56,328-CA Precedential Affirmed Processed

Kelon Young & Talitha Reed v. Isaiah Woods

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed July 16, 2025

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

  • 343 So. 3d 784 not in our corpus
  • 349 So. 3d 7 not in our corpus
  • 382 So. 3d 108 not in our corpus
  • State v. Davis 273 So. 3d 670
  • 283 So. 3d 496 not in our corpus

Opinion text

Judgment rendered July 16, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,328-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

KELON YOUNG & TALITHA Plaintiff-Appellee
REED

versus

ISAIAH WOODS Defendant-Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Monroe City Court Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2023CV01110

Honorable Angie D. Sturdivant, Judge

*****

ROUNTREE LAW OFFICES Counsel for Appellant
By: James A. Rountree

CUMMINS AND FITTS, LLC Counsel for Appellee
By: Sophie N. Barksdale

*****

Before STONE, COX, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This civil appeal arises from the Monroe City Court, Parish of

Ouachita, the Honorable Angie D. Sturdivant presiding. Defendant seeks

review of the trial court’s ruling granting each plaintiff $5,700 with legal

interest for breach of duty as a lessor to maintain the leased premises in a

condition for which it was leased and for failing to make necessary repairs.

For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2023, plaintiffs Kelon Young (“Young”) and Talitha

Reed (“Reed”) filed a pro se petition in the Monroe City Court seeking

damages for “unsafe living conditions, emotional distress, pain and

suffering, and negligence of property.” Isaiah Woods (“Woods”), plaintiffs’

landlord, was the defendant in the suit. Plaintiffs rented and lived at a

residence owned by Woods, located at 1500 Powell Street, Monroe,

Louisiana, which was their address for service that plaintiffs provided in

their petition.

Plaintiffs did not provide written details of the living conditions at

their rented house, but they attached a USB drive to their petition and stated

in the petition, “Attached USB drive.” The USB contained four videos of

plaintiffs’ backyard, recorded at different times, in which several inches of

raw sewage and damp toilet paper were depicted covering most of the yard.

A fifth video revealed the state of the storage/laundry room at their home,

showing brown water flowing behind the wall where the washing machine

was located and water damage to the storage room walls and floor, which

appeared to be sinking. A sixth video showed that plaintiffs’ toilet

would not flush and showed water damage to the bathroom and hallway

walls and floors. In the last video a repairman said that he did not want to

enter the backyard to make repairs because of the sewage.

Woods filed an answer and denied plaintiffs’ allegations. He also

filed a reconventional demand and third-party demand against the City of

Monroe (the “City”). In his reconventional demand, Woods stated that

plaintiffs were indebted to him for one month’s unpaid rent for June 2023.

He also claimed that: 1) plaintiffs stopped up the sewer lines and blocked the

air return to the A/C unit of the home causing damage; 2) in May 2023,

plaintiffs complained about a broken pipe and, upon inspection, Woods

discovered that the hose to the washing machine was unscrewed, which left

water running on the floor, which caused damage; and 3) the pumping

station at the Powell Recreation Center was broken, causing sewage to back

up throughout the neighborhood. He then claimed in his third-party demand

that any damage that resulted from sewage problems was caused by a failure

of the City to maintain its system, which resulted in overloaded sewer lines.

Plaintiffs answered Woods’ reconventional demand and stated that the

one hole in the wall of the home was caused by Young attempting to snake

the toilet. Plaintiffs attached to their answer a letter addressed to “To whom

it may concern,” which said that the City’s employees were prohibited from

going on private property and faced suspension or termination if they did so.

Plaintiffs provided a different address for service in their answer.

On July 10, 2023, the City filed an exception of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, arguing that Monroe City Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over it as a political subdivision. The trial court signed a

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consent judgment sustaining the City’s exception of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and dismissed Woods’ claims against the City without prejudice.

On April 29, 2024, the day of trial, Woods filed a motion to strike

what was contained on the USB drive attached to plaintiffs’ petition because

the drive was not served on defendant. He argued that what was contained

on the drive was outside the scope of the pleadings. On the same day, the

trial court heard the motion to strike and held a trial on the merits.

Following argument, the trial court denied Woods’ motion to strike.

