State of Louisiana v. Lester David Cheveallier

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,068-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LESTER DAVID CHEVEALLIER Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 242,626E

Honorable Alexandra Aiello Stahl, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Mary C. “Connie” Hanes

LESTER DAVID CHEVEALLIER Pro Se

JOHN SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

RICHARD RUSSELL RAY
JESSICA GREEN DAVIS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the 26th Judicial District Court,

Parish of Bossier, the Honorable Allie Aiello Stahl presiding. Defendant,

Lester David Cheveallier, pled guilty to one count of distribution or

possession with intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles and was

sentenced to 12 years at hard labor without benefits. For the following

reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 8, 2022, Cheveallier was charged by amended bill of

information with 15 counts of distribution or possession with intent to

distribute pornography involving juveniles, in violation of La. R.S.

14:81.1(A)(1). The offenses occurred on or about April 22, 2022.

Defendant initially pled not guilty. He was also charged with multiple

offenses in other cases. Cheveallier filed several pro se pretrial motions,

including at least seven motions to suppress.

On December 11, 2023, Cheveallier pled guilty to one count of

distribution or possession with intent to distribute pornography involving

juveniles. The state said that it tendered an offer to defendant that if he pled

guilty to one count of distribution or possession with intent to distribute

pornography involving juveniles with a recommended 15-year cap on his

sentence, then it would not prosecute his remaining charges, including those

in several of his other cases.

Cheveallier affirmed that he had read, signed, and initialed each page

of his sex offender registry notifications, and he said that he did not have any

questions for his attorney about the documents and fully understood them.

Those documents appear in the record.

Cheveallier affirmed that he understood: (1) the mandatory minimum

and maximum penalties for his charge; (2) that he had the right to counsel at

every stage of the proceedings, including trial; and (3) that by pleading

guilty he was giving up his right to a trial, to confront and cross-examine

witnesses, and to compel witnesses to testify. Cheveallier said that his plea

was voluntary, and no one had forced, threatened, or promised him anything

in exchange for pleading guilty.

The assistant district attorney stated that defendant unlawfully

possessed with intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles. The

discovery was made after an undercover operation revealed contact with

defendant. A search warrant was issued, and defendant’s computer was

seized; over 300 images of child pornography were found on his computer.

Defendant agreed that those facts were correct. The trial court ordered a

presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and noted that Cheveallier’s

sentence was not to exceed 15 years.

On February 5, 2024, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. He stated in his motion that his counsel told him that in return

for his guilty plea: (1) his sentence was to be capped at 15 years; (2) the

charges against his son Michael were to be dropped and his case dismissed;

and (3) the charges against his son Clayton would be dropped, except for

one charge (yet to be determined), and that Clayton would receive only time

served and possibly have to register as a sex offender. He stated that the

assistant district attorney said that she would “aggressively prosecute” the

case against him and would seek a minimum sentence of 40 years.

Cheveallier also said that he was told that the state would

“aggressively prosecute” the cases against his sons and seek the maximum
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possible sentences for both. He said that the plea was “coercive in nature

and preys upon a father’s love for his children.” Defendant wrote that his

plea deal was not put into writing, “unlike all other plea deals I[’ve] seen.”

Cheveallier said he did not want to accept the plea deal and wished to

maintain his not guilty plea.

On March 7, 2024, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Cheveallier’s attorney, Larrion Hillman (“Atty.

Hillman”), stated that he was not adopting defendant’s motion but was there

to advise him. The state argued that its plea negotiations with defendant

were separate from the concurrent negotiations with his sons. The state said

that it was not privy to what Atty. Hillman or defendant’s sons’ attorneys

communicated to Cheveallier about the plea agreements. The state said that

Clayton was allowed to plead guilty to sexual abuse of an animal and was

given a five-year suspended sentence with three years of active probation; he

was not required to register as a sex offender.

