Succession of Valerie Bryan Braswell

Judgment rendered April 9, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,133-CA
No. 56,134-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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SUCCESSION OF VALERIE BRYAN BRASWELL

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 632,226

Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge

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THOMAS, SOILEAU, JACKSON Counsel for Appellants,
& COLE, LLP Kenneth Pardee and
By: Steven E. Soileau Debra Pardee

WEEMS, SCHIMPF, HAINES Counsel for Appellees,
& MOORE, APLC Julie Bryan White,
By: Kenneth P. Haines Jennifer Bryan Clark,
Kyle A. Moore Suzanna Braswell
Sharman and William
Bryan

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Before COX, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

A chronically ill woman was accompanied by her caregiver to an

attorney and executed, in quick succession, two separate wills. The scheme

of having two wills was to give the false impression to the decedent’s family

that she was leaving the majority of her property to her sisters, when in

reality, the first will was revoked and her caregiver was the primary

beneficiary of the second will. The second will was kept secret from the

decedent’s family until after her death. The decedent’s sisters probated the

first will, and the caregiver subsequently probated the second will. The

matters were eventually consolidated, and after a trial, the trial court

determined that the decedent lacked the capacity to execute either will and

that she had been unduly influenced by her caregiver. With both wills

declared null, the decedent’s daughter inherited her property through

intestacy. The caregiver and her husband now appeal this judgment. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Valerie Braswell (“Valerie”) suffered from chronic health problems,

including COPD and cervical stenosis, that left her virtually a quadriplegic.

She was divorced and had one child, Suzanna Leigh Braswell (“Suzanna”),

and two sisters, Julie Bryan White (“Julie”) and Jennfier Bryan Clark

(“Jennifer”). Due to her health condition, from 2017 through 2020, Valerie

and her mother were both living in Heritage Manor Stratmore nursing

facility in Shreveport, Louisiana. With the onset of Covid in 2020, Valerie’s

father, Bill Bryan (“Bill”), elected to move into a home that could

accommodate Valerie and her mother, and they moved home.

Valerie’s two sisters lived in Texas but would visit the home

approximately once a month. Bill needed help caring for Valerie and her

mother, so he hired Debra Pardee (“Debra”) and Stephanie Barbo

(“Stephanie”) from the nursing home to be their caretakers. Debra and

Stephanie worked alternating 12-hour shifts in Bill’s home from 8 a.m. to 8

p.m., with Debra primarily caring for Valerie. Valerie’s mother died in

February of 2021.

On April 20, 2021, two months after her mother’s death, Valerie was

driven by Debra, and they left Bill’s home to “run errands.” They first went

to a doctor’s appointment for Valerie, where she met with the doctor and his

nurse practitioner. Next, they stopped by Valerie’s bank, where Valerie was

taken inside, and Debra was added to her bank account. From the bank, they

next went to the office of attorney Patricia Miramon (“Miramon”), who is

primarily an estate planning attorney. Valerie and Debra had previously

communicated with Miramon about executing a will for Valerie.

While at Miramon’s office, Valerie told Miramon that her sisters

hated her, and Bill was pressuring her to create a will in favor of her sisters.

She wanted to show them a will to get them to stop pressuring her, while

secretly intending for there to be a second will in favor of Debra that she was

not going to show her family. She also told Miramon she did not have a

good relationship with her daughter. Valerie executed the two wills in quick

succession. In the first will, she bequeathed two pieces of furniture to her

daughter, Suzanna, and left the remainder of her estate to her sisters as her

universal legatees (the “first will”). Three minutes later, Valerie executed a

second will that revoked the first will and bequeathed the same pieces of

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furniture to Suzanna and the remainder of her estate to Debra (the “second

will”). Valerie returned home and showed the first will to Bill, but she and

Debra kept the existence of the second will a secret. Valerie died a few

months later, on August 11, 2021.

On August 21, 2021, Valerie’s sisters filed a petition for probate of

the first will, with no mention of the undisclosed second will. An order

making the first will executory was signed and filed on August 23, 2021 in

docket number 632,226 in the First Judicial District Court. On September 2,

2021, Debra filed a petition for probate of statutory testament under a new

docket number, docket number 632,443, also in the First Judicial District

Court, and an order filing and executing the second will was signed on

September 8, 2021. At that moment, there were competing wills and

corresponding orders.

