Judy Negrete v. Parish of Caddo

Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,933-WCA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

JUDY NEGRETE Plaintiff

versus

PARISH OF CADDO Defendant

*****

Appealed from the
Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 1-W
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 21-06209

Christopher T. Lee
Workers’ Compensation Judge (Ad Hoc)

*****

LIZ MURRILL Counsel for Defendant-
Attorney General Appellant, State of
Louisiana
KIRK L. LANDRY
E. DAVID GILMER
Assistant Attorneys General

JACK BAILEY LAW CORPORATION Counsel for Plaintiff-
By: Jack M. Bailey, Jr. Appellee, Judy Negrete
Mary L. Salley Bylsma

THOMAS, SOILEAU, JACKSON Counsel for Defendants-
& COLE, LLP Appellees, Parish of
By: Erica M. Ducoing Caddo and Corvel
Corporation

*****

Before THOMPSON, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ

ELLENDER, J.

The State of Louisiana appeals a judgment of the Office of Workers’

Compensation finding the State was the borrowing employer of the claimant,

Judy Negrete, who was a temporary employee of the Caddo Parish Registrar

of Voters, and ordering the State to pay one-half of her compensation

benefits for an accident sustained while processing absentee ballots for a

state election. For the reasons expressed, we reverse and render.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Negrete was hired as a temporary employee of the Registrar of

Voters in July 2019. Making an hourly wage of $11.50, she worked as

needed around election times. On March 11, 2021, she was in a storage

room filing absentee ballots from a statewide election (Board of Secondary

and Elementary Education) in large plastic bins. After moving a bin on a

metal shelf, she crouched to sit down, but her office chair had rolled away.

Instead of settling on the chair, she fell to the floor and struck the back of her

head against another metal shelving unit. (The accident was captured on

video, which was admitted at trial.) She injured her back and neck.

Ms. Negrete filed this disputed claim for compensation against the

Parish of Caddo (“the Parish”) in November 2021. She alleged no wage

benefits had been paid (she claimed a comp rate of $302.66), but her

principal claim was for approval of treatment by a neurosurgeon. The Parish

responded it was “unknown” whether she was employed by the Parish at the

time of her injury, but the specialist authorization was quickly approved.

By an amended claim, in December 2021, Ms. Negrete clarified her

employer was the Registrar of Voters but requested service on the State of

Louisiana (“the State”), on grounds the Parish had alleged the State was the

“actual employer.” The Parish followed with a cross-claim against the State.

This pleading denied Ms. Negrete was employed by the Parish, but if she

was, the Parish was entitled to full indemnification or contribution from the

State, under La. R.S. 23:1061 (B) or 23:1031 (C). The State denied all

allegations in the cross-claim.

In March 2022, Ms. Negrete and the Parish executed a consent

agreement. This conceded that she was the Parish’s employee at the time of

her accident, and the Parish agreed to pay her comp rate of $196.47 a week,

accrued weekly benefits of $4,322.34, and any future medical benefits.

However, the agreement expressly reserved the Parish’s right to seek

contribution from the State, “whom Defendant asserts is also an employer of

Claimant[,]” as the State was a “joint employer and/or statutory employer

and/or borrowing employer[.]”

A large amount of motion practice ensued, which crystallized the

issues on appeal. The State asserted, by exception of no cause of action, that

it owes comp benefits to “employees of the state, but not those of political

subdivisions,” under La. R.S. 23:1034 (D); the Registrar of Voters, it argued,

is not a State agency but, rather, a Parish agency. The Parish countered Ms.

Negrete was an employee of both, as she was under the exclusive control of

State employees and the State provided a portion of her wages. The

Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) denied this exception.

The State then moved for summary judgment asserting the consent

agreement was a judicial confession by the Parish that it was Ms. Negrete’s

employer. It also reasserted the exclusion of benefits for Parish employees,

R.S. 23:1034 (D), and denied the existence of statutory employment, under
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R.S. 23:1061. The Parish responded that, by the prevailing law governing

the employer-employee relationship, especially “power of control,” Ms.

Negrete was a State employee. Chailland Bus. Consultants v. Duplantis, 03-

2508 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So. 2d 117, writ denied, 04-2922 (La.

2/4/05), 893 So. 2d 878. Finding a genuine issue of material fact, the WCJ

denied the State’s MSJ.