Attorney Kathryn Bloomfield (“Atty. Bloomfield”), who represented

Clayton, stated that she was still in negotiations with the state about her

client’s plea when defendant pled guilty on December 11, 2023. She said

that Clayton had not yet pled guilty at that time because they were waiting

for defendant’s case to be resolved. Atty. Bloomfield said she and her client

were happy with the plea deal Clayton received.

Atty. Hillman stated that when defendant entered his guilty plea, the

state was extending offers to his sons which would have allowed them to get

out of jail. Atty. Hillman said that defendant’s sons chose not to take those

plea deals; their attorneys were able to secure for them better deals which

eliminated the sex offender registration requirement. Defendant said that his
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understanding of his plea deal was that if he pled guilty and withdrew his

pending motions, the state would offer a deal to his sons that would allow

them to go home the same day.

Cheveallier argued that he believed the state was “using my sons

against me to get me to make a plea deal.” He said he was given less than

24 hours to make the decision. He stated that he felt the situation placed him

under duress because he had an instinct to protect his children. He then said,

“I felt that it was just too coercive … and too abrupt for me to make any

kind of rational decision at that time.”

Defendant said that he was told that if he did not take the plea deal,

his sons would be prosecuted “to the fullest extent.” Cheveallier affirmed

that when he was offered his plea deal, his sons had already been arrested

and billed for their offenses. He said he was told that the state would offer

his sons plea deals that would allow them immediate release and that the

state intended to dismiss all charges against one of his sons. Cheveallier

said that at the time of his guilty plea, he had not received the digital

forensic report about his crime, so he did not have all the information about

the state’s case against him.

The court said that Cheveallier had “buyer’s remorse” and that his

sons had already been arrested and charged when defendant pled guilty, so

there was nothing that was being held over his head to coerce him into

pleading guilty. The trial court denied his motion, finding that there was no

basis for allowing him to withdraw his plea, other than that defendant had

changed his mind. Cheveallier objected to the ruling.

On the same date, the trial court sentenced defendant. The trial court,

referencing defendant’s PSI, said that Cheveallier had no criminal history.
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Cheveallier informed the court that his cancer had returned. The court

considered the factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court

sentenced Cheveallier to 12 years at hard labor without benefits. The court

informed defendant that he was required to register as a sex offender upon

his release. The trial court informed defendant of his post-conviction relief

time constraints.

Cheveallier filed a motion to reconsider sentence stating that his

sentence was excessive and should be reduced. The motion was denied.

Cheveallier now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Guilty Plea

In his counseled assignment of error, defendant argues the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Appellant states that he felt under duress to accept the plea deal that was

offered because he thought at least one of his sons was going to have his

charges dismissed and would be going home the same day. He asserts that

he believed his other son would get a plea deal for time served and be able to

go home that same day as well. Appellant states that he felt under duress

because he had less than 24 hours to accept the deal. Appellant argues that

the trial court was incorrect in finding that his sons received the plea offers

he expected them to receive.

He claims his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made, and he

asks this court to reverse the ruling of the trial court denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction and sentence. In the

alternative, appellant asks this court to remand his case for a new hearing on

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Atty. Hillman did not explain
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at the hearing what information he conveyed to Cheveallier about the plea

offers made to his sons.

The state argues that Cheveallier was informed of and voluntarily

waived his constitutional rights when he pled guilty. Appellee contends that

the trial court properly Boykinized1 defendant and he agreed to the factual

basis provided for his plea. Appellee argues that the trial court complied

with the requirements of La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1 and that the court conducted

a hearing on whether defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily

made. Appellee states that Cheveallier had a change of heart about his

guilty plea, which is not a basis for allowing him to withdraw his plea.

Appellee contends that it did not breach the plea agreement and asks that this

court affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

Upon motion of the defendant and after a contradictory hearing,

which may be waived by the state in writing, the court may permit a plea of

guilty to be withdrawn at any time before sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art.

