56,000-KA Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Jimmy F. Kuykendall, Jr.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed November 20, 2024

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

Judgment rendered November 20, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,000-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JIMMY F. KUYKENDALL, JR. Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 387,262

Honorable Erin Leigh Waddell Garrett, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula C. Marx

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ROSS S. OWEN
TOMMY J. JOHNSON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, STONE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Defendant, Jimmy Kuykendall, Jr., was convicted by a jury of

violation of a protective order, third offense, and possession of

methamphetamine. He was sentenced to two years at hard labor for

violation of a protective order, and five years at hard labor for possession of

methamphetamine, to be served consecutively. Both convictions were

affirmed on appeal, as was the two-year sentence for violation of a

protective order. However, the five-year sentence for possession of

methamphetamine was vacated and remanded for resentencing with

instructions that the trial court articulate its reasons for imposing the

maximum sentence and for imposing the sentences consecutively. State v.

Kuykendall, 55,288 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 372 So. 3d 912 (“Kuykendall

I”).

On remand, the trial court again sentenced Kuykendall to five years

for possession of methamphetamine, consecutive to the two-year sentence

for violation of a protective order. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.

FACTS

As detailed in Kuykendall I, Kuykendall and Lori Fox were involved

in a romantic relationship that ended when Kuykendall began experiencing

what Fox described as “really bad mood swings.” Kuykendall moved out of

their shared residence at Fox’s request, but soon began calling and leaving

threatening voicemails. Fox obtained a protective order, which Kuykendall

violated on at least three occasions. The first time, he came to Fox’s house

without a sheriff’s deputy to retrieve some items he left there; he pled guilty

to violation of a protective order, first offense, on September 29, 2021. The

second time, he came to Fox’s house with a sheriff’s deputy, but, on arrival,

Fox reported Kuykendall had been emailing her in violation of the protective

order. Kuykendall pled guilty to violation of a protective order, second

offense, on December 13, 2021.

The instant case was the third violation of the protective order, which

occurred on January 23, 2022, when Kuykendall parked outside of Fox’s

home and called to ask her about the man in her yard who he believed was

taking his belongings. When deputies arrived, Kuykendall was found to be

within 100 yards of Fox’s residence and in violation of the protective order

yet again. A deputy patted him down and discovered a small amount of

methamphetamine and a glass smoking pipe on his person. A search of his

vehicle yielded another baggie of methamphetamine, hidden in a pack of

cigarettes. Kuykendall was charged with violation of a protective order,

third offense, and possession of methamphetamine in an amount more than 2

grams but less than 28 grams. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and

sentenced to serve two years at hard labor for violation of a protective order,

and five years at hard labor for possession of methamphetamine. Those

sentences were to be served consecutively.

In Kuykendall I, this court affirmed Kuykendall’s convictions, as well

as the sentence for violation of a protective order, but vacated the five-year

sentence for the possession charge with instructions for the trial court to

provide its reasons for imposing a maximum sentence and imposing

consecutive sentences; a determination was not made as to whether the

maximum five-year hard labor sentence for possession of methamphetamine

was excessive.

On remand, the trial court sentenced Kuykendall again to five years at

hard labor, consecutive to the two-year sentence for violation of a protective
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order, third offense. The trial court gave a long list of aggravating factors it

considered before imposing its sentence, many of which apply primarily to

Kuykendall’s violation of a protective order, including:

• Kuykendall’s actions manifested deliberate emotional
and mental cruelty toward the victim.

• Fox was particularly vulnerable and incapable of
resistance due to her age and female gender.

• Fox was in fear for her safety due to Kuykendall’s
repeated violations of the protective order.

• Kuykendall’s mental and emotional abuse of Fox could
have resulted in her death.

• Kuykendall made threats of physical harm toward Fox.

• Kuykendall’s conduct included threats made with the
intent to influence the outcome of criminal proceedings.

• Kuykendall’s repeated violations of the protective order
evidenced a pattern of blatant disregard for orders of the
court.

• Kuykendall’s repeated violations of the protective order
involved similar offenses.

• While no human life was foreseeably endangered by the
discharge of a firearm in the commission of the
underlying offense, a portion of the protective order case
involved a firearm Kuykendall may have had in his
possession.

