Karl Pentecost v. Joseph W. Grassi, Mckeithen, Ryland, & Champagne

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,113-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

KARL PENTECOST Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JOSEPH W. GRASSI, Defendants-Appellees
McKEITHEN, RYLAND, &
CHAMPAGNE

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2019-2913

Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge

*****

KARL PENTECOST In Proper Person

GIBSON LAW PARTNERS, LLC Counsel for Appellees,
By: James H. Gibson Joseph W. Grassi;
Marc D. Moroux McKeithen, Ryland &
Champagne; and The
Law Firm of Louis V.
Champagne, APC

*****

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This civil appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish

of Ouachita, the Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge, presiding. The

plaintiff, Karl Pentecost, appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting

exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action filed by the defendants,

Joseph W. Grassi and the law firm of McKeithen, Ryland, and Champagne.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Karl Pentecost (“Mr. Pentecost”) was the sole proprietor of Ouachita

Truck and Trailer, a truck repair company. Mr. Pentecost d/b/a Ouachita

Truck and Trailer was joined in a lawsuit originally instituted by the

Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen (“LSAT”) against another

company owned by Mr. Pentecost, Will Transport L.L.C., for alleged unpaid

workers’ compensation insurance premiums. See, Louisiana Safety Ass’n of

Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Will Transp., L.L.C., 51,798 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/28/18), 245 So. 3d 1194, writs denied sub nom. Louisiana Safety

Ass’n of Timbermen- Self Insurers Fund v. Will Transp., L.L.C., 18-0734,

18-0731 (La. 9/14/18), 252 So. 3d 480, 485. Joseph Grassi (“Mr. Grassi”) of

McKeithen, Ryland, & Champagne (“the law firm”) represented Mr.

Pentecost and both of his companies.

At the bench trial, Mr. Grassi moved for an involuntary dismissal and

prevailed; therefore, he did not present a defense. Although the trial court

found that Will Transport was the only party responsible for payment of the

premiums to LSAT, this Court reversed the dismissal of Mr. Pentecost’s

companies and rendered judgment that both of his companies were solidarily

liable with a third company for the unpaid insurance premiums. This Court

did not remand the case for Mr. Pentecost and his companies to present their

case. Although Mr. Pentecost requested a rehearing, this Court denied his

request. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Mr. Pentecost’s

writ application. See, Louisiana Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers

Fund, supra.

On September 13, 2019, Mr. Pentecost, a self-represented litigant at

the time, filed a petition against Mr. Grassi and his law firm alleging that

they committed legal malpractice in their representation of him and his

companies in the LSAT case. More specifically, Mr. Pentecost listed in his

petition the following:

1. Mr. Grassi failed to object to evidence that was not a part of the
contracts or agreements related to the insurance coverage.

2. Mr. Grassi failed to request cross examination of certain documents.

3. Mr. Grassi did not cross-examine Mr. Pentecost to establish that he
had no employees which relieved Mr. Pentecost of workers
compensation requirements.

4. Mr. Grassi failed to advise, offer, or file for Mr. Pentecost relief under
La. C.C.P. art. 2002-2004.

Mr. Pentecost argued that he suffered damages in excess of $748,930.44

plus attorney fees, and he requested $500,000.00 in general damages. On

September 15, 2021, after retaining counsel, Mr. Pentecost filed an amended

petition alleging the following:

• Defendants failed to file an answer to the appeal filed by LSAT,
the plaintiff in the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal
proceeding, pursuant to La. C.C.P. Art. 2133 to allege,
alternatively and only in the event that the Court of Appeal
reversed the grant of involuntary dismissal, that the case should
be remanded so that Mr. Pentecost and KP Trucking could
present a defense on the merits.

• Mr. Grassi failed to timely file Mr. Pentecost’s brief in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal proceeding, failed to appear for
oral argument, failed to contact opposing counsel to ask for
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their brief, nor did he file a motion to reinstate oral argument
with the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Foreseeably, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the claims against Plaintiff (Karl Pentecost, d/b/a
OT&T) and K.P. Trucking as co-defendants.

Following the amendment to the petition as well as answers filed by the

defendants, Mr. Grassi and his firm filed an exception of peremption on

December 9, 2021. In the exception, the defendants alleged that Mr.

Pentecost had one year from the date of discovery of the actions giving rise

to the claim to file the malpractice suit. According to the defendants, Mr.

