Colby Stafford Harrington v. Town of Benton, Cori Desha Harrington, individually and as Trustee of the Patrick Hough Harrington Trust, and as Succession Representative of the Succession of Patrick Hough Harrington, Patrick Jordan Harrington, individually and as trustee of the Patrick Hough Harrington Trust, Mark Allen Harrington, Gaelan Scott Harrington, Jonah Blake Harrington, and Estate of Patrick Hough Harrington (consolidated with) Succession of Patrick Hough Harrington

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,465-CA
No. 56,466-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

No. 56,465-CA No. 56,466-CA

COLBY STAFFORD SUCCESSION OF PATRICK
HARRINGTON HOUGH HARRINGTON
Plaintiff -Appellant

versus

TOWN OF BENTON, CORI
DESHA HARRINGTON,
individually and as trustee of the
Patrick Hough Harrington Trust,
and as succession representative
of the succession of Patrick
Hough Harrington, PATRICK
JORDAN HARRINGTON,
individually and as trustee of the
Patrick Hough Harrington Trust,
MARK ALLEN
HARRINGTON, GAELAN
SCOTT HARRINGTON,
JONAH BLAKE
HARRINGTON, and ESTATE
OF PATRICK HOUGH
HARRINGTON
Defendants -Appellees

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 169442 and P-17957

Honorable Michael Nerren, Judge

*****

SHUEY SMITH, LLC Counsel for Appellant,
By: Richard E. Hiller Colby Stafford
Harrington

WEEMS, SCHIMPF, HAINES & MOORE Counsel for Appellees,
By: Kenneth P. Haines Cori Desha Harrington
Kyle A. Moore and Patrick Jordan
Harrington and the Estate
of Patrick Hough
Harrington

MARK ALLEN HARRINGTON In Proper Person

GAELAN SCOTT HARRINGTON In Proper Person

JONAH BLAKE HARRINGTON In Proper Person

*****

Before PITMAN, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

This is an intrafamily dispute over the ownership of the family home

and property, 6.84 acres on Old Bellevue Road in Benton, La. Colby

Harrington appeals a judgment that rejected his claim to annul a tax sale,

quiet title, and declare him the owner of the property, and instead declared

the succession of his late father the owner. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Colby’s father, the late Pat Harrington, was an attorney in Shreveport.

In 2002, Pat bought the property, as his separate property, by a cash sale

deed, Exhibit JA-16, for “good and valuable consideration.”1 No cash was

transferred, no title examination required or made, no warranty of

merchantable title given, and the deed recited that part of the title was a tax

sale deed. Pat immediately placed a small mobile home on the front of the

property and moved in with his wife, Cori, and their five children (including

Colby) plus one child from a prior marriage. At some point they began

building a large house on the property, set back far from the road, but they

did so in phases, always paying cash, never applying for a mortgage. The

project took several years. Meanwhile, Pat’s health declined: he was

diagnosed with cancer and placed in hospice, and passed away in April

2011, shortly before the house was completed. Nonetheless, Cori and the

children moved into the house; they testified they have occupied it ever

since.

In February 2023, Colby, who was then 32 years old, filed this suit to

declare the tax sale in Pat’s chain of title null and void for lack of notice, to

1
A summary of each joint exhibit is given in the “Trial Evidence” section of this
opinion, and many of the documents are referred to by exhibit numbers herein.

quiet the title, and to declare him (Colby) the true owner of the property. He

alleged that the 1995 tax sale (Exhibit JA-13) was deficient in that notice

was sent to the tax notice party, “Estate of Grandison Thomas,” but was

returned “unclaimed,” and nobody made the effort to find and notify the

heirs of Grandison Thomas. He further alleged that, in 2008, when he was

18 years old, he bought the property, by cash sale deed from Edgar Booth

Jr., for “good and valuable consideration.” That deed (Exhibit JA-18)

recited that Booth and his family had maintained uninterrupted possession of

the property since acquiring it, in 1990. Colby named as defendants his

mother, Cori, individually, as trustee of a trust Pat had created, and as Pat’s

succession representative; the estate of Pat; Colby’s four brothers; and the

town of Benton. Colby applied for, and received, pauper status to proceed

without prepayment of costs.

In an amended petition, Colby dropped the claim against the town.

He later filed a motion for summary judgment specifically on his claim to

quiet the title to this property.

In August 2023, Colby reopened his father’s succession, which had

resulted in a prior, 2012 judgment of possession in favor of Cori. His

amended answer in the succession proceeding raised allegations similar to

those raised in the first action; the two matters were consolidated in early

2024.

