Succession of Charles Edward Weed

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,061-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

SUCCESSION OF
CHARLES EDWARD WEED

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 629,580

Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge

*****

THE PESNELL LAW FIRM, APLC Counsel for Appellant,
By: W. Alan Pesnell The Pesnell Law
J. Whitney Pesnell Firm, APLC

MEDLIN & LAFARGUE, LLP Counsel for Appellee,
By: Norman Irion Lafargue John Charles Weed

*****

Before STEPHENS, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This civil appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of

Caddo, the Honorable Michael A. Pitman presiding. The Pesnell Law Firm,

the firm representing the succession of Charles Edward Weed, appeals the

trial court’s ruling about attorney fees, expenses, costs, and expert witness

fees. Appellee, John Charles Weed, answered the appeal and assigned his

own errors. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At issue in this case is a determination of attorney fees in the

succession of Charles Edward Weed (“Charles”), who died testate on

December 18, 2020, in Shreveport, Louisiana. On February 19, 2020,

Charles executed his last will and testament before attorney Billy Pesnell

(“Atty. Pesnell”), who was named executor in Charles’ will. Charles left his

entire estate to his only two children, John Charles Weed (“John”) and

James Frank Weed (“Jim”), in equal shares. On April 6, 2021, a petition to

probate Charles’ will and for appointment of a testamentary executor was

filed. Atty. Pesnell filed three more pleadings related to the succession

(prior to the attorney fees dispute); they are as follows:

1. A detailed descriptive list (“DDL”) of assets, debts, and
obligations. The DDL stated that, at the time of his death,
Charles owned no immovable property, had assets totaling
$244,477.93 and debts totaling $29,823.79, which included
$21,599.50 in attorney fees and $964 in court costs (for filing
fees and Westlaw research) related to the administration of the
succession. The amount of debt less the attorney fees and costs
was $7,260.29.

2. An order to approve and ratify the sale of Charles’
automobile. John took the car to Texas and sold it at a private
sale without prior court authorization.

3. A petition to pay the estate’s debts and charges.

There were 29 pages filed with the trial court before the subject fee

dispute. On July 27, 2022, The Pesnell Law Firm (“the firm”) filed a motion

to fix and determine attorney fees (the “first fee request”). The firm stated

that a dispute developed between it and the Weeds about the succession’s

attorney fees. The firm stated that the succession owed it $31,069.50, which

included out-of-pocket expenses of $1,355 for Westlaw research, a

Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles duplicate registration, and a court filing

fee. The firm charged $350/hour for Atty. Pesnell’s work and $85/hour for

the work performed by its paralegal, Debra N. Ervin (“Debra”). The motion

stated that Atty. Pesnell waived any right to an executor’s fee. The firm

attached its time records related to the succession to its fee request.

John opposed the first fee request, claiming that his father had few

assets and debts, making the succession simple and administration of it

unnecessary. He highlighted the few pleadings that Atty. Pesnell filed and

argued that the firm’s fees were excessive and unreasonable. He claimed

that many of the entries in the firm’s time records showed an excessive

amount of time expended on the services rendered.

On September 19, 2022, a hearing was held in which Atty. Pesnell

testified that he graduated from NYU Law School in 1959 and was admitted

to practice law in Louisiana in 1960. Atty. Pesnell stated that initially, he

was not going to administer the succession. However, when Atty. Pesnell

corresponded with Goldman Sachs, the bank that held Charles’ brokerage

account, it wanted him to qualify as executor. Thus, he probated the will.

Atty. Pesnell testified that, early on, Jim and John had a dispute over certain

estate assets, and he had to correspond with them about that.

2

Atty. Pesnell testified that John wanted to sell Charles’ car to CarMax

in Dallas, and he informed John that court authority was required to do so.

Atty. Pesnell prepared a petition authorizing the sale and was waiting for

John to tell him the price for the car before filing it. John sold the car

without authorization, so Atty. Pesnell then drafted a petition to ratify the

sale. He tried to get documentation of the sale from CarMax and John, but

neither complied. Atty. Pesnell testified about a promissory note payable to

Charles by Financial Resources, valued at about $600,000. He stated that as

executor to the succession, he investigated the note to determine its status.