On October 22, 2021, Debra filed a rule to annul probate and rescind

orders of appointment co-executors and independent executorship in the

matter filed by Valerie’s sisters. On February 7, 2022, the trial court granted

the rule to annul, and the two separate matters were consolidated. Numerous

motions were then filed by the parties, and the matter was set for trial to

address the sisters’ claims of undue influence exerted by Debra and

Valerie’s lack of testamentary capacity.

A bench trial began on July 27, 2023. The first witness to testify was

nurse practitioner Laura Perkins (“Perkins”). She testified that she works at

Willis-Knighton Medical Center at Internal Medical Center, where she is a

nurse practitioner, and the court qualified her as an expert nurse practitioner.

Perkins began seeing Valerie in 2017 at the Heritage Manor Stratmore

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nursing facility. She testified that she remembers Valerie better than other

patients because she was needy and liked to be seen by medical personnel.

Valerie had severe COPD and was oxygen dependent. She testified that

Valerie had sitters to help with activities of daily living, or ADLs, including

bathing, personal hygiene, feeding, and cooking. Valerie could not drive,

had very little control over her upper extremities, and had cervical spine

disease that caused her a great deal of pain. She testified Valerie was almost

quadriplegic and had depression and anxiety.

Perkins described Valerie’s lack of what she considered “executive

function,” which she testified was the “ability to make decisions, complex

decisions, ability to do things that take more than one step, the ability to act

like an adult.” She testified that people who lack executive function are

more vulnerable to their environment. Perkins testified that she saw Valerie

on the day she executed the wills and that she did not have the executive

function to execute the wills. Perkins described that Valerie was so anxious

on April 20, 2021, she needed her medication increased and that her

weakness had dramatically increased. Perkins testified, “I don’t think she

could have made those kinds of decisions a year before, and certainly not

that day I saw her.” Perkins testified that she did remember Valerie’s father

visiting her in the nursing home but not her sisters. On cross-examination,

Perkins testified that there was nothing in Valerie’s chart about the loss of

executive function.

Attorney Miramon testified that she sends potential clients

information sheets to fill out before their first meeting and Valerie came in

with her sheet filled out. Miramon testified:

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She told me that she was being pressured by her father and her
sisters to do this will leaving everything to them and that she
didn’t want that. And that she had a bad relationship with her
sisters. And that they hated her. They wanted her dead. They
didn’t want her to live with her dad. Her dad was putting a lot
of pressure on her. And she had—she wanted me to do two
separate wills.

Miramon acknowledged that Valerie could not write on her own, and

someone else had handwritten in that Debra Pardee should inherit Valerie’s

estate. She testified that Valerie signed the first will at 4:35 p.m. and

revoked it at 4:38 p.m. Miramon testified that she knew Valerie’s intention

was always to revoke the first will soon after signing it. She did not want

her family to know about the revocation of the first will until after she died.

After Valerie revoked the first will, she executed the second will, which

leaves the hope chest and antique desk to Suzanna and all of her remaining

property to Debra. If Debra is unable to receive the property, then the

property would go to Debra’s children, Crystal Todd Pryor, Jesse Quintana

Todd, and Chase Duran Todd.

Miramon stated that when Valerie came to her office, she was in an

electric wheelchair, but Miramon did not ask her about the specifics of her

condition or medications. On the day they executed the wills, they also

created and executed a new power of attorney for Valerie, naming Kenneth

Pardee (“Kenneth”), Debra’s husband, as the power of attorney with Debra

as the alternative agent. Miramon noted that she does normally ask people

who come to her for estate planning a series of basic questions about

themselves to make sure they are lucid and can answer. Miramon testified

that Valerie seemed lucid and capable, and she did not seek a doctor’s note

about her capacity.

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Also testifying at trial was Dr. Robert Hernandez, an internal

medicine doctor, who confirmed that he began treating Valerie in October of

2017. When Dr. Hernandez began treating Valerie at the nursing home, she

had cervical myelopathy with weakness in her upper and lower extremities,

severe COPD, was on oxygen, and had a history of anxiety and depression.