559(A). The discretion to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea under La. C.

Cr. P. art. 559(A) lies with the trial court and such discretion cannot be

disturbed unless an abuse or arbitrary exercise of that discretion is shown.

State v. Branch, 54,951 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So. 3d 80; State v.

McGarr, 52,641, 52,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1189. A

defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.

Under La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1, a valid guilty plea must be a voluntary

choice by the defendant and not the result of force or threats. La. C. Cr. P.

art. 556.1 also provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court must

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Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
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personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea

is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the maximum possible

penalty. When the record establishes that an accused was informed of and

waived his right to a trial by jury, to confront his accusers, and against self-

incrimination, the burden shifts to the accused to prove that despite the

record, his guilty plea was involuntary. State v. Branch, supra. An express

and knowing waiver of an accused’s rights must appear on the record, and

an unequivocal showing of a free and voluntary waiver cannot be presumed.

Boykin v. Alabama, supra; State v. Branch, supra; State v. McGarr, supra.

When ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court

should look beyond the Boykinization and consider all relevant factors.

State v. Branch, supra; State v. Griffin, 535 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1988). A court, when called upon to ascertain an accused’s state of mind,

has the power, notwithstanding a record waiver of constitutional rights, to

determine whether other factors present at the time of a guilty plea, whether

inside or outside the plea colloquy record, were sufficient to render the plea

involuntary or unintelligent. State v. Lewis, 421 So. 2d 224 (La. 1982); State

v. Galliano, 396 So. 2d 1288 (La. 1981); State v. Branch, supra.

To properly exercise its discretion and for the appellate court to

review the exercise of that discretion, the trial court should conduct a

hearing or inquiry on defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id.;

State v. McGarr, supra. Reasons supporting withdrawal of the plea would

ordinarily include factors bearing on whether the guilty plea was voluntarily

and intelligently made, such as breach of a plea bargain, inducement,

misleading advice of counsel, strength of the evidence of actual guilt, or the

like. State v. Branch, supra. A mere change of heart or mind by the
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defendant as to whether he made a good bargain would not ordinarily

support allowing the withdrawal of a bargained guilty plea. Id.

Whoever distributes or possesses with the intent to distribute

pornography involving juveniles shall be fined not more than $50,000 and

shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than 5 years or more than 20

years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.

R.S. 14:81.1(E)(2)(a).

The record reflects that Cheveallier was properly informed of his

rights at the time his guilty plea was accepted; he affirmed his intention to

waive those rights. The assistant district attorney stated that the plea deal

was as follows: if defendant pled guilty to one count of distribution or

possession with intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles, the

state would recommend a 15-year cap on his sentence and would not

prosecute his remaining charges that appeared on the December 11, 2023,

docket, which included 5 other cases.

Cheveallier was present in court at that time, heard the state’s

rendition of his plea agreement, and then proceeded to plead guilty. No

mention was made about defendant’s sons during his plea colloquy, and

Cheveallier agreed to the state’s factual basis. Defendant affirmed that his

plea was voluntary and no one forced, threatened, or promised him anything

to secure his guilty plea. Atty. Hillman was present to advise Cheveallier,

though he did not join defendant in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

The trial court also stated that his sentence would be capped at 15 years.

As a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea, defendant claimed he was

told his sons would receive benefits from him pleading guilty and that the

state would “aggressively” prosecute them and seek the maximum sentence
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for both if he did not plead guilty. Defendant claimed that the thought of his

sons being prosecuted in such a manner made him feel that he was under

duress. However, as the trial court pointed out at the hearing on

withdrawing his guilty plea, defendant’s sons had already been arrested,

charged, and were facing prosecution when he pled guilty. The trial court

stated that Cheveallier had “buyer’s remorse” about the deal he received.

We agree.

