Succession of John Garner Lynch

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,052-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

SUCCESSION OF
JOHN GARNER LYNCH

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 632,448

Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge

*****
MIRAMON LAW, INC. Counsel for Appellants,
By: Patricia N. Miramon Susan Carol Lynch Hunt,
Julia Miramon Todd Martha Elizabeth Lynch
Connor J. Hargrave Riley, Nathan Hammett,
and Katie Elizabeth
Smith

CHARLES TAUNTON MELVILLE Counsel for Appellee,
Succession of John Garner
Lynch

AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, Counsel for Appellee,
BENSON & PAINE, LLC Rudy Allen Nolin
By: Lee H. Ayres
Alexandra E. Vozzella

THOMAS, SOILEAU, JACKSON Counsel for Appellee,
& COLE, LLP Martha Crosslin
By: Erica M. Ducoing

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J., dissents with written reasons.

PITMAN, C. J.

Intervenors-Appellants Susan Carol Lynch Hunt, Martha Elizabeth

Lynch Riley, Nathan Hammett and Katie Elizabeth Smith appeal the trial

court’s judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Rudy Allen Nolin and

Martha Crosslin. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On September 2, 2021, Nolin filed a petition to probate the last will

and testament (the “will”) of John Garner Lynch (“Decedent”), who passed

away on August 31, 2021. He requested to be appointed independent

executor. The will was in notarial form, dated March 19, 2018. In the will,

Decedent gave his entire estate to his wife Katherine Lynch (his “Wife”) and

made no provision for his children. He nominated his Wife to be

independent executrix of the will and nominated Nolin and then Crosslin as

successor executors. In the affidavit of death, domicile and heirship, Nolin

stated that Decedent was married four times, most recently to his Wife, who

predeceased him and with whom he had no children. He had six children—

Hunt and Riley, who survived him, and four who predeceased him—and two

grandchildren. On September 6, 2021, the trial court admitted the will to

probate and confirmed Nolin as independent executor.

On October 5, 2021, Intervenors1 filed a petition for intervention and

rule for accounting/discharge, naming Nolin as a defendant. They stated that

in the will, Decedent gave his entire estate to his Wife, who predeceased him

by one week, and made no alternative provisions for inheritance. Therefore,

1
Only Hunt and Riley filed the petition to intervene. Nolin filed an exception of
nonjoinder of required parties, stating that Decedent’s grandchildren—Hammett and
Smith—are required parties. Hammett and Smith joined Hunt and Riley on subsequent
filings.

they contended that they are entitled to inherit his entire estate and requested

to be recognized as owners and sent into possession of all Decedent’s

property and assets. They stated that they had been informed that a trust

may have been prepared for Decedent. They contended that if a trust were

prepared but not executed, it would not be deemed valid, and if a trust were

executed but no transfer of assets had been made to it, it should be deemed

invalid. They requested that Nolin provide a full accounting and list of all

the property and assets of the estate that are in his possession or under his

control. They further asked that Nolin be discharged as administrator and

that they be designated as the substitute administrators.

On November 12, 2021, Nolin filed peremptory exceptions of no right

of action and no cause of action. He first provided information about the

trust referenced by Intervenors. He stated that on March 19, 2018, Decedent

executed a durable power of attorney (the “POA”) and appointed his Wife as

agent, Nolin as successor agent and Crosslin as an additional successor

agent. He noted that the POA authorized the agent to form trusts and

transfer Decedent’s property. He stated that after Decedent’s Wife passed

away, he told his attorney that he did not want to leave any of his property to

his children. Nolin explained that because no one could visit Decedent in

the hospital, he could not execute a new will, so the POA was used to

transfer all his property to a revocable trust. Nolin declined to serve as agent

on August 27, 2021, and Crosslin accepted the appointment on this date and

created the John Garner Lynch Trust (the “Trust”). Nolin explained that

Decedent was named the beneficiary of the Trust for the remainder of his

life and that at his death, the Trust would be for the primary benefit of Nolin

and the secondary benefit of other named friends. Nolin was named the
2

trustee; and on August 27, 2021, Crosslin as agent transferred Decedent’s

property to Nolin as trustee by an Act of Assignment and Warranty Deed.

Nolin accepted the transfers between 10:00 and 10:15 a.m. on August 31,

2021, and Decedent passed away at 2:12 p.m. that day. He stated that there

were clerical errors in the Warranty Deed, including incorrectly naming the

trust as the “John Garner Trust,” but that these errors were corrected by a

Notarial Act of Correction and did not affect its validity.

Nolin then addressed his exceptions. He stated that Intervenors have

no right of action to demand an accounting because all Decedent’s assets

were transferred to the Trust and are not part of the estate’s assets. He

contended that the heirs of the estate have no ownership interest in this

property and no right to demand an accounting. He also argued that

Intervenors have no cause of action to remove him as independent executor.

On August 12, 2022, Intervenors filed a petition to annul and an

amended petition to remove executor and for accounting and named Nolin

and Crosslin as defendants. They argued that Decedent was not capable of

directing the actions of Nolin and Crosslin regarding the POA and the Trust.

They contended that the actions of Nolin and Crosslin were not authorized

by the POA, which could not be used to allow them to self-deal and

ultimately transfer all Decedent’s assets to Nolin. They argued that as

executor, Nolin acted in his own interest and not in the interest of the heirs

to the estate. They requested that Nolin be removed as executor and that

Hunt be appointed independent executor, or in the alternative, that the court

appoint an independent third-party executor. They stated that they had

suffered damages due to the actions of Nolin and Crosslin, including

financial losses in former estate assets, deprivation of their right to estate
3

assets and income generated from those assets, as well as legal and

professional fees and costs.

On April 4, 2023, Intervenors filed a petition for declaratory

judgment. They stated that Decedent had bank accounts that formed an IRA

(the “IRA”) that had no beneficiary and were not transferred to the Trust.

They contended that the IRA fell intestate, so they should be recognized as

owners.

