State of Louisiana v. Mitch Bratton

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,080-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

MITCH BRATTON Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Thirty-Seventh Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caldwell, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 99,763

Honorable Jimmy C. Teat (Ad Hoc), Judge

*****

CAMERON MURRAY & ASSOCIATES Counsel for Appellant
By: H. Cameron Murray
Clint R. Hanchey
Jane Hogan

LIZ MURRILL Counsel for Appellee
Attorney General

DARWIN C. MILLER
MICHELLE ANDERSON THOMPSON
IRENA ZAJICKOVA
Assistant Attorneys General

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Following a lengthy trial, the elected chief of police for the Village of

Grayson in Caldwell Parish, Louisiana, was convicted by a unanimous jury

of multiple counts of malfeasance in office related to funds in and

accounting for a narcotics fund, felony theft of seized cash, and possession

of two controlled substances. During the investigation by Louisiana State

Police detectives, the police chief claimed that he was simply chaotically

disorganized and messy as the reason for the presence of drugs in his

vehicle, missing cash, and the absence of recordkeeping for years of narcotic

fund transactions. The jury rejected his explanation and found him guilty on

all counts. He now appeals those convictions and his subsequent sentences,

fines, and ordered restitution. For the reasons set forth in greater detail

below, we affirm his convictions, affirm in part and vacate in part his

sentences, and remand this matter with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 18, 2020, Mitch Bratton (“Bratton”), the chief of police of

the Village of Grayson, called the Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) about

suspicions that Rosetta Mercer (“Mercer”), the town clerk, was stealing

funds from the town. Detective Nicolas Blake of the LSP interviewed

Mercer and obtained a court order for bank records for Grayson’s narcotics

account. On June 4, 2020, LSP detectives, including Det. Blake, went to

Grayson to speak to Bratton and ask him to provide records related to

Grayson’s narcotics fund. Bratton told detectives that the documents could

be somewhere in his office or elsewhere in the town hall building.

Detectives were unable to locate any documents related to the narcotics fund

from the

years 2016 through 2019, despite searching multiple areas of the building

and many different boxes.

Bratton told detectives that he knew how to keep records and that he

used the narcotics fund to perform investigations and pay informants in

Grayson. Near the end of the search by the detectives, a woman named

Francis Wooten (“Wooten”) arrived at the town hall to speak to Bratton

about a complaint. She told the detectives that Bratton had stolen $1,150

from her. Bratton told the detectives that he had arrested her husband, Jacob

Canada (“Canada”), and confiscated the $1,150 cash from him during the

arrest. When questioned about these funds, Bratton told the detectives that

the cash was missing and may have fallen out of his police vehicle.

LSP detectives then searched Bratton’s police vehicle and found a

suboxone strip, several tablets and partial tablets of Xanax, and a plastic

baggy in the cup holders. The suspected drugs were submitted to the crime

lab for analysis. The crime lab identified the drugs as buprenorphine and

flualprazolam, which is alprazolam and with a fluorine bonded to it.

alprazolam is also known as Xanax.

On August 18, 2020, Bratton was charged with one count of

malfeasance in office, two counts of theft, and one count of obstruction of

justice, to which he pleaded not guilty. On May 13, 2022, a grand jury

returned an indictment charging the defendant with malfeasance in office

(counts 1-6), unauthorized use of a movable (count 7), possession of

flualprazolam (count 8), and possession of buprenorphine (count 9), in

violation of La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1), 14:68(A), 40:966(C)(1)(a), and

40:968(C). The State later amended count 6 to theft, a violation of La. R.S.

14:67(A)(3) and amended Count 8 to possession of alprazolam, a violation
2

of La. R.S. 40:969(C). Bratton filed a motion to quash the first two counts

of malfeasance on the basis of prescription, which was denied by the trial

court.

On June 26, 2023, the jury trial began. The trial lasted until July 6,

2023, with numerous witnesses for the prosecution and defense:

LSP Detective Nicolas Blake was the first witness, who testified that

Bratton initially called his office to report concerns that Mercer was stealing

money. He testified that Bratton had no specific allegations or evidence that

Mercer was stealing money. He later met with Mercer and her attorney, and

she was not arrested for any crime. Det. Blake described receiving banking

records for Grayson, specifically for the narcotics account. Det. Blake

described that Bratton would request money for specific narcotics

investigations and the money would be transferred to him. Det. Blake

discussed photographs he had taken of Bratton’s office and described it as

messy and chaotic. When testifying about Bratton’s work area, Det. Blake

identified a brown paper bag with a broken seal on it. When questioned as

to what it was, he stated, “unsecure evidence.” Defense counsel then moved

for a mistrial pursuant to 404(B), and the motion for mistrial was denied by

the trial court.

Det. Blake further testified that Bratton directed them to several

different spots to search for records related to the narcotics fund, but they

found no documentation related to the narcotics fund from 2016 through

2019 and Bratton could produce no such records. Det. Blake described how

Wooten arrived at Bratton’s office as the detectives were searching. After a

conversation with her, the detectives also searched Bratton’s police vehicle.