Through responsive pleadings and documents offered for and against

Colby’s motion for summary judgment, it was revealed that Cori and the

other children were unaware that Colby had “bought” the property in 2008.

In fact, the cash sale deed by which he claimed title purported to bear Cori’s

2

signature as notary, but she denied she notarized it or had any knowledge of

its existence.

TRIAL EVIDENCE

The matter came to trial in June 2024, on the bifurcated issue of

ownership of the property. The district court stated at the start of trial that if

the tax sale in Pat’s chain of title was good, then Pat’s estate was the owner,

and the case was over. Counsel for Colby announced he would not call any

witnesses but, rather, build a “paper case” around the documents. The

parties stipulated to 18 of these, admitted as Exhibits JA-1 through JA-18.

Unlike Colby, Cori called four witnesses – Colby on cross-examination,

herself on direct, and two of the brothers.

Below is a list of the documents, with explanatory notes from the

witnesses’ trial testimony (in parentheses).

JA-1 Sale of lots (actually a credit sale deed), April 22,
1886, from L.D. Arick to Grandison Thomas, for $150, with
“full guarantee of title” and “rights in warranty against previous
lenders[.]” (After this, there is no disposition from Grandison
Thomas – no sale, no donation, no judgment of possession.)

JA-2 Sale deed, February 9, 1954, from Irene Thomas
Blackman, “being a daughter of Grandison Thomas, deceased,”
to Mercy Fredrick, of 1/3 interest in the property, for $100 and
other good and valuable consideration, “being services and care
rendered the grantor herein by this grantee.” (As noted, there
was no judgment of possession in favor of Ms. Blackman, and
no evidence regarding what became of Ms. Fredrick.)

JA-3 Right of Way, December 3, 1954, from
“Grandison Thomas Estate,” signed by Irene Thomas, to
SWEPCO for a powerline servitude. (The district court
commented that JA-2 could not have meant anything if, less
than one year later, the estate was granting a powerline
servitude on the property.)

JA-4 Cash sale deed, April 27, 1988 (not filed until
April 27, 1989), from Linda Kay Thomas, of Rochester, New
York, to Cindy Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all
rights “to which said vendor may be entitled,” for $500.
3

JA-5 Cash sale deed, April 27, 1988 (also not filed until
April 27, 1989), from Hattie Cross Thomas, of Shreveport, to
Cindy Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all rights “to
which said vendor may be entitled,” for $1,500.

JA-6 Cash sale deed, January 26, 1987 (filed April 27,
1989), from Delphine Diane Thomas Baker, of Shreveport, to
Cindy Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all rights “to
which said vendor may be entitled,” for $200.

JA-7 Cash sale deed, April 22, 1987 (filed April 27,
1989), from Tommie Lee Thomas, of Shreveport, to Cindy Lou
Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all rights “to which said
vendor may be entitled,” for $800.

JA-8 Cash sale deed, September 24, 1987 (filed April
27, 1989), from Terry Lee Thomas, of Shreveport, to Cindy
Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all rights “to which
said vendor may be entitled,” for $300.

JA-9 (Untitled act of donation), April 11, 1987 (filed
April 27, 1989), from Eller Thomas Rhodes and Arana Thomas
Merritt, both of Bossier Parish, to Hattie Cross Thomas, of
Shreveport, in consideration for “the natural love and affection”
for their sister-in-law, Hattie Thomas.

JA-10 Cash sale deed, October 14, 1988 (filed April 27,
1989), from Larry Thomas, of Rochester, New York, to Cindy
Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc., conveying all rights “to which
said vendor may be entitled,” for $500.

JA-11 Cash sale deed, December 4, 1990 (filed July 24,
1991), from Cindy Lou Sales of Shreveport Inc. to Edgar
Waldo Booth Jr., conveying “all of his interest which is no less
than 1/3,” for $5,000. (Cindy Lou Sales is represented here, for
the first time, by Davette Kemp, whom Cori identified as her
late husband’s bookkeeper.)

JA-12 Procès-verbal, May 8, 1995, in which the Bossier
Parish sheriff announced the property would be auctioned for
nonpayment of taxes on May 24, 1995. The delinquent
taxpayer is listed as “Grandison Thomas Estate, c/o Pat
Harrington, 711 Texas St., Shreveport LA 71101.” Attached is
a copy of the certified mail receipt marked “Return to Sender /
Reason checked /  Unclaimed.”

