State of Louisiana v. Kolby Reshaad Moore

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,106-KA
No. 56,107-KA
No. 56,108-KA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

KOLBY RESHAAD MOORE Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 396,241

Honorable Katherine Clark Dorroh, Judge

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KEVIN V. BOSHEA Counsel for Appellant

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

KODIE K. SMITH
CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN
TOMMY J. JOHNSON
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Katherine C. Dorroh,

Judge, presiding. A unanimous jury found the defendant, Kolby Reshaad

Moore, guilty as charged of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S.

14:30.1. Moore appeals his conviction, claiming that the jury had

insufficient evidence to identify him as one of the individuals involved in the

killing of the victim. For the following reasons, we affirm Moore’s

conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 24, 2020, Kolby Moore and his friend Antone Hollis

rented a dark-colored 2020 Chevy Equinox SUV with license plate number

9551482 from Hertz Rental Company. The return date for the vehicle,

indicated on a receipt that was introduced at trial, was August 31, 2020. In

her trial testimony, Ms. Hollis stated that she provided an address and a

phone number to the car rental company. The number she provided was

Moore’s phone number. Ms. Hollis indicated that she saw the vehicle on

Tuesday, August 25, 2020, when Moore was dropped off at her apartment at

Southport Apartments. On that date, she observed two other individuals in

the SUV with Moore. Moore stayed the night with Ms. Hollis, and they

went separate ways sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on

Wednesday, August 26, 2020. Although Ms. Hollis stated that she did not

see Moore in person again after he left, she indicated that Moore Facetimed

her and her son later that night.

On the evening of Wednesday, August 26, 2020, Justin Townsend

was driving east on I-220 in Shreveport, Louisiana. Townsend explained

that as he was driving his 18-wheeler truck in the righthand lane, he saw a

dark-colored four-door sedan pass him and drive into the right lane in front

of him. Townsend then heard popping noises, saw glass flying, and watched

as someone held a gun outside the window of an SUV. This SUV, which

was in the left lane, was traveling alongside the four-door sedan. Townsend

testified that he watched as the SUV continued east on I-220, but he pulled

over to inspect the four-door sedan and check on any occupants. As he

approached the sedan, he observed a young man in the driver’s seat. The

young man was later identified as Minnion Dewayne Jackson, a senior at

Green Oaks High School in Shreveport, Louisiana. According to Townsend,

although the man was breathing, he was not moving. Townsend saw visible

injuries to the man and called 911 for assistance. Once officers from the

Shreveport Police Department arrived, Townsend indicated he gave his

statements to them. Townsend related that he couldn’t identify any

individual from the SUV, and no one ever presented photographs of

individuals for Townsend to look at for him to attempt to identify the

occupant or occupants of the SUV.

Rodney Jones, a resident of Shreveport, was on his way to his

brother’s house in Bossier off of Benton Road. Jones stated he was taking

his brother supplies in preparation for the approaching hurricane and was on

I-220 heading towards Benton Road around 7:00 p.m. While in route, Jones

noticed a vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed in his rearview mirror,

and after it had passed, Jones saw that the back glass was completely

missing from the vehicle. Jones testified that the vehicle was a dark-colored

Chevy SUV, but he was unable to identify the driver or any occupants of the

vehicle. Jones watched the vehicle take the Benton Road exit off of I-220,
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and he contacted Shreveport Police Department detectives once he saw news

coverage of the shooting the next morning.

Minnion Miller, the victim’s father, indicated that his son was on his

way home from football practice when the incident took place. Miller stated

that his son was transported to Ochsner’s Hospital in Shreveport where he

was unresponsive. Miller passed away four or five hours after he arrived at

the hospital.

Corporal Adam McEntee, a detective in the SPD Violent Crimes

Homicide Unit, began working the case. After speaking to family members

about the victim’s travel route, Corp. McEntee drove the path of the

shooting along I-220. Corp. McEntee testified about the camera systems

along I-220 and his familiarity with the license plate reader locations along

the route. He explained that a license plate reader, which is attached to a

telephone, power, or light pole, has the ability to scan license plates as

vehicles drive by. Following a search through the scans of license plates,

Corp. McEntee and Captain Mack found a photo of a Chevrolet SUV with

its back window glass broken. Corp. McEntee also found information on the

vehicle and obtained the Hertz rental agreement for the vehicle with

Louisiana tag 9551482. Corp. McEntee got a warrant seeking information

from OnStar regarding the GPS location of the SUV. Corp. McEntee found

the vehicle at Fox Cove Apartments on Pines Road in Shreveport, which was

near Moore’s residence. Once Corp. McEntee made contact with Moore, the

detective recovered an Apple iPhone from Moore and brought him to the

Violent Crimes Unit for an interview. Corp. McEntee indicated that prior to

questioning, he read Moore his Miranda rights, and the form indicated that

Moore agreed to waive his rights and give a statement. Corp. McEntee
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testified that Moore was not under arrest at this point as he wanted to gather

more information before obtaining an arrest warrant. Moore told Corp.