The detectives discovered a Suboxone strip, partial tablets, and a baggy in
3

the cup holder of the police vehicle. The tablets found in the police unit had

been seized by Bratton on May 16, 2020 and were found by detectives on

June 4, 2020. The actual quantity of tablets originally seized by Bratton was

never determined. The suspected drugs were sent to the crime lab for

identification by the detectives with LSP as part of this investigation.

Det. Blake identified numerous checks from Citizen’s Progressive

Bank made out to Bratton from the narcotics account. Det. Blake clarified

that the areas searched were not the sole province of Bratton, but open to the

entire police department. He testified that he searched Bratton’s phone and

found no evidence of him working narcotics cases or speaking with

informants. He stated that he did not read the entirety of the phone record

but spent several hours searching using key words. Det. Blake stated that

Bratton had claimed he could not find certain documents because Mercer

had rearranged his office, but Mercer told Det. Blake that she had not moved

any of Bratton’s documents. Bratton testified that many other employees,

including Mercer and her husband, the assistant chief of police, had access

to the police records.

North Louisiana Crime Lab forensic chemist Leola Summerville was

next to testify at trial, and the trial court certified her as an expert in the field

of forensic chemistry. Regarding the drugs found in Bratton’s police unit,

she testified that the common name for alprazolam is Xanax. She analyzed

two tablets removed from Bratton’s police vehicle and the result was

flualprazolam, which is a fluorinated analog of alprazolam. Alprazolam is

the parent structure inside of flualprazolam, and flualprazolam cannot exist

without alprazolam. The Suboxone strip she tested that was removed from

Bratton’s vehicle contained buprenorphine. Regarding the notion the
4

Grayson Police Department was active in arresting and prosecuting drug

cases, she noted that only five cases had been submitted to the crime lab for

analysis since 2016 from Grayson’s police department.

Caldwell Parish Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy John Stott

testified that he went to assist Bratton on a call on May 16, 2020, along with

another deputy, Chuck Esters. Bratton had pulled over three men, and a set

of Suboxone strips was found and seized by Bratton. He testified that

Bratton chose to release the three suspects, rather than to charge them for

possession of the drugs found, but that Bratton retained the drugs he took

from the suspects. Apparently based on something discussed with the three

suspects, Bratton asked the deputies to follow him to Jacob Canada’s house.

Bratton made contact with Canada and patted him down. Bratton removed

Canada from the deputies’ sight for about 10 minutes, then returned and

arrested him. Deputy Esters did another patdown of Canada and pulled cash

out of Canada’s pocket.

Deputy Stott further testified that after the money was counted,

Bratton took the money, folded it, said “I’ll take that,” and put it in his

pocket. Deputy Stott testified that this was abnormal behavior. In his

experience, the money would be put in an evidence bag, labeled with the

case number, the amount, where it came from, who it came from, and the

amount of the cash. Deputy Esters transferred Canada to jail and was

followed by Bratton. He testified that Bratton stated on the police radio that

he would be taking the $1,150 dollars taken from Canada to log into the jail.

There was no record at trial that the cash had ever been logged into the jail.

Rashay Jacob Canada, Canada’s son, testified how he gave his father

$450 dollars of his Covid stimulus money and how it was confiscated by the
5

police. He testified his money has not been returned to him. Francis

Wooten, Canada’s wife, testified that she gave her husband $700 of her

Covid stimulus money to hold and to use to pay bills and the rent. It was

also confiscated by Bratton. She testified that she told Bratton that the

money he took from Canada was her and her son’s Covid stimulus money.

She stated that the money was for the payment of rent and other bills, and

because she did not have the money, she got kicked out of her home.

Wooten testified that she called Bratton every day after Canada’s arrest,

seeking her money, but never got a call back. She went to the police station

and encountered the LSP detectives. She testified that the charges were

eventually dismissed against her husband but that the money was never

returned to her.

Caldwell Parish Sheriff’s Office Chief Deputy Jack McKeithen

testified that as chief deputy he acts as the custodian of records for the

sheriff’s office. He testified regarding the radio transmission made by

Bratton stating that he would take the $1,150 and log it into the jail.

David Ryan Vercher testified that he is a certified public accountant

and was qualified by the trial court as an expert in accounting with a

specialization in the arena of governmental auditing. Vercher was the

auditor of the Village of Grayson but had never specifically examined the

narcotics fund. He testified that municipalities are required to maintain

records for auditing purposes. He stated that Louisiana law requires elected

public officials and department heads within a municipality, including the

elected chief of police, to maintain and exercise diligence in maintaining

records for a minimum of three years. Examples of such records would be

documentation related to money transactions or nonmonetary assets.
6

Vercher clarified that while the municipality had a duty to maintain records,

the chief of police also had a legislative duty to maintain records.

Grayson Mayor Melissa Bratton testified that she was elected mayor

of Grayson in 2019 and that Bratton is her husband’s cousin. She testified

that Grayson operated the narcotics fund from 2016 through 2019, but the

fund was terminated in 2019 because Grayson could not afford it anymore.

