State of Louisiana v. Jaclyn Duncan

Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,972-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

JACLYN DUNCAN Appellant

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Appealed from the
Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Jackson, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 53,470

Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant
WRIT SERVICE
By: Desiree Marie Valenti

DANIEL W. NEWELL Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

P. NELSON SMITH, JR.
DARRELL ROBERT AVERY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before COX, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This criminal appeal arises out of the Second Judicial District Court,

Parish of Jackson, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Rick Warren, Judge,

presiding. Following a guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the defendant,

Jaclyn Duncan, to concurrent terms of imprisonment at hard labor of two

and five years. Ms. Duncan has appealed her sentence as excessive. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 16, 2024, Ms. Duncan was a passenger in a vehicle that was

stopped in Hodge, Louisiana, for a traffic offense. She was searched, and

methamphetamine was found. During a search of the vehicle’s interior, a

wallet containing Ms. Duncan’s identification and a suboxone1 strip was

found.

On May 28, 2024, the defendant, Jaclyn Duncan, was charged by bill

of information with one count of possession of a Controlled Dangerous

Substance, Schedule II, methamphetamine, a violation of La. R.S.

40:967(C), and one count of possession of a Controlled Dangerous

Substance, Schedule III, buprenorphine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:968(C).

On that same date, Ms. Duncan entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.

On August 5, 2025, a motion to suppress evidence was heard and denied by

the trial court.

On September 16, 2025, Ms. Duncan withdrew her previous not guilty

plea and entered a guilty plea after a Boykin colloquy with the trial court.

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Suboxone is a prescription medication which combines buprenorphine (a partial
opioid agonist) and naloxone (an antagonist that blocks other opioids). Suboxone is a
Schedule III narcotic (as it contains buprenorphine, an opioid), even when used
therapeutically to treat opioid addiction.

The State agreed to dismiss a pending misdemeanor drug paraphernalia

charge and not file a habitual offender bill of information. Ms. Duncan was

advised of the statutory sentencing ranges at the time of her plea, but it was

agreed that sentencing was to be left to the trial court’s discretion pending

completion of the pre-sentencing investigation (“PSI”) report.

A sentencing hearing was held on December 2, 2025, and Ms. Duncan

made a statement to the trial court. Ms. Duncan was sentenced by the court

to two years’ imprisonment at hard labor on count one (possession of

methamphetamine) and five years’ imprisonment at hard labor on count two

(possession of buprenorphine). The sentences were ordered to run

concurrently, and Ms. Duncan was given credit for time served. Defense

counsel made an oral motion to reconsider, which was denied by the trial

court. Ms. Duncan has appealed, urging excessiveness of sentence.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Duncan contends that the five-year sentence imposed on count

two was constitutionally excessive. The trial court’s five-year sentence was

the maximum that could have been imposed, notes Ms. Duncan. While the

trial court did consider some of the sentencing factors under La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, Ms. Duncan contends that it did not properly weigh several mitigating

factors which favored probation.

Both the PSI and her statement to the trial court show her to be an

educated woman with a history of abandonment, abuse, addiction, and

mental instability in need of treatment, not a five-year sentence of

imprisonment, urges Ms. Duncan. She further points out that an abusive

relationship of 30 years was the reason she took an excessive number of pills

and got into a motor vehicle crash in which she sustained a traumatic brain

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injury and partial blindness. Ms. Duncan thereafter had to relearn how to

walk, talk, read, and write. She also notes her diagnosis of bipolar disorder.

According to Ms. Duncan, the trial court further failed to consider the

undue hardship her incarceration will have on her seven children, three of

whom are minors. Ms. Duncan claims that the record contradicts the

erroneous finding of the trial court that “imprisonment would not entail

excessive hardship to Ms. Duncan or her dependents.” Instead, a restraining

order is currently in place which prevents the children’s father from seeing

them, and the three minor children are in the care of their sick grandmother.

Ms. Duncan also urges that at no time did the trial court find or the

PSI declare her to be the worst offender. Instead, the record shows her to be

a victim of abuse, addiction, and mental and physical health problems. Ms.