Dr. Hernandez saw her once a month, and his nurse practitioner saw her

more often on a regular basis. The COPD caused chronic respiratory failure.

He testified that Valerie’s anxiety medications can cause confusion,

disinhibition, and problems with mental functioning and cognitive ability.

Dr. Hernandez testified:

Q: Now if Ms. Miramon had written you a letter and inquired as
to provide a letter that Ms. Braswell was capable of executing a
will in April of 2020, would you have written that letter?

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: I just didn’t think she was capable of making those higher—
higher ordered complex decisions.

***
Q: So from your observations and treatment of her, knowing
what her medical condition was and her medications that she
was on, do you think that Ms. Braswell in March or April of
2021 was capable of formulating a plan like that [the two-will
plan] on her own?

A: No.

Dr. Hernandez also testified that Valerie could be easily influenced due to

her lack of executive function and that Valerie never expressed that her

sisters disliked her. He confirmed that he never witnessed anything negative

between Valerie and her father, who was often with her during her

appointments. Under cross-examination, he testified that Valerie had never

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undergone any cognitive testing or ever been diagnosed with dementia or

Alzheimer’s.

Julie White, Valerie’s sister, testified that they had a normal sister

relationship and that she did not hate Valerie. Valerie never told her that she

wanted to leave all of her property to Debra. Julie testified that she

discussed with her father that he was going to give Debra $75,000 to add a

handicapped room onto her house for Valerie after he passed away. Julie

testified that all of her father’s money was going to go to Valerie’s care after

he was dead and that there was never a plan for Valerie to go back into a

nursing home. Julie stated that Debra drained Valerie’s bank account before

her death using her power of attorney.

Bill, Valerie’s father, testified that Valerie was not capable of entering

into contracts with other people. He testified that Valerie was dependent on

her caregivers for her every need. He stated that he had no idea that Valerie

was going to Miramon to create a will until she came home and showed him

the first will. He did not know about the second will until after Valerie had

died. On cross-examination, he testified that Valerie knew who and where

she was and was cognizant of what was going on around her.

Crystal Pryor testified that she is Debra’s daughter and that she heard

Valerie say that her sisters did not like her. She testified she never saw her

mother trying to unduly influence Valerie or take advantage of her. On

cross-examination, she testified that she interacted with Valerie about ten

times in total and did not know the extent of her medical problems.

Stephanie Barbo testified that she and Debra worked separate 12-hour

shifts for Valerie and her mother, while she was alive. She testified that

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Valerie told her that her sisters hated her and that she did not have a

relationship with her daughter. She testified that she heard Valerie’s father

tell Valerie that she had to sell her home or go back into a nursing home.

She and Debra have been friends since they were teenagers.

Kenneth Pardee, Debra’s husband, testified that Valerie was very

smart and wanted Debra to have everything of hers because her sisters were

going to have plenty after their father’s death. He testified that he did not

know what was in the second will, even though he was the executor of the

will. Testimony clearly shows that Kenneth did not understand the

difference between a will and a power of attorney. He testified he never

made any financial decisions for Valerie and did not authorize his wife to

remove any money from Valerie’s accounts. He did not authorize his wife

to sign as Valerie’s power of attorney on the sale of her house. He did not

authorize the removal of $85,900 from Valerie’s account by his wife.

Debra testified that Valerie told her that she wanted to create a will so

that her father and sisters would stop threatening to put her back in a nursing

home. She testified that she felt so badly for Valerie that she offered for

Valerie to come live with her and her husband after her father died. She

acknowledged that she drafted a $65,000 check out to herself from Valerie’s

account for improvements to her home. She testified that Valerie was fine

on April 20, 2021, when she went to the doctor and to Miramon’s office.

Debra alleged that she did not know about the two-will scheme. She

believed Valerie had capacity and did not influence Valerie. She testified

that Bill and Valerie told her what to write down on Miramon’s

questionnaire, including that Debra would inherit all her personal property.

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She testified that Bill was aware that Valerie was going to Miramon’s office.

