State of Louisiana v. Teddrick Jawad Jones

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,042-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TEDDRICK JAWAD JONES Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2021 CR 1009

Honorable Frederick D. Jones, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Chad M. Ikerd

TEDDRICK JAWAD JONES Pro Se

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

C. DOUGLAS WALKER
BARBARA ANNE HOLLADAY COLDIRON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

A dispute arose over a pack of cigarettes at a house party in Monroe,

Louisiana and came to a tragic end when the unarmed man fleeing the

confrontation was chased down and fatally shot in the back. The assailant

hid away from police but was eventually located, arrested, tried, and

convicted at a bench trial of second-degree murder and of being a felon in

possession of a firearm. The assailant now appeals only the conviction for

second-degree murder and the corresponding mandatory life sentence

imposed, asserting he should only have been found guilty of manslaughter if

anything at all. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions and

sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A dispute which arose during a house party on February 26, 2021, on

South Eighth Street in Monroe, Louisiana resulted in the shooting death of

Reginald Copning (“Copning”), and the ultimate arrest of Teddrick Jones

(“Jones”), for second-degree murder and felon in possession of a weapon.

Copning was found lying face down, and a gun light, which attaches to a

pistol, was found on the ground under him. The gun light was taken into

evidence by the Monroe Police Department. As a result of the investigation

Jones was identified as a suspect and was subsequently located and arrested.

Jones declined a plea offer of manslaughter, waived his right to a jury trial,

and proceeded to a bench trial.

The bench trial began October 9, 2023, and included the testimony of

numerous witnesses and those involved in the investigation. The first

witness to testify was Jerry Bosley, who lives two houses down the street

from the house where the party was taking place the night of the shooting

and owns the property where Copning’s body was discovered. He testified

that he heard a noise that night, went outside to look around, and saw

Jones’s body on the ground on his property.

Next, one of the Monroe Police Department officers on the scene that

night, Charles Magee, testified. Officer Magee testified that he found a TLR-

1 flashlight underneath the victim. The TLR-1 flashlight is a light that is

made specifically for weapons and will fit any modern semi-automatic

firearm. Officer Magee testified that the TLR-1 flashlight costs between

$150 and $300, depending on the model, and it would not be reasonable to

use one without a weapon. The lights are small, have a narrow light beam,

and are expensive, and it is unlikely someone would carry one to use as a

flashlight without also having a weapon. There was no weapon found at the

scene. Officer Magee testified that he handled the gun light with gloves at

all times when he discovered it.

Detective Chris Turner with the Monroe Police Department was

accepted by the trial court as an expert in crime scene investigation,

evidence handling, and securing evidence. He testified that he collected the

gun light as evidence and swabbed it for DNA. He photographed Copning’s

clothes and testified that Copning was shot in the back at close range.

Officer Turner also stated that the gun light was swabbed for DNA

immediately on the scene.

Jerome White (“White”) attended the party that night. He testified

that he was friends with Copning for almost 15 years and also knew Jones

for about the same amount of time. He testified there were about 35 or 40

people at the party the night of the shooting. White had been speaking to

Jones earlier in the night and saw that he had a gun out on his lap. He left
2

the house and saw Jones and Copning arguing in the street. White testified

that Copning took off running when Jones got his gun out and that Jones ran

after Copning, that they disappeared from view, and then he heard a gunshot.

White did not see either man again after the gunshot. White testified that

Quantavious Thompson was also present at the party. On cross-

examination, White testified that he agreed to speak with the police about

the party after he was arrested on an unrelated incident. He stated that he

had not been promised anything by the State in exchange for his testimony.

He confirmed that following the shooting he rented a room at a local hotel in

his name for Jones to hide away in and that Jones’s mother paid for the

room. Jones was eventually located by the police when he was arrested.