On April 14, 2023, Nolin filed exceptions and an answer to

Intervenors’ petition. He stated that Intervenors failed to state a cause of

action for his removal as executor and that they have no right of action to

demand an accounting of the administration of the Trust. He denied

Intervenors’ allegations and requested judgment in his favor, dismissing

their claims with prejudice.

On April 17, 2023, Crosslin filed exceptions and an answer to

Intervenors’ petition. She stated that Intervenors failed to state a cause of

action, or alternatively, have no right of action, to demand an accounting

from her. She also argued that Intervenors have no right of action to nullify

the creation of the Trust, any donation to the Trust or any action taken by her

related to the Trust. She contended that Intervenors’ claim that she took

unauthorized action is too vague to allow her to properly answer. She

denied Intervenors’ allegations and requested judgment in her favor,

dismissing their claims with prejudice.

On May 15, 2023, a hearing was held on Nolin and Crosslin’s

exceptions and Intervenors’ petition to remove executor and for accounting.

On June 15, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment. It granted Nolin’s

exception of no right of action related to Intervenors’ request for an
4

accounting of the Trust and dismissed their claim with prejudice. It denied

Nolin’s exception of no cause of action related to Intervenors’ request for his

removal as executor. It granted Interventors’ request to remove Nolin as

independent executor, denied their request to appoint Hunt as executrix and

named a third-party executor. It ordered Nolin to file an accounting of any

actions he took pursuant to his authority as executor and any transactions

passing through the estate account within 45 days. It granted Crosslin’s

exception of no cause of action related to Intervenors’ request for an

accounting of actions taken by her as agent and dismissed Intervenors’ claim

without prejudice. It denied Crosslin’s exception of no right of action

related to Intervenors’ request to nullify the Trust and referred it to the

merits. It granted Crosslin’s exception of vagueness and granted Intervenors

30 days to amend their petition.

Intervenors amended their petition against Crosslin. They alleged that

she engaged in numerous acts that exceeded her appointment as agent,

including that she used the POA to create the Trust, which was not used for

the benefit of Decedent’s descendants and when Decedent was not

interdicted; that she attempted to transfer Decedent’s property to the Trust,

when the Trust is not for the benefit of Decedent’s descendants; and that she

attempted to donate Decedent’s entire estate to the Trust, in violation of La.

C.C. art. 1498.

On June 29, 2023, Crosslin filed an answer and requested judgment in

her favor and that the Intervenors’ claims be dismissed with prejudice.

A bench trial was held on October 12, 2023. Creighton Hodges, CPA,

testified that John Williams, Decedent’s attorney, contacted him after

Decedent’s death to prepare Decedent’s tax returns for 2018, 2019, 2020 and
5

2021. He determined that the total amount of federal taxes and penalties due

for the years 2018 to 2021 was $122,789, and the total amount for the state

was $28,601.

Crosslin testified that she had been friends with Decedent since the

1980s. She was a nurse at the hospital where Decedent received his final

medical care and saw him three times while he was hospitalized. She noted

that on August 27, 2021, Decedent was in “very bad shape” in the ICU on

high-flow oxygen but that he was not on a ventilator. On that day, she

signed the acceptance of the appointment to act under the POA. She noted

that she never told Decedent that she signed the acceptance and that they did

not discuss creating the Trust. She believed she had the ability to create the

Trust using the POA. She recalled signing the Act of Assignment to transfer

his assets to the Trust and the Warranty Deed to transfer his land to the

Trust. She opined that Decedent was unable to execute the documents

himself due to COVID-19 regulations and not being able to have visitors in

the hospital. She remembered Decedent telling her that if something

happened to him and his Wife, he wanted Nolin to take care of business for

him. She noted that Decedent did not want his belongings to go to his

children and that his will reflected this.

On cross-examination, Crosslin identified Decedent’s 2014 will in

which his previous wife (Marlene, who predeceased him) was named the

sole legatee and he made no provisions for his children. Crosslin also

identified his 2018 will in which she and Nolin were named as alternate

independent executors after his Wife. She explained that Decedent did not

want to leave anything to his children and that he trusted her and Nolin to do

what he wanted. She noted that his relationship with his children worsened
6

over the years, and he wanted his Wife to receive everything. Crosslin

testified that when Decedent and his Wife were both hospitalized with

COVID-19, she spoke with Decedent, who had full mental capacity, and

recommended that he contact Williams to “get everything straightened out.”

She explained that Williams recommended creating the Trust to protect

Decedent as his health deteriorated.

Nolin testified that he and Decedent were best friends for 50 years.

He noted that he was named executor of Decedent’s 2018 will, in which the

only beneficiary was his Wife. He stated that Decedent asked him to take

care of his assets, so he spoke to Decedent’s attorney, which led to the

creation of the Trust. He did not discuss the creation of the Trust with

Decedent because Decedent was hospitalized and could not receive visitors.

He stated that as trustee he signed documents accepting Decedent’s property

to the Trust.

On cross-examination, Nolin stated that Decedent made him an

alternate executor because he trusted him. He recalled that Decedent did not

trust his children and did not want to leave them anything. He testified that

Decedent was hospitalized with COVID-19 in August 2021, that they

regularly spoke on the telephone during this time and that nothing made him

question Decedent’s mental capacity. He spoke to Decedent and Williams

on the telephone on August 26, 2021, and Decedent stated that he did not

want his daughters to receive anything and noted several friends who he

wanted to receive money and specific items, including guns and equipment.

Nolin testified that he signed the Trust agreement, Act of Assignment and

Warranty Deed on August 31, 2021, before Decedent passed away.

7

Williams, Decedent’s attorney, testified that the only legatee in the

will was his Wife, who predeceased him, and that it named no alternate

legatees. He recalled that Decedent did not believe he would outlive his

Wife. He confirmed that the POA first named his Wife, then Nolin as

alternate and then Crosslin as second alternate. Williams testified about a

telephone conversation between him, Nolin and Decedent while Decedent

was hospitalized. They discussed Decedent’s wishes for his estate, as his

Wife had passed away, and he did not want his children to receive anything

and wanted everything to go to Nolin, with instructions for Nolin to provide

financially for several friends and to give guns to another friend. Williams

stated that based on this discussion, he designed a plan to use the POA to

create the Trust. He noted that Decedent never stated that he wanted a Trust

and was likely unaware that one had been created. He stated that Nolin

resigned as agent and Crosslin accepted the agency and signed for the

creation of the Trust.