She stated that Bratton was the person receiving funds from the narcotics

fund but that she never saw any documentation related to how the money

was being spent. She testified that Bratton told her he used the money to

pay informants. She admitted that she never asked for actual documentation

related to the fund.

Louisiana State Police Detective Sergeant Albert Paxton testified that

he aided LSP Det. Blake with the search for records in Bratton’s offices. He

described the various locations Bratton suggested that they may be able to

find records related to the narcotics fund and testified that Bratton suggested

the cash from Canada may have fallen out of his patrol vehicle. Det. Paxton

felt that Bratton was not being honest or forthcoming regarding his answers

to the whereabouts of the narcotics fund records. He testified that Bratton

told him that “he wasn’t good with records, and he half-assed his records,”

later stating, “I don’t do a very good job.”

After the State rested its case, the defense called Caldwell Parish

Sheriff Clay Bennett, who testified that the Sheriff’s office did not conduct

narcotics investigations with Grayson police. He stated that they do have a

working relationship and there may have been times that they exchanged

information regarding narcotics investigations.

7

Jacob Canada testified regarding the cash confiscated by Bratton,

noting that the $1,150 belonged to his wife and child, clarifying the amount

taken from him by Bratton. Ron Schleuter was qualified as an expert in law

enforcement and narcotics investigation by the trial court and testified that

there is no requirement for officers to place seized evidence into evidence

bags, as long as the officer keeps the evidence secure and can attest that it

was in a secure and safe location. On cross-examination, he testified, after

being shown a photograph of Bratton’s police vehicle, that he would not

recommend securing evidence in such a place and it would violate his

department’s policy. He testified that it was unacceptable for money to fall

out of a police vehicle.

Chris Navarro testified that he worked as an informant for Grayson

police and was paid $250 by Bratton many times to set up drug transactions.

Teresa Roberts, the current town clerk, testified that Mercer’s personnel

records were missing and that it is her job to maintain records for Grayson.

Louis Champagne was the chief public defender for Caldwell Parish and

received subsidies from Grayson. He testified that while Mercer was the

clerk, the payments to his office were late and that he received no payments

from August of 2019 through 2020 from her. Savannah Meredith testified

that she worked with Mercer and saw Mercer taking documents from

Bratton’s office in an effort to clean it up in 2019. Glenn Guillory testified

that Mercer converted a storage room into her office and was often moving

files around to various locations. Michael Head testified that he was a

maintenance man for Grayson and was once instructed to take five boxes to

the dumpster by Mercer, some of which were labeled as “Grayson Police

Department.”
8

On June 30, 2023, the State dismissed count 5 (malfeasance in office)

and count 6 (unauthorized use of a movable). Trial proceeded on the

remaining counts. On July 6, 2023, a unanimous jury found Bratton guilty

on all remaining counts.

On September 21, 2023, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing

wherein Wooten gave a victim impact statement and Bratton presented

several witnesses to testify as to his character. After reviewing the

testimony and presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced

Bratton as follows:

1. Count 1, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor and a
$1,000 fine.

2. Count 2, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

3. Count 3, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

4. Count 4, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

5. Count 7, Felony Theft: three years at hard labor and a $1,000 fine.

6. Count 8, Possession of Alprazolam: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

7. Count 9, Possession of Buprenorphine: sentenced to three years at
hard labor with a $1,000 fine.

As noted above, counts 5 and 6 were dismissed by the State during trial.

The trial court ordered that the prison sentences were to run concurrently,

with two years suspended. The fines were ordered to run consecutively, and

credit was given for time served. Bratton was ordered to pay restitution in

the amount of $1,150 to Wooten.

Bratton filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. This

appeal followed.
9

DISCUSSION

Bratton asserts five assignments of error, which will each be

addressed below.

First Assignment of Error: The evidence is legally insufficient to sustain
Mitch Bratton’s convictions.

Bratton first contends that the State failed to provide sufficient

evidence to convict him of all charges. The standard of appellate review for

a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the case in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224. This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

fact finder. Steines, supra.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442; Steines, supra. A reviewing court affords great deference to a jury’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Copeland, 52,742 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So. 3d 848, writ

denied, 19-01646 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So. 3d 89. We will address each of

Bratton’s convictions below.

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Malfeasance Convictions

Bratton first contends that the State failed to provide sufficient

evidence to convict him on each of the four counts of malfeasance.

Malfeasance in office occurs when any public officer and public employee

shall intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of

him, as such officer or employee; or intentionally perform any such duty in

an unlawful manner. La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1)-(2).

Under this statute, the State must prove the existence of a law or

statute imposing an affirmative duty on the defendant as a public officer and

that the defendant intentionally refused or failed to perform that duty or

intentionally performed that duty in an unlawful manner. State v.

Thompson, 15-0886 (La. 9/18/17), 233 So. 3d 529. The duty must be one

expressly imposed by law on the public officer because the officer is entitled

to know exactly what conduct is expected of him in his official capacity and

what conduct will expose him to criminal charges. Id. Intent is an essential

element of the offense. As a state of mind, specific intent need not be

proved as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the

transaction and the actions of the defendant. Id.

