State of Louisiana v. Erick Williams

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,076-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ERICK WILLIAMS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 388,775

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

SAMUEL S. CRICHTON
TOMMY JAN JOHNSON
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ.

STONE, J.

This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable

Chris Victory, presiding. On May 25, 2022, the defendant, Erick Williams

(“Williams”), was charged by a four-count bill of information with third

degree rape (in violation of La. R.S. 14:42), crimes against nature (in

violation of La. R.S. 14:89), simple escape (in violation of La. R.S. 14:110),

and resisting a police officer with force or violence (in violation of La. R.S.

14:108.2). Williams entered pleas of not guilty to all charges.

After his arrest, Williams filed a motion for discovery, and a

subsequent investigation of the rape allegation was conducted. The court

issued a protective order to conceal the identity of the victim from the

public, pursuant to La. R.S. 46:1844(W).1 The state responded to Williams’

motion and supplemented discovery during pretrial proceedings. On May

28, 2022, the court conducted a preliminary examination wherein Detective

David Karam (“Det. Karam”), a Shreveport Police Department sex crimes

investigator, testified, revealing that S.D. was the 24-year-old biological

daughter of Williams. Photos and a video were taken of Williams having

intercourse with S.D. while she was unconscious. As a result of Det.

Karam’s investigation, the court found probable cause to hold Williams over

for trial.

A jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged on all four

counts on August 23, 2023. Williams’ motions for a new trial and post-

judgment verdict of acquittal were denied by the court. On November 8,

2023, Williams was sentenced to 45 years at hard labor on the third degree

1
Hereinafter, the initials of the victim, S.D., are used.

rape conviction, to 10 years at hard labor on the crimes against nature

conviction, to 8 years at hard labor on the simple escape conviction, and to 5

years at hard labor on the resisting a police officer by force or violence

conviction. His sentences were ordered to be served consecutively without

the benefits of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. A motion to

reconsider sentence was filed and denied. This appeal followed.

FACTS

On the day of the offenses, S.D. was celebrating her birthday with

friends at the Windsor Apartments, where she lived with Angel Lee

(“Angel”), her significant other. At trial, S.D. testified that she was drinking

liquor and smoking marijuana and, at some point, became incapacitated.

The last thing S.D. remembered was sitting on the couch in her apartment.

Her next recollection occurred when she awoke in the hospital feeling hung

over. After regaining consciousness, S.D. discovered that she had been

raped. Earlier in the evening, S.D. recalled speaking with Angel — who was

at work — on the phone after she had commenced drinking.

Angel testified that S.D. stopped answering phone calls after a while.

After multiple attempts to call S.D., Williams answered the phone, which

surprised Angel.2 Angel stated the conversation seemed unusual after

Williams informed her that S.D. was drunk. Hearing this, a concerned

Angel then activated a FaceTime call so that she could see S.D. for herself.

Angel observed S.D. lying face down on her bed wearing only a sports bra.

Upon arriving home, Angel found S.D. on the couch, unresponsive and

foaming at the mouth. Notably, Williams was not present. Angel testified

2
S.D. identified Williams in court as her biological father, noting that she did not
have a relationship with him.
2

that the apartment appeared to be ransacked as if someone had “robbed the

place.” The Shreveport Police and medical unit of the Shreveport Fire

Department were summoned.

Shreveport Police Corporal Avery Williams (“Cpl. Williams”) — no

relation to the defendant — arrived at the apartment where he saw S.D.

being taken away by gurney for ambulance transport to the hospital. He also

gathered photos and video taken by others who were at the scene. The

photos and video captured Williams and an incapacitated and sexually

compromised S.D.3 At trial, S.D. identified Williams as her father, in both

the courtroom and in the photos and video. She further testified that she was

unconscious, had no recollection of the events, and certainly did not consent

to sexual relations with Williams.

Within hours and in an unrelated sequence of events, Williams was

treated for stab wounds at the same hospital where S.D. was being treated.

Shreveport Police Officer Donald Bradford (“Ofr. Bradford”) was

dispatched to the hospital to arrest and transport Williams (who had non life-

threatening injuries) to the police station. Once there, Williams consented to

a recorded interview with sex crimes investigator Det. Karam where he

admitted to being at S.D.’s apartment on the night of the rape and seeing her

drunk with only her bra on. Williams denied having sex with S.D.

throughout the interview until presented with photos depicting his sexual

acts. Williams asked for DNA swabs and subsequently stated “I know I did

it” in the latter part of the interview.

3
The pictures depict Williams naked from his head to his knees where his pants
and underwear are down to his knees with him being positioned between S.D.’s legs
depicted as the “missionary position” for sexual intercourse. The video depicts vivid
movement by Williams having intercourse with S.D.
3

Det. Karam obtained DNA samples from Williams and submitted

them to the Northwest Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory of Shreveport.