Atty. Pesnell stated that Financial Resources was run by David

DeBerardinis1 and John and Jim believed that the note was worthless. He

drafted a document for John and Jim to sign agreeing to indemnify him for

any liability incurred from not pursuing the obligation on the note. Atty.

Pesnell stated that he did not record the time he spent investigating the note.

John filed an application with the Louisiana State Bar Association

(“LSBA”) to arbitrate the succession’s attorney fees, but Atty. Pesnell

objected, on the grounds that it was premature. Atty. Pesnell testified that he

attempted to negotiate a settlement of the attorney fees with the Weed

brothers, which Jim accepted timely, but John did not. Atty. Pesnell stated

that he had already completed additional work on the case before John

returned the signed acceptance agreement, which was late and undated.

Atty. Pesnell testified that early on, Debra and John had an altercation

over the phone. He said that John was “abusing” Debra, and she came to his

1
DeBerardinis managed a Ponzi scheme, misrepresenting to his “investors” that
he ran a complex and lucrative fuel trading business. In 2021, he pled guilty to wire
fraud and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.

3

office crying. Atty. Pesnell told Debra that he would handle the

communication with John after that. He testified that he charged his

$350/hour rate after that for any communication he had with John. The

firm’s time records showed that it billed the succession largely at its

$85/hour rate from December 2020 until March 2021, after which it billed

the succession at the rate of $350/hour. Atty. Pesnell believed the work he

performed and rates he charged were reasonable and customary.

John testified that Atty. Pesnell permitted John’s cousin, Christy

Defriend (“Defriend”), to take possession of Charles’ car and that he

allowed the insurance on the vehicle to lapse. John stated that the car was

damaged during a storm when it was with Defriend and uninsured. John

claimed that Atty. Pesnell made an accounting error regarding the debt he

owed his father’s estate and how much he and Jim should each receive. The

brothers straightened out the error between themselves. John stated that he

did not bully Debra, but he did become frustrated with Atty. Pesnell for how

long the administration of his father’s succession was taking, which he

expressed to her.

On October 11, 2022, the firm filed a document styled, “Executor’s

Motion to Allow Attorney Fees Incurred in Defending Administration of

Succession” (the “second fee request”), in which it sought additional

attorney fees and costs, in the amount of $23,556.30, to defend against

John’s claims. It stated that the legal representation was not for the

executor’s benefit and asked that the additional attorney fees and costs be

assessed to John alone, as Jim did not oppose the first fee request. John

opposed the second fee request; Jim did not.

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In a post-trial brief, Atty. Pesnell stated that John and Jim agreed that

Defriend could take possession of their father’s vehicle because she wanted

to purchase it. Atty. Pesnell also claimed that he sent an email to John, on

December 24, 2020, telling him not to cancel any insurance on Charles’ car

as it was still an asset of the succession.

On December 20, 2022, the trial court denied the firm’s fee requests,

stating that the fees charged in the firm’s first fee request were unreasonably

high. The trial court said that the fees Atty. Pesnell sought in the second fee

request were for the benefit of the executor and not the estate and were also

unreasonably high. The court examined Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct (which concerns attorney fees) and addressed each

factor found therein as follows:

1. The ultimate result obtained: the court said it had been two
years since the death of Charles and his sons had not been
placed in possession of the estate property. The parties insisted
that the other was to blame for the delay.

2. The responsibility incurred: the court said that the executor’s
responsibility in administering a succession valued at under
$250,000 should have been easy and routine.

3. The importance of the litigation: the court said the succession
should have been simple to administer and the only litigation
was over attorney fees.

4. The amount of money involved: the trial court said that the
estate was valued at $244,477.93, Charles owned no immovable
property, his debts totaled less than $7,300, and all the assets of
the estate were collected, sold, or otherwise disposed.

5. The extent and character of the work involved: the court said
that the work involved in the succession should not have been
complex or difficult, aside from the “personality disputes”
between John and Atty. Pesnell.

6. The legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys:
the trial court said that Atty. Pesnell testified that he graduated
from NYU Law School in 1959, had been practicing law since

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1960, and had the requisite knowledge and skill to administer a
simple succession.