Duncan asserts that she was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for

a traffic violation; she was not perpetrating a violent offense. Her criminal

history does not show her to be dangerous. The crimes to which she pled

guilty—possession of CDS, Schedule II and III—do not cause or threaten

serious harm. It is Ms. Duncan’s position that incarceration at hard labor for

the maximum term of five years is grossly out of proportion to the

seriousness of the offense and needlessly inflicts further pain and suffering

on someone who has endured hardship, abuse, and addiction.

According to the State, the five-year cumulative sentence (two-year

and five-year sentences running concurrent for a total of five years) is

lawful, within statutory limits, and was imposed by the trial court after

consideration of the record. Both the two-year and the five-year hard labor

terms were within statutory limits. The State notes that sentencing was

deferred for the PSI, and Ms. Duncan gave a formal statement at sentencing.

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The State emphasizes that article 894.1 does not require a mechanical

recitation of all factors as long as the record reflects adequate consideration

before the sentence is imposed. This was done, contends the State. The

record contains both consideration of mitigating factors and explicit hardship

findings. Ms. Duncan’s disagreement with the weight given to particular

factors does not establish error, urges the State.

Given that the methamphetamine was found on Ms. Duncan’s person,

the buprenorphine was in a wallet with her identification, and a prior

Schedule II conviction, the five-year sentence does not shock the sense of

justice nor is it grossly disproportionate, according to the State. The State

urges this Court to affirm Ms. Duncan’s convictions and sentences.

An appellate court uses a two-pronged approach in its review of a

sentence for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court

used the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Andrews, 56,402

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 419 So. 3d 432; State v. Harper, 54,173 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1/12/22), 332 So. 3d 799; State v. Scroggins, 52,323 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/25/19), 280 So. 3d 841. The trial judge is not required to list every

aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that he

adequately considered the guidelines of art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d

688 (La. 1983); State v. Andrews, supra; State v. Harper, supra; State v.

Couch, 53,956 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 541. The important

elements that should be considered are the defendant’s personal history, prior

criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of

rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. Harper,

supra; State v. Couch, supra.

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Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not

adequately describe her conduct or has received a significant reduction in

personal exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has

great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the

pled offense. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. Andrews,

supra; State v. Harper, supra.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is excessive

by constitutional standards. Id. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if

it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing

more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. Id.

For a sentence to be considered excessive by constitutional standards, a

reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence

makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is

nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.

Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Andrews, supra.

La. R.S. 40:968(C) provides that “[a]ny person who violates this

Subsection shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than

one year nor more than five years, and in addition, may be required to pay a

fine of not more than five thousand dollars.” La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) provides

that any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a Schedule II CDS

“with an aggregate weight of two grams or more but less than twenty-eight

grams shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one

year nor more than five years and, in addition, may be sentenced to pay a

fine of not more than ten thousand dollars.”

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First, the record shows the trial court’s compliance with the

requirements of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The sentencing hearing was held

after a PSI was conducted. After going through Ms. Duncan’s extensive

criminal history, the trial court discussed the facts of the instant offenses and

Ms. Duncan’s social history, including her relationship with the father of her

seven children, who are aged 11 to 23. The trial court took note of the

defendant’s educational background and lack of employment history. Part of

this history also included Ms. Duncan’s illicit drug use and mental illness

diagnoses. The trial court also allowed Ms. Duncan’s boyfriend to retrieve a

written statement from her vehicle so her defense attorney could read it to

the court prior to sentencing.

Next, we note that Ms. Duncan had a total sentencing exposure of ten

years, as she pled guilty to two narcotics possession offenses. The

maximum sentence of five years was imposed by the trial judge on count

two, the buprenorphine possession conviction; however, the trial court

imposed only a two-year sentence on count one, the methamphetamine

possession conviction. This lesser sentence was ordered to run concurrently

with the five-year term imposed on the other narcotics conviction. In

addition to this significant benefit, the State agreed not to multi-bill Ms.

Duncan and dropped another pending charge. We cannot say that this

cumulative five-year sentence is either an abuse of the trial court’s vast

discretion or excessive by constitutional standards. This assignment of error

is without merit.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentences of the

defendant, Jaclyn Duncan, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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