinguishing factor, the plaintiffs

submitted the depositions of Eldridge, Ofc. Osbon, and Ofc. Spivey. The

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Eldridge, Geico, and

Sparks. The plaintiffs appeal from that judgment, arguing that this court

should distinguish or “overrule” that jurisprudence.

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DISCUSSION

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) allocates the burden of proof on summary

judgment as follows:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if
the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not
require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse
party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to
the court the absence of factual support for one or more
elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce
factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff in a negligence action must introduce (for

the purpose of summary judgment) prima facie evidence of the element or

elements of that claim challenged by the MSJ. McGee v. Ashford Place

Apartments, LLC, 54,795 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/22) 351 So. 3d

899. Appellate courts review trial court decisions on summary judgment de

novo. Mandeville P’ship v. A Luxury Transportation, LLC, 21-1450 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 8/24/22), 348 So. 3d 763.

The fountainhead of tort liability is La. C.C. art. 2315(A), which

states, “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges

him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” In Rando v. Anco Insulations

Inc., 08-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So. 3d 1065, 1088, the Louisiana Supreme

Court reiterated the essential elements of a negligence action under La. C.C.

art. 2315:

The standard negligence analysis we employ in
determining whether to impose liability under La.
Civ.Code art. 2315 is the duty/risk analysis, which consists
of the following four-prong inquiry: (1) Was the conduct
in question a substantial factor in bringing about the harm

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to the plaintiff, i.e., was it a cause-in-fact of the harm
which occurred? (2) Did the defendant(s) owe a duty to
the plaintiff? (3) Was the duty breached? (4) Was the risk,
and harm caused, within the scope of protection afforded
by the duty breached? [(5) Did the plaintiff suffer a
compensable injury?]1 Under a duty/risk analysis,
all…[five] inquiries must be affirmatively answered for
plaintiff to recover.

Rando also addressed the overlapping terminology which can be used to

express the duty/risk analysis in a negligence action:

Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal
cause, or duty, the scope of the duty inquiry [articulated in
question “(4),” above] is ultimately a question of policy as
to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the
duty.
The scope of protection inquiry asks whether the
enunciated rule or principle of law extends to or is
intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm
arising in this manner. Although we have unequivocally
stated the determination of legal cause involves a purely
legal question, this legal determination depends on factual
determinations of foreseeability and ease of association.
(Emphasis added; internal citations and quotation marks
omitted.)

In Racine v. Moon’s Towing, 01-2837 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 21, the

plaintiffs sued multiple defendants for wrongful death, including the owner

of the land on which the vehicle was parked (a moving company and storage

facility). The plaintiffs’ 15-year-old son Hunter was trespassing and was

killed by a vehicle which he and his 14-year-old brother Logan found parked

on the property. They found the vehicle—a flatbed truck—locked with the

keys inside. Logan climbed through a partially open window and started the

vehicle but then could not turn it off. The boys left it idling in park for 15 to

1
The bracketed language is added to reflect the teaching of Pitre v. Opelousas
Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988), which in part denied medical malpractice
liability for lack of compensability of damages where an unwanted child was born to a
woman who previously had a sterilization surgery. The court held that the mother could
not recover for the future expenses of rearing the child despite finding all other elements
of malpractice being satisfied as to this item of claimed damages.

5

20 minutes, then Hunter stood on the running board of the truck and reached

through the window in another attempt to turn off the vehicle’s engine. The

vehicle suddenly jumped into gear and began moving; it pinned Hunter

against a fence and killed him. The parents sued the owner of the land on

which the vehicle was stored. The court held that the “mere act of leaving

the keys in a vehicle does not make the owner liable for injuries caused by

someone that uses the vehicle without authorization,” and granted summary

judgment for defendant.