McEntee that on the evening of the shooting, he was at Southern Classic

Chicken on W. 70th Street in Shreveport.

After further investigation and inconsistencies in Moore’s statement

and Ms. Hollis’s statement regarding Moore’s whereabouts on the evening

of the shooting, Corp. McEntee obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant

Kolby Moore on September 4, 2020. Moore ultimately turned himself in on

September 8, 2020. On December 17, 2020, a true bill of indictment was

filed in open court, charging Kolby Moore with second degree murder in

violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. An amended indictment was filed on July 7,

2023, and a jury trial in this matter commenced on July 10, 2023.

Several individuals testified at trial, including the coroner, Dr. James

G. Traylor. Dr. Traylor stated that in August of 2020, he was employed with

the LSU Health Sciences Center in the Pathology Department in Shreveport,

and he performed the autopsy of the victim. Dr. Traylor informed the court

that the victim suffered six gunshot wounds, and three of the shots were

penetrating. Dr. Traylor explained that a penetrating shot means that the

bullet goes in but does not exit. Dr. Traylor identified three perforating

gunshots that went through the victim, and he also indicated a gunshot

wound to the victim’s head that, in his opinion, was the fatal wound. At the

close of his testimony, Dr. Traylor indicated that the manner of death was

homicide.

Audra Williams, employed at the University of North Texas Center

for Human ID in Fort Worth, Texas, testified as an expert in the forensic

analysis of DNA. Ms. Williams testified that in August 2020, she was
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employed at the North Louisiana Crime Lab in Shreveport. She stated that

she tested 28 swabs of DNA, and of those 28 swabs, six resulted in a DNA

profile which assisted her in reaching her conclusions in the instant case.

Ms. Williams indicated that the DNA profiled from the swabs was consistent

with being a mixture from at least three individuals. In her testimony, Ms.

Williams stated the following:

So one of those individuals had more of a DNA profile than the
other two contributors, so that means that their DNA profile
was more robust. It had higher values, taller peaks. It’s kind of
like if you put a bunch of NBA players in with a bunch of
kindergarteners. You would be able to pick out the NBA
players really fast because they’re taller, they’re bigger, they’re
just easier to see. So for that I was able to make conclusions,
and in this case I was able to say that Kendrick Moore was --
could not be excluded as a major contributor and I was able to
put statistics on the major contributor.

Phillip Stout, an expert in the field of forensic firearms analysis and

employed at the North Louisiana Crime Lab in Shreveport, analyzed the

shell casings and projectiles recovered from the crime scene, the Chevy

SUV, and the victim’s vehicle. Mr. Stout examined four 7.62 casings and

two .40 caliber casings recovered from the crime scene, as well as two .40

caliber casings recovered from the Chevy SUV. When questioned about the

four 7.62 casings, Mr. Stout stated that those casings were fired from the

same weapon. The two .40 caliber casings recovered from the crime scene

were also fired from the same weapon according to Mr. Stout’s testimony.

However, Mr. Stout indicated that the two .40 caliber casings recovered

from the Chevy SUV were not fired from the same weapon but were instead

fired from two different weapons. Mr. Stout did testify that one of the .40

caliber casings recovered from the Chevy SUV was fired from the same

weapon as the .40 caliber casings recovered from the crime scene.

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Captain Shannon Mack with the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office also

testified at trial. Capt. Mack indicated that she is over the Digital Forensics,

Crime Scene, Property, and Intelligence Departments. Capt. Mack testified

that she has special training relating to cell phones and cell phone towers.

Although Moore objected to Capt. Mack’s qualification as an expert witness,

the trial court overruled the objection. Capt. Mack stated that she received

and reviewed cell phone records from Verizon Wireless and explained the

Cellhawk software and its purposes. Using this technology, Capt. Mack

testified that she was able to plot Moore’s phone on the evening of the

shooting. She demonstrated the use of the software during the trial and

plotted Moore’s alleged movements using his cell phone number. The

information Capt. Mack provided showed that Moore was in the area of the

shooting at the time it occurred and then continued eastbound towards the

Benton Road exit off of I-220.