Pentecost knew of the alleged malpractice action in the LSAT case as early

as the trial in October 2016 but failed to file his petition until September 29,

2019.

On January 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the exception of

peremption and issued its ruling granting the exception in open court on

February 23, 2022. According to this Court’s opinion, the trial court

determined that by April 2018, Mr. Pentecost knew or should have known

that matters were adverse to him. See, Pentecost v. Grassi, 54,836 (La. App.

2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 588, writ denied, 23-00476 (La. 5/23/23), 360 So.

3d 1258. The trial court detailed that this time frame was reasonable

because Mr. Pentecost alleged malpractice acts in this petition that not only

involved the trial held in October 2016, but also acts that occurred during the

appeal process for the LSAT case. Once this Court denied Mr. Pentecost’s

rehearing request, the trial court determined that Mr. Pentecost knew or

should have known that matters were adverse to him. Consequently, his

September 2019 petition was not filed within the one-year period set forth in

La. R.S. 9:5605(A). The trial court ultimately dismissed Mr. Pentecost’s

suit and all the claims against the defendants.
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Mr. Pentecost appealed the decision of the trial court, but this Court

agreed with the trial court that Mr. Pentecost should have had knowledge of

any alleged malpractice by Mr. Grassi in February 2018 during the LSAT

case when this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and denied

rehearing in April 2018. Similarly, Mr. Pentecost attempted to argue for the

first time on appeal that Mr. Grassi committed a fraudulent act of

malpractice and a post-malpractice fraudulent concealment of the act.

Because this claim was not asserted before the trial court, this Court did not

address that claim. Ultimately, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment

granting the exception of peremption, and the Louisiana Supreme Court

denied Mr. Pentecost’s writ application on May 23, 2023. See, Pentecost v.

Grassi, supra.

On July 17, 2023, Mr. Pentecost, as a self-represented litigant, filed a

“Petition to Nullification of Final Judgment” pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.

2004 requesting that the court annul the judgment on the exception of

peremption for fraud and ill practices. In this petition, Mr. Pentecost again

named as defendants Mr. Grassi and McKeithen, Ryland, & Champagne.

He alleged that Mr. Grassi committed fraud and ill practices when he

concealed the fact that he failed to appear at oral arguments on the LSAT

appeal. Mr. Pentecost also asserted that Mr. Grassi did not obtain Mr.

Pentecost’s informed consent before requesting an involuntary dismissal at

the trial court level in the LSAT case. On August 25, 2023, the defendants

filed exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action. Mr. Pentecost filed

an amended petition on January 3, 2024, and the defendants filed exceptions

of res judicata and no cause of action in response to the amendment on

January 22, 2024.
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On February 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on these

exceptions. Concerning the res judicata exception, the defendants argued

that no new arguments were raised in Mr. Pentecost’s new petition.

Although Mr. Pentecost attempted to raise the fraud issues on appeal in the

previous lawsuit, this Court, according to the defendants, ruled that Mr.

Pentecost could not raise the fraud claims on appeal for the first time and

found that the fraud claims should have been raised prior to the appeal. The

defendants alleged that all five factors of res judicata were met as

everything, including the parties, facts, and circumstances, was the same as

in the previous malpractice lawsuit which ended in a final judgment.

In response, Mr. Pentecost argued that if not for fraud or concealment,

he would have asserted his arguments in the first malpractice lawsuit. The

court questioned Mr. Pentecost about when he learned of the fraud, and Mr.

Pentecost explained that he discovered it when he was researching for his

appeal in the previous malpractice matter. Mr. Pentecost stated that Mr.

Grassi failed to appear in court, did not advise him that he failed to appear in

court, and continued to hide his lack of appearance from Mr. Pentecost

during the LSAT litigation. Mr. Pentecost reiterated throughout his

arguments that fraud had not been and was still not an adjudicated issue.