JA-13 Tax sale, May 31, 1995, from Bossier Parish
sheriff to William and Debbie Jorden, of Benton, for unpaid
taxes and costs of $142.72. (Cori testified she had never met
either of the Jordens.)
4

JA-14 (Untitled partition of community), September
14, 1999, Debbie Jorden conveyed her interest in the property
to her ex-husband, William Jorden.

JA-15 Cash sale deed, September 28, 1999, from
William Jorden to 707 Benton Road Corp., for $750. The
purchaser, 707 Benton Road Corp., was represented by Donald
L. Wilson. (Cori testified she knew Don Wilson, he was a title
attorney, and he never asked the Harringtons to leave the
property.)

JA-16 Cash sale deed, September 13, 2002, from 707
Benton Road Corp. to Pat Harrington, for “good and valuable
consideration * * * the significance of which third parties can
rely upon.” The deed referred to Cori but stated the property
was going to Pat’s separate estate. The deed also recites, “no
title examination was required, none was made and no
warranties of merchantable title * * * are made herein[,]” and
the parties “acknowledge that part of the title to the subject
property is a Tax Sale Deed title.”

JA-17 Oil, gas & mineral lease, November 9, 2006,
from Pat Harrington to KCS Resources.

JA-18 Cash sale deed, November 28, 2008, from Edgar
Waldo Booth Jr. to Colby, at the mailing address of 500 Old
Bellevue Road, Benton, for $100 cash “and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged.” The deed also recites, “The vendor has had
uninterrupted possession of the property since the vendor
acquired said property.” The deed is signed by Booth and his
wife, by two witnesses (one of them named Carl Henderson),
but not by the purchaser, Colby. (The deed is apparently
notarized by Cori, but Cori testified emphatically that she did
not notarize this document; she was unaware of it until this
litigation arose. She also did not see Henderson witness it.
Colby testified that he knew Henderson: he played football with
two of Henderson’s sons, and Henderson and Pat “worked as a
team” buying and selling real estate. Colby did not call
Henderson to testify.)

Called on cross-examination, Colby testified he was just a junior in

high school when he bought the property, JA-18, so he did not precisely

recall the event, such as where it was signed and by whom, and he agreed he

5

did not sign the deed.2 He could not recall how much he paid for the

property, and admitted he contributed nothing to the cost of building the

house. He also admitted that his family had lived there, first in the trailer

and then in the house, since about 2002.

On direct examination, Cori testified the family had lived on the

property since 2001, first in the trailer and then in the house. She also

provided the details about some of the exhibits noted above. She was

emphatic that nobody, either from the Grandison Thomas family, Edgar

Booth Jr., or Don Wilson, had ever claimed ownership or asked her to leave.

Two of Colby’s brothers, Jonah and Patrick, confirmed the family had

lived on the property since 2001 or 2002; nobody had ever questioned their

ownership.

ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

After taking the case under advisement, the district court ruled orally.

It first stated that Colby’s deed, JA-18, was in fact a quitclaim, and fairly

standard (by contrast, Cindy Lou Sales’ sale to Booth, JA-11, was a true

cash sale); the issue was whether it gave Colby any interest in the property.

The court rejected the validity of Colby’s deed: Colby could not remember

seeing his seller, Booth, that day, and Cori testified her signature on the

notary line was not genuine.

Regarding Pat’s deed, JA-16, the court found no evidence as to “what

happened in the tax sale,” and not enough evidence to rule the tax sale

procedure was invalid. The court therefore concluded the property belonged

to the succession.

2
Although he was only a junior in high school, he was 18 years old at the time, as
revealed by data provided in his in forma pauperis affidavit.
6

The court later signed a partial final judgment declaring (1) Colby’s

cash sale deed was invalid, (2) the tax sale in Pat’s chain of title was valid,

and the property belonged to his estate, and (3) the judgment was

immediately appealable.

Colby took this devolutive appeal, raising three assignments of error.

He has also filed peremptory exceptions of prescription and nonjoinder, for

the first time in this court.

DISCUSSION

Validity of Colby’s Cash Sale Deed

By his first assignment of error, Colby urges the court committed

reversible error when it concluded, after trial, that the Colby Harrington deed

was invalid because the notary did not sign it. He contends the court failed

to apply La. C.C. art. 1834, under which a document that fails to meet the

requirements of an authentic act may still be valid as an act under private

signature, and this error justifies de novo review. Title may be conveyed

under private signature, merely by the signatures of the parties. La. C.C. art.

