State of Louisiana v. Christopher D. Rodgers

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,045-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CHRISTOPHER D. RODGERS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 386,031

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas L Harville

CHRISTOPHER D. RODGERS Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN
MARGARET R. GASKINS
KENDRA S. JOSEPH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.

COX, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,

Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Christopher D. Rodgers appeals his two

convictions and sentences for two counts of molestation of a juvenile under

the age of 13. The trial court sentenced Rodgers to two 99-year sentences to

be served consecutively. For the following reasons, we affirm his

convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On December 2, 2021, Rodgers was charged by a bill of information

for two counts of molestation of a juvenile, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2.

On April 21, 2023, an amended bill of information was filed charging

Rodgers with two counts of molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2(A) and (D)(1). The victims in this case are

B.R. (D.O.B. 2/8/2007) and K.A. (D.O.B. 5/22/2019).

Testimony began in Rodgers’ jury trial on October 5, 2023. Robin

Sanders testified that Rodgers is her stepbrother, and she has known him

since he was three years old. She stated that although their parents were no

longer married, she and Rodgers would talk occasionally. She testified that

she began babysitting Rodgers’ youngest child, K.A., in December of 2019

and would keep K.A. overnight for months at a time at Rodgers’ request.

She stated that she and Rodgers had an amicable relationship for the first

two years of K.A.’s life, and she would babysit and return K.A. whenever

Rodgers requested it. She testified that in July of 2021, she sought

temporary custody of K.A. after Rodgers was impaired around K.A. “one

too many times.”

Ms. Sanders testified that when K.A. was between 1 1/2 and 2 years

old, she noticed he would try to stick his finger in his bottom during diaper

changes, and he was “hyper focused” on his penis. She stated that it was not

like a usual diaper change where the baby tries to roll or kick, but it took two

people to prevent him from getting feces on his hands. She stated that he

would pull his penis out of his diaper; so, she began putting a onesie over his

pants to prevent him from fondling himself. She testified that she had two

children of her own and felt this behavior was not ordinary.

Ms. Sanders testified that when Rodgers brought K.A. to her to

babysit, he also brought his three other children, including B.R. She stated

that in August of 2021, B.R., who was 14 years old, told her that when K.A.

was about one and a half, she saw Rodgers sitting on the couch with K.A.,

watching porn, masturbating, and manipulating K.A. to an erection. Ms.

Sanders stated that on another occasion, B.R. told her that when she was

younger, her dad would “bounce her on his lap and grind her and that she

could feel him get to an erection,” and he would touch her breasts and

bottom inappropriately. Ms. Sanders testified that she reported what B.R.

told her and has had full custody of K.A. since October of 2021.

On cross-examination, Ms. Sanders stated that she took K.A. to the

pediatrician in August of 2021 to discuss her concerns with his behavior.

She stated that even if she found out that B.R. was lying and a pediatrician

said K.A.’s behavior was normal for a child born addicted to drugs, she

would still have concerns.

Junior Thornton testified that he is Amanda Thornton’s father and

B.R.’s grandfather (Amanda is B.R.’s mother). He stated that B.R. and her

sisters have lived with him since they were eight to ten years old, and he has
2

legal custody of them. When asked what prompted him to seek custody of

the children, Mr. Thornton stated:

Well, at that time back then, Chris Rodgers and my daughter,
they was drinking a lot and doing drugs, but then more or less
he would go out of town and more or less say that he was going
to check the kids out of school and take them out of town and
stuff like that. I didn’t want that.

Defense counsel objected to Mr. Thornton’s statement and motioned for a

mistrial based on the reference to other crimes. The trial court denied the

motion; it cautioned the State that it was a close call, and its witnesses

should be cautioned to respond only to the questions asked.

Mr. Thornton testified that Rodgers asked him if he would keep K.A.

and adopt him, but Mr. Thornton refused because of his (Mr. Thornton’s)

age. On cross-examination, Mr. Thornton stated that Amanda and Rodgers

would argue in front of B.R., and he believed that it caused B.R. to side with

Amanda.

