State of Louisiana v. LaBarrie D. Watson

Judgment rendered May 21, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,163-KW

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Respondent

versus

LABARRIE D. WATSON Defendant-Applicant

*****

On Application for Writs from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 392,379

Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge

*****

OFFICES OF J. RANSDELL KEENE Counsel for
By: Joseph Ransdell Keene Defendant-Applicant

LABARRIE D. WATSON Pro Se
Defendant-Applicant

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for
District Attorney Plaintiff-Respondent

FERNANDO BERNARD GRIDER, JR.
Assistant District Attorney

*****

Before COX, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

The defendant, LaBarrie D. Watson, was charged by bill of

information with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by

a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The trial court denied the

defendant’s motions to suppress, and this Court granted the defendant’s writ

application to review the correctness of the court’s ruling. For the following

reasons, we reverse the trial court’s ruling denying the motions to suppress,

and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

On August 10, 2022,1 police officers with the Shreveport Police

Department Violent Crimes Abatement team, Lt. Steve McKenna, Detective

Bassett, and Detective Donald Henry, were patrolling the 2500 block of

Darien Street in Shreveport, Louisiana. The officers were searching for a

male known as “TT,” who had allegedly been riding through the area on a

bicycle threatening others with a firearm.

As the officers were traveling on Darien Street, they observed a brown

Cadillac turn into a driveway without utilizing a turn signal; the officers

executed a traffic stop. The officers exited their vehicle and approached the

Cadillac, which was driven by a woman who identified herself as “Cherrel.”2

When asked for her identification, Cherrel was unable to provide her

driver’s license. She told the officers the Cadillac belonged to her husband

1
The bill of information states the offense occurred August 10, 2022. However,
during the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lt. McKenna stated the incident occurred
on July 30, 2022.
2
The transcript contains inconsistencies in the spelling of the woman’s name. In
some portions of the transcript, it is spelled “Cherrel” and in others, it is spelled
“Cherelle.” Since the spelling “Cherrel” is used more frequently in the transcript, she
will be referred to herein as “Cherrel.”

and pointed at the defendant, LaBarrie Watson, who was closing the door of

a silver rental car parked in a vacant lot several yards away.

Lt. McKenna testified Detectives Henry and Bassett approached the

defendant and asked him if he knew TT. The defendant denied knowing

anyone named TT and walked away. Lt. McKenna also testified that he

became suspicious about the defendant because, in his “officer experience”

of more than 17 years in narcotics investigation, a husband failing to check

on his wife during a traffic stop outside their house was “very, very odd.”

Lt. McKenna stated he witnessed the defendant entering one of the houses

west of the vacant lot, and there had been “problems in the past” in the area

caused by individuals “drinking and selling illegal narcotics” in vacant lots.

Before he spoke to defendant, Lt. McKenna approached the silver

rental car multiple times, peering inside “to make sure it was not stolen,” and

to “see in the plain view if [he] could see anything.” The first time Lt.

McKenna approached the rental car, he tested the driver’s side door and

discovered the vehicle was unlocked. However, he testified he did not recall

if he “physically entered” the rental car. Lt. McKenna asked the defendant

for consent to search the silver vehicle.

The defendant exited the house and walked to where Lt. McKenna

was standing on the sidewalk. The video footage from the officers’ body

cameras reveals their concerns about the gun-wielding TT quickly

dissipated, and their focus became directed at the defendant.3 Officer

McKenna asked the defendant for consent to search the Cadillac, and he

3
The defendant told the officers where TT lived. The footage from one of the
officers’ body cameras showed a man on a bicycle riding past the officers while they
were focused on the defendant.
2

consented. The officers searched the Cadillac but “nothing of interest” was

found. The video footage from one of the officers’ body cameras showed

Lt. McKenna asking the defendant for consent to search the rental car. The

defendant refused to consent to the search, telling the officer he could not

consent to the search of the silver vehicle because it did not belong to him.

Subsequently, the officers ran the license plate on the rental car and

discovered the vehicle had been rented by Lakeisha Taylor. The officers

also learned the defendant was using the rental car with Taylor’s permission.

Lt. McKenna testified as he was peering inside the silver car, he

noticed a plate that “appeared to [have] some type of white residue on” it.