Quantavious Thompson (“Thompson”) testified that he did attend the

party that evening, that he was Copning’s best friend, and he also knew

Jones. He witnessed Copning and Jones get into an argument about Jones’s

cigarettes, which he accused Copning of stealing from him. Thompson

looked down at his phone and then saw Copning running from Jones. He

saw them run behind someone else’s house and heard a gunshot. Thompson

drove in his car to see if he could find Copning but could not see him.

Thompson testified that he saw Jones with a gun on his hip when they first

arrived at the party. Thompson admitted that he did not tell the police what

he saw when they came to speak with him because he did not want the

person who killed Copning to come looking for him or his family.

Thompson identified Jones from a police lineup. He admitted that he gave

differing stories to the police but claimed that his testimony in court was the

truth.

3

Deputy Dee Hughes, with the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office, was

qualified as an expert in fingerprint analysis and fingerprinted Jones in the

courtroom to definitively state that he is the defendant. Next, Monroe Police

Department Detective Johnanthan Davis testified that he interviewed

witnesses at the scene the night of the shooting, but nobody would admit to

seeing anything. He could not identify any witnesses other than Thompson

and White. He testified that the police department was alerted to the

shooting that night by ShotSpotter, which is a system that registers gunshots

and notes the location of the shots, and he notified the police department of

the shooting in this case. Det. Hughes testified that Thompson’s story

stayed consistent other than finally identifying the shooter in his last

interview with police. He testified that the DNA samples from the gun light

could not rule out Jones and two other unidentified people. He never tested

Thompson or White against the unknown samples.

Monroe Police Department Detective Andrew Stadius testified that he

interviewed Thompson and White. Katie Traweek is a forensic DNA

analyst at North Louisiana Crime Lab in Shreveport, Louisiana and was

qualified by the trial court as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. She

described the process of analyzing a DNA sample. She testified that the

DNA taken from the gun light was contact DNA, meaning it normally comes

from someone holding or touching an item. She admitted that secondary

transfer is possible, meaning if one person touched another person’s hand

and then that person touched the gun light, it is possible both sets of DNA

would be present. Traweek testified that Jones’s DNA was found on the gun

light. Dr. Frank Peretti, a forensic pathologist, testified that Copning died of

a single gunshot wound in the mid-back.
4

Finally, Tenishia Jones, Jones’s aunt, testified that she was also

present at the house party. She testified that White left the party with

another man before the altercation happened. She asserted that Jones had

stopped smoking cigarettes and did not carry a gun. She testified that Jones,

Thompson, and Copning were playing and running in the street but were not

arguing. She admitted to not having come forward with information when

the police were first looking for witnesses.

After the conclusion of the trial on October 12, 2023, the trial court

found Jones guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Jones filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the

trial court. On February 12, 2024, the trial court, after noting that it

considered the presentence investigative report (PSI), sentenced Jones: (1)

for the crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon to ten years at

hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence

and a fine of $1,000 plus costs; and (2) for the crime of second degree

murder to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation or suspension of sentence, with the two sentences to run

concurrently. Jones now appeals only his conviction for second-degree

murder.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

First Assignment of Error: The State failed to prove that Teddrick
Jones was guilty of second-degree murder. The State did not prove the
identification of the shooter and only offered circumstantial evidence.

Second Assignment of Error: Alternatively, if the evidence was
sufficient to prove Teddrick Jones was the shooter, he should have been
found guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.

5

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Jones asserts that the evidence

introduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he was guilty of second-degree murder.

The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-

1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct.

1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Grimble, 51,446 (La. App. 2 Cir.

7/5/17), 224 So. 3d 498. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.

C.Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.

State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied,

09-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297. The appellate court does not assess

the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116

(La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference

to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or

in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, writ

denied, 09-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
6

evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient

for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton,

436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Hampton, 52,403 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/14/18), 261 So. 3d 993, writ denied, 19-0287 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So. 3d

1029. Circumstantial evidence is defined as evidence of facts or

circumstances from which one might infer or conclude the existence of other

connected facts. Hampton, supra. Direct evidence provides proof of the

existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard

something. Circumstantial evidence provides proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, 468 So. 2d 1154

(La. 1985); Hampton, supra.