On cross-examination, Williams stated that he first met Decedent in

2014 and had multiple conversations with him over the years about his

wishes for his estate. When he prepared Decedent’s 2014 will, Decedent

told him that he did not want his children or grandchildren to receive

anything, and the same was true when he prepared Decedent’s 2018 will.

He testified that the POA authorized the agent, i.e., Crosslin, to create the

Trust and to transfer Decedent’s property. He stated that Crosslin is not a

beneficiary of the Trust and has not engaged in any self-dealing. He also

stated that nothing prohibits Nolin from serving as trustee and being named

as a secondary beneficiary and that he does not believe Nolin has engaged in

any self-dealing. Williams stated that Decedent’s IRA was not transferred to
8

the Trust and recalled that there is approximately $450,000 in the IRA,

which is sufficient to pay Decedent’s taxes. He stated that he did not believe

Decedent’s Texas property was transferred to the Trust.

Riley, Decedent’s daughter, testified that she thought she had a good

relationship with her father. She stated that before she moved to Kentucky

in 2017, she helped take care of him. After her move, they talked on the

telephone once or twice a month. She stated that she spoke to Decedent

when he was in the hospital and that she also spoke to Nolin. She testified

that Decedent “always” asked her what she wanted in the event of his death,

and she responded that she did not want anything. She was aware that

Decedent planned to leave everything to his Wife, and she told her father

that she would not do anything to disrupt this from happening. She stated

that Decedent never mentioned what would happen if his Wife predeceased

him because he was sure she would outlive him. She testified that she did

not know anything about the creation of the Trust and that when she asked

Nolin about the will, he said there was no will. She also asked Nolin if she

could go to her father’s house, and he said no.

Hammett, Decedent’s grandson, testified that his parents never

married, so he did not meet his grandfather until he was older and seeking

out his father. He stated that he saw his grandfather three times before his

death and that they had nice visits. He recalled that during the first visit,

Decedent told him that if he was looking for money, he was not going to

receive any. Hammett responded that he was not there for money but to

meet his father’s family. On cross-examination, he agreed that the last time

he saw Decedent was in 2018 or 2019.

9

On December 1, 2023, the trial court filed a judgment. It noted that

Decedent’s desires are clear and he had no intention of leaving any of his

property to his heirs. It stated that due to Decedent’s Wife’s death and his

own final illness, he was unable to execute a testament reflecting his wishes,

so he equipped his friends, Nolin and Crosslin, with legal means to achieve

his desires regarding his possessions. It reviewed the POA and determined

that Decedent trusted his Wife, Nolin and Crosslin with the broadest

possible authority over his affairs and executed a valid POA conferring such

authority. It also determined that the Trust was validly created. It stated that

the parties agreed that Decedent’s property in Texas and his IRA were not

properly transferred to the Trust, so they will ultimately be distributed to the

heirs under the law of intestacy. The court noted that these assets are more

than sufficient to cover any debts of the succession. It determined that all

other property, both movable and immovable, was validly transferred to the

Trust. Regarding the error in the name of the Trust in the Warranty Deed,

the court found that the Notarial Act of Correction was appropriate but

unnecessary and that the public records doctrine cannot be extended to

thwart Decedent’s wishes. Accordingly, the trial court decreed that the Trust

was validly created and that the Act of Assignment and Warranty Deed

transferred Decedent’s assets to the Trust, not including his IRA or property

in Texas. It denied Intervenors’ petition to annul and dismissed it with

prejudice.

On December 21, 2023, the trial court designated the December 1,

2023 judgment to be a final judgment.

Intervenors appeal.

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DISCUSSION

Power of Attorney and Creation of the Trust

Intervenors argue that the trial court erred when it found that Nolin

and Crosslin could use the POA to create the Trust. They contend that the

POA allows for the creation of a trust for the benefit of Decedent’s children,

their descendants and their spouses or if Decedent were interdicted, but that

neither circumstance was present. They argue that Nolin’s purpose was to

manage and protect the assets, not to become the ultimate beneficiary.

Nolin and Crosslin argue that the trial court correctly determined that

the Trust was validly created. They explain that the POA expressly and

clearly authorizes Crosslin as agent to create the Trust and transfer assets to

it. They contend that the evidence and testimony presented at trial clearly

show that the creation of the Trust and subsequent transfer of assets to it

were done for the purpose of accomplishing Decedent’s expressed wishes.

They note that in every circumstance Decedent could have included

provisions for Intervenors to inherit, he specifically chose not to do so.

“Power of attorney” is a common law term whose equivalent civilian

term is “procuration.” La. C.C. art. 2986, Revision Comments (a);

Succession of Conville v. Bank One, Louisiana, N.A., 40,506 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So. 2d 397. A procuration is a unilateral juridical act by

which a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the

representative, to represent the principal in legal relations. La. C.C.

art. 2987. A procuration is subject to the rules governing mandate to the

extent that the application of those rules is compatible with the nature of the

procuration. La. C.C. art. 2988.

11

Under the rules of mandate, the principal may confer on the

representative general authority to do whatever is appropriate under the

circumstances. La. C.C. art. 2994. The authority to alienate, acquire,

encumber or lease a thing must be given expressly. La. C.C. art. 2996. La.

C.C. art. 2997 sets forth additional instances when the principal must give

express authority to the representative. Self-dealing also requires express

authorization by the principal. La. C.C. art. 2998; Matter of Succession of

Frazier, 54,751 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 634.

As a procuration or power of attorney is a contract, we interpret its

provisions pursuant to the rules of contract interpretation. When a contract

can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to

extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a

matter of law. Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-0054 (La. 5/22/07),

956 So. 2d 583. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead

to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search

of the parties’ intent. La. C.C. art. 2046. Powers of attorney are construed

strictly and no special authority is implied by the general terms of a

procuration except ordinary powers of administration. Matter of Succession

of Frazier, supra.

