Felicia Wilson Crow v. John T. Crow

Judgment rendered November 19, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,445-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****
FELICIA WILSON CROW Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JOHN T. CROW Defendant-Appellee

*****
Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Union, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 49,847

Honorable Glen Wade Strong, Judge
*****

LAW OFFICES OF CHRIS L. BOWMAN Counsel for Appellant
By: Chris L. Bowman

LAW OFFICES OF JIM NORRIS Counsel for Appellee
By: Alan James “Jim” Norris

*****
Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

STONE, J.

This case concerns a previously married couple, who executed a

prenuptial agreement (“prenuptial agreement” or “prenup”) that effectively

extinguished Louisiana’s community property regime. Felicia Wilson Crow

(“Felicia”) and John T. Crow (“John”) were married in 2003 and lived

together for nearly 20 years in Union Parish. Felicia filed a petition for

divorce on May 27, 2021, wherein she challenged the enforceability of their

prenup.

FACTS

Felicia and John were to be married on July 25, 2003. Three days

prior thereto, they separately executed their prenuptial agreement before a

notary and two witnesses. The prenup expressly renounced all provisions of

law that established a legal community of acquets and gains and was

thereafter filed in the conveyance records of Union Parish that same day.

Felicia filed for divorce on May 27, 2021, and asserted, for the first time,

that the prenup was invalid. Specifically, Felicia alleges that she was not

fully advised by her own legal counsel of the content and consequences of

the agreement and that she signed the agreement under circumstances that

caused her to be unduly influenced.

A bench trial on the validity of the prenuptial agreement was set for

November 18, 2024.1 Three days prior to trial, John filed a motion in limine

1
A divorce was rendered in favor of John on July 28, 2022, effectively dissolving
the marriage. During their divorce proceedings, the parties had a myriad of other post-
marriage matters that were set (and heard) in addition to the issue at bar that included
spousal and child support, custody, separation of property, restraining orders, etc. After a
pretrial conference held on August 12, 2024, the trial court determined that the validity of
the prenuptial agreement should be resolved prior to any partitioning of property.

to exclude evidence of error, fraud, or duress. John also filed an exception

of no right of action. The trial court granted the motion in limine in part,

disallowing evidence of fraud and duress — since those factors were not

stated as an affirmative defense in the pleadings — but allowed evidence

regarding error.2 The exception of no right of action was denied altogether,

and the matter proceeded to trial.

Felicia testified that she knew about the prenuptial agreement about a

month prior to its execution as it was John’s idea to have the prenup. She

admits that she did not read it before signing it because she was not a legal

expert and would not understand the legal terminology. Felicia stated that

she did not hire a lawyer to review the prenup, because she believed it

merely preserved the assets she and John owned prior to their marriage as

separate property while allowing them to live in a community property

regime thereafter. According to Felicia, on the day of signing the prenup,

she was sent to the office of David Post, a local attorney who, unbeknownst

to her, had done legal work for John and had business dealings with him.3

While there, he neither disclosed that he was John’s lawyer nor reviewed the

prenup with her, just notarized it. She further testified that after the

wedding, she and John operated in a community regime just as she

understood, filing joint tax returns as proof thereof.4 John testified that the

purpose of executing the prenup was to keep everything separate throughout

2
Subsequently, this issue is not an assignment of error on appeal.
3
David Post was John’s real estate lawyer for over 15 years, and they own a
company called ‘P & C Rentals’ dating back to 1995.
4
John and Felicia filed joint tax returns throughout their marriage, where John
would list income that he had from property that he maintained as his separate property in
addition to their other income. Thus, any income taxes due on the income tax return was
a community obligation.
2

the marriage and alleged this sentiment was relayed to Felicia in their

discussions about it. He admitted that he and David Post were business

partners at the time he notarized Felicia’s signature, and further testified that

the prenup was actually prepared by his personal lawyer, Jack Laird.

Following the presentation of Felicia’s evidence, John moved for a

directed verdict on the grounds that the law and evidence afforded her no

relief, as the prenup is an authentic act and Felicia’s signature represents that

she read it and agreed to its contents.5 The trial court granted John’s motion,

finding that Felicia failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that

something was done in some way to either persuade her to sign the prenup

or prevent her from adequately understanding it. Additionally, the trial

court, in its written reasons, noted that the prenup benefit Felicia in that it

granted her ½ interest in the family home John purchased prior to their

marriage.6 The case was dismissed with prejudice at Felicia’s cost, and it is

from this judgment that she appeals.

DISCUSSION

In her sole assignment of error, Felicia asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion in granting John’s motion for a directed verdict. She

argues that the prenup was executed in error as she was not afforded ample

time and opportunity to review the agreement with her own counsel, as she

was placed in a vulnerable position just days before her wedding.

5
John’s counsel moved for a directed verdict, which may be granted in a jury trial
under La. C.C.P. art. 1810, rather than for an involuntary dismissal under La. C.C.P. art.
1672(B), which may be granted in a bench trial. While it is a nominal use of an incorrect
procedural vehicle, we consider such error to be one of form rather than substance, as the
legal effect of either motion is the same.
6
Felicia was still residing in the family home at the time of trial.
3

Furthermore, Felicia asserts that David Post was in direct violation of the

rules of professional conduct by not disclosing his business interests with

John and failing to advise her to seek counsel prior to signing the prenup. In

response, John asserts that Felicia cannot claim to be uninformed about the

contents of the prenup because she chose not to seek legal counsel to review

it. Additionally, John alleges that his business relationship with David Post

is irrelevant, as he acted only as a notary on the document.

Matrimonial Agreement

The presumption is that parties are aware of the contents of writings to

which they have affixed their signatures. The burden of proof is upon them

to establish with reasonable certainty that they have been deceived.