Madison Crnkovic testified that she has known B.R. and her sisters

for about ten years, and they would play together as children. She recalled a

time when she was in ninth grade visiting B.R. and her sisters at Rodgers’

condo. She stated that she and the girls were watching TV upstairs, she

went downstairs to get a drink, and she saw Rodgers watching porn in the

living room. She testified that when she saw him watching it, she took the

girls and left the house.

On cross-examination, Ms. Crnkovic admitted that she told Rodgers

that she did not believe B.R.’s allegations. She testified that she did believe

B.R. and explained that she feared Rodgers, and he was manipulative.

B.R. testified that she was currently 16 years old and homeschooled.

She stated the following regarding the molestation by Rodgers:
3

Well, when I was younger, like, I would say, like, 10, six, seven
or eight, he would, like, put me in his lap and stuff and then
move me, like, on his private area and stuff. And then there
was times where, like, he would touch my butt and stuff. And,
like, when he would threaten me and stuff. There’s been a lot
of, like, moments.
…
I thought it was normal until I got older and realized.
…
I tried telling my mom, but she didn’t believe me at the time
because she wasn’t in her right mind.

B.R. testified that when Rodgers would act inappropriately with her

on his lap, she could feel him get an erection. She stated that the

inappropriate behavior ended when she was not around Rodgers anymore.

B.R. testified that K.A. is her half-brother. She stated that when she

was about 14 years old, her mom took her to Rodgers’ condo. She testified

that when she walked in the condo, she saw Rodgers watching porn and

touching K.A.’s “private spot.” She stated that she asked Rodgers what he

was doing, told her mom, and they took K.A. She stated that Rodgers said it

was not what it looked like. B.R. testified that when she felt comfortable,

she told Ms. Sanders about what happened to K.A. and herself.

The State introduced a screenshot of text messages from “Chris” to

B.R. B.R. testified that those were the messages sent to her by Rodgers and

read the messages to the jury. The text messages contained the following

statements:

[B.R.], don’t you f****** dare test me. I swear to God I’ll kill
you, if you’re my daughter or f****** not. All you do is cause
this family hell. You’re the reason why your mom don’t want
to be with me. You’re always causing drama with me and your
mom. I’m tired of you, and it’s time for you to get put out of
your misery. You’re a mistake. Nobody wants you, none of
your friends or family. I’m sick and tired of you, and if I don’t
do that, I’ll make sure you’re sent away so me and your mom
can be together.

4

On cross-examination, B.R. admitted that there were times when she

and Rodgers had a bad relationship, and she usually sided with her mother

when her mom and Rodgers would argue. She stated that she did not tell her

grandfather “[p]robably because [Rodgers] had everyone brainwashed and

no one would have probably believed me at the time.” Defense counsel

asked B.R. how the topic of her abuse came up when she disclosed to Ms.

Sanders. She stated that Ms. Sanders told her that Rodgers would make

comments about her that were sexual in nature. B.R. also stated that she felt

she could trust Ms. Sanders, and Ms. Sanders would do something about it

because she was not scared of anyone. She testified that she did not want to

stress Mr. Thornton and add more to his plate. B.R. stated that she was

clothed during each inappropriate incident.

Lacie Hadley, the Director of the Gingerbread House Children’s

Advocacy Center, was accepted as an expert in forensic interviewing and

delayed reporting. She testified generally about delayed reporting in child

abuse cases, particularly in cases where the abuser is a family member. Ms.

Hadley did not testify to the specifics of this case.

Laura Sanders testified on behalf of Rodgers. She stated that she was

Rodgers’ mother, would watch K.A. for Robin, and had a good relationship

with Robin. She testified that she received two “ugly” text messages in the

past, which turned out to be from B.R. pretending to be another person.

Jamie Abbott testified that she is a good friend of Amanda’s and has

known Rodgers since childhood. She testified that Rodgers stayed at her

apartment almost every night from April of 2020 through August of 2021 to

help her out after her car was stolen.