At all relevant times herein, La. R.S. 44:412(A)1 stated:

The head of each agency of the state and its subdivisions shall
establish and maintain an active, continuing program for the
economical and efficient management of the records of the
agency. Such program shall provide for: effective controls over
the creation, maintenance, and use of records in the conduct of
current business; cooperation with the division in applying
standards, procedures, and techniques designed to improve the
management of records, promote the maintenance and security
of records deemed appropriate for preservation, and facilitate
the segregation and disposal of records of temporary value; and

1
La. R.S. 44:412 was repealed on July 31, 2024.
11

compliance with the provisions of this Chapter and the rules,
and regulations of the division.

In this case, the question presented is whether the evidence is such that any

rational juror could reasonably infer that defendant’s failure to perform his

statutory duties as chief of police of the Village of Grayson was intentional.

We must evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution

and give deference to the jury’s assessment of credibility and weighing of

the evidence. State v. Thomas, supra.

While Bratton argues that he did not have a duty because it was the

clerk’s job to maintain records, La. R.S. 44:412 states that the duty to

maintain an active, continuing program for the economical and efficient

management of records of the agency falls on the heard of each agency of

the state and its subdivision, which would include the chief of police of

Grayson. The jury heard testimony that Bratton had previously kept detailed

records on the use of the narcotics fund and that detectives had found

records from 2012 and earlier. The jury further heard testimony and

reviewed evidence that Bratton had withdrawn thousands of dollars from the

narcotics fund from 2016 through 2019 but that he was unable to produce

records evidencing the names of the informants he alleged to have paid with

the funds or the results of those investigations. While Bratton presented

evidence that Mercer had removed records from his office, the jury clearly

rejected this argument. The jury heard testimony that Bratton was evasive

and inconsistent while detectives were searching for the records, which were

never located. In sum, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of malfeasance were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

12

Illegal Possession Convictions

Bratton next argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him

of possession of buprenorphine and alprazolam pursuant to La. R.S. 40:968

and La. R.S. 40:969.

To support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous

substance (“CDS”), the prosecution must prove that the defendant

knowingly possessed an illegal drug. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157 So. 3d

1127. The identity of the drug is an essential element of the charged

offense. Id. Possession of a CDS may be established by showing that the

defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the substance.

“Actual possession” means having an object in one’s possession or on one’s

person in such a way as to have direct physical contact with and control of

the object. Id. The State need not prove the defendant actually possessed

the drugs, and constructive possession is sufficient. State v. Simon, 51,778

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1149, writ denied, 18-0283 (La.

11/5/18), 255 So. 3d 1052. Constructive possession is established by

evidence that the drugs were within the defendant’s dominion and control

and that the defendant had knowledge of their presence. Id.

At the outset, we distinguish the understandable and necessary

protection afforded to law enforcement officers in the lawful and appropriate

performance of their duties while confiscating, storing, and destroying

controlled dangerous substances from the facts in this matter. The record

makes clear this is not a situation where Bratton was interrupted in the

process of confiscating, logging, and securing seized drugs. Any reasonable

explanation for possession by any law enforcement officer of drugs seized
13

that are not logged into evidence evaporates with each passing day from the

date of seizure until properly logged and secured in evidence. There was no

detailed inventory made by Bratton of the quantity of drugs seized that could

be compared to the drugs found weeks later in his vehicle. Without any

record of what was seized to compare to what was found, there can be no

rational explanation that Bratton was in the course of performing his duties.

Another unanswered question which is of concern is why drugs were seized

but suspects were not arrested, and why those drugs were not properly

secured and then appropriately and lawfully destroyed if they were not to be

evidence at a trial.

As to his conviction for possession of alprazolam, Bratton argues that

the State only submitted evidence that he possessed flualprazolam.

Alprazolam is a Schedule IV CDS pursuant to La. R.S. 40:969. The jury

heard evidence and testimony from Summerville that she tested the two

white tablets through the GC-MS chromatograph and the tablets were

confirmed to be flualprazolam. She testified that flualprazolam contains

alprazolam with fluorine bonded to it. She testified that alprazolam is the

parent drug of flualprazolam and that flualrpazolam cannot exist without

alprazolam. When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational juror could have found that Bratton was guilty of possession of

alprazolam

Bratton further argued that there was insufficient evidence that he

illegally possessed either alprazolam or buprenorphine because he seized

them as evidence of crime and kept them secured in his police unit. The jury

heard testimony that the drugs were found by detectives loose in Bratton’s

cupholder, weeks after the seizure of the drugs on May 16, 2020. Several
14

witnesses testified that keeping loose pills that were seized from suspects of

a crime is not the proper way of handling drug evidence. The jury,

confronted with the facts in this matter, clearly overcame any rational

predisposition that Bratton should be considered appropriately to have had

possession of controlled dangerous substances in the process of seizing,

storing, using as evidence at a trial, and then properly destroying them.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find there

was sufficient evidence that a rational juror could have found Bratton

illegally possessed alprazolam and buprenorphine.

Theft Conviction

Bratton argues that his conviction for theft should also be vacated

because the State’s circumstantial evidence failed to exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. He contends that the State did not

prove he intended to permanently deprive Wooten of the money he

confiscated from Canada.