The trial court stated that, according to: 1) La. C.C.P. art. 1202, the clerk of

court is not required to serve exhibits; and 2) La. C.C.P. art. 1311, exhibits

do not have to be served unless the party who files the pleadings expressly

prays for such service. The trial court asked Woods if he propounded

discovery on plaintiffs, and he said he did not. Woods first argued that he

did not have plaintiffs’ new address, but he later acknowledged that they

provided an updated address in their answer to his demand, with which he

was served.

The case proceeded to trial. Plaintiffs testified about the sewage that

was backing up in their yard and home and the damage it caused to the

home. The videos from the flash drive were played for the court. Plaintiffs

stated that Young fell while trying to snake the toilet in their back bathroom,

making a hole in the wall.

Plaintiffs testified that a repairman refused to walk in the sewage

waste in the backyard to repair their A/C unit. Plaintiffs did not let their kids

play in the backyard because of the constant waste, and Reed said that she

suffered emotional distress because their neighbor repeatedly complained

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about the sewage that came from plaintiffs’ yard into her yard. Plaintiffs

stopped using the back bathroom of the home because the toilet would not

flush. Plaintiffs stated that they said they lived in the Powell Street home for

a full year because they did not want to break their lease.

Young testified that he notified Woods about the problem multiple

times, but Woods told him to contact the City because it was the City’s

malfunctioning sewer system that was the problem. In turn, he contacted the

City, which told him that he needed to contact his landlord because the

problem was on private property. Young said the City did a cleanout in the

front yard but not the backyard. He said that any repairs done under the

home did not last, and the next day they had the same problems. Young

testified that he had to visit a medical center because his feet “broke out,”

which medical personnel told him was caused by walking through the

sewage in his backyard.

Woods testified that the City ran its sewage through the line to the

Powell Street house, causing the problem. He said he contacted the City 15-

30 times to remedy the issue, but they did not respond, or the City told him

that the problem was his to remedy. Woods testified that the floor to the

storage/laundry area, which held the washing machine and water heater, had

to be replaced due to water damage. He could not say where the water

damage came from. He stated that there were 12 large holes in the walls that

had to be repaired after plaintiffs vacated the premises. He entered an

invoice for $4,150 in repair work made on the Powell Street house, which

included repair work for 12 holes and fixing the storage room floor.

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Woods said that plaintiffs did not turn the property over to him as

required in the lease and the court evicted them. Woods said he did not

know there was a problem with the sewage prior to leasing the home to

plaintiffs. He also said the house was built on piers and was about one to

two feet off the ground.

Tyrone Holmes (“Holmes”), Woods’ repairman, testified that he

provided plumbing services for Woods. He said the City did a clean out of

the front yard of the Powell Street house, but not the rest of the property. He

stated that once the City fixed the sewage issues, there were no more

problems at the house. Holmes stated that someone had removed a hose

from the washing machine and left the water running, which was reported as

a busted pipe. Holmes turned off the water, and that resolved the issue. He

said that there were no sewage problems in that area of the home. Holmes

stated that when the tenants called about sewage problems in the backyard,

he would clean it out, but a couple of days later plaintiffs would call again

about the same problem.

Holmes testified that a person from the City inspected the Powell

Street property and said that there was nothing it could do until the problem

at the Powell Recreation Center was corrected. Holmes went to the house

two times to snake the backyard cleanout before plaintiffs moved into the

property. Holmes said that he never saw water on the floor and the walls as

was depicted in the videos on the occasions he went into the house while the

plaintiffs were living there.

On May 6, 2024, Woods filed a motion to reconsider the ruling on his

motion to strike. He argued that La. C.C.P. art. 1311 only applied to written

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instruments, not USB drives. Woods again said that the failure to serve him

with the USB drive meant that he was not informed of the claims made

against him, making the subsequent proceedings absolutely null. The trial

court denied his motion.

On May 30, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment awarding $5,700

to each plaintiff, taxing costs to defendant, and dismissing Woods’

reconventional demand at his cost. In its written reasons for judgment, the

trial court said that while defendant testified that the sewer problem was the

fault of the City, no one from the City testified at trial. The trial court said

that defendant entered the invoice for repair work into evidence, but he did

not call the repairman to testify. The trial court pointed out that Woods

stated that he was unsure if the water coming from the walls was from the

plaintiffs living there and that there was a lack of evidence that plaintiffs

caused any intentional damage to the property other than the one hole they

admitted creating when they attempted to fix their ongoing sewer issues.