When the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, such

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438. As an evidentiary rule, it restrains the fact finder, as well as the

reviewer on appeal, to accept as proven all that the evidence tends to prove

and then to convict only if every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is

excluded. Whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence presents a question of law. State v. Shapiro, 431

So. 2d 372 (La. 1982); State v. Hampton, supra.

Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists

when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the

prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S.
7

14:10(1). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances

surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Walker,

53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334

(La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

the State presented ample evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to convict

Jones of second-degree murder. The State presented evidence from

eyewitnesses that Jones and Copning were both at the party at the same time

and got into an argument about cigarettes. More than one witness saw

Copning running and being chased by Jones, who was seen carrying a gun

on his hip the night of the party. There was a short time period between

when Jones began chasing Copning toward the neighbor’s property that a

gunshot was heard in that location, which was also registered on

ShotSpotter, and Copning was found lying in the neighbor’s yard. The gun

light found underneath Copning’s body had Jones’s DNA on it. Jones fled

the area and hid in a hotel room until he was later apprehended by police.

Jones’s defense challenged the credibility of Thompson and White

and argued that Jones’s aunt was a more believable witness. However, as

noted above, this Court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. Based on the record before us, the State provided ample

evidence that excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence pursuant to

La. R.S. 15:438. This assignment of error is without merit.

In his second assignment of error, Jones argues in the alternative that

he should have been convicted of manslaughter, rather than second-degree

murder. The offense of manslaughter is defined as a homicide that would be

second-degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or
8

heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an

average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1);

State v. Thornton, 47,598 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/13/13), 111 So. 3d 1130.

Sudden passion and heat of blood are mitigatory factors in the nature of a

defense which exhibits a degree of culpability less than present when the

homicide is committed without them. State v. Lombard, 486 So. 2d 106 (La.

1986); State v. Thornton, supra. The defendant bears the burden to prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted in sudden passion or heat

of blood in order for manslaughter to be appropriate. State v. Thornton,

supra.

Provocation and the time for cooling are questions for the trier of fact

to determine according to the standard of the average or ordinary person. Id.

The appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact, upon

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could

have found that these mitigating factors had not been established by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id.

On review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, Jones failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

circumstances existed such that he was so provoked by sudden passion or

heat of blood that he was deprived of an average person’s self-control and

cool reflection. The only possible explanation given for the argument

between Jones and Copning was that Copning may have stolen a pack of

cigarettes from Jones. The average person would certainly not have

escalated the argument such that it resulted in chasing Copning from the

party to a neighbor’s yard and then shooting Copning, who was unarmed and

fleeing, at close range in the back. The evidence was sufficient to support a
9

conviction for second-degree murder. Jones failed to prove that he acted in

a sudden passion or heat of blood sufficient to reduce his culpability and

render the homicide a manslaughter. This second assignment of error is

likewise without merit. As a result, the trial court’s verdict was correct, and

the conviction is affirmed.

ERROR PATENT

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not comply

with the obligatory delay before sentencing Jones. La. C. Cr. P. art. 873

requires that “[i]f a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days

shall elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for new trial, or in

arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least

twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled.” Jones was sentenced on

the same date that his motion for a new trial was denied. Nevertheless, we

conclude that any error was harmless in this instance because Jones did not

object to the trial court’s failure to observe the sentencing delay and because

he suffered no prejudice as he faced a mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment. State v. Moossy, 40,566 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/10/06), 924 So.

2d 485.

Additionally, the trial court failed to advise Jones of his rights under

La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8. Jones is hereby advised that no application for

postconviction relief shall be considered if filed more than two years after

the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final. State v. Nelson,

46,915 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/29/12), 86 So. 3d 747.

10

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Teddrick Jones’ convictions and sentences

are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

11