In Humphrey v. Balsamo, 40,200 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/8/05), 914 So. 2d

1217, this court affirmed a judgment (rendered after trial on the merits)

which dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims arising out of a motor vehicle

accident. There, as here, the plaintiffs’ vehicle was struck by a thief driving

a stolen vehicle which had been left parked on private property with the keys

inside. On appeal, the parties disputed which standard of review applied—

de novo or manifest error. Citing the “well-settled” rule illustrated in

DeCastro v. Boylan, 367 So.2d 83 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979), writ denied, 369

So. 2d 458 (La.1979) and reiterated in Racine, supra, we held that the

judgment had to be affirmed under either standard. This court so held even

though the vehicle owner “admittedly left a set of keys in the vehicle, parked

outside of the designated parking lot, had knowledge of some prior thefts

and vandalism, and had sought better security for the parking.” Id. at 1221.

We explained:

Those acts do not make him liable for injuries caused by
someone who stole and drove his vehicle without
authorization. The cause of plaintiffs’ injuries was the
thief’s deliberate act of stealing Balsamo’s van which
he/she negligently rammed into the rear of the vehicle
occupied by unfortunate plaintiffs.

6

Id. We upheld that principle in Knicely v. XYZ Ins. Co., 43,250 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/17/08), 997 So. 2d 8, 9, writ denied, 08-2729 (La. 1/30/09), 999 So.

2d 758. Therein we affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant car

dealership from which a vehicle was stolen. It was part of the dealership’s

inventory and was parked on the sales lot and left unattended with the keys

left inside; that is how it was stolen. The thief crashed the stolen vehicle

into the plaintiffs’ vehicle, killing Doris Kathryn Knicely, a passenger of the

plaintiffs’ vehicle. The plaintiffs sued the dealership (among others) in tort.

As previously mentioned, their claims were dismissed on summary

judgment, and this court affirmed that judgment of dismissal.

The plaintiffs ask this court to overrule its precedent established in

Knicely and adopt the dissent therein, which argued that Racine and

Humphrey should be distinguished on the ground that the defendant vehicle

owner was a car dealer—as opposed to a moving/storage business (Racine)

or an individual’s personal vehicle parked at his workplace (Humphrey).

However, unlike Knicely, the instant case does not involve a vehicle in the

dealership’s inventory; rather, like Humphrey, the instant case involves an

employee’s vehicle parked at his place of employment. Thus, even if the

Knicely dissent had been the Knicely majority, Knicely would not support

liability on the facts of the instant case.

The plaintiff also cites Blanchard v. Mitchell, 17-444 (La. App. 3 Cir.

6/12/17), 233 So. 3d 719, writ denied, 17-1372 (La. 11/6/17), 228 So. 3d

738, which arguably contradicted the Louisiana Supreme Court precedent of

Racine, supra. Furthermore, a different panel of the third circuit sternly

overruled this decision less than six months later in Blanchard v. Hicks, 17-

7

1045 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 244 So. 3d 875, 879, writ denied, 18-0829

(La. 9/21/18), 252 So. 3d 908.

In Blanchard v. Mitchell, supra, the defendant filed a MSJ

(presumably citing Racine, supra) and the trial court denied it. The

defendant sought a supervisory writ from the third circuit, which denied the

writ application in a published opinion. The court relied on La. R.S. 32:145,

which governs the parking of vehicles on public roads only, as a basis for

applying the doctrine of negligence per se. This application of the statute

purportedly distinguished Racine, which involved a vehicle parked on

private property. The statute, which is part of the Highway Regulatory Act,2

provides:

No person driving or in charge of any motor vehicle shall
permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the
motor, locking the ignition, removing the key, and
effectively setting the brake thereon, and, when standing
upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or
side of the highway.
The italicized language in the above quote demonstrates that the statute

presupposes that the vehicle is being parked on a public road. This

interpretation was affirmed in DeCastro, supra, and Knicely, supra.

As previously stated, the plaintiffs fail to mention the third circuit’s

more recent decision in Blanchard v. Hicks, supra, which also involved the

theft of a vehicle parked on a public road with keys inside. (This case,

though involving a plaintiff of the same surname, concerned a different

incident and different parties.) This decision overruled Blanchard v.

Mitchell, supra, and held that the owner/rightful operator of a vehicle who

2
La. R.S. 32:145 was originally enacted in 1962 and has not been amended.
Therefore, it antedates Racine, supra, Humphrey, supra, and Knicely, supra.
8

parks it with the keys left inside is not “at fault” if a thief steals the vehicle

and causes injury to other people—even if the vehicle was so parked on a

public roadway. In other words, Blanchard v. Hicks stands for the

proposition that La. R.S. 32:145 does not serve as a basis for applying the

doctrine of negligence per se in such cases.