At the close of trial on July 13, 2023, the jury found Kolby Moore

guilty of the second degree murder of the victim, Minnion Dewayne

Jackson. On August 14, 2023, Moore filed a motion for a new trial, arguing

that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence and objecting to the

court’s ruling on several objections made during the trial. The trial court

held a sentencing hearing on August 16, 2023. The trial court heard

arguments on Moore’s new trial motion, which was denied, then gave its

reasons for sentencing before imposing upon Moore the mandatory sentence

of life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension

of sentence. In response, Moore filed a motion to reconsider sentence which

was denied. On August 16, 2023, Moore filed a motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal in which he claimed that the evidence viewed in light
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most favorable to the State did not permit the jury to find him guilty of

second degree murder. However, the trial court disagreed and, in its written

reasons filed on August 18, 2023, stated that the jury had ample evidence to

unanimously convict and therefore denied the motion. Moore now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Moore argues that the State failed to prove his guilt of second degree

murder beyond a reasonable doubt by failing to remove every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence. He first contends that the jury’s guilty verdict of

second degree murder is contrary to the law and the evidence. In his second

assignment of error, Moore argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for new trial. Lastly, he suggests that the trial court erred when it

denied his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. He requests that

this Court reverse the guilty verdict and grant his motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal. In the alternative, he asks this Court to grant him a

new trial.

Moore asserts that the trial testimony and the circumstantial evidence

support his argument that the State failed to remove every reasonable

hypothesis of innocence that someone other than him was responsible for the

homicide. Moore urges that no one was able to identify and place him in the

vehicle allegedly holding the shooters, and no footage from dashboard

cameras was recovered to identify the occupants of the vehicle. Moore

further points out that the DNA swabs collected point to his cousin,

Kendrick Moore, as a major contributor rather than him. He also notes that,

although search warrants were executed at two different locations, no

evidence was recovered from either that could establish a connection to him.

Moore suggests that the State did not prove that he actually did the killing or
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that he aided and abetted any killing that happened on the day of the

incident.

In response, the State suggests that the pattern of facts introduced into

evidence allowed the jury to draw inferences based upon reason and

common sense experiences. The State urges that the jury was instructed on

circumstantial evidence and the weight and credibility to be given to the

testimony of the witnesses as well as the weight and value to be afforded to

the statement made by Moore. The State argues that the jury rejected

Moore’s hypothesis that he was not in the vehicle and did not participate in

the shooting as a principal to the homicide. The State suggests that this

Court should refrain from impinging on the jury’s discretion in light of all of

the evidence presented when viewed in light most favorable to the

prosecution.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v.

Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310

(La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.
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The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a

rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.

2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222

So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240 So. 3d 926.

Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact; for example,

a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.

2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148

So. 3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157

So. 3d 1127.

For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; State v. Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d

255, writ denied, 16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985. The appellate court

reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and

determines whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a

rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Alexander,
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53,449, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/20), 306 So. 3d 594, 598, writ denied,

20-01449 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So. 3d 642; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),

775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d

62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v.

Green, 49,741 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 331. A reviewing court

accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony

of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1).

Although Moore contends that no eyewitness testimony or direct

physical evidence places him in the Chevy SUV involved in the shooting,

the circumstantial evidence contained in the record supports the jury’s

finding of Moore’s guilt in the murder of the victim. Ms. Hollis’s testimony

establishes that she rented the Chevy SUV involved in the shooting for

Moore’s benefit. She also testified that Moore Facetimed her and her son on

the evening of the shooting between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. using the

cellphone that Capt. Mack tracked via the Cellhawk software. While

demonstrating the use of the software and plotting Moore’s movements,

Capt. Mack’s testimony clearly established that the Moore’s cellphone

placed him in the area of the shooting.
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Moore argues that Capt. Mack’s analysis cannot and did not provide

an exact location of Moore’s alleged cellphone, and he also maintains that he

told police that his cousin Kendrick Moore used this cellphone as much as

he did. Moore states that this should have been considered in conjunction

with the DNA evidence collected from the dashboard of the vehicle and

explained in Ms. Willaims’ testimony wherein she concluded that the DNA

present in the vehicle was a mixture from at least three individuals.

However, the testimony contained in the record establishes that Moore’s

cellphone number was used in the Hertz rental agreement, Moore used this

cell phone to Facetime Ms. Hollis, and Moore had this same cell phone on

his person when he was detained at his mother’s home following the

shooting. Furthermore, the Chevy SUV, found merely half a mile from

Moore’s mother’s home, was indicated by detectives to have been cleaned.

We also find it noteworthy that the vehicle was backed into a parking space,

in an apparent attempt to conceal the broken rear window which was

identified in Mr. Jones’s testimony as well as captured on the camera

systems discussed in Corp. McEntee’s testimony. Ms. Williams’ testimony

about three sets of DNA is also consistent with Mr. Stout’s testimony

indicating that three different firearms were used in the commission of the

crime.

Although Moore suggests that the jury was presented with a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence, i.e., that Kendrick Moore was driving

the vehicle as a principal at the time of the shooting, nothing in the record

contradicts the State’s assessment that Kolby Moore was present in the

vehicle during the shooting. Other than Moore’s statements about others

using his cell phone or his whereabouts during the shooting being miles
11

away, nothing in the testimony or the evidence suggests that Moore was not

in possession of his cell phone and was not present in the vehicle during the

shooting. The trier of fact, in this case the jury, heard the testimony and

evidence and determined that the testimony and evidence supported that

Moore was in the vehicle during drive-by shooting and was guilty of second

degree murder. Given the facts, testimony, and evidence before us, we

cannot say that the jury erred in its findings. For these reasons, Moore’s first

assignment of error is without merit.