5

Rodgers testified that he is the father of B.R. through his relationship

with Amanda, and he is the father of K.A. through his relationship with

Mandy Angelo. He stated that he was notified when K.A. was born that he

was a possible father and could attend a child in need of care proceeding in

St. Bernard Parish. He testified that K.A. was born addicted to opiates, and

he was granted sole custody of K.A. in August of 2019, when K.A. was

three months old. Rodgers testified that when he got custody of K.A., he

tried to become a family again with Amanda and their three daughters,

including B.R. He stated that when B.R. was growing up, he worked out of

town all over the South and took B.R. on vacations to Six Flags or other

destinations where he was working. Pictures of the family on vacations and

doing family activities were admitted into evidence.

Rodgers denied fondling K.A. or touching him inappropriately;

bouncing B.R. on his lap and getting an erection or attempting to arouse

himself with B.R. on his lap; and touching B.R.’s breasts and bottom or

molesting her in any way.

Rodgers testified that he was not made aware of the allegations

against him until he went to court regarding the custody of K.A. in

September of 2021. He stated that he was living with Ms. Abbott during the

dates of the alleged abuse. He testified that during the alleged abuse, B.R.

would text him for food, pageant dresses, Apple products, earbuds, and

anything else she wanted. Rodgers stated that he would buy anything B.R.

requested and take it to her. He testified that B.R. visited him before,

during, and after the alleged dates of abuse.

Rodgers testified that he and Ms. Sanders had a decent relationship

prior to the custody dispute over K.A. He stated that he contemplated a
6

limited custody arrangement with Ms. Sanders to enable her to take K.A. to

the doctor and communicate with medical professionals regarding weaning

K.A. off phenobarbital. He stated that he did not recall the incident that Ms.

Crnkovic described and has never watched porn in the presence of the

children. He also denied sending B.R. the text messages that were read for

the jury.

The jury returned the verdicts of guilty as charged on both counts.

The jury was polled, and it was a unanimous verdict.

Rogers filed a pro se post verdict judgment of acquittal, motion for

new trial, and motion for arrest of judgment. Rodgers’ counsel also filed a

motion for new trial and motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal.

These were all denied at a hearing on January 18, 2024, where Rodgers

represented himself and his trial counsel became his stand-by counsel.

The sentencing hearing was held on January 19, 2024. Rodgers again

represented himself and trial counsel was stand-by counsel. The trial court

stated that there was an undue risk that during the period of a suspended

sentence or probation the defendant would commit another crime, the

defendant needed correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can

be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution, and a

lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.

The trial court found the following aggravating factors to be

applicable: 1) the offender’s conduct during the commission of the offense

manifested deliberate cruelty to the victims; 2) the offender knew or should

have known that the victims of the offense were particularly vulnerable and

incapable of resistance due to extreme youth; 3) the offender used his or her

position or status to facilitate the commission of the offense; 4) the offender
7

used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense; and 5)

the offense resulted in a significant permanent injury to the victim and

family. The trial court did not find any mitigating factors to apply. The trial

court sentenced Rodgers to two 99-year sentences at hard labor without

benefits, to be served consecutively. The trial court’s sentencing outline is

included in the record.

After the trial court rendered its sentence, Rodgers stated that he

wanted to make a statement before sentencing. The trial court allowed him

to make his statement. Stand-by counsel clarified Rodgers’ arguments for

reconsideration of sentence. The trial court denied the reconsideration.

Stand-by counsel then stated for clarification of the record, “He made a

Motion to Reconsider with the certificates, but that motion was denied as

well too, so he’s just objecting for the record. And then, finally, Your

Honor, he wants to make a motion for appeal to designate the entire record

including the transcripts, exhibits, voir dire, the whole record, and to appoint

the appellate project as his attorney.” The trial court responded, “So

ordered.”

DISCUSSION

Insufficient Evidence

In both the counseled brief and Rodgers’ pro se brief, Rodgers argues

there was insufficient evidence to convict him. He argues that B.R.’s

allegations were the sole source of all evidence against him. He states that

the State offered no medical expert, medical records, or any other type of

scientific evidence to establish that K.A.’s conduct was indicative of sexual

abuse. He highlights that B.R.’s statements were inconsistent—she reported

that she saw Rodgers masturbating while manipulating K.A.’s penis and
8

watching porn, but at trial she did not include that he was masturbating.