La. R.S. 14:67(A) defines theft as:

Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value
which belongs to another, either without the consent of the
other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of
fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to
deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject
of the misappropriation or taking is essential.

The jury heard evidence that Bratton seized the $1,150 from Canada,

watched as a deputy counted the money out, and then took the money,

folded it, said “I’ll take that,” and placed it in his own pocket. Dep. Stott

testified to the jury that he found this to be abnormal behavior for a law

enforcement officer. The jury heard testimony from Wooten and Rashay

15

Canada, Jr. that the money seized from Canada was their government

stimulus money.

Wooten testified that she attempted to contact Bratton about returning

her money for several weeks before she came to the police department to

speak with him and ended up speaking to LSP detectives. Bratton suggested

to detectives that the money had simply fallen out of his police unit due to

his disorganization. There was evidence presented to the jury that Bratton

said on the radio that he was going to take the cash to the jail to be logged

into evidence but that there was no indication he ever attempted to log the

cash as evidence. Sadly, this explanation by Bratton is akin to a schoolchild

asserting “the dog ate my homework” in an attempt to avoid responsibility.

The above evidence forms a sufficient basis for a rational juror to conclude

that Bratton intended to permanently deprive Wooten and Rashay Canada,

Jr. of the cash.

For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.

Second Assignment of Error: The trial court erroneously denied Mitch
Bratton’s motion to quash.

Bratton argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash

the first two counts of malfeasance against him. The motion to quash is

essentially a mechanism by which to raise pretrial pleas of defense, i.e.,

matters which do not go to the merits of the charge. La. C. Cr. P. arts. 531-

534; State v. Armstard, 43,333 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 991 So. 2d 116,

writ denied, 08-2440 (La. 1/16/09), 998 So. 2d 89, cert. denied, 557 U.S.

905, 129 S. Ct. 2799, 174 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2009). In considering a motion to

quash, a court must accept as true the facts contained in the bill of

information and in the bills of particulars and determine as a matter of law

16

and from the face of the pleadings whether a crime has been charged. While

evidence may be adduced, such may not include a defense on the merits.

The question of factual guilt or innocence of the offense charged is not

raised by the motion to quash. Id. In cases in which the State cannot

establish an essential element of the offense under any set of facts

conceivably provable at trial, the motion to quash is the proper procedural

vehicle. Id.

An appellate court may reverse a trial court’s judgment on a motion to

quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

State v. Love, 00-3347 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So. 2d 1198; State v. Armstard,

supra. La. C. Cr. P. art. 532 states that a motion to quash may be based on

prescription. When a defendant has brought a motion to quash based on

prescription, the State bears a heavy burden to demonstrate either an

interruption or a suspension of the time limit has occurred. State v. Rome,

93-1221 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 1284.

In the present case, Bratton argues that the first two counts of

malfeasance in the indictment are prescribed because they cover the failure

to maintain public records for 2016 and 2017. The indictment was issued in

2022, and Bratton argues that the first two counts prescribed four years after

the offenses were alleged to occur, pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 572. The

trial court denied the motion to quash, finding that the exception set forth in

La. C. Cr. P. art 573(1) applied. Article 573(1) states:

The time limitations established by Article 572 shall not
commence to run as to the following offenses until the
relationship or status involved has ceased to exist when:

(1)The offense charged is based on the misappropriation
of any money or thing of value by one who, by virtue of

17

his office, employment, or fiduciary relationship, has
been entrusted therewith or has control thereof.

The trial court found that the time limitations established by Article 572 had

not commenced because at the time of indictment, Bratton was still serving

as the chief of police. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

ruling. Accepting as true the facts contained in the bill of information and in

the bills of particulars, from the face of the pleadings, the State successfully

charged Bratton with the crime of malfeasance. Because Bratton still held

his position as the chief of police, the time limitations set forth in Article 572

had not yet commenced. This assignment of error is without merit.

Third Assignment of Error: The trial court erroneously denied Mitch
Bratton’s motion for a mistrial.

Bratton argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

mistrial. Mistrial is a drastic remedy which is authorized only where

substantial prejudice will otherwise result to the accused. State v. Bell,

51,312 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 79. The determination of

whether actual prejudice has occurred lies with the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that

discretion. Id.; State v. Wilson, 50,589 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 196 So. 3d

614. Likewise, the determination of whether an admonition will adequately

cure any prejudice and assure a fair trial lies within the trial court’s

discretion. Id.

The law regarding mistrials on the grounds of improper references to

other crimes is well settled. La. C.E. art. 404(B) provides that evidence of

other crimes, acts, or wrongs is generally not admissible. La. C. Cr. P. art.

770(2) provides that a mistrial shall be granted upon motion of the defendant

when a remark or comment is made within the hearing of the jury by the
18

judge, district attorney, or a court official during a trial or in argument and

that remark refers to another crime committed or alleged to have been

committed by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible. State v.