In this case, the plaintiffs argue that the presence of the pistol

distinguishes the existing jurisprudence. To establish valid ground for

distinguishing Racine, supra, and its progeny, the plaintiffs’ burden requires

prima facie evidence that the pistol’s presence was a substantial factor in

causing the wreck. As evidentiary support, the plaintiffs rely on the above-

quoted testimony of Ofcs. Spivey and Osbon.

In the alternative, the plaintiffs argue that this court should overrule its

prior decisions, reject the authority of Racine, and adopt the dissent in

Knicely (which argued for distinguishing Racine as to a car dealership’s

liability in connection with vehicle stolen from the car dealership’s

inventory).3

The existing jurisprudence cannot be distinguished from the instant

case. That is because the plaintiffs have not shown that the gun was an

empirical cause (i.e., cause-in-fact) of their injuries. Because the gun was

not a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries, it cannot possibly be a legal

cause of their injuries.4 Both elements of causation are necessary to the

prima facie case of negligence, but the plaintiffs have not introduced prima

facie proof of either. The plaintiffs’ evidence shows merely that the gun

3
Unlike the instant case, Knicely did not involve a dealership employee’s liability
in connection with his personal vehicle stolen while parked on car dealership property.
4
Rando, supra.
9

“could” have changed the vehicular pursuit in some unspecified way: this

does not and cannot constitute prima facie evidence of causation.5 In effect,

Ofc. Spivey merely stated that the known presence of the gun would

increase the caution with which the officers would approach Hill if he

stopped the vehicle. Likewise, Ofc. Osbon testified that information about a

gun being in the vehicle could change the seriousness of the issues involved

in whether to pursue or not; he did not testify that it likely did change

anything in this case. In sum, the plaintiffs introduced no summary

judgment evidence: (1) that the police pursuit was initiated or maintained

because of the gun; (2) that the pursuit was faster, longer, or more aggressive

because of the gun; or (3) that the crash was in any way more likely because

of the gun.6

Furthermore, the officers both testified that the respective supervisors

on duty would have made the command decisions concerning the pursuit.

Ofc. Spivey specifically advised plaintiffs’ counsel to contact Capt. Brown

to potentially ascertain the identity of the Monroe Police Department

supervisor in charge of the pursuit. However, no mention of plaintiffs’

5
The deposition transcripts suggest that plaintiffs’ counsel made a strategic
decision to avoid asking Officer Osbon or Officer Spivey any question calling for
definitive testimony regarding whether the presence of the gun (more likely than not) did
cause or intensify the pursuit. Rather, the question posed to Officer Spivey regarding the
gun was: “And does that do anything to the nature of the pursuit or the seriousness of it?”
Similarly, plaintiffs’ counsel asked Officer Osbon: “does that [the gun] change the
seriousness of the issues involved in whether to pursue or not?” The responses to these
vague questions alluded to the likelihood of plaintiffs’ counsel getting definitive answers
that they did not want if they pressed further. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ counsel appears to
have consciously opted to avoid further questioning on this point.

6
There is neither evidence Hill fired the weapon, nor that he was even aware of
its presence in the vehicle, nor that it otherwise discharged during the episode, nor that it
was ever removed from the console during the chase.

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counsels making such inquiry is made anywhere in plaintiffs’ summary

judgment evidence.

Pursuant to the binding authority of Racine, supra; Humphrey, supra;

Knicely, supra; —and persuasive jurisprudence (Decastro, supra; Blanchard

v. Hicks, supra)—this court must affirm the summary judgment dismissing

the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. This court cannot contradict such a

long, well-established series of its own decisions, nor the binding authority

of Racine. Moreover, the facts of this case fit squarely within the policy of

Racine and its progeny: the victim of a motor vehicle theft should not be

held liable to victims of the thief’s substandard driving of that vehicle. The

mere inactive presence of a firearm makes no difference.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. All costs of this

appeal are to be taxed to the plaintiffs.

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