7. The number of appearances involved: the trial court pointed
out that prior to the fee dispute, there were no court appearances
in the matter.

8. The intricacies of the facts involved: the court stated that,
other than the fee dispute, the facts involved in the succession
should have been minimal. The court reiterated that, prior to
the fee dispute, the entire suit record consisted of 29 pages.

9. The diligence and skill of counsel: the court said that Atty.
Pesnell had the skill and diligence to administer a simple
succession. The court stated that it reviewed Atty. Pesnell’s
time sheets and found an excessive amount of time spent on
certain tasks, such as, on March 14-16, 2021, billing 10.5 hours
at $350/hour to a draft a letter to John and Jim.

10. The court’s own knowledge: the trial court stated that it
reviewed succession proceedings daily and aside from the fee
dispute, it found nothing unusual in the succession that required
Atty. Pesnell to complete extraordinary work.

The trial court then urged the parties to mediate the fee dispute

through the LSBA’s Lawyer Fee Dispute Resolution Program. The court

said that if the parties did not consent to mediation, it would appoint two

independent attorneys with longstanding succession practices to review the

record and provide a recommendation on what a reasonable fee was for the

work performed for the benefit of the estate. The trial court signed a

judgment to that effect on January 5, 2023. The firm filed an objection to

mediation. The trial court communicated to the parties that mediation was

not ordered but urged.

The firm then filed an application for rehearing, which the court

denied following a hearing on February 27, 2023. The court, on its own

motion, granted a motion for a new trial for the limited purpose of

appointing experts to review the suit record and give a recommendation on

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what was a reasonable fee given the facts presented. The court appointed

attorneys Armand Roos (“Atty. Roos”) and Walter F. Johnson, III (“Atty.

Johnson”). The firm later filed a motion to allow them to call their own

expert witness about the value of the legal services provided by the firm; the

trial court signed an order to that effect.

At the new trial, Atty. Roos testified that he graduated from LSU Law

School in 1975 and began practicing law that same year. A vast amount of

his legal career was spent in successions and estate planning, and he was

certified by the LSBA as a specialist in estate planning. He stated that his

hourly rate was $435. Atty. Roos testified that Charles’ estate was simple,

with very few assets. He said that, looking at the time sheets submitted by

the firm, the administration of the succession became more complicated due

to the failure of the successors to get along with each other and Atty. Pesnell

and his paralegal.

Atty. Roos said that it was clear from the record that one of the

brothers was rude to Debra which “kind of set off a whole bad thing here.”

He said that Atty. Pesnell did not allow John to communicate with Debra

again, so “things were done by him that normally would have been done

with the paralegal, and that just escalated the time.” Atty. Roos stated that

his impression was that Debra was not completing any work on the

succession after she and John quarreled. Atty. Roos also highlighted the

calculation error that Atty. Pesnell made in determining each brother’s

portion of the estate, saying that it contributed to the mistrust between the

Weed brothers and Atty. Pesnell.

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Atty. Roos said that the issue of selling the car without court order

required Atty. Pesnell to complete additional work. He testified that Atty.

Pesnell tried to handle the succession without administration, but due to

Goldman Sachs’ stance on releasing the account funds, Atty. Pesnell decided

that administration was necessary. Atty. Roos stated that he also considered

that there was an unknown promissory note that Atty. Pesnell believed he

should investigate to determine whether the asset could be recovered.

Atty. Roos submitted a report to the court in which he said that the

highest reasonable fee for the work Atty. Pesnell provided was $15,000, plus

out-of-pocket expenses. He said in his report that the administration of

smaller estates, like the Weed estate, would usually result in an attorney fee

between $2,000 and $3,500. However, due to the complication,

disagreements, and correspondence between the firm and John, the fee grew

dramatically. Atty. Roos said that his firm’s minimum fee for handling a

succession was $1,500 plus expenses.