We note that at first glance, the facts of this case might appear

suspicious—that a POA was used to create the Trust and transfer assets to it

hours before Decedent passed away while hospitalized in isolation with

COVID-19, resulting in his heirs not receiving the bulk of his estate and,

instead, his best friend being designated as the trustee and primary

beneficiary of the Trust following his death. However, the testimony and

evidence presented at trial remove this suspicion and reveal that the actions
12

taken by Williams, Nolin and Crosslin in the days leading up to Decedent’s

death were authorized by a valid POA and were for the purpose of fulfilling

Decedent’s wishes for his property.

In the POA, Decedent, as the principal, granted his representative the

following authority, as is relevant to this appeal:

[T]o do any and every act and to exercise any and every
power that Appearer could do or exercise if present and acting
for himself and in his own right, including not only all matters
of administration, but also all acts of ownership and the doing
of whatever may appear to Agent to be conducive to the
interest of Appearer.
Without in any manner limiting or restricting any of the
foregoing, Appearer hereby grants unto Agent, for Appearer
and in Appearer’s name, place and stead, full power and
authority:
***
2. To do the following things and perform the following acts
with respect to Appearer’s interest or a part thereof, or an
undivided interest therein, in all kinds of things or property,
whether movable or immovable, personal or real, corporeal or
incorporeal, tangible or intangible, wheresoever situated, and
whether now owned or hereafter acquired:
***
f. To exchange, sell, convey, assign or otherwise
dispose of the same in any manner, including but
without being limited to making dations en
paiement and gratuitous, onerous or remunerative
donations of the same;
***
14. To form or cause to be formed, or join with any other
person or persons in forming or causing to be formed, one or
more partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations,
trusts, and other business entities, in any manner, on any terms
and conditions, and for any capitalization, duration or purpose
authorized by the laws applicable thereto; to execute, as one of
the partners, members, incorporators, trustees, or settlers,
proper organizational documents, including without limitation,
articles of incorporation, articles of partnership, articles of
organization, and to execute any and all other papers which
Agent may deem necessary or desirable to effect such
formation or in connection with such formation; and to
exchange cash or property of any amount or value belonging to
Appearer for any form of general or limited interest, or class or
amount of stock or other evidence of ownership or membership
in such entity, or for any bonds, notes or other evidences of
indebtedness of such entity;
13

***
17. To make gifts, grants, or other transfers without
consideration, either outright, in trust or otherwise to or for the
benefit of Appearer’s children and their descendants, the
spouses of all of Appearer’s descendants, and such other
persons as Agent may determine to be in Appearer’s best
interest or in the best interest of Appearer’s estate, including but
not limited to gifts that will be eligible for the annual gift tax
exclusion in Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRO) as it now appears or may be hereafter amended, and gifts
of tuition costs and medical costs in accordance with IRC
Sections 2503(e) and 2611(b)(1), as they now appear or may be
hereafter amended, as well as taxable gifts that may use up
Appearer’s unified credit during lifetime as the same is defined
in IRC Section 2010 as it now appears or may be hereafter
amended, as well as gifts to charities and the making or
fulfillment of charitable pledges, and to elect split-gift giving
in accordance with IRC Section 2513 as it now appears or may
be hereafter amended; provided, however, that Agent shall have
no power or authority to make a gift to herself, her estate, or her
creditors or a gift which directly or indirectly relieves her of a
support obligation.
***
21. To sell, transfer and convey all of Appearer’s interest in and
to any immovable property for such consideration and on such
terms and conditions as Agent shall deem proper in her
unrestricted discretion; said Agent shall also have full authority
and power to execute on Appearer’s behalf such contracts to
sell, settlement statements, affidavits, declarations and other
contracts and documents as in Agent’s judgment are proper so
as to effectively and completely convey title to immovable
property.

As is clearly evident in these sections of the POA, Decedent gave his

representative express authority to form a trust and to transfer his assets. A

reading of the full text of Section 17 confirms that Intervenors incorrectly

contend that a trust created and transfers made by the POA must be for the

benefit of Decedent’s children, their descendants and their spouses. As

Nolin and Crosslin correctly argue, Sections 14 and 17 provide that the agent

may form a trust and transfer assets for the benefit of such persons as the

agent determines to be in Decedent’s best interest or in the best interest of

his estate. The actions taken by Crosslin as agent to create the Trust and

14

transfer property to it were for Decedent’s best interest and the best interest

of his estate and fulfilled his express wishes.

In the POA, Decedent named his Wife as his agent and then named

Nolin and then Crosslin as alternate agents. Notably, he did not name any of

his children or grandchildren as alternate agents. As Nolin and Crosslin

testified, Decedent named them as alternate agents because he trusted them

to carry out his wishes, which included that he did not want his children to

receive any of his belongings. This is consistent with Decedent’s 2014 and

2018 wills in which he named his then-wives as the sole legatee; named his

then-wives as executrix and Nolin and Crosslin as alternate executors; and

made no provisions for his children. Williams testified that in their

discussions about Decedent’s wishes for his estate when preparing these

wills, Decedent stated that he did not want his children or grandchildren to

receive anything. Nolin and Crosslin provided consistent testimony

regarding Decedent’s trust in them as alternate executors and their

understanding that he did not want to leave anything to his children. Riley

also testified that she was aware of Decedent’s wish to leave everything to

his Wife, and Hammett testified that Decedent told him that he would not

receive any money.

With his understanding of Decedent’s testamentary requests and POA,

Williams directed a plan to effectuate Decedent’s wishes through the

creation of the Trust and transfer of assets to it. The creation of the Trust

and, as discussed below, the transfer of assets to it fulfills Decedent’s desire

to prevent his children from inheriting, save for the IRA and Texas property

that were not transferred to the Trust.

