State of Louisiana v. Armond Jamar Burgy

Judgment rendered December 18, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,055-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

ARMOND JAMAR BURGY Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 386,902

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

ARMOND JAMAR BURGY Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN
REBECCA A. EDWARDS
KENDRA S. JOSEPH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STEPHENS, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court, the

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge, presiding. The defendant,

Armond Jamar Burgy, originally charged with second degree murder in the

death of Katrayvon Hill, was convicted by a jury of manslaughter.

Thereafter, he was sentenced by the trial court to 40 years’ imprisonment at

hard labor. The instant appeal was filed by the defendant. Burgy urges that

the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and the trial court’s

40-year sentence is excessive. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, Armond Jamar Burgy, was charged by bill of

indictment filed March 18, 2022, with the second degree murder of

Katrayvon Hill on December 23, 2021. On that day, Don Midland, who

worked for Republic Services, was picking up the trash from the

Neighborhood Store located at the corner of Madison and Laurel Streets in

Shreveport, Louisiana. When he pulled into the parking lot, he saw a man

wearing a blue jacket holding a gun talking to a man wearing a black shirt.

Midland also observed a white car, which he saw drive off. Midland noticed

what he described as a gray car pull up. Midland saw a man with dreads,

presumably Burgy, pointing at the man in the blue jacket. Midland went

about his business, and as he was emptying the trash bin, he heard four

shots. The man who was in the gray car (Burgy) sped past Midland, who

then saw the other man later identified as Katrayvon “Little Lakeside” Hill

lying on the ground. Midland left in his truck heading the same direction as

the gray car. When he saw a Shreveport police officer, Midland reported

what he had just witnessed.

Officer Delandro Washington was at the corner of Lakeshore and

Portland Streets writing a report when Midland approached him to report the

shooting. Ofc. Washington notified dispatch and drove to the store, where

he saw a bleeding man lying on the ground. Ofc. Washington promptly

began CPR. There were no people on the scene when the officer arrived, but

family members soon began to show up, and the scene had to be secured.

Several other officers who had been responding to a 9-1-1 hangup call from

a possible domestic situation at a house on nearby Oxford Street1 came to

the store when they heard the shots and the dispatch report of a shooting at

the store at 1528 Madison Street.

Officer J.T. McNally testified that he saw Hill on the ground with

what appeared to be a gunshot wound to his chest. Officers spoke with

witnesses on the scene, including Hannah Clark, and learned that the suspect

had left the scene in a blue Mazda with her phone.2 The “Find My Friends”

app was used to locate Ms. Clark’s cell phone, which led police to the blue

Mazda which they recovered. Burgy was taken into custody later that

morning during a traffic stop when a police officer who knew him

recognized him riding as a passenger in another vehicle.

Corporal Anthony Haines testified that he assisted Ofc. Washington in

providing CPR to Hill until the fire department arrived to take over. At that

time, as the officers were canvassing for witnesses, they learned the store

As it turns out, the 9-1-1 call came from the home where Burgy lived with
1

Hannah Clark (also referred to as Hannah Welch), his girlfriend and the mother of his
son.
2
Ms. Clark was apparently unable to be located to testify at trial.
2

had security cameras which had recorded the incident. Cpl. Haines

explained to the jury what he observed as the video was played for the

officers by the store clerk.

The footage shows the victim walking around the parking lot

“quickly” with what Cpl. Haines thinks was a gun in his hand. Hannah

Clark’s white car pulls up and she opens her door to speak to Hill, apparently

in an attempt to persuade him to get into her car. Hill does not do so. Later

on, Ms. Clark got into her car and was out of the camera’s view. The

footage doesn’t show whether she left the scene or went around the side of

the store. At that point, another car pulls up, “driving pretty erratic,” and

another male gets out of the car. The men “kind of got into it” face-to-face,

shoving on each other. The guy drives off in his vehicle, but soon he returns.

The victim still has a gun in his hand, but now the other guy has a gun. The

two keep on shoving one another, and then the man shoots the victim. After

the shooting, the man gets into his car and drives away.

The officers continued to review the video and were able to see that

the victim’s firearm had been picked up by one of the bystanders. They

learned that the weapon was given to Hill’s mother, Crystal Hill, who put the

gun in her truck and left the scene. The weapon was later secured and seized

by the police.