Finally, the Parish filed its own MSJ asserting Ms. Negrete was a

“borrowed employee” of the State, as she was performing “work for the

State, using State-provided tools, at the direction of State employees.” In

addition to deposition testimony, the Parish offered an Attorney General

Opinion which concluded that, for purposes of “accrued, sick and

compensatory leave,” the “registrar of voters and his employees are properly

classified as state and not parish officials or employees.” Op. Att. Gen., No.

85-355 (5/23/85). The WCJ found certain facts were still in dispute and

denied the Parish’s MSJ.

TRIAL AND EVIDENCE

The matter came to trial in April 2024. The Parish called three

witnesses. The first, Ms. Negrete, reiterated she was a “permanent

temporary seasonal worker” employed by the Parish. She had been hired by

Linda Feazell, the chief deputy registrar and second-in-command, and never

considered herself a State employee.

Yazmin Harper, the Parish’s human resources supervisor, confirmed

the Parish had paid Ms. Negrete’s (undisputed) medical and indemnity

benefits.

Dale Sibley, the registrar of voters, testified he is by statute a State

employee, as are his chief deputy and confidential assistant. The Election
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Code authorizes him to have seven full-time employees, and up to 15

employees at election time, with the temporary employees being paid out of

the Parish’s budget. He considered Ms. Negrete a Parish employee and

never thought he was “lending” her to the State; nobody from the State could

fire any of his employees; and Ms. Negrete always used exclusively Parish

equipment. He agreed, however, his office processed State elections, his

employees (including Ms. Negrete) used a “Yubi Key” to log results into the

State computer system, and she was working a State election (the BESE

race) when she was injured.

The Parish also offered the deposition of Ms. Feazell, the chief deputy

registrar, who confirmed the registrar, Mr. Sibley, had the ultimate authority

to hire and fire all employees, and she (Ms. Feazell) could probably fire Ms.

Negrete too.

The State offered various documents but called no witnesses. Both

sides offered the surveillance video of Ms. Negrete’s accident.

ACTION OF THE WCJ

After taking the case under advisement, the WCJ delivered oral

reasons. He recognized the claimant and the registrar both considered Ms.

Negrete a Parish employee, but he found this not binding. He also

recognized that R.S. 23:1034 excluded employees of political subdivisions

from the State’s workers’ comp coverage, but he found the statutes did not

explicitly cover registrar personnel. He therefore looked to the nature of the

office. One case held the registrar was a “hybrid” agency, In re Bankston,

306 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1975); another found “registrar’s employees

are considered state employees,” State v. Center for Tech & Civic Life,

21,670 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/30/22), 350 So. 3d 534, writ denied, 22-00721 (La.
4

6/28/22), 341 So. 3d 568; and an early case said if an office is established

“in the first instance” by the Constitution, it is a State office, State v. Taylor,

44 La. Ann. 783, 11 So. 132 (1892). Also, a more recent Attorney General

Opinion found the registrar is “subject to the direction” of the Secretary of

State and “may not be considered a local employee,” Att. Gen. Op. 19-0097

(9/3/19). From this authority, the WCJ found the registrar is a “hybrid

office.”

The WCJ then stated the parties had abandoned the theories of joint or

statutory employment, leaving only the issue of the borrowed employee.

The WCJ cited factors purporting to determine whether a claimant is a

borrowed employee, Biggs v. S. Lifestyles Dev. LLC, 22-463 (La. App. 3 Cir.

3/22/23), 363 So. 3d 568.1 Applying these factors, the WCJ found the State

was a borrowing employer of Ms. Negrete at the time of her accident.

The WCJ rendered judgment finding the claimant sustained a work-

related accident and was entitled to indemnity benefits of $196.47 a week.

The judgment further found the State was the claimant’s borrowing

employer at the time of the work-related accident and held the State liable

for one-half of all compensation benefits “paid to date and future[.]”