1836; Succession of Davisson, 50,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So. 3d

597, writ denied, 17-0307 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So. 3d 111. In fact, he argues,

the signature of the recipient is not required; acceptance may be inferred by

the recipient’s acts. Mitchell v. Blount, 448 So. 2d 681 (La. 1984); Cecil

Blount Farms LLC v. MAP00-Net, 47,246 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/25/12), 104 So.

3d 1, writ denied, 12-2263 (La. 1/11/13), 107 So. 3d 614. He concludes that

even if the notary’s signature was no good, Colby confirmed the signature of

the seller, Booth, and accepted the sale by paying the price and asserting his

ownership; hence the deed is valid as an act under private signature.

7

A transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic act or by

act under private signature. La. C.C. arts. 1839, 2440; Hidden Grove LLC v.

Brauns, 22-00757 (La. 1/27/23), 356 So. 3d 974. Colby does not contest the

district court’s finding that his cash sale deed, JA-18, fails as an authentic

act: the purported notary, Cori, testified that the signature on the document

was not hers, and no evidence contradicted this. Rather, he contends his

deed is valid as an act under private signature, under La. C.C. art. 1834. The

district court examined JA-18 to see if it qualified as an act under private

signature; the court’s finding is factual in nature and is subject to manifest

error review. Hansen v. River Cities Disposal Co., 51,700 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 213.

An act under private signature need not be written by the parties, but it

must be signed by them. La. C.C. art. 1837; Succession of Davisson, supra.

An act under private signature need not be signed by both parties; it is valid

“when the party who signed it asserts the validity of the commutative

contract” against a party who did not sign it “but whose conduct reveals that

he has availed himself of the contract.” La. C.C. art. 1837, Revision

Comment (b) (1984); Cecil Blount Farms LLC v. MAP00-NET, supra. The

vendee under private signature may avail himself of the transfer by the

“mere recordation” of the instrument, Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197

So. 752 (1940); by executing a correction deed, Neblett v. Placid Oil Co.,

257 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1972), writ denied, 260 La. 1121, 258 So.

2d 376 (1972); or by other acts “clearly indicating” acceptance, Succession

of Davisson, supra.

We have closely examined Colby’s cash sale deed, JA-18, and agree

with the district court that it does not meet the requirements of an act under
8

private signature. As stated by the Comment to Art. 1837 and by this court

in Cecil Blount Farms, supra, an act signed by one party alone is valid when

(1) the party who signed it asserts the validity of the contract, and (2) the

party who did not sign it reveals acceptance thereof by conduct. The party

who signed JA-18, Booth, did not testify at trial, file any pleadings in the

case, or assert the validity of the contract in any way. For this reason alone,

JA-18 cannot pass muster as an act under private signature.

We agree with Colby’s assertion that the party who did not sign JA-

18, Colby, performed some acts of acceptance by filing it in the Bossier

Parish conveyance records nearly one year later and by filing this suit over

13 years after that. However, Colby could not recall if he actually paid the

$100 stated in the cash sale deed. Critically, he made no practical assertion

of his ownership: he never told his father, who was still alive at the time, that

he had bought the property out from under him; he never disclosed the

purchase to his mother or any of his siblings; he never asked them to leave

“his” property; he never registered as a tax notice party. He candidly

admitted he never contributed anything, not even a dime, to the construction

of the large house on “his” property. He was ambiguous about the

circumstances of the sale, chalking it up to “intuition” and admitting he was

not present when the other people signed the document. On this evidence,

the district court was not plainly wrong to find that Colby’s conduct did not

amount to an assertion of ownership, and that JA-18 fails as an act under

private signature.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

9

Validity of Pat’s Tax Sale Deed

By his second assignment, Colby urges the court committed reversible

error when it concluded, after trial, that the tax sale was valid, when it was

undisputed that co-owners who had an interest in the property never received

the requisite notice of the tax sale. He shows that mortgagees have due

process rights in tax sales, Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.

791, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983), and that notice of tax sale is

paramount, La. Const. art. VII, § 25(A); Tietjen v. City of Shreveport, 09-

2116 (La. 5/11/10), 36 So. 3d 192. Notice was required to be sent to “each

taxpayer,” under the law as it provided in 1995, La. R.S. 47:2180 (B);

Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp Inc., 11-2566 (La. 7/12/12), 94 So. 3d 750.3

When the notice of tax sale is returned unclaimed, the tax collector must

take additional, reasonable steps to notify the tax debtor, and failure to do so

is fatal to the tax sale, C & C Energy LLC v. Cody Invs. LLC, 09-2160 (La.