15

Although Intervenors question Nolin and Crosslin’s actions regarding

the POA’s prohibition on self-dealing, Williams, Nolin and Crosslin ensured

that self-dealing would not occur. Nolin declined to serve as an agent for

Decedent on August 27, 2021; and, after this declination, Crosslin accepted

the appointment. Crosslin then created the Trust and transferred Decedent’s

property to it. At trial, Williams explained that Crosslin has not engaged in

any self-dealing because she is not a beneficiary of the Trust. He also noted

that Nolin has not engaged in any self-dealing as a trustee or secondary

beneficiary of the Trust. At the time of the creation of the Trust and the

transfer of assets to it, Decedent was the primary beneficiary of the Trust as

he was still living.

Therefore, the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in determining

that Decedent executed a valid POA and that Crosslin was authorized by this

POA to create the Trust and transfer assets to it in order to fulfill Decedent’s

clear wishes regarding his possessions. We emphasize that this result is fact-

specific to this case and does not stand for a general proposition that a

procuration takes precedence over a testament. This case presents a unique

situation where Decedent’s wish that his heirs receive nothing was

unrefuted; he took steps after the death of his sole legatee and while he was

isolated in the hospital with his final illness to ensure that his desires were

fulfilled; and that he had previously granted a broad POA giving his agent

the authority to create a trust and transfer his assets to it.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Transfer of Assets

Intervenors raise four assignments of error in which they argue that

the trial court erred in determining that Decedent’s movables and
16

immovables, save his property in Texas and IRA, were validly transferred to

the Trust. They contend that the Act of Assignment is invalid because it

attempts to transfer all Decedent’s property to the Trust, in violation of La.

C.C. art. 1498. They argue that Decedent’s movables were not validly

transferred to the Trust because there was no actual transfer or delivery of

them. They contend that Decedent’s immovable property located in

Louisiana was not validly transferred to the Trust by the Warranty Deed

because the Trust instrument was not recorded until after Decedent’s death

and, therefore, had no effect against them as third parties. They further

allege that the Notarial Act of Correction could not be used to change the

name of the Trust in the Warranty Deed. Accordingly, they contend that all

Decedent’s property remained in his estate and was inherited by them.

Nolin and Crosslin argue that the trial court correctly determined that

the transfers of assets by the Act of Assignment and Warranty Deed to the

Trust were valid. They contend that there is no requirement that the trustee

be in possession of the assets at Decedent’s death for the transfer to be valid

and that the non-recordation of the Trust instrument has no effect on the

validity of the transfers of property to the Trust. Therefore, they argue that

Intervenors did not come into any rights in Decedent’s estate at his death

because the Act of Assignment and Warranty Deed effected valid transfers

of his property to the Trust.

A trust is the relationship resulting from the transfer of title to

property to a person to be administered by him as a fiduciary for the benefit

of another. La. R.S. 9:1731. The provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code

shall be accorded a liberal construction in favor of freedom of disposition.

La. R.S. 9:1724. An inter vivos trust is created upon execution of the trust
17

instrument. La. R.S. 9:1822. A trustee’s acceptance is retroactive to the

date of creation of the trust. La. R.S. 9:1823. Whenever possible a trust

instrument will be construed so as to uphold the validity of the trust and

render the instrument effective. Grant v. Grant, 35,635 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/27/02), 810 So. 2d 1226, writ denied, 02-1046 (La. 6/14/02), 817 So. 2d

1158.

The trust instrument is not required to contain specific language of

conveyance provided it is clear that title is being transferred to the trustee,

because the creation of a trust automatically and by definition effects a

transfer of title to the trust property pursuant to La. R.S. 9:1731. Grant v.

Grant, supra. The trust instrument must identify the property being

transferred in trust either specially, as in a description of land, or generally,

as under a universal legacy. Id. A universal legacy is a disposition of all of

the estate. Id.

An instrument that transfers an immovable is without effect as to a

third person unless the instrument is registered by recording it in the

appropriate mortgage or conveyance records. La. C.C. art. 3338. La.

R.S. 9:2092 discusses the recordation of a trust that includes immovables

and states in pertinent part:

A. If at any time the trust property of either an inter vivos trust
or a testamentary trust includes immovables or other property
the title to which must be recorded in order to affect third
persons, a trustee shall file the trust instrument, an extract of
trust, or a copy of the trust instrument or extract of trust
certified by the clerk of court for the parish in which the
original trust instrument or extract of trust was filed, for record
in each parish in which the property is located. Nevertheless, if
the trust instrument contains a transfer of immovable property
or other property the title to which must be recorded in order to
affect third persons, a trustee shall file the trust instrument for
record in the parish in which the property is located.

18

The public records doctrine is founded upon our public policy and

social purpose of assuring the stability of land titles. Biggs v. Hatter, 46,910

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/12), 91 So. 3d 1148, writ denied, 12-1075 (La.

9/21/12), 98 So. 3d 337. The doctrine does not create rights in a positive

sense but, rather, has the negative effect of denying the effectiveness of

certain rights unless they are recorded. Id. It is essentially a negative

doctrine. Id. Third persons are not allowed to rely on what is contained in

the public records but can, instead, rely on the absence from the public

record of those interests that are required to be recorded. Id. Simply put, an

instrument in writing affecting immovable property which is not recorded is

null and void except between the parties. Id.

Section 7.1 of the Trust states:

Property acceptable to the Trustee may be transferred to any
trust created by this Agreement from time to time in the future
by Grantor or by any other person (including additions pursuant
to the provisions of the last will of any person). The transfer
may be by any means. Such property, if accepted by the
Trustee, shall be held, administered, and distributed pursuant to
the terms of this Agreement.

Through the Act of Assignment, Crosslin as agent transferred to Nolin as

trustee:

[A]ll of the property which he owns (hereinafter referred to as
the “Property”), specifically including all immovable and/or
real property located in the State of Louisiana and the State of
Texas, and all movable and/or personal property, whether or not
titled, including all financial accounts of any nature and all
guns, vehicles, and equipment.

Through the Warranty Deed, Crosslin as agent transferred to Nolin as trustee

all Decedent’s “right, title and interest in and to the property” listed in the

attached exhibit, which described four immovable properties in Louisiana.