The State moved for new trial, which was denied, and then took this

suspensive appeal.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

The State designates three assignments of error. By its first, it urges

the WCJ committed legal error in failing to apply the clear and unambiguous

1
This court notes, Biggs applied the concept of joint employment, under La. R.S.
23:1031 (B), not borrowed employees, a purely jurisprudential concept. However, the
latter entails a similar nine-factor analysis. Galindo v. Castillo, 56,202 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/9/25), 409 So. 3d 1061, writ denied, 25-00570 (La. 9/16/25), 416 So. 3d 481.
5

language of R.S. 23:1034 (D), under which workers’ comp benefits for

Parish employees are to be provided by the Parish. A parish is obviously a

political subdivision, State v. Coulon, 197 La. 1058, 3 So. 2d 241 (1941),

and the consent agreement established Ms. Negrete was a Parish employee;

hence, § 1034 (D) prohibits any order for the State to pay her comp benefits.

Even if she really was a “borrowed employee,” this statute prohibited the

relief granted.

By its second assignment of error, the State urges the WCJ committed

legal error by identifying Ms. Negrete as a State employee in derogation of

the Election Code. Specifically, R.S. 18:59.2 (A)(1) and 18:59 (I)(1) fix the

maximum number of permanent and temporary employees in a registrar’s

office, and Mr. Sibley’s testimony confirmed these limits. Under this

scheme, he had filled all permanent positions and had no authority to hire

anybody else on behalf of the State; Ms. Negrete, as a temporary worker,

was by necessity a Parish employee.

By its third assignment, the State argues, even if the Parish could

borrow from the State, the State was not a borrowing employer from the

Parish. The law recognizes the concept of “borrowing employer,” using

nine factors, Lastie v. Cooper, 14-561 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/14), 167 So. 3d

150, writ denied, 15-0123 (La. 5/1/15), 169 So. 3d 371. The State submits

most of these factors are neutral, as the registrar, Mr. Sibley, clearly works

for both the State and the Parish; critically, however, there was no agreement

for the State to borrow Ms. Negrete. This, the State submits, is fatal to the

claim; in support, it cites Hall v. Equitable Shipyard Inc., 95-1754 (La. App.

4 Cir. 2/29/96), 670 So. 2d 543. The State concludes the finding of a

borrowed employee cannot exist and is legally wrong.
6

The Parish argues the WCJ analyzed the case right: Ms. Negrete was

employed by the Parish, but she was hired and controlled by State

employees, her pay was set by the State, the Attorney General opinions

confirm the registrar’s employees are indeed State employees, and Mr.

Sibley’s comments to the contrary are simply not binding on the WCJ. The

Parish also submits that, under the employment relationship test of

Chailland, supra, aside from the payment of wages, all factors favored

finding employment by the State. It concludes the WCJ committed no legal

or manifest error in finding borrowed employment, and it properly allocated

payment of benefits in accordance with La. R.S. 23:1031 (C).

APPLICABLE LAW

An employee who receives personal injury by accident arising out of

and in the course of his employment, and is not otherwise eliminated from

coverage, is entitled to compensation from his employer in the amounts and

on the conditions specified by the workers’ compensation law. La. R.S.

23:1031 (A). This coverage applies to any person employed by the State or

any political subdivision thereof. La. R.S. 23:1034 (A). In the case of

public employees, the obligation to pay benefits is allocated between the

State and political subdivisions by R.S. 23:1034 (D), which states, in

pertinent part and with emphasis added:

Employees of the state, but not those of political subdivisions,
shall be provided compensation * * * by the office of risk
management of the Division of Administration * * *. For purpose of
this Section, “employees of the state” mean the employees of “state
agencies” as defined by R.S. 39:1527(1). Employees of political
subdivisions shall be provided compensation under this Section by the
governing authorities of their respective political subdivisions. The
fact that the state may grant to an employee of a political subdivision
any additional or supplemental pay or otherwise provide funds for the
payment of such employee’s salary shall not make such employee, in
whole or in part or in any way, an employee of the state.
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Under La. R.S. 39:1527 (3), “state agencies” do not include parish

officials set forth in La. Const. art. 6, §§ 5(G) and 7(B). These constitutional

sections, however, do not refer explicitly to registrars of voters.

The governing authority of each parish shall appoint a registrar of

voters in the manner provided by law. La. Const. art. 11, § 5. Each registrar

may appoint deputies, confidential assistants, or other office employees. La.

R.S. 18:59 (A). The salaries of the chief deputy registrar and confidential

assistants are paid in part by the state and in part by the parish governing

authority. La. R.S. 18:59 (H). The registrar of voters, and his deputy or

permanent employees, are considered State employees, for purposes of the

retirement system. La. R.S. 11:2031 (10), (11).