With regard to the exception of no cause of action, the defendants

argued that the conduct related to the ill practices claim occurred prior to the

final judgment in the previous malpractice suit. In order for a cause of

action for an annulment to occur, the alleged conduct relating to the fraud

and ill practice had to occur after the judgment in the previous malpractice

matter. Because the conduct occurred prior to the final judgment in the

malpractice action, the defendants maintained that an action for nullity of the
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judgment was not possible. Mr. Pentecost responded and urged that

discovery, not the act, is important in determining whether a previous

judgment may be annulled. The trial court ultimately granted the exceptions

of res judicata and no cause of action, finding that all requirements were met

for both exceptions. Mr. Pentecost now appeals the trial court’s ruling on

these exceptions.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Pentecost first asserts that the trial court committed

legal and manifest error in not finding a cause or causes of action within the

four corners and on the facts of the nullity petition. In his second

assignment of error, Mr. Pentecost maintains that the trial court committed

legal or manifest error in granting the exception of res judicata. Although

Mr. Pentecost’s brief is not compliant with the URCA, this Court reads pro

se filings indulgently and will attempt to discern the thrust of the plaintiff’s

position on appeal and the relief he seeks. Linn v. Ouachita Parish Police

Jury, 55,480 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So. 3d 1171; Fobbs v.

CompuCom Sys., Inc., 55,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d

1146; Magee v. Williams, 50,726 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 265.

In support of his assignments of error, Mr. Pentecost argues that he

only became aware of Mr. Grassi’s conduct during the LSAT appeal when

Mr. Grassi was questioned about his actions during a deposition taken on

November 20, 2020. These actions included failing to file an answer to the

appeal, timely file a brief for the appeal, and appear for oral arguments.

Because Mr. Grassi delayed in revealing his actions related to the LSAT

appeal, Mr. Pentecost suggests that this delay prevented him from filing his

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original malpractice petition timely and supports this Court nullifying the

judgment in the first malpractice suit.

In response, the defendants claim that La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not

intended as a substitute for an appeal or second chance but rather is intended

to prevent injustice that cannot be corrected through a new trial or appeal.

Mr. Pentecost, according to the defendants, has made no allegation that his

right to defend himself was denied as Mr. Pentecost was present during the

hearing on the exception of peremption that extinguished the first

malpractice claim. For these reasons, the defendants suggest that the

exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action should be affirmed.

The nullity of a final judgment may be demanded for vices of either

form or substance. La. C.C.P. art. 2001. A final judgment obtained by fraud

or ill practices may be annulled. La. C.C.P. art. 2004(A). An action to

annul a judgment on these grounds must be brought within one year of the

discovery by the plaintiff in the nullity action of the fraud or ill practices.

La. C.C.P. art. 2004(B). The burden of proof is on the party seeking the

nullity to establish that the action was brought within one year of the

discovery of fraud or ill practices. Cariere v. The Kroger Store, 52,846 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 276 So. 3d 1150, writ denied, 19-01471 (La. 11/12/19),

282 So. 3d 224; Burkett v. Prop. of Douglas, 575 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1991). The one-year limitation of La. C.C.P. art. 2004(B) is considered a

period of peremption rather than prescription. Id.

The two criteria for determining whether a judgment has been

obtained by fraud or ill practice include: (1) whether the circumstances

under which the judgment was rendered show that the litigant seeking relief

was deprived of legal rights, and (2) whether the enforcement of the
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judgment would be unconscionable or inequitable. Belle Pass Terminal, Inc.

v. Jolin, Inc., 01-0149 (La. 10/16/01), 800 So. 2d 762; Kem Search, Inc. v.

Sheffield, 434 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1983); Payne v. Glass, 41,232 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/23/06), 939 So. 2d 526; Yellowbird Investments, L.L.C. v. Barber, 46,

977 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/14/12), 87 So. 3d 970. La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not

limited to cases of actual fraud or intentional wrongdoing. Rather, it

encompasses situations in which a judgment is rendered through some

improper practice or procedure which operates, even innocently, to deprive

the party cast in judgment of some legal right. Kem Search, supra;

Yellowbird Investments, L.L.C., supra; Lieber v. Caddo Levee Distr. Bd. of

Com’rs, 32,551 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 748 So. 2d 587, writ denied, 00-

0561 (La. 4/7/00), 759 So. 2d 763, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 928, 121 S. Ct.

306, 148 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2000). As stated by the supreme court, “Conduct

which prevents an opposing party from having an opportunity to appear or to

assert a defense constitutes a deprivation of his legal rights.” Yellowbird

Investments, supra; Kem Search, supra.

A nullity action under La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not a substitute for an

appeal from a judgment that may be based on insufficient evidence or a

misinterpretation of substantive law. Rather, the action provided by La.

C.C.P. art. 2004 is “designed to afford relief against a judgment procured by

methods viewed with disdain by the judiciary.” Lieber, supra at

590, citing Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So. 2d 398 (La. 1980).