19

The parties and trial court agree that these documents did not transfer

Decedent’s immovable property in Texas or his IRA.

As discussed above, Crosslin had the authority as agent under the

POA to transfer Decedent’s assets. These transfers and acceptances

occurred prior to Decedent’s death on August 31, 2021. On August 27,

2021, the Trust was created and Crosslin as agent signed the Act of

Assignment and Warranty Deed, and Nolin as trustee signed these

documents, accepting the transfers, on August 31, 2021. Nolin testified at

trial that he accepted the Trust and these transfers during the lifetime of the

donor, as he signed the documents on the morning of August 31, 2021,

before Decedent passed away that afternoon.

Intervenors rely upon statutes that apply to sales in their argument that

the trustee be in possession of the assets at the time of Decedent’s death for

the transfer to be valid. They also rely upon a statute that applies to

donations to argue that the Act of Assignment is invalid because it attempts

to transfer all Decedent’s property to the Trust. These statutes are

inapplicable to the transfers made by the Act of Assignment. In accordance

with Louisiana jurisprudence, see Grant v. Grant, supra, and Section 7.1 of

the Trust, the Trust was not required to contain any specific language of

conveyance, a universal disposition of all the estate was permitted and the

transfers could be made by any means. Therefore, the trial court was not

manifestly erroneous in its determination that the transfer of all Decedent’s

movables to the Trust was valid.

Regarding the transfer of Decedent’s immovable property in

Louisiana, Intervenor’s arguments also are not persuasive. Although they

argue that the Warranty Deed is defective because it states that the grantee is
20

“Nolin, in his capacity as the trustee of the John Garner Trust” rather than of

the “John Garner Lynch Trust,” the signature line correctly states the name

of the Trust. There was clearly an understanding between the parties as for

what Trust Nolin was accepting the transfer of immovable property. This

court need not determine whether the Warranty Deed was invalid under the

public records doctrine because the public records doctrine does not apply to

Intervenors. Intervenors are not third persons as contemplated by the public

records doctrine because they are Decedent’s heirs. Therefore, the trial court

was not manifestly erroneous in determining that Decedent’s immovable

property located in Louisiana was validly transferred to the Trust.

Accordingly, these assignments of error lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in

favor of Defendants-Appellees Rudy Allen Nolin and Martha Crosslin.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to Intervenors-Appellants Susan Carol

Lynch Hunt, Martha Elizabeth Lynch Riley, Nathan Hammett and Katie

Elizabeth Smith.

AFFIRMED.

21

THOMPSON, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and write to express

my concern that condoning these efforts to use a power of attorney to

transfer all of an individual’s assets in last few days and hours of his life will

embolden and empower those who would seek to do the same for their own

personal gain. While self-enrichment was not the motive in the present

matter, that was certainly a result. I believe the agent exceeded her authority

and improperly used the power of attorney, without such direction from

Lynch, when she created a trust and conveyed much of Lynch’s property to

it immediately before his death. Those acts should be declared nullities. I

also believe the collaboration between the trustee and the agent in these

conveyances is contrary to the prohibition of self-dealing, and the

conveyances to the trust should likewise be declared nullities.

In support of the conclusions reached above, I will reference in record

some of the evidence and testimony confirming: (1) that Lynch fully

understood his children would inherit through intestacy under his 2014 and

2018 testaments if his current wife were to predecease him; (2) the

“telephone call” was not about estate planning; and (3) “The Plan” violates

the fiduciary duty owned by the agent.

Lynch Knew His Children Would Inherit Through Intestacy

I do not subscribe to the notion that Lynch was completely estranged

from his children, that he wanted to disinherit them, or that he hoped to

overcome their rights to inherit through intestacy should his wife predecease

him. Testimony at trial confirmed that Lynch’s relationship with his

children during his third marriage was “better.” However, the record

indicates that in 2018, at the age of 82, when he married for the fourth time,
1

his contact with his children apparently deteriorated. His friend Crosslin

testified that despite years of her and her husband having regular visits and

contact with Lynch, even she did not see much of Lynch or spend as much

time at his home2 after his fourth marriage. She testified, “I think his

relationship was different with everybody after he married Kathy.”3

Crosslin and Nolin testified that Lynch’s fourth wife allowed the

condition of a mobile home to become uninhabitable, which required Lynch

and his wife to have to move. Crosslin and Nolin also testified that during

Lynch and his wife’s hospitalizations, and immediately following her death,

that her drug-addicted friends and family were taking items from Lynch’s

home, which necessitated shutting the gates and locking everything down.4 I

assert this testimony about the nature and circumstances of Lynch’s fourth

marriage is a reason he had a strained relationship and infrequent contact

with his children at that point of his life.

The applicability and effects of our laws of intestacy were known to

Lynch. The record shows that Lynch had a full knowledge and

understanding that his children would inherit under both his 2014 and 2018

testaments if his wife predeceased him. Lynch never took steps to alter or

interfere in that certainty, even after outliving two previous wives.

At least twice Lynch received advice and instruction from his attorney

on the controlling law of intestacy. He also received advice from two long-

term friends about effectively disinheriting his children and naming an

alternate beneficiary in his wills. It appears to this writer that Lynch’s

2 R.P. 927.
3 R.P. 928.
4 R. P. 896.

2

decision to never act on that information or advice from his friends was

consistently intentional. I suggest we should accept Lynch’s actions as

purposeful and as the best evidence of his intentions.

The record contains ample evidence confirming Lynch understood the

results of the language contained in his 2014 and 2018 wills may benefit his

children through intestacy. In his 2014 will, Lynch named his spouse as his

universal legatee and made no specific bequest to anyone else. Regarding

his children, Mr. Lynch’s 2014 testament simply provided:

I have not made any provisions herein for any children I now
have and all children of mine who may survive me, and the
birth of a child of mine, or the adoption of a child by me,
hereafter shall not revoke this will.

This provision does not disinherit his children. They still stood to inherit

though intestacy, and Lynch knew it.