Atty. Johnson testified that he began practicing law in 1975, more

than half his work was in successions, and his hourly rate for that practice

area was $250. Atty. Johnson submitted a report to the trial court in which

he said that he found the Weed succession to be ordinary and not especially

complicated. Atty. Johnson compared the duties of the executor to a

succession and the succession attorney. He noted that the statutory fee for

an executor is 2 ½ percent of the gross estate. Atty. Johnson found that

much of the time Atty. Pesnell spent on the succession appeared to be in the

role of executor rather than succession attorney, which created a difference

in the total fees. Atty. Johnson concluded that in Atty. Pesnell’s billing

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statement, nearly every entry was excessive. Atty. Johnson said that he

believed Atty. Pesnell to be a qualified attorney, but the time incurred in

drafting pleadings in the succession would have been minimal for a well-

seasoned attorney.

Atty. Johnson deduced that the fees for a succession attorney in

Charles’ succession would have been reasonable if in the range of $10,000.

He said that the gross value of Charles’ estate was $233,477.93, so the

executor’s fee would be $6,111.95. He added those figures together and

found that the total attorney fee should have been $16,111.95 plus costs.

Atty. Johnson said that he considered when calculating the appropriate

attorney fees the issues in the succession including the dispute between the

Weed brothers, the dispute between John and Atty. Pesnell, the sale of

Charles’ car, the problem in obtaining the estate funds from Goldman Sachs,

and Atty. Pesnell’s calculation error. Atty. Johnson said that the succession

would have been simple if not for those issues and the Weed brothers taking

things into their own hands which Atty. Pesnell later had to rectify. He

stated that, without the complications in the succession, the attorney fee

would have been between $2,500 and $3,000. Atty. Johnson stated that

Atty. Pesnell’s hourly rate of $350 was reasonable, but several of the tasks

performed by Atty. Pesnell were excessive, which included Atty. Pesnell not

becoming an independent executor of the estate, which would have allowed

him to act without court approval in many respects.

Attorney William Medlin (“Atty. Medlin”), John’s expert witness,

testified that he practiced law for 45 years and was certified with the LSBA

in estate planning and administration. Atty. Medlin stated that his hourly

9

rate was $300, but he would reduce that rate when he believed the total

amount billed was too high.

Atty. Medlin stated that the complications in this case were from

personal interactions. He said he did not believe Atty. Pesnell could bill for

that because “that’s not legal stuff.” He said that he found a succession

which cost more than $5,000-$6,000 to administer to be a very high cost and

that fees would rarely get to that amount. Atty. Medlin said that he was not

concerned about John selling the car without court authority and that the

laws regarding those matters were more lenient in Texas, where Charles’ car

was sold, than in Louisiana.

Atty. Medlin acknowledged that John brought on many of the

complications, but that his actions did not warrant an award of attorney fees

such as what the firm charged the succession. He said that a reasonable fee

should have been between $4,000 and $5,000, including the filing fee. Atty.

Medlin said that when handling a succession, he always used an independent

administrator.

Atty. Medlin said that he found Atty. Pesnell to be intelligent and his

hourly rate of $350 reasonable. He said that he did not know Atty. Pesnell

to pad his bill. He said that Atty. Pesnell’s actions regarding the succession

were not unreasonable, but the amount of time he spent on those actions

were. He gave the example that Atty. Pesnell charged 10 hours to probate a

will, which he believed could have been accomplished in 1 hour. He also

said that the DDL in Charles’ succession was “basic,” when it was usually

the drafting of the list that was the most time-consuming task in any

succession.

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The parties stipulated that Atty. Pesnell was an expert in attorney fees

in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, and in succession matters. They also stipulated

that his testimony would be the same as the testimony he gave at the trial

held on September 19, 2022.2 The court took the matter under advisement.

On August 3, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment finding that the

fees charged by the firm in its first fee request were unreasonably high. The

court also found that the attorney fees and expenses sought in its second fee

request were not for the benefit of the estate and were unreasonably high.

The trial court stated that the highest reasonable amount that could be

awarded to the firm for attorney fees for the benefit of the estate was

$16,000 plus reasonable costs and expenses incurred for the benefit of the

estate. The trial court ordered the succession to pay the firm that amount.