7/6/10), 41 So. 3d 1134. Factually, Colby shows that in the procès-verbal,

JA-12, notice was sent only to “Grandison Thomas Estate,” care of Pat

Harrington, and this was returned on May 27, 1995; he argues that Booth

still had some interest in the property at this time, and the tax collector could

have easily found Booth’s address, but this did not happen. Colby concludes

this nullifies the tax sale and, with it, Pat’s title to the property. He also

suggests that his claim to annul the tax sale does not prescribe because that

sale was absolutely null, Security First Nat’l Bank v. Murchison, 98-1225

(La. App. 3 Cir. 3/17/99), 739 So. 2d 803, writ denied, 99-1713 (La.

3
R.S. 47:2180 was repealed in 2008 and reenacted, with major revisions, as R.S.
47:2121, et seq. It currently calls for notice to “each tax notice party,” defined as “each
tax debtor and any person requesting notice,” R.S. 47:2122 (18). This version has also
been repealed, 2024 La. Acts No. 774, effective January 1, 2026, but the new R.S.
47:2122 (18) retains the current definition of “tax notice party.”
10

10/15/99), 748 So. 2d 1147; Jackson v. Bernstein, 39 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1948).

The sale of property for nonpayment of taxes is an action that affects a

property right protected by the 14th Amendment. Mennonite Bd. of

Missions v. Adams, supra. In Mennonite, the court recognized that the

mortgagee has a legally protected property interest and is entitled to notice

reasonably calculated to apprise the mortgagee of a pending tax sale. Id. at

798, 103 S. Ct. at 2711. As a minimum constitutional precondition to such a

proceeding, notice must be sent by mail or other means certain to ensure

actual notice if the party’s name and address are reasonably ascertainable.

Id. at 800, 103 S. Ct. at 2712. The fundamental objective is to provide

notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested

parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to

present their objections. Id., citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr.

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950); Tietjen v. City of

Shreveport, supra; Adair Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Turney, 50,574 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/4/16), 195 So. 3d 501, writ denied, 16-01347 (La. 11/7/16/), 209 So.

3d 97.

Mennonite is not the only authority; La. Const. art. VII, § 25, also

requires the tax collector to provide notice to a delinquent taxpayer, and La.

R.S. 47:2180 established the manner in which notice of delinquencies in

immovable property taxes should be provided to comply with Art. VII, § 25.

At the time of JA-13, R.S. 47:2180 provided, in pertinent part:

§ 2180. Immovable property, notice of delinquency

A. On the second day of January each year, or as soon
thereafter as possible, the tax collector shall address to each
taxpayer who has not paid all the taxes, which have been
11

assessed to him on immovable property, or to the record owner
of the property for which the taxes are delinquent, or to the
actual owner in the event the record owner is deceased, written
or printed notice in the manner provided for herein that his
taxes on immovable property must be paid within twenty days
after the service or mailing of the notice, or that the property
will be sold according to law.

B. The tax collector shall send to each taxpayer by certified
mail, with return receipt requested, the notice prescribed herein,
provided that in cities containing a population of over fifty
thousand persons, the tax collector may either send this notice
by certified mail or may make personal or domiciliary service
on the taxpayer. In the event the certified notice is returned as
being undeliverable by the post office, the tax collector may
comply with Article 7 Section 25 of the Constitution of
Louisiana and the provisions of this Section by advertising the
tax debtor’s property in the advertising required for unknown
owners in Subsection C of this Section. After the tax collector
shall have completed the service by the notices herein required,
either by mail or by personal or domiciliary service, he shall
make out a procès verbal stating therein the names of
delinquents so notified, their post office addresses, a brief
description of the property, the amount of taxes due and how
the service of notice was made.

C. The tax collector shall publish one general notice
substantially in the form set forth herein, addressed to all
unknown owners of assessed immovable property situated in
his parish, and to nonresident owners of such property whose
post office address is unknown, in which he shall describe the
property as described in the tax roll. Such notice shall be
published once a week for two weeks in a newspaper published
in his parish, or if there be none published in the parish, then
such notice shall be given in the manner provided by law for
judicial sales.