The trial court said that Woods knew of and blamed the City for the

extended period in which there was feces, sewer water, and toilet paper

covering plaintiffs’ backyard. The trial court stated that the conditions in

which plaintiffs lived at the Powell Street house rendered the leased

premises unsuitable for habitation due to defendant’s failure to make

necessary repairs and that Woods breached his duties as a lessor under La.

C.C. arts. 2691 and 2696. The court said plaintiffs were justified in vacating

the premises on June 5, 2023, regardless of the eviction proceedings brought

against them, after which they owed no further rent to defendant. The trial

court set damages at $2,700 to each plaintiff, for half of nine months’ rent

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paid to Woods, and $3,000 to each plaintiff for pain and suffering. The total

award was $11,400.

On June 10, 2024, Woods filed a motion for a new trial arguing that

plaintiffs’ petition alleged only legal conclusions unsupported by facts and

that he was not notified of plaintiffs’ claims because he was not served with

the flash drive. Woods argued that the trial court was in error when it said in

its written reasons for judgment that plaintiffs were justified in vacating the

premises because when plaintiffs filed their petition on June 20, 2023, they

still resided at the Powell Street house. He said that plaintiffs appeared in

court to oppose their eviction on June 28, 2023, which he argued

undermined their testimony about intolerable living conditions because they

lived at the property through the end of their lease.

Woods attached a copy of the transcript of the eviction proceedings

held on June 28, 2023, to his memorandum in support of his motion for a

new trial. At those proceedings, plaintiffs stated that they had already

moved out of the Powell Street house at the time of the hearing. The trial

court granted the eviction “just so that Mr. Woods can take possession of the

property.”

On August 15, 2024, a hearing was held on the motion for a new trial.

The trial court asked Woods why the transcript of the eviction hearing was

not used at trial, and his counsel responded, “There was no reason to.” The

trial court said that its judgment awarding damages was due to the home

being unlivable. The trial court noted that there was nothing that precluded

Woods from subpoenaing someone from the City to testify.

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The court said Woods was aware that there were sewer issues and that his

position at trial was that the issues were the City’s fault.

The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. In its oral reasons

for judgment, the trial court pointed out that: 1) at the hearing on the motion

to strike, defense counsel said he had received plaintiffs’ answer to Woods’

reconventional demand; 2) plaintiffs’ new address was included in their

answer; and 3) defense counsel said he had not propounded discovery upon

plaintiffs. The trial court said that Woods’ arguments were repetitive of

what was in his motion to strike and the new evidence Woods included in

his motion for a new trial could have been presented at trial. The trial court

stated, “Due diligence prior to trial is important. Defendant failed to send

discovery to [plaintiffs]…. Defendant claims he was ambushed at trial with

information contained in the USB drive that was filed in the clerk’s office.”

Defendant now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Woods’ assignments of error are as follows:

1. The trial court erred by denying defendant-landlord’s motion
to strike the USB drive that plaintiffs attached to their petition
but did not serve on defendant.

2. The trial court erred when it considered at trial evidence
beyond the scope of the pleadings.

Woods contends that the USB drive plaintiffs attached to their petition

contained all the allegations and evidence upon which the court granted its

judgment. He states that plaintiffs’ petition, without the flash drive,

contained only legal conclusions and no material facts, as required by La.

C.C.P. art. 891. He argues that La. C.C.P. art. 1311 states that a copy of a

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written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading need not be served upon

an adverse party, and the flash drive was not a written instrument.

Woods argues he had no notice of plaintiffs’ complaint, and that

without having seen the videos on the flash drive and without a transcript of

the eviction proceedings, defense counsel was unable to effectively cross-

examine plaintiffs. He states that if the condition of the property was as bad

as plaintiffs claimed, it would not have been necessary for a different city

court judge to evict plaintiffs. Woods asks that this court reverse the trial

court based upon its ruling on the motion to strike.