Roberson, 46,697 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11), 81 So. 3d 911, writ denied, 12-

0086 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1270. For the purposes of Article 770, a law

enforcement officer is not considered a “court official,” and an unsolicited,

unresponsive reference to other crimes evidence made by a law enforcement

officer is not grounds for a mandatory mistrial under La. C. Cr. P. art. 770.

Id.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 771 sets forth permissive grounds for requesting an

admonition or a mistrial when a prejudicial remark is made on grounds that

do not require an automatic mistrial. Mistrial is at the discretion of the trial

court and should be granted only where the prejudicial remarks of the

witness make it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial. State v.

Roberson, supra. Mistrial is a drastic remedy which is authorized only

where substantial prejudice will result to the accused. Id. A comment must

not “arguably” point to a prior crime; to trigger a mandatory mistrial

pursuant to Article 770(2), the remark must “unmistakably” point to

evidence of another crime. Id.

Bratton argues that the trial court should have granted a mistrial after

Det. Blake testified that Bratton had a bag of unsecured evidence under his

desk. Det. Blake’s remark was made during an examination of the

photographs showing Bratton’s office and places that the LSP officers

searched for records. We do not find that this reference by Det. Blake was

so prejudicial as to make it impossible for Bratton to receive a fair trial. The

State established through further testimony that Bratton’s office was
19

available to many people who worked in town hall, indicating that any

number of people could have left the bag of evidence under the desk. One

remark by a law enforcement officer that a bag contained unsecured

evidence, in an office that was chaotically messy, did not cause substantial

prejudice to the defendant. We do not find it was an abuse of discretion for

the trial court to deny the motion for a mistrial, and this assignment of error

is without merit.

Fourth Assignment of Error: The trial court erroneously granted three
State cause challenges.

In his fourth assignment of error, Bratton argues that the trial court

erred in granting three for cause challenges made by the State during jury

selection. He contends that Caldwell Parish has only 10,000 residents and

that it was normal and reasonable for many of the potential jurors to know

him. La. C. Cr. P. art. 797 provides the five grounds a defendant may use to

challenge a juror for cause:

(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his
partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of
challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied,
that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and
the evidence;

(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment,
friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the
person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense
counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would
influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the
court; or

(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the
indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for
the same or any other offense.

20

A district court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges

for cause, and such a ruling is subject to reversal only when a review of the

entire voir dire reveals the court abused its discretion. State v. Dotson, 16-

0473 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So. 3d 34. This standard of review is utilized

“because the trial judge has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and

hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they

respond to questions by the parties’ attorneys.” Id. “Such expressions and

intonations are not readily apparent at the appellate level where review is

based on a cold record.” Id.

Bratton specifically objects to the dismissal of the following three

jurors for cause.

Gilbert Smith

Gilbert Smith testified that he did not know Bratton and did not raise

his hand when asked if he knew Bratton by the court. The State was able to

show that Smith was friends with Bratton on Facebook, although he at first

claimed that they were not friends. Courts are often challenged to

distinguish between actual friends and the minimal amount of effort to

become a “Facebook” friend, as there is no other designation available.

Smith testified that he had lived in Grayson since 2008 and actively posted

about politics on Facebook. He stated that he did not know that Bratton was

the chief of police of Grayson. The trial court noted that it was concerned

about the fact that Smith did not initially disclose that he was Facebook

friends with Bratton, noting that someone, either Smith or Bratton, had to

request the friendship. Considering the limited population base and subject

matter of frequent Facebook posts and comments, we do not find error in the

dismissal of Gilbert Smith by the trial court.
21

Arthur Nelson

Arthur Nelson testified that he had two generators stolen and the

sheriff’s office has been unable to recover them, even though they knew

where the generators are located. Nelson blamed Sheriff Bennett

specifically for the loss of his generators and testified that he would be

unable to believe everything the sheriff had to say if he testified. The trial

court noted that although Nelson eventually stated that he would listen to

what every witness had to say, his first and strongest response to the sheriff

was that he would not be a believable witness and was not good at his job.

We recognize that such strong sentiments toward an important witness

understandably undermine the ability to conduct a fair trial and unbiased

consideration of the evidence and testimony, and find no error in the

dismissal of Arthur Nelson by the trial court.

Tina Steele

Tina Steele testified that she was friends with Bratton and his wife and

saw them socially. The record reflects the following exchange between the

State and Steele:

Q: Are you going to hold me to a higher burden because of your
relationship with the defendant and his wife? Meaning, I’ve got
to prove it 100%; not just beyond a reasonable doubt?

A: Not sure.

Q: And that’s a great question. You’re not sure. Do you feel
that maybe you would make us prove it 100%, beyond what’s
required because you know him?

A: Maybe.

Q: Okay. Even if the law says beyond a reasonable doubt, you
might make us prove it stronger because of your relationship
with the defendant and his wife?

A: Yes.
22

The trial court granted the challenge for cause based on her above testimony

that she required more than reasonable doubt to convict.