To give property owners reasonable notice so as not to deprive them

of constitutionally protected property rights, the tax collector was required to

provide “each taxpayer” with written notice, sent by certified mail, return

receipt requested, alerting each record owner of the immovable property that

the owner’s failure to pay the taxes within 20 days will result in sale of the

property. Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 05-1192 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So. 2d

1172; Robertson v. Stonecreek Builders LLC, 50,798 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12

8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 851. Tax sales are presumed valid, and a tax sale deed

shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the tax sale. La. Const. art.

VII, § 25(A)(1); Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, supra; Robertson v.

Stonecreek Builders, supra. Interpreting this statute in terms of due process

requirements, courts have repeatedly held that when the tax collector sends

notice to the known, correct address of the tax debtor with return receipt

requested, he has made a reasonable effort, and the tax sale will not be

invalidated simply because the debtor did not actually receive the notice.

Pardon v. Moore, 39,949 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/17/05), 908 So. 2d 1253, and

citations therein.

The Estate of Grandison Thomas was the only taxpayer listed on

Bossier Parish’s rolls; the record is clear that notice was sent to the Estate,

care of Pat Harrington. This satisfied the notice requirement of R.S. 47:2180

(A). The notice then went unclaimed, and the sheriff advertised the

property, in accordance with R.S. 47:2180 (B). The property was sold for

past due taxes, to the Jordens. The procedure followed all the notice

requirements of La. Const. art. VII, § 25, and R.S. 47:2180.

Colby further argues that, once the initial notice was returned

unclaimed, the tax collector had to take “additional reasonable steps to

notify the tax debtor,” and any failure to do so rendered the tax sale null.

Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, supra; Vincson Inc. v. Ingram, 2001-2655

(La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 835 So. 2d 813; Childress v. Johnson, 387 So. 2d

1217 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 744 (1980). On close

review, we find the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the

tax collector took adequate steps, by the process described in the procès-

verbal and the tax sale, to notify any other owners of the imminent tax sale.
13

After Grandison Thomas bought the property, in 1886, there is no

disposition of the property by him or judgment of possession adjudicating it

to anyone. There are subsequent acts, such as the 1954 sale deed, JA-2,

from Irene Blackman, who purported to be the daughter of Grandison

Thomas, of one-third interest in the property; a sequence of cash sale deeds,

JA-4 through JA-10, from the late 1980s in which people named Thomas

quitclaimed their interest in the property to Cindy Lou Sales; and a cash sale

deed, JA-11, in which Cindy Lou Sales sold “no less than 1/3 interest” to

Booth. However, there is no evidence that any of these vendors had any

legal connection to Grandison Thomas; providing notice to any of these

persons would have been speculative and not reasonable. Moreover, the

whole purpose of Mennonite notice is to apprise interested parties of the

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

objections. None of the parties involved in these transactions, JA-2 through

JA-11, has ever asserted an interest in the property since the tax sale. On

this evidence, the district court was entitled to find the notice was adequate

under Mennonite and under R.S. 47:2180.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Other Arguments

By his third assignment of error, Colby argues, in the alternative, that

if the court found the property belonged to Pat’s estate by acquisitive

prescription, this was error because Pat was a possessor in bad faith, owing

to the recitations in his cash sale deed, JA-16. The district court, however,

did not use the concept of acquisitive prescription, but rather found the tax

sale to the Jordens was valid, a finding which we have declared not plainly

wrong. We therefore pretermit any consideration of acquisitive prescription.
14

By peremptory exception raised in this court, Colby contends Cori’s

claim to annul Colby’s deed is prescribed by five years, under La. C.C. art.

2032. However, Cori filed no action, principal or incidental, seeking to

nullify Colby’s deed; she merely raised the issue of its validity, citing his

burden of proof. The district court found he did not meet his burden, and we

have declared this not plainly wrong. This peremptory exception is without

merit and is denied.

By another peremptory exception raised in this court, Colby urges

nonjoinder of parties necessary for just adjudication, under La. C.C.P. art.

641. He contends that Mercy Fredrick and the Estate of Grandison Thomas

are needed for such adjudication. In light of the district court’s finding that

the tax sale deed to the Jordens, JA-13, was valid, and the subsequent cash

sale deed to Pat, JA-16, was also valid, there is no substance to the argument

that Mercy Fredrick and the Estate of Grandison Thomas have an interest

relating to the subject matter of the action. Moreover, if Colby had felt these

parties were needed for just adjudication, he could have easily joined them,

but he never did so. This peremptory exception is without merit and is

denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to

be paid by Colby Harrington, in accordance with La. C.C.P. arts. 5186 and

5188.

AFFIRMED.

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