Motions to Strike and for a New Trial

The court on motion of a party or on its own motion may at any time

and after a hearing order stricken from any pleading any insufficient demand

or defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

La. C.C.P. art. 964. Whether a motion to strike should be granted pursuant

to Article 964 rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed

under the abuse of discretion standard. Thurman v. Aguilar, 21-1514 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So. 3d 784, writ denied, 22-01110 (La. 11/1/22),

349 So. 3d 7.

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. This is

because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy, and because

motions to strike are often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.

However, a motion to strike is proper if it can be shown that the allegations

being challenged are so unrelated to a plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of

any consideration and that their presence in the pleading would be

prejudicial to the moving party. A motion to strike is a means of clearing up

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the pleadings, not a means of eliminating causes of action or substantive

allegations. Id.

A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading

need not be served upon the adverse party unless the party who files the

pleading expressly prays for such service. La. C.C.P. art. 1311.

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Woods’ motion to strike. The USB drive plaintiffs attached to their petition

as an exhibit was related to their claims that defendant breached his

obligations as a landlord under La. C.C. art. 2691, et seq. Plaintiffs alleged

in their petition that their landlord did not provide habitable living

conditions, and the videos on the USB drive showed the condition of the

rental house while the plaintiffs lived there. Therefore, the content of the

USB drive was an inappropriate subject for a motion to strike because the

attached drive was relevant to plaintiffs’ claims, making it worthy of

consideration and not prejudicial to defendant. Plaintiffs referenced the

attached USB drive in their petition, and they were not required to request

service of the drive with the petition.

We find defendant’s argument that he was “blindsided” by what was

on the USB drive at trial to be disingenuous. Defendant had ample

opportunity to determine what was contained on the drive prior to trial by

going to the clerk’s office and viewing the contents of the drive and/or

conducting discovery. Defendant had plaintiffs’ address and could have

compelled production of the USB drive, but did not do so. Defendant was

also granted the opportunity to respond to the contents of the USB drive at

trial and was able to cross-examine plaintiffs about what was contained

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therein. Nearly 10 months passed between when plaintiffs filed their

petition and when the trial was held. That length of time offered sufficient

opportunity for defendant to ascertain what was contained on the drive.

We likewise find defendant’s grievance that he was deprived of his

due process rights because he was unaware of plaintiffs’ claims to be

insincere. If defendant believed that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of

action, he could have filed a declinatory exception of no cause of action

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(5) at any time prior to the submission of

the case for decision. If Woods thought that plaintiffs’ petition did not

conform with the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 891 regarding fact

pleading, he could have filed a dilatory exception pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

926 prior to filing his answer. See La. C.C.P. art. 928. There were several

avenues defendant could have taken to clarify plaintiffs’ claims, but he did

not do so. Defendant’s decision to file a motion to strike on the day of trial

was done so solely for the purposes of delay, and the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying it.

Defendant also complains that he was unable to “effectively” cross-

examine the plaintiffs without a transcript of the eviction proceedings.

Defendant’s grounds for a new trial were that the transcript of the eviction

proceedings constituted new evidence which he could not have obtained

with due diligence before or during the trial. See La. C.C.P. art. 1972. The

standard of review of a ruling on a motion for new trial is abuse of

discretion. Succession of Wood, 55,360 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 375 So.

3d 600, writ denied, 24-00168 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d 108.

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The eviction proceedings were held on June 28, 2023. The trial on the

instant matter was held on April 29, 2024, 10 months later. With due

diligence, defendant could have gotten a copy of the transcript of the

eviction proceedings prior to the trial. The trial court was correct in not

considering the transcript of the eviction proceedings, and it did not abuse its

discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Scope of the Pleadings

Woods did not brief his second assignment of error claiming that the

evidence presented at trial went beyond the scope of the pleadings.

Defendant fails to state what that evidence was and how it went beyond the

scope of the pleadings. Pursuant to U.R.C.A. Rule 2-12.4, all assignments

of error and issues for review must be briefed, and the appellate court may

consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has

not been briefed. A mere statement of an assignment of error in a brief does

not constitute the briefing of the assignment of error. State v. Davis, 52,517

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 670, writ denied, 19-00928 (La.

11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 496. We, therefore, consider defendant’s second

assignment of error abandoned.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. Costs of

the appeal are assessed to appellant.

AFFIRMED.

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