State of Louisiana v. Lorenzo Dunkentell

Judgment rendered April 9, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,056-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LORENZO DUNKENTELL Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 222,306

Honorable Charles A. Smith, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Chad Ikerd

LORENZO DUNKENTELL Pro Se

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

J. CHANCELLOR NERREN
RICHARD R. RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Police bodycam footage captured a victim identifying his shooter, the

defendant, by name while police officers were administering first aid for

multiple gunshot wounds. While hospitalized, the victim told his father he

intended to address his shooting directly rather than through law

enforcement, so he recanted his videotaped identification of the defendant to

the police. The following week the victim died from his injuries while still

hospitalized. The defendant fled to Texas immediately after the shooting,

and evidence gathered in the police investigation revealed that the vehicle he

was driving linked him to the shooting in both time and place. The

defendant was indicted and charged with second degree murder. After a

trial, he was convicted as charged by a unanimous jury and sentenced to life

in prison without benefits of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

He now appeals. For reasons more fully detailed below, we affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A resident of Yarborough Street in Bossier City, Louisiana, called

police the morning of July 8, 2021, after hearing several gunshots. Officer

Matthew Welch with the Bossier City Police Department (“BCPD”)

responded within minutes of the call. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer

Welch was wearing a body camera that recorded his entire encounter with

the victim, LaMarcus Stewart, who was lying bleeding in the driveway of

the residence. Despite being shot several times, Stewart was conscious and

responsive to the police officers who were assisting him. Officer Welch and

other police officers began to administer first aid to Stewart, including the

application of a tourniquet to his thigh and packing multiple gunshot

wounds. As the officers were administering first aid while waiting for

Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) to arrive, Officer Welch questioned

Stewart about who shot him. As was captured by Officer Welch’s body

camera, Stewart stated that he had been shot by Lorenzo Dunkentell.

Stewart also told officers that Dunkentell was driving a gray Charger. EMS

arrived, administered assistance, loaded Stewart onto a stretcher, and

transported him to the hospital. Stewart sustained 11 gunshot wounds and

received extensive medical treatment at Ochsner LSU Health in Shreveport.

On July 13, 2021, five days after the shooting, Detective Jason

Warren with BCPD visited Stewart in his hospital room. Det. Warren

recorded his conversation with Stewart. In this statement to Det. Warren,

Stewart recanted his prior statement identifying Dunkentell as the man who

shot him. Stewart explained that Dunkentell was his “cousin” and claimed

he would never shoot him. Five days later, on July 18, 2021, Stewart died

from severe pneumonia, a complication that arose from the trauma of his

numerous gunshot wounds.

On August 2, 2021, Johnnie Revels provided a recorded statement to

BCPD at the police station. Revels stated that he lived on Yarborough

Street, a few houses down from the scene of the shooting. Revels was not

home at the time of the shooting. However, earlier that morning, at

approximately 9:00 A.M., he left his house in his vehicle to drive to the

bank. On his way out of the neighborhood, he passed LaMarcus Stewart in a

black vehicle. Stewart waved at him as he drove past. Revels stated that

Dunkentell was driving very close behind Stewart in a gray Charger.

Dunkentell also waved at him. Revels stated that he knew of both men from

seeing them on the street.
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Dunkentell was charged by true bill of indictment with second degree

murder. Dunkentell subsequently filed a motion to suppress Stewart’s

statement to the police officers identifying him as the shooter as

inadmissible hearsay. Dunkentell also sought to suppress statements Stewart

made to his family members during his hospital stay regarding the shooting.

After the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court issued a

written opinion and determined that Stewart’s “dying declaration” was

admissible for the trial. The trial court also permitted Stewart’s recanting

statement to be admitted and provided it would become a function of the

trier of fact to determine the weight and credibility of the contradictory

statements.

Subsequently, Dunketell filed a motion to determine the admissibility

of “bad character” evidence regarding Stewart, including prior criminal

charges and a criminal conviction. The minutes of the hearing on that matter

reflect that the trial court excluded any evidence related to the bad character

of Stewart.

On December 18, 2023, the trial commenced. The jury heard

testimony from Johnnie Revels, the neighbor on Yarborough Street who had

previously provided BCPD with his recorded statement. Revels testified

consistently with his prior statement, that as he drove out of the

neighborhood where the shooting occurred around 9:00 A.M., he recalled

passing Stewart, who was driving his vehicle into the neighborhood. Revels

testified that he also observed Dunkentell in a gray Charger following

directly behind Stewart’s vehicle on Yarbrough Street near the location of

the shooting.

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Detective Camille Stewart with the BCPD crime scene unit testified

that the day of the shooting she recovered multiple shell casings and bullet

jackets from the crime scene. Det. Stewart testified that a search warrant

was obtained for the gray Charger and that upon the execution of the search

warrant, officers discovered the vehicle had several bullet holes. Det.