• Fox in no way induced or facilitated Kuykendall’s
conduct toward her.

• Kuykendall could never financially compensate Fox for
the mental and emotional anguish she endured as a result
of his actions.

The trial court also noted aggravating factors it found applied

primarily to Kuykendall’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine:

• Though Kuykendall has no prior criminal history outside
of the underlying charges, the information elicited at trial
proved a history of substance abuse.

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• Kuykendall’s violations of Fox’s protective order were
not terroristic threats. However, when considered in light
of his use of methamphetamine, those violations posed an
undue threat to the victim.

• Kuykendall’s behavior toward Fox could have been
exacerbated by his use of methamphetamine and
increased the substantial risk of harm to Fox.

• Kuykendall failed to consider how his use of
methamphetamine would exacerbate his already
problematic disregard for the law.

• Kuykendall was unlikely to respond well to probationary
treatment as evidenced by his failure to take advantage of
any substance abuse treatment made available to him.

The trial court found Kuykendall’s blatant disregard for the lawful

orders of the court showed a need for correctional treatment and of a high

likelihood he would reoffend. Also of concern to the trial court was the

safety of the victim and those persons in her immediate vicinity. The trial

court determined Kuykendall presented a grave risk to public safety based

on his documented history of drug use, his repeated disregard for the lawful

orders of the court, and his failure to avail himself of any drug treatment.

The trial court cited the aggravating factors already discussed as support for

the imposition of consecutive sentences under La. C. Cr. P. art. 883.

Fox was present in the courtroom for Kuykendall’s resentencing. As

Kuykendall left the courtroom, the record indicates he attempted to

intimidate or scare Fox, so the trial court directed him to return and his

actions were addressed on the record. The trial court found Kuykendall’s

attempts to intimidate Fox proved his disregard for the court, and it

considered his actions as additional support for the maximum consecutive

sentences.

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Kuykendall filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court

denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Kuykendall argues the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court

for possession of methamphetamine is unconstitutionally excessive in light

of his personal circumstances, and he argues the trial court failed to

articulate sufficient justification for its imposition of consecutive sentences.

The State contends Kuykendall waived any claims related to the trial court’s

consideration of factors listed in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 because he claimed

only constitutional excessiveness in his motion for reconsideration of

sentence and is, therefore, limited on appeal to a bare claim of

excessiveness. The State further argues the maximum consecutive sentence

is appropriate under the circumstances and urges this court to affirm.

Consecutive Sentences

Kuykendall argues the record does not support the trial court’s finding

he presents a grave risk to the community, the victim, or her safety because

his violation of the protective order resulted in no physical harm to the

victim or the public that would warrant consecutive sentences. Kuykendall

points to his lack of criminal history, the lack of physical harm to the victim,

and the circumstances of the protective order violations in support. He also

asks this court to vacate the maximum sentence for possession of

methamphetamine and remand for imposition of a lesser, concurrent,

particularized sentence pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

In response, the State argues the multitude of factors considered by

the trial court when imposing the maximum sentence also supports its

imposition of consecutive sentences. The State cites the totality of the
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circumstances, points to the trial court’s finding Kuykendall presented a

grave risk to the victim and those persons in her vicinity, and its concern for

Kuykendall’s obvious disdain for the orders of the court and continued

pattern of behavior toward the victim, as valid reasons for ordering

consecutive sentences.

When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction,

or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment

shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or

all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. It is within the court’s

discretion to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. State v.

Dunams, 55,443 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 251, writ denied, 24-

00205 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 6325; State v. Robinson, 49,677 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 829, writ denied, 15-0924 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.

3d 1034; State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.

Concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of conduct are not

mandatory, and consecutive sentences under those circumstances are not

necessarily excessive. State v. Dunams, supra; State v. Hebert, 50,163 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 795.