The court also ordered that the succession pay Wiener, Weiss & Madison,

APC, Atty. Roos’ firm, and Atty. Johnson expert witness fees of $5,000 and

$3,187.50, respectively.

In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court noted that the firm

only provided the testimony of Atty. Pesnell, but did not call an independent

expert or put on additional evidence, such as independent documentation to

support its claim about the attorney fees the firm charged in the Weed

succession. The trial court found the firm’s evidence “self-generated and

self-serving.” The court contrasted Atty. Pesnell’s testimony with that of

Atty. Medlin, who said that Atty. Pesnell’s rate was reasonable, but his time

spent was not. The court said that its independent court-appointed experts,

2
Atty. Pesnell passed away about a month after the May 31, 2023, hearing.

11

Attys. Roos and Johnson, agreed that Atty. Pesnell’s hourly rate of $350 was

reasonable, but the time he spent on the succession was excessive.

The court found it significant that the court-appointed experts

separately came to a similar valuation about what constituted a reasonable

amount to charge for attorney fees, within $1,133 of each other. The court

said the attorney fees for the administration of the succession were

unreasonably high and the additional attorney fees for litigating the

succession attorney fees were also unreasonably high and not for the benefit

of the succession. The firm now appeals. John answered the appeal and

assigned his own errors.

DISCUSSION

Appellant’s Assignments of Error Nos. One and Two: the Second Fee
Request

The firm first complains that the trial court erred in finding that the

second fee request was not for the benefit of the estate. It states that each

case the court cited involved a succession representative that also had a

personal interest in the case as an heir or legatee. The firm argues that Atty.

Pesnell had no special interest here. It claims that its second fee request was

related to its first fee request, which was necessary to liquidate the estate and

get court approval. The firm contends that a hearing on the motions was

required to get a judgment of possession. Appellant asks that this court

reverse the trial court’s ruling about its second fee request.

In the firm’s second assignment of error, it argues that the trial court

erred in dismissing its second fee request for being unreasonably high

without assessment and analysis. Appellant adds that the trial court

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considered its second application to fix attorney fees as separate from its

first, which it complains the court should not have done.

John asserts that the attorney for the executor, who provided services

primarily for the benefit of the executor and not the estate, should not be

paid by the estate. He argues that the firm had an interest in the estate as a

creditor concerned with how much it was paid for its services, and its pursuit

of what the trial court determined were unreasonably high attorney fees

benefited the firm and Atty. Pesnell. John contends that the primary

beneficiary of the resolution of the fee dispute was the firm and not the

estate. He maintains that he had every right to complain about the excessive

attorney fees at issue and the estate should not be penalized for him

prevailing in his claim.

John also argues that it does not matter if the attorney fees were

unreasonably high because they were not for the benefit of the estate. He

asks that this court affirm the trial court’s ruling on the second fee request.

Estate debts are debts of the decedent and administration expenses.

Debts of the decedent are obligations of the decedent or those that arise as a

result of his death, such as the cost of his funeral and burial. Administration

expenses are obligations incurred in the collection, preservation,

management, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. La. C.C. art.

1415.

This court, in In re Succession of Dysart, 50,927, p. 18 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/28/16), 206 So. 3d 357, 368 (citing Succession of Haydel, 606 So. 2d

42, 44-45 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), said:

Louisiana law has long recognized that an executor or an
administrator of a succession may obtain an attorney to aid in

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the carrying out of the executor’s duties and to defend the
succession against adverse claims made against it.
Furthermore, the costs of such legal representation may be
charged to the succession. However, Louisiana law also adopts
the principle that where the legal representation is primarily for
the personal benefit of the executor and not the estate, such fees
may not be paid from the property of the succession. Where the
executor has an individual and special interest which she
contests to protect against others, the succession shall not be
responsible for the legal costs incurred (internal citations
omitted).

The trial court was required to determine to what extent Atty.

Pesnell’s work was attributable to representing the interests of the

succession or was for the benefit of the firm. Whether Atty. Pesnell’s work

was for the benefit of the succession is a question of fact. Louisiana law is

well settled that great deference must be given to the trial court in its

determination of fact. Such a determination cannot be set aside absent

manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989).