Stewart further testified that multiple bullet fragments and shell casings were

found under the hood and in the fender of the vehicle. She testified that no

firearm was recovered from the crime scene or from Dunkentell’s vehicle, so

a ballistics report of the bullets recovered could not be prepared. Det.

Stewart also testified that several items were recovered from the gray

Charger linking Dunkentell to the vehicle, including paperwork containing

his name and identifying information, as well as a prescription pill bottle

with his name on it.

Dr. Frank Peretti, the forensic pathologist who performed Stewart’s

autopsy, testified that Stewart sustained 11 gunshot entry wounds, including

to his chest, abdomen, and the area of his pelvis. Dr. Peretti testified that the

autopsy revealed extensive surgical interventions had occurred to Stewart

after the shooting. Dr. Peretti testified that Stewart died due to acute

respiratory distress and severe pneumonia, a complication that arose from

the severe trauma of sustaining multiple gunshot wounds.

BCPD Detective Jason Warren testified regarding video surveillance

footage from a nearby apartment building taken on the morning of the

shooting. The surveillance footage corroborated Revels’ testimony

regarding Stewart entering the neighborhood in his vehicle and a gray

Charger following closely behind Stewart’s vehicle into the neighborhood.

The video surveillance footage also showed that just after the time of the
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shooting, the gray Charger was driving away from the scene of the shooting

at a high rate of speed. Det. Warren testified regarding license plate reader

cameras, which capture the license plate information of vehicles traveling on

roadways. Approximately ten minutes after the shooting, the license plate

reading camera on Benton Road showed a gray Charger with the license

plate belonging to Dunkentell’s mother.

Additionally, Det. Warren testified regarding cell phone location data

that was introduced into evidence. Dunkentell’s primary cell phone was

located around the time and in the vicinity of Yarbrough Street where the

shooting occurred. Det. Warren also testified regarding cell phone records

showing Dunkentell purchased a new cell phone under a different name, but

he used his personal email address and his own date of birth on the cell

phone. Dunkentell discontinued use of his primary cell phone after the time

of the shooting and used only the new cell phone.

Det. Warren testified that license plate reader cameras also identified

Dunkentell’s gray Charger on Interstate 20, crossing from Louisiana into

Texas on July 8, 2021. On July 18, 2021, a vehicle owned by Dunkentell’s

girlfriend was captured on the license plate cameras following a gray Dodge

Charger to a body shop on Barksdale Boulevard.

Jasmine Simmons, Dunkentell’s girlfriend, testified at trial and

corroborated the evidence obtained during the police investigation.

Specifically, Simmons testified that Dunkentell arrived at her home in

Dallas, Texas, on the afternoon of July 8, 2021. Simmons testified that

Dunkentell had two cell phones. Simmons also testified that they returned to

Shreveport on July 18, 2021, to take Dunkentell’s Charger to a body shop.

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Coutrell Guichard, Stewart’s father, testified at trial regarding his

son’s shooting, hospitalization, and death. Guichard testified that Stewart

told him he recanted his initial statement identifying Dunkentell as his

shooter because “he [was] gonna keep it in the streets” and “he was gonna

handle it himself.” The defense did not call additional witnesses, and the

trial ended with the conclusion of the State’s presentation of witnesses and

evidence.

The jury trial concluded on December 21, 2023; the jury returned a

unanimous verdict of guilty of second degree murder, as charged. On

February 20, 2024, Dunkentell was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard

labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Dunkentell filed a motion for new trial and a motion for post verdict

judgment of acquittal, which were denied by the trial court. Dunkentell now

appeals his conviction of second degree murder.

DISCUSSION

Dunkentell asserts two assignments of error:

Assignment of Error No. 1: The evidence introduced at the trial of this
case, when viewed under the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
standard, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Lorenzo Dunkentell was guilty of second degree murder.

Dunkentell argues that the State failed to prove each element of the

crime of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing that the

State’s case was based on a recanted statement by Stewart and circumstantial

evidence placing Dunkentell in the area at the time Stewart was shot.

Dunkentell points out that while Stewart did tell police officers that

Dunkentell was the shooter immediately after the shooting, he denied or did

not remember giving the statement five days later when he was conscious in

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the hospital speaking with Det. Warren. In the hospital, Stewart claimed that

Dunkentell was not the shooter but was present at the time “they” shot him.

Dunkentell argues that the police failed to investigate another white

vehicle that was shown on video surveillance footage. Dunkentell also notes

that the police did not send any of the shell casings found in the driveway to

the crime lab for analysis to determine if they were from different weapons.

Dunkentell argues that there is no evidence to indicate that his flight to

Texas was based on a cognizance of guilt rather than fear for his own safety.

The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Grimble, 51,446 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/5/17),

224 So. 3d 498. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its

own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Dotie,

43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La.

11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297. The appellate court does not assess the credibility

of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95),

661 So. 2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, writ denied,

09-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913.

