State of Louisiana in the Interest of L.C., DOB: 12/12/2008

Judgment rendered July16, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,325-JAK

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
IN THE INTEREST OF
L.C., DOB: 12/12/2008

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Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Franklin, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2024J2334

Honorable John Clay Hamilton, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant,
By: Annette Fuller Roach L.C.

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee,
District Attorney State of Louisiana

AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS
SHIRLEY GUILLORY GEE
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before THOMPSON, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This is a juvenile delinquency appeal. It arises from the Fifth Judicial

District Court, Parish of Franklin, the Honorable John Clay Hamilton

presiding. The juvenile, L.C., was adjudicated delinquent for one count of

aggravated assault with a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:37.4. L.C. was

ordered to serve three years in a secure care program. L.C. now appeals,

arguing that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate him delinquent and

that his disposition was harsh and excessive. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTS

On April 22, 2024, the state filed a juvenile delinquency petition in

Franklin Parish, Louisiana, alleging that L.C. committed aggravated assault

with a firearm on April 17, 2024. The court minutes indicate that L.C.

entered a general denial to the charge on April 25, 2024, and June 27, 2024.

The adjudication hearing was held on September 26, 2024, at which the

following evidence was adduced.

The victim, Marquise Heckard, took the stand and described the

events that transpired on April 17, 2024. He stated that he had never met

L.C. prior to the incident but that on that date, the two were “exchanging

words” in the street outside of his cousin’s house and near L.C.’s house in

Winnsboro, Louisiana. Mr. Heckard surmised that L.C. did not like him

because he was from a different town.

When the verbal sparring between the two became more heated, L.C.

said he was going to “get [his] momma” and proceeded back to his house.

However, rather than returning with his mother, Mr. Heckard said that L.C.

came back with a gun in his waistband. Mr. Heckard testified that L.C. ran

halfway down the street toward him with the gun handle sticking out of his

pants.

Since L.C. was chasing him with a gun and there were other children

outside, Mr. Heckard said he decided to run inside his cousin’s house. Mr.

Heckard positively identified L.C. in the courtroom as the person who

chased him with the gun. Mr. Heckard testified that he could see the gun

sticking out two inches from the waist of L.C.’s pants. Mr. Heckard also

said that he knew the gun was real because at one point the gun fell out of

L.C.’s pants and made a distinct noise of metal hitting pavement.

Mr. Heckard stated that he was about 25 feet away from L.C. when he

saw the gun sticking out of his waistband. Mr. Heckard’s back was turned

toward L.C. as he was running away from him, but he heard the gun fall and

hit the ground. Mr. Heckard stated that he was afraid for his life when he

ran into the house with L.C. chasing him.

Shaquana Whitley, Mr. Heckard’s cousin who lived across the street

and several houses down from L.C., testified regarding the assault. Ms.

Whitley testified that she saw L.C. chase Mr. Heckard into her house and

that L.C. was trying to shoot him. She called in the complaint to the

Winnsboro Police Department.

Ms. Whitley described the incident as follows:

A: They was about to fight and he (L.C.) – he walked
towards the house and he was like – he was like ‘I’m
fixing to go and get my mamma’ so he went back in the
house and when he came back outside that’s when he
went to hollering ‘I’m fixing to shoot you! I’m fixing to
shoot you!’ so he ran from his house and he ran in my
yard up under – like halfway up under my car porch
trying to catch Mr. Heckard.

Q: And so when he said he was going to shoot you, did you
physically see a gun?
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A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Okay. Where was the gun on him?

A: It was in his pants. And when he was leaving out the
yard he dropped the gun in the middle of the road. In
fact it slid out his pants.

Q: Oh, it fell into the road?

A: Uh huh (yes).

Q: Did you see the gun when it fell into the road?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Ms. Whitley stated that she was about twenty feet from L.C. when she

saw the gun fall out of his pants. Ms. Whitley also testified regarding two

subsequent incidents concerning L.C. and threats that he made toward her.

First, he told her daughter that he had “something serious” for her and would

shoot up her house and then, on Easter Sunday, she saw L.C. standing with

his friends and they all had on ski masks and pulled out guns and pointed

them at her car. She reported this incident to the Franklin Parish Sheriff’s

Office (“FPSO”). Ms. Whitley was asked about L.C.’s claim that the

weapon was actually a fake, plastic gun, and she assured the court that the

gun she saw drop out of L.C.’s pants was a real gun and that she could tell

by the sound it made when it hit the road.

FPSO Deputy Damon Emfinger (“Dep. Emfinger”) was called as a

witness for the limited purpose of corroborating Ms. Whitley’s testimony

regarding the complaint she filed against L.C. for pointing a gun at her

vehicle. Dep. Emfinger was not involved in the investigation of the incident

involving L.C. and Mr. Heckard. However, he confirmed to the court that

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Ms. Whitley had lodged a complaint regarding L.C. and several other

subjects possibly pointing a gun at her as she drove by in her car.