Appellant complains that the cases the trial court cited in finding that

the firm’s second fee request was for legal work that did not benefit the

estate are distinguishable from the instant matter because those cases

involved succession representatives that had a personal interest in their

respective successions as an heir or legatee.3 While Atty. Pesnell was not an

heir or legatee to Charles’ succession, he was the succession’s executor and

his firm represented the succession. It was, therefore, a creditor of the

succession and had an interest in being paid for the services it rendered.

The substance of the firm’s second fee request was for work

performed for the sole purpose of litigating the succession’s attorney fees,

3
The trial court cited: Atkins v. Roberts, 561 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990);
Succession of Mollere, 19-414 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/26/20), 296 So. 3d 642, writ denied, 20-
00573 (La. 9/23/20), 301 So. 3d 1184; and Succession of Haydel, supra.

14

which was for the sole benefit of the executor and the firm and not the

succession. The firm’s second fee request was neither a debt incurred by

Charles, nor was it an administration expense incurred in the collection,

preservation, management, and distribution of his estate. A ruling finding

otherwise will increase litigation about the appropriate amount of attorney

fees to the detriment of even simple successions. We find no manifest error

with the trial court’s decision and that part of the trial court’s ruling is

affirmed.

Because this court is affirming the part of the trial court’s judgment

finding that the firm’s second fee request was not for the benefit of the

succession, it is unnecessary for this court to consider appellant’s second

assignment of error about whether the trial court erred in finding that the

amount of the fee claimed in its second fee request was unreasonably high.

That assignment of error is now moot.

Appellee’s Assignment of Error No. One: Amount of Attorney Fees

In his first assignment of error, John claims that the trial court’s

judgment should be modified to decrease the amount of attorney fees

awarded from $16,000 to $3,000. He contends that Atty. Medlin testified

that the fees should be no more than $5,000; Atty. Johnson stated that the

fees should be about $10,000, but he then made the mistake of adding an

additional $6,000 for the executor’s fees, not realizing that the executor’s

fees would be offset by the payment of attorney fees; and Atty. Roos

testified that the $15,000 was reasonable but he also said that it was the

highest fee that should be paid. Appellee points out that the firm made no

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mention of Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in either of their

fee requests.

Appellant replied and stated that the trial court disregarded the parties’

experts and considered the testimony of Attys. Johnson and Roos, their

reports, and the fee guidelines under the Rules of Professional Conduct in its

opinion. Appellant contends that the trial court’s decision to accept the

testimony of one witness over another cannot be manifestly erroneous and

the court’s conclusion was aligned with that of the experts it appointed.

Attorney fees are subject to review and control by the courts. Abadie

v. Markey, 97-684 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/98), 710 So. 2d 327. Regardless of

the language of the statutory authorization for an award of attorney fees or

the method employed by a trial court in making an award of attorney fees,

courts may inquire as to the reasonableness of attorney fees as part of their

prevailing, inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. Richardson v.

Parish of Jefferson, 98-625 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/10/99), 727 So. 2d 705, writ

denied, 99-864 (La. 5/7/99), 740 So. 2d 1289. The factors to be considered

in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees are: 1) the ultimate result

obtained; 2) the responsibility incurred; 3) the importance of the litigation;

4) the amount of money involved; 5) the extent and character of the work

performed; 6) the legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys; 7)

the number of appearances involved; 8) the intricacies of the facts involved;

9) the diligence and skill of counsel; and 10) the court’s own knowledge.

Rivet v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 96-145 (La. 9/5/96), 680 So. 2d

1154; In re Tutorship of the Prop. of Alicia St. John Huddleston, 95-97 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 4/25/95), 655 So. 2d 416.

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The factors listed in Rivet, supra, are derived from Rule 1.5(a) of the

Rules of Professional Conduct Rule, which states:

(A) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include
the following:

(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the question involved, and the skill requisite to perform the
legal service properly;

(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of a particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer;

(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client;

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
lawyers performing the services; and

(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

A reasonable attorney fee is determined by the facts of an individual

case. Richardson v. Parish of Jefferson, supra. In making awards of

attorney fees, the trial court is vested with great discretion, the exercise of

which will not be interfered with, except in a case of clear abuse.