Ms. Hill testified that while she is Katrayvon Hill’s mother, she is also

Burgy’s cousin. Ms. Hill described the relationship between her son and

Burgy as they were growing up as the “best of friends.” On the date of the

shooting, December 23, 2021, Ms. Hill was heading to drop her son off at

the store after stopping to pick up Darius Adams along the way. When they

got to the store she saw two cars at the stop sign. The driver of the white car
3

at the stop sign was Hannah Clark. Hill got out of Ms. Hill’s truck and

started walking toward the store. Burgy, who was in the second car at the

stop sign, backed his car into the store’s parking lot. According to Ms. Hill,

when Burgy got out of his car, he was demanding of Hill, “where my

hundred dollars at?” Ms. Hill got out of her truck and stood between the two

men because Burgy had a gun tucked under his arm. A verbal argument

about whether Hill owed Burgy money then took place.

Ms. Hill stated that she told her son to give Burgy the money because

he had a gun. She admitted that Burgy had not pointed the gun at anyone.

According to Ms. Hill, once she made her son give Burgy the hundred

dollars he claimed he was owed, he left. Ms. Hill then left to go to Burgy’s

house to find out what was going on, but turned around when she saw a

police officer there. Ms. Hill returned to the store to tell her son to leave,

only to find him fatally shot.

Darius Adams3 was across the street when Ms. Hill came back to find

her son lying on the ground. Adams had taken Hill’s gun from him after the

shooting. Ms. Hill took that gun, put it in her truck, and left. Ms. Hill

returned later and, at some point, she turned the gun over to the police. Ms.

Hill admitted that her son habitually carried a gun, but denied he had a habit

of threatening others.

The defendant, Armond Burgy, also testified about what happened

between him and his cousin Katrayvon Hill. Burgy explained that Hill had

lived with him for about two years. Burgy had a young son around whom he

did not allow weapons. Hill always had a gun and would flash it around the

3
Adams, also known as “Little Lakeside,” did not testify at Burgy’s trial.
4

house. According to Burgy, he and his cousin had a couple of arguments,

over animals and Hill flashing guns, among other things. During one of

these incidents, Burgy asked Hill to leave his yard. Hill did so, but when he

got to the curb, he pulled his gun and pointed it at Burgy before getting into

a truck and leaving. Burgy testified that he felt threatened by Hill, who had

pulled guns on him and told him that he would kill him.

The most recent incident had been after Burgy was released from jail

on November 26, 2021. He came home from Texas to find his belongings

out of place or gone. He told Hill he had to leave, and Hill pulled a gun and

threatened him. After the incident in November, things had been good

leading up to December 23, 2021. On that day, Burgy testified that he asked

Hill to pay him money that he was owed, but said he would just take the

$100 Hill had on him. At that time, Burgy and his son’s mother, Hannah

Clark, had been arguing and he wanted to leave.

Burgy testified that he left the store, but returned because of

threatening phone calls Crystal Hill was directing at him and his son. In one

call, Ms. Hill said she was going to get her gun. By the time Burgy got back

to the store, Ms. Hill was gone. Burgy confronted Hill about having guns

pulled on him as the two men stepped up to each other. Burgy told Hill, who

had his gun out, to back up. Hill had told Burgy he would kill him on

multiple occasions. The situation deteriorated into the two men getting into

a shoving match. According to Burgy, the shoving was instigated by Hill.

Burgy said that Hill told Burgy again he would kill him. Believing he was

going to be shot, Burgy fired what he said were two shots. Dr. James

Traylor with the Caddo Parish Coroner’s Office testified that Hill sustained

three gunshot wounds which caused in his death.
5

Detective Montreal Jackson of the Shreveport Police Department

testified that he and Burgy were friends. While he was not assigned to this

case, Det. Jackson spoke with Burgy to find out where his gun was. Based

on the information provided by Burgy to Det. Jackson, the gun was

recovered. Three spent cartridge casings were located in the parking lot of

the Neighborhood Store. One projectile was recovered during the autopsy of

Hill. According to Michael Stelly, a firearms identification expert from the

North Louisiana Crime Lab, the cartridge cases recovered from the scene

were determined to have been fired by Burgy’s weapon. The projectile

recovered during the victim’s autopsy had the same class characteristics, but

a positive identification could not be made.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned the responsive verdict of

manslaughter. The jury was polled, and no irregularities were noted. Burgy

was sentenced on January 18, 2024, to serve 40 years’ imprisonment at hard

labor and to pay court costs. A motion to reconsider sentence was filed on

February 15, 2024, and denied without a hearing. The instant appeal was

filed by the defendant.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Burgy first urges that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the evidence introduced by the State at trial was sufficient to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter as

it did not prove that he was not acting in self-defense when the victim was

shot. The evidence shows that, in the moments before the shooting, Burgy

was confronted by Hill, not for the first time, with a gun. Burgy and his son

6

were threatened by Hill. According to the defendant, the difference is this

time, he felt like he had no choice but to protect himself.