Motion for New Trial

La. C. Cr. P. art. 851 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that
injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is
shown to have been the case the motion shall be denied, no
matter upon what allegations it is grounded.

B. The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial
whenever any of the following occur:

1. The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.

2. The court’s ruling on a written motion, or an objection
made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial error.

Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court may

be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant a new trial, except

for error of law. La. C. Cr. P. art. 858. The decision on a motion for new

trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Roth, 52,359

(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1230, writ denied, 18-2059 (La.

6/17/19), 273 So. 3d 1210; State v. Horne, 28,327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96),

679 So. 2d 953, writ denied, 96-2345 (La. 2/21/97), 688 So. 2d 521. The

appellate court will not disturb this ruling on appeal absent a clear showing

of abuse. Id.

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As it pertains to Moore’s new trial motion under La. C. Cr. P. art.

851(B)(2), he argues that the trial court erred in denying his objections to the

relevancy of the photographs of firearms, a magazine, and ammunition taken

during the execution of a search warrant at 1004 Quail Creek. Moore

suggests that the guns in the photos were not related to the shooting and only

served to be inflammatory and prejudicial. He also maintains that the trial

court erred in denying his objections to the cell phone ping presentation

made by Capt. Mack during her testimony as well as the trial court’s

acceptance of Capt. Mack as an expert witness.

The State attempted to introduce the photographs in question during

Corporal Walsworth’s testimony. However, the trial court clearly states on

page 415 of the record, “[s]o at this point I’m going to sustain his objection

just so the record is clear. He can identify the guns that he retrieved pursuant

to that search warrant, but they’re not coming in yet.” While showing the

jury the photographs was tantamount to their introduction into evidence, we

find the showing of these photographs to be harmless error and not grounds

for the granting of a new trial. Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing Capt. Mack to show and use the cell phone

presentation to demonstrate the Cellhawk software tracking Moore’s

movements on the night of the shooting, as the presentation itself was never

formally introduced into evidence. In qualifying as an expert witness, Capt.

Mack was questioned by the trial court and Moore’s trial counsel extensively

about the software, her experience using the software, and her qualifications

as an expert in her field. On these grounds, we find that the trial court

properly denied the motion for new trial.

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In ruling on a motion for new trial brought under La. C. Cr. P. art.

851(B)(1), the trial court’s duty is to put itself in the position of a juror.

State v. McKinnies, 13-1412, p. 10 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 861, 869;

State v. Bourg, 19-00038, p. 5 (La. 12/11/19), 286 So. 3d 1005, 1008-09. A

trial court independently assesses credibility and weighs the evidence, and in

doing so acts as what is often described as a thirteenth juror. Id., 19-00038,

p. 5, 286 So. 3d at 1009. Because Moore is arguing that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him, he is essentially requesting a sufficiency review

that is more properly considered in a motion for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal. See State v. Hamilton, 03-1385, pp. 15-16 (La. App. 3 Cir.

3/3/04), 867 So. 2d 151, 160-61, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Hamilton

v. State, 04-1227 (La. 4/22/05), 899 So. 2d 567. As a result, the trial court’s

ruling on Moore’s motion for new trial on this ground was not erroneous,

and Moore’s second assignment of error is without merit.

Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal

A post-verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the trial

court finds that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state,

does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty. La. C. Cr. P. art. 821(B);

State v. Muse, 53,345 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 373 So. 3d 88; State v.

McLaughlin, 54,874 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 551. This is a

question of legal sufficiency. Id. This is similar to the standard for appellate

review of sufficiency of the evidence to support a defendant’s conviction in

that the court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 620 So. 2d

508, 513-514 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-1939 (La. 10/16/93),
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625 So. 2d 1062; see also State v. Hampton, 98-0331 (La. 4/23/99), 750 So.

2d 867, 880, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S. Ct. 504, 145 L. Ed. 2d 390

(1999); State v. Nabors, 52,163 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/19/18), 251 So. 3d

1214, writ denied, 18-1477 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So. 3d 496, and writ

denied, 19-0567 (La. 5/28/19), 274 So. 3d 560.

Considering the above and having already found that the evidence

presented at trial was sufficient for conviction, we find that the trial court did

not err in denying Moore’s motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

Consequently, Moore’s third assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Finding no errors patent in our review of the record and for the

reasons expressed herein, Kolby Reshaad Moore’s conviction for second

degree murder is affirmed. The trial court’s denials of the motion for new

trial and post-verdict judgment acquittal are also affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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