When consecutive sentences are imposed, the court shall state the

factors considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms. Among the

factors to be considered are the defendant’s criminal history, the gravity or

dangerousness of the offense, the viciousness of the crimes, the harm done

to the victims, whether the defendant constitutes an unusual risk of danger to

the public, the potential for defendant’s rehabilitation, and whether the

defendant has received a benefit from a plea bargain. State v. Dunams,

supra; State v. Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711.
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These consecutive sentences are supported by the substantial list of

aggravating factors noted by the trial court, the conduct exhibited by

Kuykendall after his trial, his continued noncompliance with lawful orders,

and the trial court’s determination that Kuykendall presents a serious risk of

danger to the victim and the public. We find the trial court thoroughly

supported its imposition of consecutive sentences. This assignment of error

lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

Regarding the maximum sentence for possession of

methamphetamine, Kuykendall argues the trial court failed to consider

important elements of his personal history, including his homelessness,

physical and mental health, family ties, age, drug problem, the small amount

of methamphetamine in his possession at the time of his arrest, the lack of

distribution charges, and his difficulty with comprehension stemming from a

traumatic brain injury sustained in 1987. He contends all of these are

mitigating factors the trial court should have considered pursuant to La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1. Kuykendall believes the trial court improperly used the

facts surrounding his violation of the protective order as the basis for

imposing the maximum sentence for his possession offense. Kuykendall

argues the maximum sentence for any offense must be reserved for the worst

offenders, which he contends he cannot be as he possessed a relatively small

amount of methamphetamine.

The State responds the trial court comprehensively supported the

maximum sentence for possession of methamphetamine by detailing

Kuykendall’s history, which showed an undue risk he would commit another

crime, the devastating impact of methamphetamine on the community,
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Kuykendall’s refusal to participate in drug treatment previously made

available to him, the ongoing nature of his drug use revealed at his trial, and

his repeated refusal to abide by the orders of the court. The State submits

the trial court did not abuse its discretion or inflict needless or purposeless

pain upon Kuykendall, but imposed an appropriate term of imprisonment to

protect the victim and the public from a chronic drug user who is known to

regularly disregard lawful orders of the court.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.

Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). On review, an appellate court

does not determine whether another sentence may have been more

appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook, 95-

2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show the trial court complied with

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Sandifer, 54,990 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23),

361 So. 3d 1079, writ denied, 23-00653 (La. 10/31/23), 372 So. 3d 811,

citing State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The trial court need not

articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance outlined in Art.

894.1, but the record must reflect it adequately considered these guidelines

in particularizing the sentence to the defendant. Id. There is no requirement

that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v.

DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-

0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
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Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1, citing State v. Bonanno, 384 So.

2d 355 (La. 1980).

At the time of this offense, La. R.S. 40:967(C)(2) provided the

following sentencing range:

Any person who violates this Subsection with respect to * * *
an aggregate weight of two grams or more but less than twenty-
eight grams shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for
not less than one year nor more than five years and, in addition,
may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars.

The record shows the trial court thoroughly and methodically

complied with the requirements set out in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, providing

several serious aggravating factors to justify its five-year sentence. Further,

despite Kuykendall’s claims to the contrary, the trial court expressly

discussed various aspects of his personal history at his resentencing,

including his age, homelessness, lack of employment, lack of familial

support, and pattern of conduct, prior to imposing sentence.

Additionally, the trial court determined Kuykendall had a history of

substance abuse supported by evidence presented at trial, that this placed

Fox and those around her at an increased risk of harm, and it exacerbated his

own criminal conduct. We find it particularly important to note that this trial

court judge, Judge Waddell Garrett, presides over the drug court section for

Caddo Parish and has for several years; she has a firsthand perspective on

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the devastating effects of methamphetamine on the citizens of her parish in

particular and north Louisiana in general.

The trial court determined Kuykendall was unlikely to benefit from

probationary services based on his history, a finding supported by the record

in this case. Not only had he previously violated Fox’s protective order

twice, but then chose to violate it a third time while in possession of

methamphetamine. His choice to commit two felony crimes underscores the

trial court’s concerns about his escalating criminal conduct. Astonishingly,

he then attempted to intimidate Fox in the courtroom in the presence of the

trial court and courtroom personnel.

When considering the totality of the circumstances, we are unable to

say the trial court abused its vast discretion in sentencing Kuykendall to five

years at hard labor, consecutive to his sentence for violation of a protective

order, third offense. This sentence does not shock the sense of justice, and

this assigned error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, Jimmy F. Kuykendall, Jr.’s convictions and

sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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