Burgy contends that he did not set out to kill Hill. The evidence

presented at trial shows that, when he first saw Hill at the store, there was

already a gun in Hill’s hand. Burgy then left and returned, but only because

family members whom he believed he was close to (Hill’s mother, Crystal

Hill) were threatening not only him, but his child. Burgy points out that

only Ms. Hill described Burgy as having a gun during the first encounter

between him and Hill. Even then, she admitted that he did not point it at

anyone.

Ms. Hill admitted her son had a habit of carrying a gun. Midland, the

man emptying the trash receptacle outside of the store, described Hill as

being armed on that day, prior to Burgy’s arrival. Midland testified that he

did not see Burgy with a gun. When Burgy got back to the Neighborhood

Store, Ms. Hill was not there, having left after telling him she was going to

get a gun. Hill still had his gun on him, and as the two men argued, he again

threatened Burgy. It was only at this point that Burgy fired the shots that

resulted in Hill’s death.

Burgy argues that the evidence shows that Hill was brandishing a

weapon and making threats. There is testimony to show that this was

something Hill had done previously. On the date of the shooting, Burgy

claims he responded to those threats. It is his position that his response was

necessary to protect himself from imminent danger of death or great bodily

harm. This was not manslaughter, urges Burgy, it was self-defense.

According to the State, its evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that the killing of Katrayvon Hill was not committed in self-defense.
7

Because Burgy was the aggressor in the situation, he could not claim self-

defense as justification for the shooting. The evidence was sufficient to

prove he acted with specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, which

was required to prove second degree murder. However, the jury returned a

responsive manslaughter verdict, either as a compromise verdict or because

it found that there was sufficient provocation to reduce the verdict to

manslaughter. Either way, urges the State, the jury’s leniency benefited the

defendant, who escaped a mandatory life sentence had he been convicted (as

charged) of second degree murder.

Under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), “the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; State v. Stockstill, 19-01235, p. 4 (La. 10/1/20), 341 So. 3d 502, 505-

06. This standard, now codified in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford an

appellate court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517.

Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Instead, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. Where there

is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the resolution of which

depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter

is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen,
8

36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La.

3/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566, and 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2004). In the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Coffey, 54,729

(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 22-01574 (La.

12/20/22), 352 So. 3d 89; State v. Wilson, 50,418 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/6/16),

189 So. 3d 513, writ denied, 16-0793 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d 629.

In the present case, Burgy was charged with second degree murder in

violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, which is defined, in part, in section (1) as the

killing of human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or

inflict great bodily harm. However, the jury convicted the defendant of the

lesser offense of manslaughter.

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) provides that manslaughter is a homicide which

would be murder under either article 30 (first degree murder) or article 30.1

(second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or

heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an

average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not

reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood

had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at

the time the offense was committed. Subsection (2) of La. R.S. 14:31(A)

provides that manslaughter is a homicide committed without any intent to

cause death or great bodily harm.

Because Burgy claimed that he shot the victim in self-defense, the

State also had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
9

homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. State v. Taylor, 03-1834, p. 7

(La. 5/25/04), 875 So. 2d 58, 63. In determining whether a defendant had a

reasonable belief that the killing was necessary, factors that may be

considered include the excitement and confusion of the situation, the

possibility of using force short of killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of

the assailant’s bad character. State v. Johnson, 55,254, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/09/23), 370 So. 3d 91, 98.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-

defense case involving a homicide, the question becomes whether, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide

was not committed in self-defense or in the defense of others. State v.

Stockstill, 19-01235, p. 5, 341 So. 3d at 506; State v. Johnson, supra. See,

e.g., State v. Matthews, 464 So. 2d 298, 299 (La. 1985) (“On review, the

question therefore is not whether a rational fact-finder could have found that

the state had proved the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. The applicable standard is whether a rational fact-finder,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not

committed in self-defense or in defense of others.”).

In the instant case, while the unanimous jury found insufficient

evidence to convict Burgy of second degree murder, it nonetheless found

that the evidence presented by the State established that he was guilty of

manslaughter and that he did not act in self-defense. The evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to

find the elements of manslaughter proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Under
10

this same standard, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense.