Rogers states, “This inconsistency is too great for any reasonable trier of fact

to ignore.” He asserts that the evidence introduced at the trial, when viewed

under the Jackson standard, was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the case in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d

797. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821,

does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own

appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. Steines, supra.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442; Steines, supra. A reviewing court affords great deference to a

factfinder’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole

or in part. Steines, supra. In the absence of internal contradiction or

irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, the testimony of one

witness—if believed by the trier of fact—is sufficient to support the requisite

factual conclusion. Such testimony alone is sufficient even where the State

does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence. This is equally

applicable to the testimony of sexual assault victims. Steines, supra.
9

At the time of the offenses, La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) provided:

Molestation of a juvenile is the commission by anyone over the
age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person
or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen,
where there is an age difference of greater than two years
between the two persons, with the intention of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desires of either person, by the use of
force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation,
threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue
of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. Lack of
knowledge of the juvenile’s age shall not be a defense.

We find there was sufficient evidence to convict Rodgers of both

offenses. B.R.’s testimony alone is sufficient evidence that Rodgers is guilty

of molestation of a juvenile.

As acknowledged by Rodgers and detailed above, B.R.’s statements to

Ms. Sanders were mostly consistent with B.R.’s testimony at trial, the

difference being the recounting of masturbation. The jury was able to hear

directly from Ms. Sanders and B.R. and determine whether they found them

to be credible. The jury was also able to weigh the testimony of Rodgers,

who denied ever inappropriately touching either child. In addition, Ms.

Abbott testified that Rodgers stayed at her home almost nightly during the

time of the incident with K.A. Rodgers also introduced photographs of B.R.

around the time of her reporting the abuse to prove that she was comfortable

around him, which he alleged would negate her credibility. The jury

weighed the evidence and by finding Rodgers guilty as charged on both

counts, found B.R. to be a credible witness. The fact that she did not

mention masturbation in her testimony was not enough for the jury to

question her credibility on the incidents.

10

As the jury’s decision was reasonably based on a credibility call,

Rodgers’ convictions are not disturbed on appeal. This assignment is

without merit.

Prior Bad Acts

In both the counseled brief and Rodgers’ pro se brief, Rodgers argues

that he did not have a fair trial because witnesses discussed his prior

incarceration and drug use. He asserts that the State was able to overcome

B.R.’s inconsistent and incredible testimony by improperly introducing this

testimony related to his prior drug use and prior time in jail. Rogers requests

that his convictions be reversed and the matter remanded.

The law regarding discretionary mistrials and admonitions is set forth

in La. C. Cr. P. art. 771, which provides, in pertinent part:

In the following cases, upon the request of the defendant or the
state, the court shall promptly admonish the jury to disregard a
remark or comment made during the trial, or in argument within
the hearing of the jury, when the remark is irrelevant or
immaterial and of such a nature that it might create prejudice
against the defendant, or the state, in the mind of the jury:
…

(2) When the remark or comment is made by a witness or
person other than the judge, district attorney, or a court official,
regardless of whether the remark or comment is within the
scope of Article 770.

In such cases, on motion of the defendant, the court may grant a
mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to
assure the defendant a fair trial.

The ordering of a mistrial is a drastic remedy and, except in instances

in which it is mandatory, is only warranted if substantial prejudice results

which deprives defendant of a fair trial. State v. Burdgess, 434 So. 2d 1062

(La. 1983); State v. Moore, 38,444 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/23/04), 877 So. 2d

1027, writ denied, 04-2316 (La. 2/4/05), 893 So. 2d 83. The trial court’s

11

rulings with regard to trial conduct should not be disturbed absent a manifest

abuse of discretion. Id. Trial error is harmless where the verdict rendered is

“surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Johnson, 94-1379 (La.

11/27/95), 664 So. 2d 94; State v. Bradley, 43,593 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/29/08), 997 So. 2d 694, writ denied, 08-2997 (La. 9/18/09), 17 So. 3d

384.

We find no error in the trial court’s denial of Rodgers’ motions for

mistrial. On cross-examination, Rodgers’ counsel repeatedly asked Ms.