The law on res judicata is set forth in La. R.S. 13:4231 as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

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(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the litigation are extinguished and merged in the
judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a
subsequent action on those causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action
between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated
and determined if its determination was essential to that
judgment.

Under the res judicata statute, a second action is precluded when the

following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final;

(3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the

second suit existed at the time of the final judgment in the first suit; and (5)

the cause or causes of action in the second suit arose out of the same

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.

Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-0808 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So. 3d 761;

Barnett v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 51,908 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18),

248 So. 3d 594, writ denied, 18-0944 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So. 3d 154; Alpine

Meadows, L.C. v. Winkler, 49,490 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/14),154 So. 3d

747, writ denied, 15-0292 (La. 4/24/15), 169 So. 3d 357; Bankers Ins. Co. v.

State, 53,140 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 285 So. 3d 59.

The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to promote judicial

efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. Rogers v. Caddo Par. Sch.

Bd., 54,239 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/13/22), 342 So. 3d 1151; Ave. Plaza, LLC v.

Falgoust, 96-0173 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So. 2d 1077; Hines v. Smith, 44,285

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/12/09), 16 So. 3d 1234, writ denied, 09-2001 (La.
9

12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 922. Res judicata forecloses both the relitigation of

matters that have not been litigated but should have been raised in the earlier

suit (claim preclusion) and matters previously litigated and decided (issue

preclusion). Alpine Meadows, L.C., supra; Hudson v. City of

Bossier, 33,620 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/25/00), 766 So. 2d 738, writ denied, 00-

2687 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So. 2d 450.

The doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt concerning

application of the principle of res judicata must be resolved against its

application. Rogers, supra; Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La. 2/25/94), 633

So. 2d 1210; Hines, supra. The party who urges the exception

of res judicata bears the burden of proving its essential elements by a

preponderance of the evidence. If there is any doubt as to its applicability,

the exception must be overruled. Rogers, supra; Hines, supra.

The standard of review of a ruling on an exception of res judicata is

manifest error when the exception is raised before the case is submitted and

evidence is received from both sides. Rogers, supra; Barnett v. Louisiana

Med. Mutual Ins. Co., 51,908 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So. 3d 594, writ

denied, 18-0944 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So. 3d 154. The res judicata effect of a

prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal.

Rogers, supra; Penton v. Castellano, 49,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169

So. 3d 739.

The peremptory exception of no cause of action tests the legal

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s petition by determining whether the law affords

a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Scheffler v. Adams and Reese,

LLP, 06-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So. 2d 641; Gipson v. Fortune, 45,021 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/27/10), 30 So. 3d 1076, writ denied, 10-0432 (La. 4/30/10), 34
10

So. 3d 298; Blanche v. Varner, 52,659 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d

620. A “cause of action,” when used in the context of the peremptory

exception of no cause of action, refers to the operative facts that give rise to

the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. White

v. St. Elizabeth B.C. Bd. of Directors, 45,213 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/10), 37 So.

3d 1139; Blanche, supra. The purpose of the exception of no cause of action

is not to determine whether the plaintiff will prevail at trial, but is to

ascertain if a cause of action exists. Bogues v. Louisiana Energy

Consultants, Inc., 46,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So. 3d 1128;

Blanche, supra. The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and for

the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-

pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Fink v. Bryant, 01-

0987 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346; Blanche, supra.

An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling sustaining an

exception of no cause of action is de novo because the exception raises a

question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency

of the petition. Fink, supra; Blanche, supra. The essential question is

whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt

resolved in plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for

relief. Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 06-1181 (La. 3/9/07), 951 So. 2d

1058; Scheffler, supra; Blanche, supra.

In 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that an attorney’s

post-malpractice actions consisting of fraudulent concealment can amount to

fraud and thus bar application of three-year peremptive period for legal

malpractice. Lomont v. Bennett, 14-2483 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 620.