She stated that Valerie executed a power of attorney that granted her the

right to act as power of attorney but admitted that she has never produced a

copy of the power of attorney that grants her that authority. On cross-

examination, Debra testified that Bill and Julie told her to withdraw the

$85,900 from Valerie’s account days before Valerie died because they

wanted her to have the money.

Suzanna testified that she and her mother had a strained relationship,

but they never went more than 10 years without speaking, as had been

suggested by Debra. Suzanna testified that she went with her grandfather to

see her mom in the nursing home when she lived with Bill in 2019. On

cross-examination, Suzanna admitted to several criminal convictions and

that she never visited her mother after Bill moved her into the home in 2020.

Debra challenged the standing of Julie and Jennifer to object to the

second will. After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the trial court

found that Julie and Jennifer had standing as the universal legatees of the

first will to challenge the validity of the second will. The trial court’s

judgment then summarized the testimony and evidence presented at the trial

and noted its impressions of the veracity and credibility of the witnesses. It

noted that it found Bill and the medical providers’ testimonies credible and

informative and that it found the Pardees’, Crystal’s, and Stephanie’s

testimonies problematic and not credible. The court found that on April 21,

2021, “Valerie did not have the mental and emotional capacity to deliberate

her actions and knowledgeably and act independently to make an

unconfused and uninfluenced decision to execute a will.” The court further

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found that Valerie was unduly influenced, and the evidence showed a

substitution of volition. The court specifically found that the timing and

deceptive circumstances of the wills, coming when Valerie was grieving the

death of her mother and was having her medications adjusted, was

troublesome. The trial court found that both wills were null and any orders

probating them and any orders arising therefrom were vacated. The court

ordered that Valerie died intestate and Suzanna, as her only child, was her

sole intestate heir. The Pardees have appealed this judgment.

DISCUSSION

The Pardees have asserted three assignments of error, which will be

addressed below.

First Assignment of Error: The court erred in finding that collateral
relations who had no standing would inherit nothing had any right to
challenge the validity of the Last Will and Testament of Valerie
Braswell.

In their first assignment of error, the Pardees contend that the trial

court erred in finding that Julie and Jennifer had standing to challenge the

validity of Valerie’s second will. They contend that Julie and Jennifer, as

collateral relations, have no standing to challenge the second will.

La. C.C.P. art. 681 states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,

an action can be brought only by a person having a real and actual interest

which he asserts.” While the exception of no right of action tests whether

the plaintiff has a “real and actual interest” in the action, it does not raise

questions of the plaintiff’s ability to prevail on the merits or whether the

defendant may have a valid defense. Succession of Sylvester, 16-372 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/14/16), 215 So. 3d 368, writ denied, 17-00265 (La. 4/13/17),

218 So. 3d 119. The court assumes the “petition states a valid cause of

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action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular

case is a member of the class that has a legal interest in the subject matter of

the litigation.” Howard v. Admrs. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224 (La.

7/1/08), 986 So. 2d 47. The introduction of evidence is permitted to support

or controvert an exception of no right of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.

The burden of proof establishing the exception of no right of action is

on the exceptor. The determination of whether a plaintiff has a right to bring

an action raises a question of law, which requires de novo review. La.

C.C.P. art. 5051 provides that the articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure “are to be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that

rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in

themselves.”

La. C.C.P. art. 2972, which is included in the chapter providing

general rules of procedure for succession proceedings, states that an

opposition to a petition, motion, or other application for an order or

judgment in a succession proceeding shall allege the interest of the opponent

in filing the opposition. Section (b) of the Official Revision Comments to

La. C.C.P. art. 2972 further explains that a person must have a “justiciable

interest” to file an opposition in a succession proceeding. “The definition of

this interest has been left for the determination of the courts, and the

requirement has been stated only implicitly in the term ‘interested person’.”

Id. Louisiana courts recognize that one must have a justiciable interest in

the succession proceeding in order to have standing to maintain an action to

annul the testator’s testament. See Succession of Brandt, 21-131 (La. App. 5

Cir. 12/29/21), 334 So. 3d 1041.