Not only did the jury have eyewitness testimony, there was video

evidence of the shooting. The footage from the security camera at the

Neighborhood Store showed two encounters between Hill and Burgy. Both

were initiated by Burgy. Ms. Hill and Burgy testified that Burgy first

approached Hill to collect money from him, and that Hill paid the defendant

$100. Although Burgy denied having a gun on him, Ms. Hill testified that he

had a gun at his side. Because the defendant was not fully visible on the

video footage during the first encounter, there is no verification as to

whether Burgy was armed at that time.

Hill had a gun in his hand from the time he got out of his mother’s

truck. The security footage showed that Burgy started to leave in his car, but

he stopped abruptly and got out beside the driver’s door as the victim and

Ms. Hill walked toward his car in what appeared to be an aggressive manner.

However, Hill did not point his gun at Burgy, who got back into his vehicle

and drove away. Burgy’s retreat ended the first encounter and should have

ended whatever was going on. Clearly acting as the aggressor, Burgy

returned to confront Hill a second time. Within about 30 seconds of leaving,

Burgy drove back into the parking lot beside Hill, popped out the car clearly

armed with a gun in his right hand, and angrily confronted Hill. The two

men circled and were close together when Burgy shoved Hill back and then

as Hill started to step forward, Burgy shot him, causing him to fall forward

to the ground. Burgy’s testimony that Hill shoved him was refuted by the

security video footage. Hill did not shove Burgy and did not raise his gun

from his side during the confrontation.
11

In this second encounter that ended with Hill shot three times and

dying on the ground, Burgy was clearly the aggressor. The defendant, by

returning to confront Hill with a firearm, shoving him, and then shooting

him three times at close range in the neck and chest, shows that he was the

aggressor and that he acted with specific intent to kill. As the aggressor,

Burgy could not claim self-defense. See, La. R.S. 14:21.

Apparently the jury found the testimony by Burgy and his defense

witnesses about supposed threats made by the victim to be contradictory and

unbelievable. For instance, Burgy claimed that Hill threatened him, yet

Burgy also testified that Hill flashing around his gun did not make him

nervous. The defendant’s sister testified that Hill pulled a gun on Burgy

some weeks before the shooting and supposedly made a threat against him

the day before the incident, yet she later testified that the two men were not

“beefing.” On the day of the shooting, however, Burgy did not feel

threatened apparently—he confronted Hill for money he owed, left the

scene, then returned to confront Hill a second time, knowing that Hill was

armed with a gun.

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in this case.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Excessiveness of Sentence

In arguing that the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive

sentence, Burgy notes that the trial court did not order a presentence

investigation prior to imposing sentence. The trial court listed Burgy’s prior

convictions as possession with intent to distribute a schedule I narcotic and a

misdemeanor domestic abuse battery conviction. The trial court noted that

the 31-year-old defendant, who had an 11th grade education, had pending
12

charges for possession of more than five but less than 50 pounds of

marijuana in Texas, domestic abuse battery (strangulation), simple robbery,

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Burgy added he had a six-

year-old child and had employment prior to COVID.

The trial court discussed the factors it took into consideration in

fashioning a sentence in this case. The aggravating factors considered by the

trial court were threats of or actual violence, a significant permanent injury

to the victim, the endangering of a human life by discharging a firearm, and

the use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon. Burgy points out that the

use of actual violence and the permanent injury to Hill are elements of the

crime of manslaughter and should not be considered as aggravating factors

for sentencing purposes. Because the legislature based the sentencing range

for manslaughter on the elements of the offense, these two “aggravating

factors” were already taken into account.

The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. Burgy points out

that he has a young son, and Hill was armed at the time of this incident. The

trial court, substituting its opinion for the verdict of the jury, opined that this

was a second degree murder. Unable to impose a life sentence, the trial

court imposed the maximum sentence available to it. Burgy is not the worst

of offenders, and this was not the worst of offenses. This was a tragedy for

this family. According to the defendant, incarcerating him for most of the

rest of his life will not make it any less of a tragedy, and he urges that the 40-

year hard labor sentence is a needless imposition of pain and serves no

legitimate purpose.

The State argues that the 40-year sentence, although the maximum for

manslaughter, is not excessive under the facts and circumstances of this
13

case. Burgy, charged with second degree murder and facing the possibility

of a life sentence, benefited when the jury came back with the responsive

verdict of manslaughter. Furthermore, the trial court’s reasoning shows

adequate compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in tailoring the sentence to

this defendant, a prior convicted felon who also had pending charges at the

time of sentencing.