Succession of Mollere, supra.

We find that the trial court was reasonable in setting the attorney fees

at $16,000. The court sought the assistance of two qualified expert

witnesses to arrive at the $16,000 figure. Attys. Roos and Johnson were

both admitted to the bar nearly 50 years prior to the instant matter, and both

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attorneys handled many succession cases. Attys. Roos and Johnson found

that Charles’ succession was simple, including few assets and debts. They

respectively acknowledged the contentious relationship between John and

Jim, and John and Atty. Pesnell. They said that Atty. Pesnell handled

matters that typically would have been managed by his paralegal, which

increased the billable hours.

Both attorneys found Atty. Pesnell’s rate to be reasonable, but the

amount of time he spent on certain tasks was not reasonable, such as drafting

the pleadings and communicating with John and Jim. We also mention the

voluminous correspondence between the brothers and Atty. Pesnell. Much

of that communication involved Atty. Pesnell asking John for information or

attempting to clarify matters of which John complained.

John also instigated a lot of communication through phone calls and

email, to which Atty. Pesnell was required to respond. The court also

observes that in the communication between Atty. Pesnell and the Weeds,

Jim’s spouse, Lori, told Debra that she and Jim wanted to reach a resolution

on the attorney fee matter as quickly as possible so that they did not have to

“be involved with John Weed and his antics.” Lori also said in the same

email, “As you know from personal experience, it is exhausting, insulting

and stressful having to continue conversations with him (John) regarding

this estate.” Jim emailed Debra and asked if he could settle the estate less a

negotiated fee for Atty. Pesnell’s work. Jim said that “95% of all the issues

are with John, so I would like to get my [half] and get the hell out of this

deal.”

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Attys. Roos and Johnson noted that Atty. Pesnell had to complete

additional work to 1) ratify the sale of Charles’ car, which John sold without

the proper authority; 2) obtain estate funds from Goldman Sachs; 3)

moderate disputes between John and Jim; 4) communicate repeatedly with

John; and 5) investigate the unknown promissory note. Atty. Johnson

pointed out that it would have been more reasonable for Atty. Pesnell to be

appointed an independent executor, which would have authorized him to act

without court approval to administer much of the succession. Both of the

court’s experts noted Atty. Pesnell’s calculation error which intensified the

misgivings John had about the firm. We also observe that the firm twice

refused to mediate the attorney fees with the LSBA.

Looking at the factors the trial court and this court are required to

consider, we find the following:

1) The ultimate result obtained: as the trial court noted Charles
died more than two years before the trial in this simple
succession. The Weed brothers had not yet been placed in
possession of their father’s estate more than two years after his
death.

2) The responsibility incurred: this was a simple succession
with few assets and debts; administering it should have been
straightforward and rote.

3) The importance of the litigation: again, this was a simple
succession and, as the trial court mentioned, the only litigation
that occurred in the succession was about the attorney fees.

4) The amount of money involved: the assets of Charles’ estate
were valued at less than $250,000, and his debts (not including
the attorney fees), amounted to less than $10,000. No assets
remained that were not accounted for.

5) The extent and character of the work performed: as the trial
court stated, this succession was simple and uncomplicated; it
was largely the disputes between Atty. Pesnell and John, John’s
actions regarding Charles’ automobile, Atty. Pesnell’s

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unnecessary time spent on certain succession matters, etc., that
complicated the succession.

6) The legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys:
as an attorney practicing since 1960, Atty. Pesnell had the
requisite knowledge and skill to administer a simple succession.
Given his lengthy career and extensive practice in succession
law, Atty. Pesnell should have been able to quickly and
succinctly handle drafting and filing any necessary pleadings or
manage any matters which required the expertise of a
succession attorney in administering such an easy succession.

7) The number of appearances involved: prior to the litigation
over attorney fees, there were no court appearances.

8) The intricacies of the facts involved: Charles’ succession
required minimal effort to administer due to it containing few
assets and debts. It was only the litigation over attorney fees
that complicated the succession.

9) The diligence and skill of counsel: a simple succession does
not require an overabundance of skill or diligence for a
succession attorney to manage.