Considering the record of the entire voir dire, including each potential

juror’s answers, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the State’s challenges for cause. The trial court, in making its

rulings, was able to view each juror’s tone and demeanor while delivering

their responses. Thus, it was in the best position to determine if each

potential juror had been properly rehabilitated. We find nothing in the

record to suggest an abuse of this discretion. Accordingly, this assignment

of error is without merit.

Fifth Assignment of Error: The trial court abused its discretion when it
imposed an excessive sentence.

Finally, Bratton contends that his sentence of three years’

imprisonment with two years suspended is excessive. He argues that his

alleged malfeasance did not cause direct or indirect harm to any other

individual. He asserts that he is a first-time offender and the trial court did

not take due consideration of the mitigating factors presented during the

sentencing hearing.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749; State v. Vanhorn,

52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La.

11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065. First, the record must show that the trial court

took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.
23

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial

court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Croskey, 53,505

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1151. The important elements which

should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties,

marital status, health, and employment record), prior criminal record,

seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones,

398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); Dowles, supra. There is no requirement that

specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Dowles,

supra.

On review, we find the trial court was in compliance with Article

894.1. The trial court heard testimony regarding Bratton’s mitigating

circumstances and reviewed the aggravating circumstances, including the

oath of office taken by Bratton as the Village of Grayson’s chief of police,

the economic injury done to the victims, and the use of his position of power

to facilitate the commission of the crimes. The trial court reviewed the facts

of the case and the victim impact statement. The court noted that a lesser

sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crimes. We

find that the trial court adequately complied with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. Dowles, supra. Constitutional review turns upon

whether the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

offense, or shocking to the sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const.

art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense

or nothing more than the purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A
24

sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in light of the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Baker, 51,933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-

0858 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18),

257 So. 3d 196.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and sentences should not be set aside as excessive

in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Dowles, supra. A trial judge

is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. Id. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate

court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the

appropriateness of a particular sentence. Id.

The offense of malfeasance is punishable by imprisonment for not

more than ten years, with or without hard labor, or a fine of not more than

five thousand dollars, or both. La. R.S. 14:134(C)(1). Conviction of

possession of buprenorphine, a Schedule III CDS, is punishable by

imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor

more than five years and, in addition, defendant may be required to pay a

fine of not more than five thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:968(C). Conviction

of possession of alprazolam, a Schedule IV CDS, is punishable by

imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor

more than five years and, in addition, defendant may be required to pay a

fine of not more than five thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:969(C).

The trial court sentenced Bratton as follows:

25

1. Count 1, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor and a
$1,000 fine.

2. Count 2, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

3. Count 3, Malfeasance in Office: three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

4. Count 4, Malfeasance in Office, three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

5. Count 7, three years at hard labor and a $1,000 fine.

6. Count 8, Possession of Alprazolam, three years at hard labor with a
$1,000 fine.

7. Count 9, Possession of Buprenorphine, sentenced to three years at
hard labor with a $1,000 fine.

The trial court suspended two years of his prison sentences, and Bratton was

ordered to serve one year at hard labor. All sentences were to run

concurrently to one another. Bratton was ordered to pay all costs of the

proceeds and the fines as a condition of his parole and probation.

Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution to Wooten in the amount of

$1,150.

We are mindful in reviewing the sentences imposed on public officials

for malfeasance in office of the delicate balance between having a chilling

effect on people being willing to seek public office and to serve, with the

requirement to hold elected officials to the highest standards when their

conduct varies, as it did here, from what is expected and required.

Unfortunately for Bratton, there is no documentation or record keeping

which could explain to the jury the actions he undertook with the authority

conferred on him. As a result, we cannot say there was error on the part of

the jury in its verdict or the court below in fashioning the sentences imposed.

26

On review, we do not find that Bratton’s sentences are constitutionally

excessive. The sentences imposed are in the middle of the range for all of

the offenses and have all been partially suspended. The sentences do not

shock the sense of justice, nor are they a needless infliction of pain and

suffering. While we may have fashioned a different sentence under these

facts and circumstances, the record before us supports the sentences and

fines, and there is no indication that they are excessive. This assignment of

error is without merit.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record indicates that there is an error patent in the

current proceedings regarding the trial court's imposition of the seven fines

of $1,000 each. As noted above, each of the above counts authorized the

imposition of a fine of not more than $5,000. The trial court in the present

matter imposed a $1,000 fine on Bratton for each count. However, La. C.

Cr. P. art. 875.1 states, in pertinent part:

A. The purpose of imposing financial obligations on an offender
who is convicted of a criminal offense is to hold the offender
accountable for his action, to compensate victims for any actual
pecuniary loss or costs incurred in connection with a criminal
prosecution, to defray the cost of court operations, and to provide
services to offenders and victims. These financial obligations
should not create a barrier to the offender’s successful
rehabilitation and reentry into society. Financial obligations in
excess of what an offender can reasonably pay undermine the
primary purpose of the justice system which is to deter criminal
behavior and encourage compliance with the law. Financial
obligations that cause undue hardship on the offender should be
waived, modified, or forgiven. Creating a payment plan for the
offender that is based upon the ability to pay, results in financial
obligations that the offender is able to comply with and often
results in more money collected. Offenders who are consistent in
their payments and in good faith try to fulfill their financial
obligations should be rewarded for their efforts.