Bagneris v. Oddo, 2 Pelt. 278 (La. App. Orl. 1919). Here, Felicia readily

admits that she did not read the prenuptial agreement before signing because

she would not have comprehended the legal terminology contained in the

agreement.

Subsection/Paragraph 1 of the prenuptial agreement reads as follows:

The intended husband and wife hereby establish a regime of
separation of property as allowed by Civil Code Article 2329.
Accordingly, they expressly renounce all provisions of law
which establish a legal community of acquets and gains between
husband and wife, whether now or later enacted.

Subsection/Paragraph 2 of the prenuptial agreement reads as follows:

All property of the intended husband and wife, whether owned
at the time of the ceremony of marriage or acquired during the
marriage, is declared to be separate property.

Although Felicia is not an attorney, the first two paragraphs of the

prenup are straightforward as they include the simplest of laymen’s language
4

pertaining to entering a separate property regime under Louisiana law.

Felicia was not compelled by law to necessarily read the prenup; however,

she is still held to the consequences as if she had done so. This court will

not allow her to invalidate an authentic act/agreement that she signed by

arguing ignorance on her part. The courts of our state have long held that “if

a party can read, it behooves him to examine an instrument before signing

it.” Snell v. Union Sawmill Co., 159 La. 604 at 608, 105 So. 728 at 730

(1925). If Felicia had taken a few seconds to read the first page, she would

have fully understood the effects of the document she was signing.

Remarkably, after reading the first line of the prenup while on the witness

stand at trial, she indicated her understanding that it was a separation of the

matrimonial regime and had no objection to its contents.

Notary as an Attorney

Felicia’s assertions that David Post, the notary who just happened to

also be an attorney, had an obligation to advise her or talk her out of signing

the prenuptial agreement is mere folly, as she did not actually hire him to

represent her interests in this matter. The existence of an attorney-client

relationship turns largely on the client’s subjective belief that it exists.

Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Bosworth, 481 So.2d 567, 571 (La. 1986).

However, this subjective belief must be a reasonable one. Watson v.

Franklin, 50,730 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 198 So. 3d 177. In this case, the

only thing Felicia entrusted David Post to do was notarize her signature on

the document — which he did. David Post neither persuaded Felicia to sign

the prenup nor gave her any information regarding its contents. By Felicia’s

own testimony, she did not talk to him; he merely notarized her signature,

5

which demonstrates she expected nothing further from him. Objectively and

subjectively, there was absolutely no attorney-client relationship between

David Post and Felicia and thus, he had no duty to act as her counsel.

Standard of Review

Akin to the motion for a directed verdict, a motion for involuntary

dismissal is allowed at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence in a bench trial.

The movant requests dismissal of the action on the grounds that, based on

the facts and the law and that the plaintiff has failed to show a right to relief.

La. C.C.P. art. 1672(B); King of Hearts, Inc. v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 27,137

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So. 2d 524; Brodnax v. Foster, 47,079 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/11/12), 92 So. 3d 427, writ denied, 2012-1074 (La. 9/12/12),

98 So. 3d 310. The appropriate standard for the trial court’s determination

of a motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient

evidence to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Clifton

v. Coleman, 32,612 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/23/99), 748 So. 2d 1263, writ denied,

2000-0201 (La. 3/24/00), 758 So. 2d 151. When a party fails to carry his

burden of proof, there is no necessity for the opposing party to rebut

insufficient evidence. Humphrey v. Humphrey, 614 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 2d

Cir. 1993).

The applicable standard of review is manifest error. To reverse a

factfinder’s determination under this standard of review, an appellate court

must undertake a two-part inquiry: (1) the court must find from the record

that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trier of

fact, and (2) the court must further determine the record establishes the

finding is clearly wrong. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 09–1408 (La.

6

3/16/10), 35 So. 3d 230. Ultimately, the issue to be resolved by the

reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but

whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Id. If the factual

findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, a

reviewing court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been

sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.

We find that the trial court’s conclusion in this case was reasonable.

Felicia’s attempts to invalidate her prenuptial agreement are baseless as she

knew about its potential existence at least one month prior to its execution

and is familiar with the process of procuring representation for important

legal matters. She is college educated with extensive business experience

prior to, during, and subsequent to her marriage to John where she has hired

an attorney for business transactions. Moreover, Felicia was married and

divorced prior to her relationship with John and was represented by legal

counsel throughout that process. The record is devoid of any evidence that

shows where Felicia and John altered the separate property regime they

established by way of their prenuptial agreement. Filing joint taxes and/or

acquiring property during a marriage does not automatically change or

otherwise indicate a desire to convert from a separate property regime to a

community property regime of acquets and gains.

According to Felicia, John did not threaten to call off the wedding

(i.e., not marry her), if she refused to sign the prenup before their wedding.

Furthermore, Louisiana law (as well as the prenuptial agreement itself)

allows spouses to alter their prenuptial agreement prior to and during the

7

marriage.7 Again, had Felicia simply perused their agreement at any point

during their nearly 20-year marriage, perhaps the divorce could have been

more amicable. The timing and basis of this suit lead us to believe that her

motives are perhaps more vindictive in nature.

To reiterate, the prenup was signed by both parties with the

presumption that the parties knew, understood, and agreed to the terms of

the regime they were entering. The law of Louisiana is that one who signs

an instrument without reading it has no complaint. See, Ray v. McClain, 106

La. 780, 31 So. 315 (1901). Felicia’s assertion that she is not bound by her

own signature (prenuptial agreement) — because she did not read it — but

signed it in ignorance of its substance and effects, is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court

granting John’s motion for a directed verdict is affirmed. Costs are assessed

to the appellant.

AFFIRMED. COSTS ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.

7
See, La. C.C. art. 2331.
8