Williams testified regarding the language of Lynch’s 2014 testament

and his appreciation of its effect. Williams had the following conversation5

with Lynch:

Q: Mr. Williams, at the time that you were asked to prepare this
Will that we identified as Exhibit 1A, what -what did you
discuss with Mr. Lynch?

A: Who he wanted to leave his estate to. And he told me he
wanted to leave it to his wife at the time, which was referred to
as Marlene. I asked him at the time, I said, “What if she doesn’t
survive you?” And I still remember, John was sitting there in
overalls, and pointed to his belly and said, look at me. “I don’t -
I don’t think that I’ll survive her. So, I’m not worried about
where it goes if she doesn’t survive me.”

(emphasis added).

That wife did not survive Lynch; she died in March of 2015. For the

three years after her death, and until Lynch’s March 2018 will became

5 R. P. 824, l. 30 – R. P. 825, l. 8.

3

effective, the provisions of his 2014 will were still in effect. If Lynch had

died during this time period, then his estate would have gone to his children

through intestacy. Lynch never revised his will during that time, never

added a codicil naming an alternate legatee, and did not undertake efforts to

disinherit his children.

In 2018, after the marriage to his fourth wife, Lynch had Williams

update his will and power of attorney. The 2018 will had identical

provisions to his 2014 will, with the exception of naming his current wife as

his universal legatee. The 2018 will also included the same statement

regarding his children. What remained in place was the certainty that if

Lynch’s wife predeceased him, then his children would inherit though

intestacy.

When Williams was asked about Lynch twice (2014 and 2018)

leaving his wills without a successor legatee, Williams testified:

Q: Well, why, well if he was so adamant, why didn’t you say,
hey, you’ve got to name somebody else? I mean, I -

A: I said it a couple of times. He just said, look, I’m not, he sat
there in his overalls, and he was a little overweight and he
pointed and goes, there’s no way. I mean, I know you are
telling me he survived two wives or whatever. But that was
just, that was just John Lynch. I can, I feel confident by him
not doing anything, he still did not intend for it to go there.

What Lynch intended is best discerned from his actions, not from

what others “feel” he may have intended. Lynch continued to fully

understand the fact that his children would inherit his property if his spouse

predeceased him, as confirmed by his Williams who testified:6

Q: He thought he would go first?

A: Yes.

6 R. P. 995-96.

4

Q: All right. Now at the time that you spoke to him about his
Will, which I’m assuming was in 2018, was he aware of what
would happen if he didn’t name alternate legatees and Kathy
died before him?

A: Yes, I think he was.

Q: Okay. And so, he knew that if he didn’t name alternate
legatees of his estate would fall intestate to his children and
grandchildren?

A: Well, yes. He was convinced he would not survive. We
basically both times, in ‘14 and ‘18, pointed to himself and
said, look at me, there’s no way I’m going to survive them.

***

Q: But by ‘18, when he didn’t, again, didn’t name an
alternate legatee, he had already outlived ——

A: Right.

Q: -- two wives. Yes?

A: Yes.

Q: And so, and he did know that if he didn’t name an alternate,
there was no alternate, that his estate would fall to his
children and grandchildren?

A: I think so.

(emphasis added)

In addition to access to legal counsel who explained the law and effect

of Lynch’s last two wills, Lynch also received opinions and suggestions on

the topic from his neighbors, the Crosslins. Crosslin testified that Lynch

told them about the provisions of his will, and she and her husband advised

him to have an alternate beneficiary. Lynch heard their suggestions, but he

did not any take action to name an alternate legatee to the exclusion of his

children. That consistent position by Lynch should be recognized and

honored.

5

The “Telephone Call” Was Not About Estate Planning

The district court and majority rely on the August 26, 2021 telephone

call to support the argument that Lynch intended to disinherit his children in

favor of his friends, which his friends simply implemented for him. I

respectfully disagree. The telephone call, which was only partially recorded

and is somewhat inaccurately transcribed, was initiated because Lynch

trusted Nolin to look after his property, and it needed to be looked after.

During the time Lynch had been hospitalized, his trailer had been broken

into and items stolen. The record confirms the telephone call was not started

as an estate planning conference but, rather, was intended as a discussion of

actions needed to be taken while Lynch was in the hospital to protect his

assets.

Nolin testified about the purpose of that telephone call with Lynch:7

I had told him that things were not good at his farm, you know.
It was being broken into. And we needed to do something, so
if you got out of the hospital that you would have something
left when you got there, you know. So that’s, that’s when he
told me to take care of things.

(emphasis added). Importantly, everyone participating in the telephone

conversation expected Lynch to get out of the hospital, including Lynch

himself, who commented, “I’ll be out of here in the next two days.”8

Nolin was receiving instructions from Lynch about managing the

situation and taking care of his business while Lynch was hospitalized. I

assert any attempts to describe the contents of the conversation as Lynch

laying out global estate planning wishes is undermined by his response to a

question posed by Williams, inquiring about bequests, when Williams asked,

7 R. P. 965-966.
8 See Transcript of telephone conversation between Lynch, Nolin and Williams.

6

“if there was like a charity ultimately you wanted anything to go to,” to

which Lynch replied, “Don’t iron your dress just yet.” (Emphasis added).

This sentence indicates that Lynch was not intending to permanently

deprive himself of any of his assets, and he was not ready to address estate

planning. His desire was for Nolin to help him manage the assets, like his

guns and trailer, that were being vandalized. Lynch never initiated any

discussion in detail about who was to inherit what, and Lynch was only

responding to questions posed to him on the subject by Nolin and Williams.

This was not a discussion with his attorney to draft a new will or any action

other than secure his property and look after his business until he was

discharged. It is not clear that Lynch even knew Williams was present for

the telephone call during the beginning. “Don’t iron your dress just yet!”