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The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient

for a rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton,

436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Hampton, 52,403 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/14/18), 261 So. 3d 993, writ denied, 19-0287 (La. 4/29/19), 268 So. 3d

1029. Circumstantial evidence is defined as evidence of facts or

circumstances from which one might infer or conclude the existence of other

connected facts. Hampton, supra. Direct evidence provides proof of the

existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard

something. Circumstantial evidence provides proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Lilly, 468 So. 2d 1154

(La. 1985); Hampton, supra.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of

fact to convict Dunkentell of second degree murder. The State presented

evidence that Dunkentell was at the scene of the shooting and had been

following directly behind Stewart’s vehicle. This fact was confirmed by

testimony of multiple witnesses, video surveillance footage, and cell phone

location records. The evidence at trial also proved that Dunkentell fled the

scene of the shooting at a high rate of speed in his mother’s vehicle, the gray
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Charger. Dunkentell then fled to Texas and purchased what is commonly

referred to as a “burner phone” to use rather than his existing phone.

Stewart’s own statement, captured on police bodycam footage immediately

after he was shot, showed that he specifically identified Dunkentell as the

man who shot him and the vehicle he was driving. The State did

acknowledge that Stewart recanted his “dying declaration” statement later in

the hospital; however, the jury found Stewart’s father’s testimony at trial to

be credible when he explained that Stewart, thinking he would recover from

his wounds, wanted to seek street justice against Dunkentell. The jury

clearly applied great weight to Stewart’s videotaped statement to police

immediately after he was shot. Accordingly, this assignment of error is

without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2: It was error for the trial judge to exclude
the evidence of Stewart’s conviction record despite the fact that his
statements were being offered as evidence in the case.

Dunkentell argues that the trial court erroneously denied his attempt to

introduce the conviction record of Stewart into evidence. Specifically,

Dunkentell sought to introduce the bill of information and minutes from a

criminal charge of attempted second degree murder and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. In that case, Stewart ultimately pled guilty to

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Dunkentell argues that the

introduction of a “dying declaration” hearsay statement is impeachable by

bad character evidence, including a history of criminal convictions.

Dunkentell argues that Stewart’s conviction record should have been

admitted because his hearsay statements were offered into evidence.

Evidence of the dangerous character of the victim is admissible only if

the accused first produces evidence that at the time of the incident, the
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victim made a hostile demonstration or committed an overt act against the

accused of such character that would have created in the mind of a

reasonable person a belief that he was in immediate danger of losing life or

suffering great bodily harm. State v. Scott, 31,379 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/28/98), 720 So. 2d 415, 424, writ denied, 99-0170 (La. 5/14/99), 741 So.

2d 664. An “overt act” within the meaning of La. C.E. art. 404 is any act of

the victim which manifests in the mind of a reasonable person a present

intention on his part to kill or do great bodily harm. Scott, supra.

Before being entitled to present evidence of the victim’s character, the

defendant must present appreciable evidence of the overt act. La. C.E. art.

404; State v. Woodhead, 03-1036 (La. App. 5 Cir.1/27/04), 866 So. 2d 995,

1001, writ denied, 04-0598 (La. 7/2/04), citing State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d

663 (La. 1982). Once the defendant has presented appreciable evidence of

the overt act, the trial court cannot exercise its discretion to infringe on the

fact-determination function of the jury by disbelieving this defense

testimony and thus, deny the accused a defense permitted by law.

Woodhead, supra. Thus, the threshold inquiry is whether the defendant

presented evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of

the victim. State v. Johnson, 41,428 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d

711, writ denied, 06-2615 (La. 5/18/07), 957 So. 2d 150.

The record provides no evidence of an altercation between Stewart

and Dunkentell on the day of the shooting. The record does not indicate that

Stewart was armed on the day of the shooting. Further, the character

evidence that Dunkentell sought to admit was evidence of a specific act,

which is prohibited by La. C.E. art. 404 to show the dangerous character of

the deceased. The record does not show that Dunkentell was aware of a
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general violent reputation or any past violent acts of Stewart. No allegation

that Dunkentell was provoked to shoot Stewart in self-defense or self-

preservation was ever made to justify Stewart being repeatedly shot.

Therefore, evidence of the character of Stewart was properly excluded.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Error Patent Review

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court failed to advise

Dunkentell of the time delays for filing an application for post-conviction

relief in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that La. C. Cr. P. art.

930.8(C), which requires the trial court to inform the defendant of the

limitations period for filing an application for post-conviction relief, is

supplicatory language that does not bestow an enforceable right to an

individual defendant. State v. Williams, 34,936 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01),

795 So. 2d 1221. The failure to advise a defendant of these rights is not

grounds to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Id. at 1223;

State v. Cooper, 31,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/23/98), 718 So. 2d 1063, writ

denied, 99-0187 (La. 5/14/99), 741 So. 2d 663.

The trial court should have advised Dunkentell, and he is hereby

advised, that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications

to seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two

years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under

the provisions of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lorenzo Dunkentell’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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