Kari Dicken (“Dicken”), a forensic DNA analyst with the crime lab,

qualified as an expert in forensic DNA at trial. The reference samples were

compared with the recovery of DNA taken from the external genitalia and

perineal swabs collected from S.D.’s vaginal opening. Dicken’s report also

contained two anal swabs collected from the external opening of S.D.’s

rectum. Dicken explained to the jury that from Williams’ DNA samples, she

was able to identify Williams’ DNA profile and then tested sperm cells from

the samples taken from S.D. The tests revealed that Williams’ DNA profile

was a major contributor to both the vaginal and anal swabs taken from S.D.

On August 23, 2023, a jury unanimously convicted Williams of all

four counts. Williams was adjudicated a third felony offender and his

sentencing exposure was enhanced as a result. Williams appealed, asserting

two assignments of error, specifically arguing: (1) insufficiency of the

evidence for his third degree rape conviction, and (2) failure of the state to

meet its burden of proof for the crimes against nature conviction.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On review, Williams contends he never admitted to penetrating S.D.,

that she did not remember the incident, and the state failed to prove vaginal

or anal penetration as none of his DNA was found inside S.D.’s vagina or

anus. He argues that as a result of the state’s failure to prove an essential

element of third degree rape — penetration — his conviction must be

4

vacated.4 Williams asserts the evidence introduced at trial, when viewed

under the Jackson standard, was insufficient to prove third degree rape.

In response, the state argues the evidence is abundantly clear to prove

the element in dispute as to the third degree rape and submits that the totality

of the evidence proves penetration occurred.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Ladell, 52,847 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So.3d 932. This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

factfinder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.

The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v.

Green, 49,741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. Direct evidence

provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example, a witness’s testimony

that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1985).

Circumstantial evidence provides proof of collateral facts and circumstances,

4
La. R.S. 14:43 provides, in pertinent part: Third degree rape is committed when
the anal, oral or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of
a victim because it is committed when the victim is incapable of resisting or of
understanding the nature of the act by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of mind
produced by an intoxicating agent or any cause and the offender knew or should have
known of the victim’s incapacity.
5

from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to

reason and common experience. Id. When the state relies on circumstantial

evidence to establish the existence of an essential element of a crime, the

court must assume every fact that the evidence tends to prove and the

circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence. La. R.S. 15:438; Lilly supra; Ladell, supra; Green, supra. The

trier of fact is charged with weighing the credibility of this evidence and, on

review, the same standard as in Jackson, supra is applied, giving great

deference to the factfinder’s conclusions. Green, supra. When the trier of

fact reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence advanced by a defendant,

the hypothesis fails, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another

hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Sosa, 05-0213 (La.

1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 94.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

Green, supra; State v. Glover, 47,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/10/12), 106 So. 3d

129, writ denied, 12-2667 (La. 5/24/13), 116 So. 3d 659. Such testimony

alone is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical,

scientific, or physical evidence. State v. Larkins, 51,540 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/27/17), 243 So. 3d 1220, writ denied, 17-1900 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So. 3d

154

In this case, Williams’ challenge of his conviction on the basis that the

state did not prove penetration is without merit as the evidence was more

than sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt.

6

Ultimately, it was the jury’s duty as the factfinder to weigh the

evidence presented. At trial, the jury heard testimony from S.D. that she

could not recall the rape, but she was able to identify Williams in a photo

naked and on top of her in a sexual position while she was unconscious. This

is overwhelmingly demonstrative evidence of his penetration and guilt.

Additionally, the jury viewed Williams’ admission of guilt in his recorded

interview with Det. Karam — which the trial court found was freely and

voluntarily given — that he committed the rape. Lastly, the jury listened to

Dicken (an expert forensic DNA analyst), explain how she swabbed and

collected Williams’ DNA from S.D.’s genital areas soon after the rape

occurred. The location and collection of Williams’ DNA in the perineal

vaginal opening and the external aperture of the anus inside the intergluteal

cleft further implies penetration took place. With testimonial, visual, and

DNA evidence presented here, any rational trier of fact could not conclude

anything contrary to penetration taking place. The jury reasonably found

that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as it amply demonstrated

that Williams did indeed rape S.D. Moreover, in reviewing factors under

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, the trial court noted that Williams presented an

unreasonable risk of danger to the public believing that a man who willingly

violates his own daughter would willingly violate other members of society.

We agree. Williams’ conduct during the commission of this deplorable

crime manifested deliberate cruelty to S.D. and she will surely suffer severe

emotional and psychological damage as a result. This court cannot and will

not disturb any determinations of guilt made by the factfinder in this case.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

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Burden of Proof

In his second assignment of error, Williams asserts that in the bill of

information, the state charged him with crimes against nature (sodomy) of

S.D.5 Prior to deliberations, however, the trial court instructed the jury that

it could determine whether Williams was guilty of crimes against nature

(incest) with S.D. instead.6 Williams contends the verdict form did not

specify that the jury found him guilty of the crime with which he was

charged. As such, the state failed to meet its burden of proof.