The defendant in Lomont failed to record a community property agreement
11

in the mortgage and conveyance records for the plaintiff. Lomont, 14-2483,

p. 2, 172 So. 3d at 623-24. Two years later in 2010, the defendant filed the

agreement after the plaintiff notified the defendant that she was unable to

refinance her mortgage on the property. Id. Following the discovery of a

lien on the property in December 2010, the defendant alleged that she

reported the malpractice to the plaintiff but the defendant continued

representing the plaintiff to attempt to remedy the lien. Id. It was not until

March 2012 that the defendant revealed to the plaintiff that the defendant

had a conflict of interest and could no longer represent the plaintiff in an

effort to remove the lien. Id. After meeting with another attorney on June 8,

2012, the plaintiff filed a malpractice action on July 12, 2012, in which she

claimed the defendant committed legal malpractice by failing to record the

community property settlement. The plaintiff later supplemented and

amended her petition alleging that the defendant acted fraudulently in

mispresenting and/or suppressing the truth regarding the malpractice the

defendant committed. Id., 14-2483, pp. 3-5, 172 So. 3d at 624-25. The

defendant filed an exception of peremption which the trial court granted and

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. Id., 14-2483, pp. 5-6, 172 So. 3d

at 625-26.

Ultimately in Lomont, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the

decisions of the lower courts, finding that the facts and circumstances

constituted fraud. Given this finding of fraud committed within the meaning

of La. R.S. 9:5605(E), the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that a legal

malpractice claim is governed by the one-year prescriptive period set forth in

La. C.C. art. 3492, versus the peremptive periods set forth in La. R.S.

9:5605(A). Id., 14-2483, pp. 22-24, 172 So. 3d at 636-37. The Supreme
12

Court reasoned that since the defendant “effectively hid her malpractice,”

the one-year prescriptive period began to run on June 28, 2012, making the

plaintiff’s suit timely as it was filed on July 12, 2012. Id., 14-2483, pp. 24-

27, 172 So. 3d at 637-39.

At first glance, Mr. Pentecost’s circumstances are comparable to the

plaintiff’s circumstances in Lomont. Mr. Pentecost alleged that Mr. Grassi

concealed the actions he took relating to the LSAT appeal and failed to

reveal these actions until a malpractice suit would be considered perempted.

However, a significant distinction must be highlighted. Whereas the

plaintiff in Lomont amended her petition to include transactions or

occurrences related to fraudulently mispresenting and/or suppressing the

truth, Mr. Pentecost failed to amend his petition and assert his claims related

to Mr. Grassi concealing his actions related to the LSAT appeal. Instead, he

classified Mr. Grassi’s behavior relating to the appellate work as malpractice

and failed to articulate in the petition Mr. Grassi’s concealment of fact that

Mr. Grassi failed to file an answer to the appeal, failed to timely file a brief,

and failed to appear for the oral argument.

The Code of Civil Procedure requires that a petition “shall contain a

short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of, and

of the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject

matter of the litigation.” La. C.C.P. art. 891. The 1990 comment to this

article further clarifies that the plaintiff is required to set forth the facts of

the transaction or occurrence and not merely the facts supporting the cause

of action asserted because “all causes of action arising out of that transaction

or occurrence are considered to have been submitted for adjudication and

will be barred or merged in the judgment.”
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By failing to include the fraud allegations when he amended his

malpractice petition, Mr. Pentecost is precluded from alleging the fraud

claims in his nullity petition. See Alpine Meadows, supra. Although Mr.

Pentecost attempts to nullify the final judgment in the first malpractice suit

by filing a “nullity petition,” res judicata bars him from using the

fraud/concealment claims to justify the annulment petition. La. C.C.P. art.

891 further supports this as the article requires a plaintiff to assert all causes

of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject

matter of the litigation. Mr. Pentecost’s cause of action in his nullity petition

arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of

the first malpractice suit. Similarly, the other requirements for res judicata

are met in this matter. Mr. Pentecost’s first malpractice suit resulted in a

valid, final judgment, and the parties in the first malpractice lawsuit and this

lawsuit are the same: Mr. Pentecost, Mr. Grassi, and the law firm. Lastly,

Mr. Pentecost’s cause of action alleged in the nullity action existed at the

time of the first malpractice suit. For these reasons, the record supports the

trial court’s ruling granting the defendants’ exception of res judicata.

Consequently, because res judicata is applicable to the claims made in

Mr. Pentecost’s nullity petition, his petition does not allege facts that are

legally sufficient for the law to afford him a remedy. According to the

record, Mr. Pentecost is unable to prove a set of facts supporting a claim

which would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the trial court properly granted

the defendants’ exception of no cause of action. Considering the trial court

properly granted both the exception of res judicata and exception of no

cause of action, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Pentecost’s

claims.
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CONCLUSION

Given the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment granting the

defendants’ exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action is affirmed.

The costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, Karl Pentecost.

AFFIRMED.

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