Sanders if Rodgers was present for the July 2021 emergency custody hearing

of K.A. Counsel stated, “You indicated he was supposed to be, but isn’t it

true – and this is important for the jury – isn’t it true he was not present for

that hearing?” Counsel then asked if Rodgers was present for the October

21, 2021, hearing, and Ms. Sanders stated that he was not at that hearing

either.

Then, on redirect, the following exchange occurred between the State

and Ms. Sanders:

Q. Now, you testified that the defendant was not present on
that July 21st hearing --
A. That’s correct.
Q. -- do you know where he was?
A. Asleep.
…
Q. Okay. And then you testified he wasn’t present at the
October 21 hearing?
A. That’s right.
Q. Do you know where he was?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was he? Where was he?
A. He was in Caddo Correctional.

Defense counsel made an issue about Rodgers not being at the

custody hearings when custody was given to Ms. Sanders. He stated that it

was “important for the jury” to know that Rodgers was not present. The trial
12

court stated that it was clear that Counsel was trying to show that Ms.

Sanders obtained custody without Rodgers being present. Therefore,

Counsel opened the door for the State to clarify why Rodgers was not

present. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

this motion for mistrial.

The State questioned Mr. Thornton as to why he sought legal custody

of B.R. and her sisters. He responded, “Well, at that time back then,

[Rodgers] and my daughter, they was drinking a lot and doing drugs[.]” We

agree with the State that this statement does not indicate Rodgers was doing

illegal drugs—people are prescribed prescription drugs. The trial court’s

denial of a mistrial under these circumstances is not an abuse of discretion.

As discussed above, the testimony presented at trial was sufficient for

the jury to find Rodgers guilty. Therefore, the complained-of statements

made by Ms. Sanders and Mr. Thornton did not contribute to the verdict.

Additionally, Rodgers later testified to his previous convictions, including

drug-related convictions. This assignment of error is without merit.

Excessive Sentence

Rodgers argues that the maximum, consecutive sentences of 99 years

of imprisonment on each count is excessive. He states that while his crimes

of conviction are serious, the record fails to show that he is the worst of the

worst. He highlights that the district court sentenced him without ordering a

presentence investigation report (“PSI”). He requests that his sentences be

reversed.

The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled; claims are

reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the

guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is
13

constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id. The goal of Art. 894.1 is

to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence, not to achieve rigid

or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d

475 (La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d

1081. There is no requirement that any specific factor be given any

particular weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La. 12/3/03), 861

So. 2d 144; State v. Grant, 55,592 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 384 So. 3d

1159.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Efferson,

52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052

(La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131. To constitute an excessive sentence, a

reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence

makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is

nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. Id.; State

v. Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262. The trial court has wide

discretion in the imposition of sentences within the statutory limits and such

sentences should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest

abuse of that discretion. Id.; State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum

sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State
14

v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665. On review, an appellate

court does not determine whether another sentence may have been more

appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.; Grant,

supra; State v. McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d

1156, writ denied, 23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So. 3d 149.

A PSI report is an aid to help the court, not a right of the defendant,

and the court is not required to order a PSI. La. C. Cr. P. art. 875; State v.

Braden, 55,275 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 372 So. 3d 900, writ denied, 23-

01428 (La. 4/9/24), 382 So. 3d 830. La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile when
the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall be imprisoned
at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years nor more than
ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years of the sentence
imposed shall be served without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence.

The trial court has broad discretion in the imposition of sentences.

Although the trial court did not order a PSI, it is not required to do so.

During the trial, the trial court heard testimony regarding Rodgers’ history.

Rodgers testified to his criminal record and work history.

At sentencing, the trial court weighed the evidence and sentencing

factors. The trial court stated, “[A] lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of the defendant’s crimes. The defendant’s conduct

manifested… extreme cruelty to the young victims.” The victims were

under 13 years of age at the time of the offenses, and as their father, Rodgers

exercised control over them. The trial court properly considered the

aggravating factors and outlined the five factors it found to have applied, as

detailed above. The trial court also considered the mitigating factors and

15

found that none applied. Although a maximum sentence, it falls within the

sentencing range.