The trial court noted that it was familiar with Burgy’s family history

from the court proceedings and Ms. Hill’s statement to the court at the

sentencing hearing. The trial court considered Burgy’s criminal history,

which included a 2015 conviction for possession with intent to distribute a

Schedule I narcotic for which he was sentenced to six years at hard labor

suspended and three years of active supervised probation, and a

misdemeanor domestic abuse battery with child endangerment in 2017 for

which he served 90 days in parish jail. The trial court also took into account

Burgy’s pending charges, which included a Texas possession of marijuana of

less than 50 but greater than five pounds, as well as charges before the

sentencing court of domestic abuse strangulation, simple robbery, and

possession of firearm by a convicted felon.

The trial court found all three factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) to

be applicable, and concluded there was an undue risk that Burgy would

commit another crime during a suspended or probated sentence, he was in

need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate

the seriousness of the crime. The trial court found the following aggravating

factors under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B) to be applicable: Burgy used threats

of or actual violence in committing the offense; the offense resulted in

significant permanent injury to the victim, who was killed; Burgy used a
14

dangerous weapon and foreseeably endangered human life by discharging

the firearm while committing an offense that has, as an element, the use,

attempted or threatened use of physical force against the person or property

of another; Burgy used a firearm while committing an offense having as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person or property of another and which by its nature involves a

substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense;

and Burgy’s criminal history. The court found no mitigating factors under

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B) to apply.

According to the trial court, Burgy committed second degree murder,

not manslaughter, and he did not act under strong provocation. In light of

the above findings, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 40 years at hard

labor with credit for time served and designated the offense a crime of

violence. The trial court then advised Burgy of the time limitations for

appeal and post-conviction relief. The State urges that the trial court’s

sentencing outline and transcript from the hearing show that adequate

consideration was given to the guidelines and La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 factors.

The sentence is not unconstitutionally harsh and therefore not excessive,

argues the State, which urges this Court to affirm Burgy’s 40-year sentence.

A defendant’s claim of an excessive sentence is reviewed by

examining whether the trial court adequately considered the guidelines

established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id.
15

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. O’Neal,

55,559 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 273, writ denied, 24-0424 (La.

10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 817; State v. McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156, writ denied, 23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 394 So. 3d

149. For a sentence to be considered excessive by constitutional standards, a

reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence

makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is

nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.

Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Efferson, 52,306

(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052 (La.

4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Griffin, supra; State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d

1116. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another

sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused

its discretion. State v. O’Neal, supra; State v. McKeever, supra.

La. R.S. 14:31(B) provides that the sentencing range for a defendant

convicted of manslaughter is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than

forty years. Manslaughter is a violent crime. In this case, the evidence

adduced at trial could have supported a second degree murder conviction

and the exposure to a mandatory life sentence under La. R.S. 14:30.1. In
16

considering the nature of the offense, both the trial court and reviewing court

may assess whether the crime for which defendant has been convicted

adequately describes his conduct when the conviction is for a lesser included

responsive offense to the crime charged. State v. Lewis, 09-1404, p. 4 (La.

10/22/10), 48 So. 3d 1073, 1078; State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475, 478 (La.

1982); State v. White, 48,788, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 280,

282, writ denied, 14-0603 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d 599.

This general sentencing principle accommodates Louisiana’s

responsive verdict scheme which provides the factfinder, ordinarily a jury in

felony cases, the discretion to return verdicts for lesser included offenses

against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. State v. Lewis, supra;

State v. Porter, 93-1106, p. 4 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So. 2d 1137, 1140. Louisiana

courts have found the fact that the evidence might have supported a verdict

of second degree murder is an appropriate consideration where the defendant

has been convicted of a lesser offense. See, State v. Lewis, supra; State v.

Gaines, 52,536, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 948, 951, writ

denied, 19-00773 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So. 3d 379; State v. White, supra.

While the sentence imposed by the trial court in this case, 40 years’

imprisonment at hard labor, is the maximum penalty for the offense of

conviction, it was nonetheless within the statutory limits provided for a

defendant convicted of manslaughter. Under the facts and circumstances of

this case, we cannot say that it is excessive by constitutional standards. This

court notes that, as found by the trial court, the evidence arguably supports a

conviction for second degree murder. The incident was captured on video,

and there was eyewitness testimony. The defendant withdrew from his

initial conflict with the armed victim (which Burgy started over an alleged
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debt), yet came back to revive their beef even though Hill had paid him the

money he allegedly owed. This time, Burgy, a convicted felon prohibited by

law from possessing a firearm, was himself armed. The defendant escalated

the argument by shoving the victim, then shooting him three times in the

neck and chest before fleeing the scene. This assignment of error lacks

merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the conviction and sentence of the

defendant, Armond Jamar Burgy, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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