Defendant’s change of heart is not a basis for withdrawing a guilty

plea. In fact, it appears that his sons received better plea deals than those

initially offered. He cannot withdraw his guilty plea because he saw that his

sons received better plea agreements than he did. He received enormous

benefit from being allowed to plead to a single count of distribution or

possession with intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles. His

sentence was capped at 15 years, and the state agreed to dismiss more than

two dozen other charges against him. He faced up to 20 years in prison for a

single count under La. R.S. 14:81.1 but instead received a 12-year sentence.

We emphasize that defendant’s computer contained more than 300 images

of pornography involving juveniles.

We find that Cheveallier’s guilty plea was constitutionally sound, and

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea. This assignment of error has no merit and defendant’s

conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Pro Se Assignments of Error

Defendant’s pro se assignments of error are as follows:

1) The investigating police officers committed a crime by
impersonating a fictitious anime character when entering
an online private chat room for adults and informing the
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group that the account belonged to a 15-year-old. A
fictitious anime character is not a person and cannot
accrue any rights under the law. Cheveallier also claims
that the officers committed perjury in their search
warrant because the chat room they entered required age
verification before entering.

2) The investigating police officers committed the crime of
endeavoring to intercept private communications by
impersonating a male anime cartoon and capturing
communications sent as part of a sting operation.

3) The investigating police officers obtained the contents of
private communications without a warrant.

4) The police illegally intercepted his private
communications because the investigating officer in
question was not a party to the communications.

5) The investigating police officers committed identity theft
because their physical attributes did not match those of
the male anime character depicted in association with the
online account with which defendant communicated.

6) The investigating officers used the online platform by
which they communicated with defendant illegally
because the officers impersonated a minor, male anime
character, and the platform did not allow minors to use
the platform without parental supervision.

7) One of the investigating officers conducted his own
administrative review of his agency’s policy regarding
computer forensics and, therefore, had no oversight as to
his use of electronic surveillance.

8) He alleges that: (a) his defense counsel told the district
attorney that he had no reason to plead guilty unless his
sons were released from custody, which was a statement
his counsel made without his permission; (b) his plea was
not voluntary because he said at his plea colloquy that he
had been threatened due to fearing the consequences and
“a parent’s natural instinct to protect his family”; and (c)
the district attorney did not disclose Brady evidence.

Generally, a valid, unqualified plea of guilty waives a defendant’s

right to appeal all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings prior to the

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plea. State v. Crosby, 338 So. 2d 584 (La. 1976); State v. Bradham, 51,889

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 246 So. 3d 775. A defendant’s guilty plea also

waives any right to question the merits of the state’s case and factual basis

for the plea. State v. Branch, supra.

Because we are upholding defendant’s guilty plea and affirming his

conviction and sentence, any non-jurisdictional defects of which he now

complains are waived. Furthermore, we note that Cheveallier stated at the

hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that Atty. Hillman

communicated to him that his plea agreement was contingent upon him

withdrawing all the motions he filed, which included his many motions to

suppress. The claims made in defendant’s motions to suppress are also found

in his assignments of error.

To the extent that defendant is asserting that his defense counsel was

ineffective, we note that such a claim is generally more properly raised in an

application for post-conviction relief in the trial court, where there is an

opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. State v. Burch, 52,247 (La. App. 2

Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1190. Thus, we decline to address the issue in

this appeal.

Errors Patent

In reviewing the record for errors patent, we find defendant’s sentence

to be illegally lenient. For Cheveallier’s conviction for distribution or

possession with intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles, the trial

court failed to impose the mandatory fine of not more than $50,000 pursuant

to La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(2)(a). Defendant is not prejudiced in any way by the

trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory fine. An illegally lenient

sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence
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or by an appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A). This court,

however, is not required to take such action. See State v. Green, 54,267 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 334 So. 3d 1107. Since this court is not required to act,

the state has not objected to the error, and defendant is not prejudiced in any

way by the failure to impose the mandatory fine, we decline to impose the

fine.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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