This is a case of a father convicted for molesting two of his natural

children. In addition to the evidence for the crimes, the trial court heard

testimony from Rodgers regarding his prior convictions. As a reviewing

court, we do not determine whether another sentence would have been more

appropriate. Although we may not have given these sentences, the trial

court’s reasons for sentencing are sufficient to uphold the sentence. We do

not find that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Rodgers to the

maximum sentences.

Where convictions stem from separate incidents involving different

victims and occurring over a lengthy period of time, the resulting

consecutive penalties will not be found to be an abuse of discretion. State v.

Bailey, 50,097 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 180 So. 3d 442. Rodgers was

convicted of molesting his two children during two different periods of time.

Therefore, his consecutive sentences are not an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion. We find Rodgers’ assignment of error as to the excessiveness of

his sentences to be without merit and affirm both of his sentences.

Admissibility of Evidence

Rodgers argues pro se that the trial court abused its discretion by

ruling cell phone evidence to be admissible without requiring the State to

authenticate the text messages. He asserts that the text messages were not

properly authenticated under La. C.E. arts. 104 and 901.

Authentication or identification of evidence is required for that

evidence to be admissible at trial. La. C.E. art. 901. Authentication is a

condition precedent to admissibility that is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
16

support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

State v. Lee, 01-2082 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/21/02), 826 So. 2d 616, writ denied,

02-2549 (La. 9/5/03), 852 So. 2d 1019. Generally, the standard applied by

state and federal courts with respect to the authentication of a document is

whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find

that the proposed evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. State v.

Harris, 52,541 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 953, writ denied, 19-

00611 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So. 3d 380.

Louisiana courts have allowed text messages to be authenticated by

the recipient of the texts. See Harris, supra; State v. Haydin, 17-234 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/20/17), 235 So. 3d 1293, writ denied, 18-0114 (La. 10/29/18),

254 So. 3d 701.

B.R. testified that the message came from Rodgers, and she responded

to the message. She confirmed that it had not been changed in any way. At

trial, defense counsel conceded that if the trial court admitted the text

message, the weight and credibility of the text message would be determined

by the jury. On cross-examination, B.R. stated that the screenshot showed

the contact she had saved for Rodgers, and she was not questioned further on

the issue. Although Rodgers denied sending the text message to B.R., the

jury could reasonably find that he sent the text message based on B.R.’s

testimony. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Motion for New Trial

Rodgers argues pro se that he was entitled to a new trial based on

newly discovered evidence regarding victim and witness credibility. He

asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new

trial. Rodgers states that he attached an affidavit, testimony, and this Court’s
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opinion from his custody case with Ms. Sanders. In his motion for new trial,

he does not reference these documents, only that there was new and material

evidence not discovered before or during trial.

A ruling on a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of

the trial judge. State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So. 2d 923. In

ruling on the motion, the trial judge’s duty is not to weigh the new evidence

as though he were a jury determining guilt or innocence; rather his duty is

the narrow one of ascertaining whether there is new material fit for a new

jury’s judgment. State v. Tubbs, 52,417 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 285 So.

3d 536, writ denied, 20-00307 (La. 7/31/20), 300 So. 3d 404, on recons., 20-

00307 (La. 9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 30, and writ denied, 20-00307 (La. 9/8/20),

301 So. 3d 30.

The denial of a motion for new trial is not subject to appellate review

except for error of law. La. C. Cr. P. art. 858. The decision on a motion for

new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Horne,

28,327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So. 2d 953, writ denied, 96-2345 (La.

2/21/97), 688 So. 2d 521. The appellate court will not disturb this ruling on

appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. Id.

The appeal of Rodgers’ custody case with Ms. Sanders was rendered

on December 14, 2022, and Rodgers’ criminal trial began on October 5,

2023. Any information from the custody dispute was discoverable prior to

trial. The custody dispute was discussed at trial, and the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s writ denial in that case was submitted into evidence. We find no

error in the trial court’s judgment denying the motion for new trial. This

assignment of error lacks merit.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Christopher D. Rodgers’ convictions and

sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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