“The Plan” Fails to Satisfy the Agent’s Fiduciary Duties

After the afternoon telephone conversation with Lynch on August 26,

2021, Williams set about drafting the documents regarding what he believed

Lynch’s desires were – to prevent his children from acquiring his property

through intestacy. Confronted with a hospitalized patient during COVID-19,

Williams devised the plan to use the existing 2018 power of attorney to

convey most of Lynch’s Louisiana assets into a trust to prevent his children

from inheriting those assets via intestacy, but was not limited to only this

course of action. When Williams was asked why he did not draft a new will

to accomplish Lynch’s desires to disinherit his children, Williams replied “I

didn’t have time.”9 Williams confirmed he did not try to get Lynch to sign

9 R.P. 1010.

7

anything personally.10 When asked why, Williams responded: “Well, I

didn’t need to, I had a power of attorney.”11 I assert, as the comparison of

Lynch’s words in the transcript with the provisions of the trust illustrate,

they are not the same, and the trust is not consistent with Lynch’s comments.

Williams’ use of the power of attorney is an estate planning “work

around” that creates a blueprint that could far too easily be subject to abuse

by others with selfish motives who have no qualms of replacing the

principal’s volition with their own.

I am not implying that Nolin intended anything other than to honor the

wishes of his longtime friend, Lynch, in good faith. The Plan, however,

would put Nolin in a position as trustee and beneficiary upon the death of

Lynch, whose condition had taken an abrupt turn for the worse in the days

after the telephone call. The record also indicates that Crosslin would not be

an obstacle to quickly effectuating the Plan, as she knew and trusted Nolin

and Williams and did not seek independent legal counsel to determine the

effect of what she was signing. Nolin and Crosslin, well-meaning friends,

collaborated and signed the documents handed to them by Williams, that

transferred much of Lynch’s property to the trust in less than 24 hours. The

plan was in place and the individuals named as Lynch’s agent and

trustee/beneficiary were working collectively to effectuate in Lynch’s estate

plans what they had been advocating for years – exclude Lynch’s children.

As the Plan required Nolin to be trustee of the trust, he was required

first to decline to serve as agent under the power of attorney, to avoid the

10 At the time there were in place strict visitation policies regarding COVID-19,

but alternatives to get documents to Lynch to sign, or instructions for writing an
olographic will were not explored or pursued.
11 R. P. 1011.

8

appearance of self-dealing. Williams presented Crosslin with a document

establishing her acceptance of appointment as Lynch’s agent, which elevated

her role in the Plan. Williams also prepared a trust document, acts of

assignment to the trust, and a warranty deed to the trust for Crosslin’s

signature as agent. The trust document packet was presented to Crosslin for

her signature while in her driveway. Crosslin had not participated in the

telephone conversation with Lynch the evening before, and she did not

initiate the concept of the trust or any other action on behalf of Lynch

exercising her new authority. Crosslin testified that after signing the

documents that morning, her involvement effectively came to an end. I

suggest Crosslin’s compliant actions of signing trust documents,

assignments, and deeds failed to satisfy her fiduciary duties and duty of care

as an agent. How could these actions be in the interest of Lynch when

Lynch himself never took any action to implement them? How could

Crosslin be certain Lynch wanted his assets to go into a trust and then be

distributed to various beneficiaries if she never told him about the plan or

discussed his wishes with him personally? Crosslin admits in her testimony

that she never talked to Lynch about creating a trust, he never requested a

trust, and she never told him she had signed a trust document or deed of his

property. 12

The law of agency establishes a prohibition against self-dealing and a

requirement to fulfill with prudence and diligence the mandate accepted. La.

C.C. arts. 2998 and 3001. There is a fiduciary duty and a duty of care

imposed on the agent. Here, Nolin, who was originally named as the first

12 R. P. 888.

9

alternate agent, was going to name himself as trustee of the trust, which

should raise concerns for the objective observer. Crosslin should have

investigated and questioned a plan providing that after the death of Lynch,

the planned trust agreement would permit Nolin as trustee to distribute any

and all of Lynch’s assets to himself:

so much or all of the trust estate, both principal and income, as
in the Trustee’s (his own) sole discretion is necessary or
beneficial for the support, maintenance, health or education of
Al. After Grantor’s death, Grantor’s primary concern is for
the future benefit of Rudy Allen Nolin, and secondary
concern is for the benefit of Arlin Mullen and Irma McDuff.

(emphasis added).

Courts should not condone an agent working in conjunction with

another individual – in this case, an alternate agent – to achieve a result that

is not permissible. You should not be permitted to do indirectly that which

is prohibited directly. I suggest that Crosslin’s actions effectively constitute

self-dealing on behalf of Nolin, as Crosslin did not independently attempt to

meet her fiduciary duty and, instead, signed whatever Nolin and Williams (at

this point acting as Nolin’s attorney) told her to sign. The duties incumbent

on her in her capacity as agent require more, and her failure to meet those

duties and ensure the actions are in the interest of Lynch are fatal to the

documents.

As Lynch’s agent, Crosslin’s actions must comport with the authority

granted her in the power of attorney, and she must do “whatever may appear

to Agent to be conducive to the interest of [John Garner Lynch].” The

durable power of attorney granted her the authority to manage the affairs of

Lynch, which would remain in effect if, in her words, “something happened

to him,” such as a stroke, a coma, or incapacity. The only thing the trust

10

accomplishes is to empower her to rewrite how Lynch’s estate would

devolve after his death. Lynch had politely ignored her recommendations to

effectively disinherit his children or add an alternate legatee to his will for at

least seven years, and to do anything to the contrary is to replace Lynch’s

volition with her own. As such, I suggest Crosslin acted outside the

authority granted to her as agent, and that the documents relating to the trust,

the act of assignment to the trust, the warranty deed, and any other efforts to

deprive Lynch’s estate of assets solely for the purpose of circumventing our

laws of intestacy should be declared null and of no effect.

Conclusion

In conclusion, my overriding concerns are that despite the good faith,

well-meaning intentions of Williams, Nolin, and Crosslin, the result of

affirming the trial court creates a blueprint for potential abuse by those

without such noble purposes and intent. Effectively a new deviation from

Louisiana’s exacting requirements for testaments and the effects of our laws

of intestacy have emerged, orchestrated by others and resulting in enriching

himself, and as a result I must respectfully dissent.

11