Based on its population at the time, the Caddo Parish Registrar of

Voters was authorized to have seven positions. La. R.S. 18:59.2 (A)(1)(5).

The salaries of “additional temporary personnel” are paid only by the parish

governing authority. La. R.S. 18:59 (I)(1).

The jurisprudence recognizes the concept of “borrowed employee,”

whereby a nonemployee may be “deemed to be under the control of the

employer” sufficiently to impose vicarious liability. H. Alston Johnson, 13

La. Civ. L. Treatise (Workers’ Comp), 5 ed. (2010), § 58. To determine

whether a worker is a borrowed employee, this court applies a nine-question

test to the working relationship. Galindo v. Castillo, supra. The nine

questions are:

1. Who has control over the employee and the work he is performing,
beyond mere suggestion of details or cooperation?
2. Whose work is being performed?
3. Was there an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds
between the original and the borrowing employer?
4. Did the employee acquiesce in the new work situation?
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5. Did the original employer terminate his relationship with the
employee?
6. Who furnished the tools and place for employment?
7. Was the new employment over a considerable length of time?
8. Who had the right to discharge the employee?
9. Who had the obligation to pay the employee?

An admission by a party in a pleading constitutes a judicial confession

and is full proof against the party making it. La. C.C. art. 1853; Conti

Holding LLC v. 1025 Bienville LLC, 22-01288 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d

930; Sherman v. Anderson-Scott, 56,429 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 419 So.

3d 881, writ denied, 25-01240 (La. 12/9/25), 422 So. 3d 297.

Factual findings of the WCJ are reviewed under the manifest error

standard. Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic v. La. United Bus. SIF, 15-2137

(La. 6/29/16), 194 So. 3d 1112; Marshall v. City of Winnsboro, 56,553 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/19/25), 425 So. 3d 256, writ denied, 25-01631 (La. 3/25/26),

428 So. 3d 265. Under this standard, the judgment must stand if it is found

to be reasonable. Buxton v. Iowa Police Dept., 09-0520 (La. 10/20/09), 23

So. 3d 275; Marshall v. City of Winnsboro, supra. By contrast,

interpretations of the workers’ comp law are questions of law and subject to

the de novo standard of review, without deference to the legal conclusions of

the WCJ. Burgess v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 16-2267 (La.

6/29/17), 225 So. 3d 1020; Eilts v. Twentieth Century Fox TV, 54,757 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 1038.

DISCUSSION

The critical question is Ms. Negrete’s status as either a State or a

Parish employee. The WCJ performed a labored analysis to find the

registrar’s office was a “hybrid office” and, in the process, sidestepped the

9

basic requirement of the claimant’s status. We have therefore reviewed Ms.

Negrete’s employment status de novo.

The law makes the registrar himself a State employee, as the

Constitution expressly creates the position, La. Const. art. 11, § 5, and the

statutes expressly place the registrar, along with any deputy or permanent

employee of the registrar’s, in the State retirement system, La. R.S. 11:2031

(10), (11). The attorney general has confirmed that the registrar is a state

employee. Att. Gen. Op. 19-0097 (9/3/19).

The situation with the registrar’s temporary employees is not so clear.

The statutes set out a maximum number of “authorized positions,” La. R.S.

18:59.2 (A)(2), and provided that “additional temporary personnel” shall be

paid from funds appropriate by the parish governing authority, La. R.S.

18:59 (I)(1). Payment by the Parish exclusively creates a strong inference

that such additional temporary personnel are Parish employees. Moreover,

the Constitution, the law regarding registrars, R.S. 18:59 (I)(1), and the law

regarding State retirement, R.S. 11:2031 (10), (11), conspicuously omit any

reference to the registrar’s temporary personnel. In short, the statutes

regulating registrars do not regard their temporary employees as State

employees.

Specifically relevant to Ms. Negrete, the workers’ comp law, R.S.

23:1034 (D), carefully delineates between State employees, who receive

benefits from the office of risk management, and other public employees,

who receive benefits from their “respective political subdivisions.” To

emphasize the distinction, the fact that the state may grant an employee of a

political subdivision any additional or supplemental pay “shall not make

such employee, in whole or in part or in any way, an employee of the state.”
10

This language shows a strong intent that employees who are not designated

as State employees cannot receive the workers’ comp benefits of State

employees. Section 1034 (D), in our view, eliminates any doubt that the

Constitution or the law regarding registrars can be “finessed” into calling

Ms. Negrete a State employee.