Jonathan Washington, L.C.’s stepfather, was called as a defense

witness. Mr. Washington said that he was in his house when the incident

occurred and by the time he left the house he did not see Mr. Heckard at all,

but did see people in the street arguing. Mr. Washington also stated that he

never saw L.C. go into Ms. Whitley’s yard.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court rendered its judgment,

adjudicating L.C. delinquent for aggravated assault with a firearm. The trial

court found Mr. Heckard to be a credible witness, and described its findings

regarding Mr. Heckard as follows:

I perceived him to be very truthful about his statements. I do
believe that there was an altercation between he and the
defendant. He also heard the defendant indicate he was going
to get his mother and I believe him when he said that he saw
clearly a gun sticking out of the defendant’s waist band about
two inches, and only after that did he turn and run into the
house. I do believe he also heard the gun fall from the
waistband onto the road. And both he and Ms. Whitley
indicated that it made a significant noise when it did. So I put a
lot of credibility in Mr. Heckard’s testimony.

The trial court was less convinced of Ms. Whitley’s believability,

finding “her credibility to be somewhat lacking in that I think she wanted to

embellish to some extent the things that she saw.” However, the trial court

did note its belief in the portion of her testimony where she described seeing

and hearing a gun drop from L.C.’s waistband.

After reviewing and weighing all of the testimony, the trial court gave

reasons for its ruling:

So based . . . primarily on the testimony of Mr. Heckard, I do
find that the defendant in this case committed an assault with a
firearm, I do find that Mr. Heckard was in significant fear of his
safety based primarily on two things, No. 1, the altercation –
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verbal altercation that occurred between he and the defendant
and No. 2, the fact that he saw a firearm sticking out of the
defendant’s waistband. So I’m going to adjudicate the
defendant in this case as a delinquent with regard to the charge
of aggravated assault with a firearm.

The trial court then ordered L.C. to serve three years in the custody of

the office of juvenile justice. L.C. filed a motion for a new trial on October

2, 2024, which was denied by the trial court on October 10, 2024.

This timely juvenile delinquency appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

For his first assignment of error, L.C. argues that the evidence

admitted at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed the offense of aggravated assault with a firearm. L.C. claims that

although Mr. Heckard testified that he feared for his life because he saw a

weapon, he never testified that L.C. pulled the weapon from his pants or

made any gestures “which would have incited a belief of his intent to use the

weapon.” L.C. asserts that in his review of “numerous cases” involving

convictions of aggravated assault, “the majority of the defendants pulled the

weapons and pointed it at their victim.” And in the few cases where the

weapon was not pulled, “the defendants made it clear that they were armed

and made threats either by directly stating their intent to use the firearm

against the victim or by actions such as gesturing or other visual

communication of their intent to do so.”

L.C. argues that the facts of his case are distinct because he never

pulled his weapon from his waistband nor did he point it at anyone. Instead,

he “merely had it on his person where it was visible to others.” L.C. also

claims that the state never proved the gun was real rather than a toy.
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L.C. asserts that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

the intent-to-scare mental element and conduct by him of the sort to arouse a

reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. L.C. submits that “some sort of

overt act directly involving the weapon was necessary to incite a reasonable

apprehension of bodily harm.”

The state argues that the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that L.C. committed aggravated assault

with a firearm. The state points to the testimony of Mr. Heckard and Ms.

Whitley, who were both in accord that L.C. came out of his house with a gun

sticking out of his pants yelling, “I am fixing to shoot you!” in the direction

of Mr. Heckard. While the state contends that it proved the weapon on

L.C.’s person was in fact an actual gun, based on the testimony regarding the

noise it made when it fell out of L.C.’s pants, it also contends that it did not

have to prove that it was real. Instead, what matters for purposes of the

elements of the offense is that the weapon was used by the juvenile to excite

fear and apprehension in the victim, which in this case it did according to the

testimony at trial.

The state argues that it established the intent-to-scare element with the

testimony from Ms. Whitley that she heard L.C. scream “I’m fixing to shoot

you!” as he was running down the street toward Mr. Heckard with a gun

poking out of his waistband. The state also disputes L.C.’s contention that

“some sort of overt act directly involving the weapon” was necessary to

incite a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. The state contends that this

claim is not supported by the jurisprudence and is adding an additional

element to the crime and burden upon the state which does not exist.

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The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d

560 (1979), is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See also

State v. Carter, 42,894 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So. 2d 181, writ denied,

08-0499 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1086. This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v.

Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310

(La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Speed, 43,786 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 2 So. 3d 582, writ denied,

09-0372 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 299. In the absence of internal

contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s

testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite

factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,032 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975

So. 2d 753. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses

or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442. Not only does the standard of review in Jackson, supra, apply to

juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hearings, but our state constitution

mandates that we determine, after reviewing the record evidence, whether

the juvenile court was clearly wrong in its fact findings. Id.
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In order for the court to adjudicate a child delinquent, the state must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed a delinquent act

alleged in the petition. La. Ch. C. art. 883. In a juvenile case, the reviewing

court is constitutionally compelled to review both facts and law. La. Const.

art. V, § 10(A) and (B). However, the reviewing court must recognize that

the juvenile judge observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses and

was in the best position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence.

State In Interest of D.R., 50,594 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d 1116.

Therefore, this court grants great deference to the juvenile court’s factual

findings and credibility determinations and assessment of the weight of

particular testimony. Id.

To convict a defendant of aggravated assault with a firearm, the state

must prove the defendant tried to commit a battery, or intentionally placed

the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery by the discharge

of a firearm. State v. McCoy, 45,090 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/10), 34 So. 3d

1145. A discharge of the firearm is not an element of the offense. State v.

Sheperd, 56,075 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/05), 2025 WL 615113. (See also La.

R.S. 14:37.4, which the Louisiana Legislature amended in 2012 to exclude

the phrase “by the discharge of” and added the word “with,” thereby

eliminating the element of “discharge” of a firearm. 2012 La. Acts No. 320,

§ 1.)

In order to support a conviction for assault, the state must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the intent-to-scare mental element (general

intent); (2) conduct by defendant of the sort to arouse a reasonable

apprehension of bodily harm; and (3) the resulting apprehension on the part

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of the victim. State v. De Gruy, 16-0891 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/5/17), 215 So.

3d 723.

Here, the facts at trial showed that L.C., after arguing with Mr.

Heckard and under the guise of summoning his mother, went back to his

house and armed himself with a gun. L.C. then exited his house with the

gun protruding from his waistband and proceeded to run down the street

toward Mr. Heckard screaming that he was “fixing to shoot” Mr. Heckard.

Mr. Heckard, understandably scared by these events, retreated to the

safety of Ms. Whitley’s home. At trial, Mr. Heckard affirmed that he was in

fear for his life. He also testified that he was about 25 feet away from L.C.

when saw the gun. In our view, this distance is close enough where Mr.

Heckard could see the gun and be in fear for his life.

L.C.’s claim that the gun in his waistband was actually a toy gun is

belied by the testimony from Mr. Heckard and Ms. Whitley that when the

gun fell out of his waistband, they both heard the distinct sound of gunmetal

hitting pavement. Moreover, whether the gun was real or fake is not

determinative. So long as the weapon was used in such a way to excite fear

and apprehension in Mr. Heckard, it is considered a dangerous weapon

under the law. See State in Int. of C.B., 52,245 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18),

251 So. 3d 562.

L.C. urges that “some sort of overt act directly involving a weapon

was necessary to incite a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.” We find

no statutory or jurisprudential support for this position. What matters is the

effect the use of the weapon has on the victim. In this case, Mr. Heckard

had just been involved in a verbal altercation with L.C., who then returned to

the scene with a gun sticking out of his pants threatening to shoot Mr.
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Heckard. We find that this was sufficient to place Mr. Heckard in

reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, which is all that is required under

the statute. Accordingly, there was a reasonable basis for the trial court’s

finding L.C. delinquent for one count of aggravated assault. This

assignment of error is without merit.

Excessive Disposition

In his second assignment of error, L.C. argues that the disposition of

three years in secure care amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and that

it fails to assure the requisite rehabilitative features necessary for fulfillment

of the legislative mandates in juvenile delinquency proceedings. L.C. notes

that he was 15 at the time of this offense, thus, once he is released, he will

no longer be subject to the juvenile courts so no other opportunities for

rehabilitation will exist.

Before ordering secure care for three years during a critical stage of

his development, L.C. asserts that the trial court should have explored what

rehabilitative services could have been provided in the community or lesser

restrictive settings. L.C. states that the office of juvenile justice facilities

will not provide him with the rehabilitative services he needs. L.C. claims

that a lesser disposition with appropriate rehabilitative services will better

serve both the juvenile and the community.

The state argues that the three-year disposition imposed on L.C. was

not excessive. The state notes that aggravated assault with a firearm carries

a maximum sentence of ten years with or without hard labor, maximum ten

thousand dollar fine, or both. Thus, the state argues the three-year sentence

fell well within the applicable sentencing range of zero to ten years.

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The state further notes that the trial court’s order provided for

nonsecure custody and allowed for family therapy and home visits.