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This court addressed a similar issue in Succession of Kilpatrick, 356

So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1978), wherein it determined that a bank named

as the decedent’s executor and trustee of a trust established in a 1976 will

had a right of action to file a petition to annul a probated will executed by

the decedent a year later. The executors for the 1977 will filed an exception

of no right of action against the bank, arguing that it did not have a real or

actual interest in annulling the 1977 will because it was not an heir or

beneficiary under the 1976 will. The bank argued that it had a right of

action to annul because it was named as the executor and trustee of the 1976

will.

This Court found that because the bank would have a pecuniary

interest as the executor and because it was the universal legatee of the 1976

will, the bank possessed a justiciable interest in the action to annul the later

will. Other courts have affirmed that an interested party has a justiciable

interest in opposing a succession proceeding if they will be able to benefit

from the attack. Succession of Brandt, supra; Estate of Mallet v. Mallet, 527

So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988); Succession of Moran, 485 So. 2d 623 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1986).

In the present matter, our de novo review of the record indicates that

Julie and Jennifer had standing to attack the second will, as the heirs and

legatees of the first will. While the particular facts of this case are complex

and purposefully confusing by the actions of various parties, including the

decedent herself, it remains that Julie and Jennifer argued the second will

was the product of undue influence. While the trial court ultimately found

both wills were tainted by a lack of capacity, the argument still existed at the

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time the second will was challenged by Julie and Jennifer as the product of

undue influence but the first will was not, giving them the opportunity to

inherit under the first will. Considering that the articles of civil procedure

are to be construed liberally, we find that Julie and Jennifer had standing to

challenge the second will, as the heirs of the first will. This assignment of

error is without merit.

Second Assignment of Error: The court erred in finding that the
plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Valerie Braswell
lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed her Last Will and
Testament. The court created a new standard stating the decedent
lacked “executive function” making ability, instead of simply
determining whether she had mental capacity to understand that she
was executing a will and the effects thereof.

The Pardees contend that the trial court erred in finding there was

clear and convincing evidence that Valerie did not have the capacity to

execute the second will. They note the lay testimony stating that she knew

who and where she was on April 20, 2021, and the fact that her medical

providers never diagnosed Valerie with dementia or Alzheimer’s.

All persons have capacity to make and receive donations inter vivos

and mortis causa, except as expressly provided by law. La. C.C. art. 1470.

Capacity to donate mortis causa must exist at the time the testator executes

the testament. La. C.C. art. 1471. There is a presumption in favor of

testamentary capacity. In re Succession of Furlow, 44,473 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/12/09), 17 So. 3d 475. Testamentary capacity means the donor must be

able to comprehend generally the nature and consequences of the disposition

he is making. La. C.C. art. 1477. A person who challenges the capacity of a

donor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor lacked

capacity at the time he executed the testament. La. C.C. art. 1482. The issue

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of capacity is factual in nature; the ultimate finding that the testator either

possessed or lacked capacity cannot be disturbed unless clearly wrong or

manifestly erroneous. Succession of Furlow, supra. The court may consider

medical evidence, other expert testimony, and lay witness testimony. As

such, there is no “litmus paper” test to apply in the evaluation of mental

capacity. La. C.C. art. 1477, Revision comment (f).

In will contest cases, absent a finding of manifest error, the factual

findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed

on appeal. Succession of Moore, 54,338 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/30/22), 339 So.

3d 12, writ denied, 22-00973 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So. 3d 859. The factfinder

is required to assess the credibility of all witnesses, whether they be lay

people or experts, to determine the most credible evidence. Expert testimony

is to be weighted the same as any other evidence, and the trier of fact can

accept or reject, in whole or in part, any expert opinion. Such credibility

determinations are factual issues to be resolved by the trier of fact and

should not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Id.

The trial court was presented with conflicting testimony regarding

Valerie’s capacity to execute the wills on April 20, 2021. Our inquiry is

whether the result reached by the trial court was manifestly erroneous.