10) The court’s own knowledge: as the court stated, it handled
succession proceedings daily, and it found nothing unusual
about the succession that required Atty. Pesnell to do atypical
labor.

This simple succession required additional work from Atty. Pesnell to

address the concerns and actions of John, which included a considerable

amount of communication to resolve. Issues between John and Jim, and

John and Atty. Pesnell further complicated the succession and increased the

hours billed by Atty. Pesnell. However, we agree with the trial court and the

testimony of its expert witnesses that the number of hours the firm billed for

the succession was too high. We note that the trial court reduced the firm’s

requested fee by nearly half after Attys. Roos and Johnson independently

suggested a fee within $1,200 of each other. After reviewing the facts of

this case, we cannot find that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by

reducing the amount of attorney fees awarded to the firm. Consequently, we

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will not interfere with the trial court’s determination. The trial court’s ruling

reducing the firm’s attorney fees to $16,000 is affirmed.

Appellee’s Assignments of Error Nos. Two, Three, and Four: Expenses,
Expert Witness Fees, and Costs

In his remaining assignments of error, John claims that the judgment

should be modified to limit the award of reasonable costs and expenses to

only those related to the succession; that the trial court’s judgment assessing

the expert witness fees to him should be reversed because it was inequitable,

or, in the alternative, the expert witness fees should be taxed equally

between the succession and the firm; and that the firm should be condemned

to pay all other costs to the trial court and in this appeal.

The firm argues that the trial court has wide discretion to tax costs. It

states that John gives little weight to the fact that the attorney fees were

increased by his direct actions. The firm points out that the trial court

selected the experts for a matter that was part of the succession proceedings.

The firm asks this court to affirm the trial court’s ruling about the witness

fees and costs and tax John with the costs of the appeal.

The court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against

any party, as it may consider equitable. La. C.C.P. art. 1920. The allocation

of court costs among the parties is a matter which is subject to the discretion

of the trial court, and its allocation of those costs will not be disturbed absent

evidence of an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Herring, 48,019 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/22/13), 114 So. 3d 1245, writ denied, 13-1452 (La. 9/27/13), 123 So.

3d 727.

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The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and

proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages, including

attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs, and may tax the

costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to

the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable. La. C.C.P. art.

2164.

It was within the trial court’s discretion to order the succession to pay

the costs and expenses related to actions that the firm undertook which were

for the benefit of the succession. In the firm’s fee bill, it included “research”

as the description for several billing entries. The firm also provided a

summary from Westlaw about the charges connected to the Weed

succession. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering the succession to pay the costs and expenses related to the

succession, which were listed in the firm’s first fee request as $1,355.

We do find, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing

the expert witness fees solely to the succession. The administration of

Charles’ simple succession garnered uncommonly high attorney fees due to

Atty. Pesnell’s calculation of time spent on the succession and John’s

communications and actions regarding the succession assets. The firm also

twice refused mediation of the attorney fees. We also note that Jim did not

join John in litigating the fees. We find it more equitable to tax the expert

witness fees equally to the succession and to The Pesnell Law Firm. The

part of the judgment ordering the succession to pay expert witness fees of

$5,000 to Atty. Roos’ firm, Wiener, Weiss & Madison, APC, and $3,187.50

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to Atty. Johnson is amended so that the expert witness fees are taxed equally

to each party.

This court likewise finds it equitable to tax the appellate costs equally

between the parties.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the part of the judgment taxing the

Succession of Charles Edward Weed with the payment of expert witness

fees is amended to require the parties to equally share the expert witness

fees. It is hereby ordered that The Pesnell Law Firm reimburse the

succession of Charles Edward Weed $2,500 within 30 days of this judgment,

for half the expert witness fees the succession paid to Wiener, Weiss &

Madison. It is hereby ordered that The Pesnell Law Firm reimburse the

succession of Charles Edward Weed $1,593.75 within 30 days of this

judgment, for half the expert witness fees the succession paid to Mr. Walter

F. Johnson, III. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The costs of

the appeal are assessed equally between the parties.

AMENDED IN PART, AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

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