This court also considers the consent agreement entered between Ms.

Negrete and the Parish and the testimony of all witnesses. While the

agreement reserved the Parish’s right to seek contribution from the State, it

established that she was a Parish employee, a point reinforced by Mr. Sibley,

Ms. Negrete, and Ms. Feazell. This is a judicial confession of the fact. La.

C.C. art. 1853; Sherman v. Anderson-Scott, supra. While it may not be

legally binding as a conclusion of law, it corresponds to the Constitutional

and statutory structure, under which a temporary employee is a Parish

employee, not a State employee.

In light of this conclusion, we distinguish the dictum in State v. Center

for Tech & Civic Life, supra: that court’s statement, “In fact, the registrar’s

employees are considered state employees,” is followed by an explicit

reference to authorized positions, R.S. 18:59.2 (A)(1), with respect to laws

prohibiting the use of private money to manage elections, R.S. 18:1400.3

(A). We also distinguish the broad language in the heading of one Attorney

General opinion, La. Att. Gen. Op. 85-355 (5/23/85): the early reference to

“the registrar of voters and his employees as state or parish officials or

employees” is later refined to “other permanent employees of the registrars

of voters” and “their chief deputies, and confidential assistants” as the State

employees with respect to accrued, sick and compensatory leave. Contrary

11

to the WCJ’s reasoning, these authorities do not support the legal conclusion

that Ms. Negrete was a State employee.

Further, we are unconvinced by the suggestion, raised at trial and at

oral argument, that because Ms. Negrete was working a State election

(BESE) at the time of her injury she can be deemed a State employee. Most

municipal and parochial workers are, to some extent, performing duties in

compliance with State law – local police enforce State criminal statutes,

deputy clerks of court record mortgages and conveyances as required by the

Civil Code – but this does not make them State employees. The applicable

statute, R.S. 23:1034 (D), carefully places close cases outside the coverage

of State workers’ comp benefits. With this conclusion, we cannot accept the

WCJ’s apparent finding that Ms. Negrete was a hybrid employee of the

Parish and the State.

Finally, we address the WCJ’s principal finding, that the State was a

borrowing employer of Ms. Negrete. Given that Mr. Sibley was allocated

seven permanent employees, all such positions were filled, and additional,

temporary workers could not be considered State employees, we doubt

whether the jurisprudential concept of borrowing could apply. However,

because it was a large portion of the WCJ’s rationale, we have reviewed his

factual findings.

To determine whether a worker is a borrowed employee, courts apply

a nine-question test to the working relationship. Galindo v. Castillo, supra;

Rogers v. State, 43,000 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/30/08), 982 So. 2d 252, writ

denied, 08-1178 (La. 9/19/08), 992 So. 2d 931. The testimony was uniform:

the person with control over the work done by Ms. Negrete was the registrar,

Mr. Sibley, or his chief deputy, Ms. Feazell; there was no agreement,
12

implicit or explicit, between the registrar and the State for the performance

of Ms. Negrete’s functions; she did not terminate her relationship with the

Parish; she did not acquiesce in any new work situation; the Parish furnished

the tools and place of employment; and the Parish had the right to discharge,

and the duty to pay, Ms. Negrete. These factors strongly indicate there was

no borrowing. The point was raised that, at the time of her accident, Ms.

Negrete was processing absentee ballots for a State election; however, for

the reasons already discussed, this cannot change her to a State employee.

There is no showing of a “new employment,” or that it persisted for any

length of time. In short, the record will not support the WCJ’s factual

finding that she was a “borrowed employee” of the State. That finding is

manifestly erroneous and will be reversed. Ms. Negrete was, and remained, a

Parish employee.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the judgment is REVERSED insofar as it

found the State was the claimant’s “borrowing employer” and was liable for

one-half of her compensation benefits. Judgement is RENDERED casting

the Parish of Caddo with all workers’ compensation benefits, paid to date

and future. Because no appellate costs have been deferred, La. R.S. 13:4521

(A)(1), costs in this court are not assessed. La. C.C.P. art. 2164.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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