Debra testified that the two-will scheme was entirely Valerie’s idea and that

she knew what she was doing the day she executed the wills. Miramon

testified that Valerie seemed capable of executing the wills and she did not

think she needed to get a doctor’s note on capacity. Bill and Julie testified

that they did not think Valerie was capable of creating the two-will scheme

but believed her capable of executing the first will. Significantly, both of

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Valerie’s treating medical team testified that she did not have the capacity to

execute the wills on April 20, 2021. Dr. Hernandez testified that if Miramon

had contacted him about a letter as to Valerie’s capacity, he would not have

signed such a letter.

The trial court’s reasons for judgment are extensive and specifically

reference the credibility of each witness and their testimony. The trial court

found Perkins and Dr. Hernandez to be credible and noted “the two medical

caregivers who actually saw Valerie on the day she executed the disputed

testaments both unequivocally stated that she lacked capacity.” We cannot

say that this determination by the trial court was manifestly erroneous. In

the face of conflicting evidence and testimony, the trial court was in the best

position to make credibility determinations, and this court will not disturb

such determinations on appeal. This assignment of error is without merit.

Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in finding that Debra
Pardee asserted undue influence over Valerie Braswell, such that the
latter’s own intentions were substituted for those of Valerie Braswell.

Finally, the Pardees contend that the trial court erred in finding that

Debra asserted undue influence over Valerie. A donation inter vivos or

mortis causa shall be declared null upon proof that it is the product of

influence by the donee or another person that so impaired the volition of the

donor as to substitute the volition of the donee or other person for the

volition of the donor. “Mere advice, or persuasion, or kindness or

assistance, should not constitute influence that would destroy the free agency

of the donor and substitute someone else’s volition for his own.” In re

Succession of Gilbert, 37,047 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/5/03), 850 So. 2d 733, writ

denied, 03-1887 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So. 2d 493. La. C.C. art. 1483 states:

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A person who challenges a donation because of fraud, duress,
or undue influence, must prove it by clear and convincing
evidence. However, if at the time the donation was made or the
testament executed, a relationship of confidence existed
between the donor and the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer was
not then related to the donor by affinity, consanguinity or
adoption, the person who challenges the donation need only
prove the fraud, duress, or undue influence by a preponderance
of the evidence.

“Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence, taken as

a whole, shows that the fact or cause sought to be proven is more probable

than not.” Crowell v. City of Alexandria Through Synder, 558 So. 2d 216

(La. 1990).

The trial court’s finding of, or failure to find, undue influence is fact

intensive, and such a finding cannot be disturbed on appeal in the absence of

manifest error. Succession of Gilbert, supra. Reversal is warranted only if

the appellate court finds that no reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s

finding exists in the record and that the finding is clearly wrong. Id. When

seeking to annul a donation on the basis of undue influence, it is not

sufficient to merely show that the donee exercised some degree of influence

over a donor; instead, the challenger must show that the donee’s influence

was so substantial that the donee substituted his or her volition for that of the

donor. To annul a testamentary disposition on the basis of undue influence,

the influence must be operative at the time the testament is executed. Id.

When the evidence shows that the execution of a testament was well within

the discretion of the testator, the court should find that the testator’s volition

has not been substituted by the volition of any donee. Id.

Because Valerie and Debra had established a relationship of

confidence and were not related by affinity, consanguinity, or adoption, only

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a preponderance of the evidence was required to show undue influence. In

re Succession of Gilbert, supra. Here, the evidence is sufficient to support

the trial court’s finding of undue influence by Debra over Valerie. As noted

above, the trial court made credibility determinations based on witness

testimony and found that Debra’s testimony that she was unaware and

uninvolved in the two-will scheme to be implausible. The trial court

determined that the evidence showed that the Pardees, Stephanie, and

Crystal took advantage of a critically ill woman after witnessing the conflict

within her family after the death of her mother. The court gave great

credence to Valerie’s medical team’s testimony that she did not have the

capacity on April 21, 2021, to execute the wills and that her overall mental

and physical health made her susceptible to influence from those around her.

We do not find this conclusion, based on the evidence presented in the

record, to be manifestly erroneous. As such, this assignment of error is

likewise without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Costs

of this appeal are assessed to appellants Kenneth Pardee and Debra Pardee.

AFFIRMED.

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