In response, the state submits that Williams is not entitled to any relief

under this assignment because his failure to assign error to a defect in the

bill of information excludes the issue from consideration on appeal unless it

was patent on the face of the record. La. C. Cr. P. art. 920.

The time for testing the sufficiency of an indictment or bill of

information is before trial by way of a motion to quash or an application for

a bill of particulars. State v. Gainey, 376 So.2d 1240, 1243 (La. 1979). A

post-verdict attack on the sufficiency of an indictment should be rejected

unless the indictment failed to give fair notice of the offense charged or

failed to set forth any identifiable offense. State v. Campbell, 06-0286 (La.

5
La. R.S. 14:89 (A)(1) provides: A crime against nature is the unnatural carnal
copulation by a human being with another of the same sex or opposite sex, except that
anal sexual intercourse between two human beings shall not be deemed as a crime against
nature when done under any of the circumstances described in R.S. 14:41, 42, 42.1, or 43.
Emission is not necessary; and, when committed by a human being with another, the use
of the genital organ of one of the offenders of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the
crime.
6
La. R.S. 14:89 (A)(2) provides: A crime against nature is the marriage to, or
sexual intercourse with, any ascendant or descendant, brother or sister, uncle or niece,
aunt or nephew, with knowledge of their relationship. The relationship must be by
consanguinity, but it is immaterial whether the parties to the act are related to one another
by the whole or half blood. The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply where one
person, not a resident of this state at the time of the celebration of his marriage,
contracted a marriage lawful at the place of celebration and thereafter removed to this
state.
8

5/21/08); 983 So. 2d 810. State v. Williams, 480 So. 2d 721, 722, n. 1 (La.

1985); The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state

for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the

defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission

shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a

conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his

prejudice. La. C. Cr. P. art. 464.

The pertinent issue for this assignment is not whether the state met its

burden of proof for either sodomy or incest, because a jury undoubtedly

found Williams guilty of both. We must determine whether Williams is

entitled to any relief on appeal. We conclude that he is not. Williams was

not prejudiced in preparing for his defense by surprise or lack of notice of

the charges and facts against him in this case. He filed neither a motion to

quash nor a motion for a bill of particulars to clarify the bill of information.

The appropriate time would have been prior to trial. The record clearly

shows that Williams was notified of the crime against nature charge

involving sexual intercourse with his biological daughter throughout

pleadings, pretrial investigations, preliminary matters, and the discovery

process. Because Williams neither objected nor raised the issue at trial, he

waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the bill of information on

appeal. This assignment lacks merit.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record reveals two errors patent. First, there was no

proper pronouncement restriction of benefits in Williams’ sentences. The

trial court failed to specify that his sentences were to be served without the
9

benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and that the third degree rape

sentence is specifically to be served without the benefit of parole. Thus,

Williams’ sentences are illegally lenient.

A defendant in a criminal case does not have a constitutional right or a

statutory right to an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 00-1725

(La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790. The failure to impose hard labor is harmless

and self-correcting when there is a mandatory felony requiring any sentence

to be served at hard labor. State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d

61; State v. Foster, 50,535 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 674. When

the trial court fails to order that a portion of a sentence to be served without

benefits as statutorily mandated, the sentence will be automatically served

without benefits for the requisite time period. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A). Any

sentence imposed under the habitual offender provisions shall be at hard

labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The benefit of

parole is determined by the sentencing provisions for the underlying offense.

La. R.S. 15:529.1 (G).

We again note that the trial court did not restrict the benefits of

Williams’ sentences as required by law. However, this is harmless and self-

correcting error. Williams was adjudicated a third felony habitual offender,

and as such, all of his sentences are to be served at hard labor without the

benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Williams’ parole eligibility

is determined by his underlying convictions. An illegally lenient sentence

may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an

appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882 (A). This correction may be

made despite the failure of either party to raise the issue. Williams, supra.
10

Accordingly, we amend Williams’ sentences to provide that they are to be

served without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

The second error patent reveals a discrepancy between the minutes of

the sentencing hearing held on January 18, 2024, in that the minutes do not

accurately reflect the trial court’s sentencing. The minutes mentioned the

sentences were ordered to be served without the benefit of probation, parole

or suspension of sentence. However, the restriction of benefits was not

reflected on the record. A sentence shall be pronounced orally in open court

and recorded in the minutes. Where there is a discrepancy between the

minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Smith, 53,827

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21); 315 So. 3d 407 State v. Burns, 53,250 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/15/20), 290 So. 3d 721. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial

court with instructions to amend the minutes to accurately reflect the

sentences imposed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are

affirmed, the sentences are amended, and this matter is remanded with

instructions to amend the court minutes to correctly reflect the sentences

imposed at the sentencing hearing.

AFFIRMED, SENTENCES AMENDED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

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