Accordingly, the state argues that the trial court’s disposition is not the

restrictive, unforgiving, cruel and unusual punishment that L.C. claims.

Finally, the state notes that L.C. had already received the benefit of

probation and referrals to community services after his first adjudication for

a firearm crime and was still on probation when he committed the

aggravated assault with a firearm.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Johnson, 56,043

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/25), 403 So. 3d 679.

A trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad

discretion in sentencing. State v. Allen 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162

So. 3d 519, writ denied, 15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289. On

review, the appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may

have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307.

Vast discretion is afforded to courts in juvenile matters due to the

special nature of the proceedings. State ex rel. A.M. 07-1228 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/9/08), 983 So. 2d 176. In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, a

juvenile court is vested with broad discretion to arrive at solutions balancing

the needs of the child with interests of society. State in Int. of G.S., 19-0605

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(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), 287 So. 3d 752, writ denied, 20-00033 (La.

9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 34.

Under Louisiana Children’s Code Article 901(C), commitment to the

custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections may be

appropriate if any of the following exist:

(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended
commitment or probation the child will commit another crime.

(2) The child is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial
environment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment.

(3) A lesser disposition will deprecate the seriousness of the
child’s delinquent act.

(4) The delinquent act involved the illegal carrying, use, or
possession of a firearm.

The factors under Article 901(C) are identical to the sentencing

factors under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1(A) except

that Article 901 adds the additional factor for judicial dispositions if the

delinquent act involved the illegal carrying, use, or possession of a firearm.

The sentencing range for aggravated assault with a firearm carries a

maximum sentence of ten years with or without hard labor, a maximum fine

of $10,000, or both. In this case, the three-year sentence fell well within the

sentencing range.

We note that L.C. committed the aggravated assault with a firearm in

April 2024, while already on probation for a firearms charge. A motion to

revoke his probation was on the docket on the day of his trial. Furthermore,

the state had previously notified the court that it would be filing a new

petition on the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

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From the record before us, it is reasonable to conclude that the trial

court found an undue risk L.C. would commit another crime if once again

given a suspended commitment or probation. Indeed, L.C. had been given

the benefit of probation and community resource referrals after his prior

adjudication, and he committed the instant crime while still on probation.

Louisiana appellate courts consistently uphold custodial dispositions

when firearms are involved. In State in Int. of C.P.G., 53,038 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/27/19), 278 So. 3d 1095, this court upheld a disposition of five years

in secure care for a negligent homicide involving a firearm. In State in Int.

of C.T., 15-1864 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), 195 So. 3d 70, aff'd, 16-0939

(La. 10/18/17), 236 So. 3d 1210, the First Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a

disposition committing the juvenile until he turned 21 for adjudications of

illegal possession of a stolen firearm and unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle. In State in Int. of D.S., 11-416 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 83 So. 3d

1131, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a disposition of three years in

the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice for an adjudication of armed

robbery.

We also note that the three years of secure care is not quite the

draconian penalty L.C. makes it out to be, as the trial court’s custody order

contains provisions for nonsecure custody and allows for family therapy,

home visits, and community resource referrals to assist in L.C.’s release and

return to home.

L.C.’s disposition of three years in secure care fell comfortably within

the sentencing range for aggravated assault with a firearm and the trial court

did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing it. A lesser disposition

would deprecate the seriousness of this firearm-involved offense, and L.C.’s
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history suggests that probation would not deter him from committing

another crime. The trial court’s disposition strikes an appropriate balance

between the interests of society and the needs of L.C. This assignment of

error is without merit.

ERROR PATENT

In reviewing the record for error patent, we note that, at the time of

disposition, the juvenile court failed to advise L.C. of the time period within

which to apply for post-conviction relief.

The Louisiana Children’s Code provides no procedures regarding

post-conviction relief. When the Children’s Code is silent, the provisions of

the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable. State in Int. of D.M., 51,920

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 247 So. 3d 133; State in the Interest of W.A.P.,

52,779 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 274 So. 3d 690. La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(C)

states, in part, that, “At the time of sentencing, the trial court shall inform the

defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction relief either verbally

or in writing.” Therefore, the juvenile court was required to inform L.C. of

the time limitation for seeking post-conviction relief. If the trial court fails

to advise, or provides an incomplete advisal, pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art.

930.8, the appellate court may correct the error by informing the defendant

of the applicable prescriptive period for post-conviction relief. State in

Interest of D.M., supra.

Therefore, by way of this opinion, the juvenile is advised that no

application for post-conviction relief, including an application for an out-of-

time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the

judgment of adjudication and disposition have become final under the

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provisions of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922. See State in Int. of D.M., supra;

State in the Int. of W.A.P., supra.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the juvenile’s adjudication as delinquent and

subsequent disposition are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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