B. For purposes of this Article, “financial obligations” shall
include any fine, fee, cost, restitution, or other monetary
27

obligation authorized by this Code or by the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 and imposed upon the defendant as part of a
criminal sentence, incarceration, or as a condition of the
defendant’s release on probation or parole.

C. (1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, prior
to ordering the imposition or enforcement of any financial
obligations as defined by this Article, the court shall conduct a
hearing to determine whether payment in full of the aggregate
amount of all the financial obligations to be imposed upon the
defendant would cause substantial financial hardship to the
defendant or his dependents. The court may consider, among
other factors, whether any victim of the crime has incurred a
substantial financial hardship as a result of the criminal act or
acts and whether the defendant is employed. The court may delay
the hearing to determine substantial financial hardship for a
period not to exceed ninety days, in order to permit either party
to submit relevant evidence.

(2) The defendant or the court may waive the judicial
determination of a substantial financial hardship required by the
provisions of this Paragraph. If the court waives the hearing on
its own motion, the court shall provide reasons, entered upon the
record, for its determination that the defendant is capable of
paying the fines, fees, and penalties imposed without causing a
substantial financial hardship.

D. (1) If the court determines that payment in full of the
aggregate amount of all financial obligations imposed upon the
defendant would cause substantial financial hardship to the
defendant or his dependents, the court shall do either of the
following:
(a) Waive all or any portion of the financial obligations, except
as provided in Paragraph E of this Article.
(b) Order a payment plan that requires the defendant to make a
monthly payment to fulfill the financial obligations.

(2)(a) The amount of each monthly payment for the payment plan
ordered pursuant to the provisions of Subsubparagraph (1)(b) of
this Paragraph shall be determined by the court after considering
all relevant factors, including but not limited to the defendant’s
average gross daily income for an eight-hour work day.
(b) If the court has ordered restitution, half of the defendant’s
monthly payment shall be distributed toward the defendant’s
restitution obligation.
(c) Except as provided in Paragraph E of this Article, during any
periods of unemployment, homelessness, or other circumstances
in which the defendant is unable to make the monthly payment,
the court or the defendant’s probation and parole officer is
authorized to impose a payment alternative, including but not

28

limited to substance abuse treatment, education, job training, or
community service.
(3) If, after the initial determination of the defendant’s ability to
fulfill his financial obligations, the defendant’s circumstances
and ability to pay his financial obligations change, the state, the
defendant, or the defendant’s attorney may file a motion with the
court to reevaluate the defendant’s circumstances and determine,
in the same manner as the initial determination, whether a
modification of the monthly financial obligation imposed
pursuant to this Article is appropriate under the circumstances.

We find that Bratton was entitled to a hearing pursuant to La. C. Cr. P.

art. 875.1 prior to the imposition of the fines and the order of restitution to

Wooten. There is no evidence in the record that he or the trial court waived

the determination of financial hardship. Because a hearing was not held, we

vacate the $1,000 fine assessed for each count and the order of restitution

and remand the matter to the trial court for the required hearing. We do not

find Bratton’s prison sentences should be vacated, as they are not excessive,

as noted above.

During sentencing, the trial court advised Bratton that he had “a

period of two years from the date this Judgment becomes final to file” for

postconviction relief. La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8 provides that a defendant has

two years from the date his “judgment of conviction and sentence has

become final” in which to seek post-conviction relief. Bratton is hereby

advised that no application for postconviction relief shall be considered if

filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has

become final. State v. Nelson, 46,915 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/29/12), 86 So. 3d

747.

Finally, the Uniform Commitment Order, signed by the trial judge,

does not accurately reflect the sentences imposed. The transcript of

Bratton’s sentencing hearing and the court minutes reveal that the trial court

29

ordered that Bratton was sentenced to three years hard labor, with two years

suspended, and to pay a fine of $1,000 plus fees for each charge. The prison

time was to run concurrently, and the fines were to run consecutively.

Credit was given for time served. Restitution was ordered in the amount of

$1,150 to Wooten. However, the Uniform Commitment Order reflects that

Bratton must serve three years of supervised probation upon release.

Accordingly, we hereby remand this matter for the purpose of correcting the

Uniform Commitment Order to reflect that the sentences imposed are in

conformity with the trial court’s order. State v. Robertson, 51,225 (La. App.

2 Cir. 4/12/17), 216 So. 3d 1137, writ denied, 17-0937 (La. 4/6/18), 240 So.

3d 185.

CONCLUSION

Bratton’s convictions are affirmed. Bratton’s sentences are affirmed,

in part, as to his sentences of three years at hard labor, two years suspended,

on each count, to run concurrently, and vacated, in part, as to the $1,000 fine

imposed on each count without a hearing. We remand this case for a hearing

pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 875.1 to determine Bratton’s ability to pay any

assessed fine or restitution and to correct the Uniform Commitment Order to

reflect that the sentences imposed are in conformity with the trial court’s

order.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES AFFIRMED, IN PART,

AND VACATED, IN PART, CASE REMANDED, WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

30