The plate was subsequently seized and examined by the crime lab; however,

it was later discarded because the lab did not find any residue on it.4 Lt.

McKenna testified he did not stop and apply for a warrant to search the

rental car at this point. He admitted he could have applied for a warrant

electronically, the incident occurred in the middle of the day (approximately

2:00 p.m.), and he had time to apply for a warrant. However, the officer

stated he did not apply for a warrant because he “can get consent,” and he

was “curious about where [defendant] was at.”

Additionally, Lt. McKenna testified when defendant came over to talk

to him, he advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and they walked to the

rental car.5 According to Lt. McKenna, after being advised of his rights,

4
Lt. McKenna testified the defendant told him the residue on the plate “was the
dope that [his wife] was smoking and using earlier.”
5
At the July hearing Lt. McKenna testified he and defendant were walking to the
rental car. However, at the August hearing, he testified they were going to the police
unit.
3

defendant began “freely talking” and admitted he was currently on parole. 6

When asked by defense counsel whether the Miranda rights were warranted

because the defendant was a target or subject of an investigation, Lt.

McKenna testified as follows: (1) he believed it was “very, very odd” that

defendant did not check on his wife; (2) defendant could have gone into the

house and “hid” something; (3) he had “a feeling” the perceived white

substance on the plate in the rental car was cocaine; and (4) “there could’ve

been something in that vehicle that was criminal.”

Lt. McKenna testified he believed the defendant was being untruthful

when answering questions, so he directed the defendant to a nearby shade

tree. At this point, Lt. McKenna deactivated his body camera but continued

to converse with the defendant. During the hearing, he testified he turned

the camera off because he was attempting “to get [the defendant] to flip” and

become a confidential informant (“CI”).7 When questioned further about

why he deactivated his body camera, Lt. McKenna testified as follows:

So a lot of times what I’ll do is I’ll shut that – shut that mic
down. So if we’re trying to work a deal out to the point that I
didn’t want everybody knowing, the Court, or if we had jurors,
excuse me, or a lot of bystanders knowing that he was trying to
help the police out and help himself out. I didn’t want
everybody knowing that he was trying to be a confidential
informant and possibly could get hurt later down the road. That
was my plan. So I talked to him to say, hey, this is what I can
do. This is what you can do. And see if we can work together
and try to minimize some of the shootings around the
Queensboro area.

6
At the July hearing, Lt. McKenna stated defendant told him he was on parole
after being read his rights; however, at the August hearing Lt. McKenna testified he was
uncertain whether he was told defendant was on parole.

Det. Henry’s body camera captured portions of the conversation between Lt.
7

McKenna and the defendant.
4

Upon further questioning regarding deactivating his body camera, Lt.

McKenna responded:

I turned it off because a lot of times I try to keep, just in case I
do not have to be – or just in case I do have to arrest the
defendant if they don’t – if they don’t come out to their
agreement or something changes. I don’t like for the Court,
meaning bystanders, other defendants, knowing that
[defendant] was helping the police or considered to help the
police.

Lt. McKenna was then asked whether the defendant’s consent to

search the rental car was subject to a promise or agreement made by him,

and he replied as follows:

I don’t recall making a promise. I do recall that we could
possibly work something out. The 17 years that I’ve worked in
the office of special investigations, we never promise
something; however, I do recall trying to, what we call it flip,
flip [defendant] to be a confidential informant.

Subsequently, at the hearing conducted on August 29, 2024, after the

body camera footage was played, Lt. McKenna was asked if he told the

defendant he would not arrest him if he provided information. Lt. McKenna

replied:

I explained to him that if we work together and you provide
information, because he is on parole, and we cannot put him in
a criminal element that they would – that we would hold those
charges and that, hey, you work for us, we would help you out.
And then he wouldn’t be arrested for the firearm charges.

When asked more straightforwardly if the agreement was the defendant

would not be arrested for the firearm charge, Lt. McKenna stated, “That is

correct.”

After the agreement was reached, Lt. McKenna testified the defendant

consented to the search of the rental vehicle. Prior to searching the vehicle,

Lt. McKenna asked the defendant what would be found in the rental car.

The defendant informed the officer a firearm was inside the rental car, but
5

Taylor was the owner of the weapon. At Lt. McKenna’s request, the

defendant agreed to retrieve the firearm from the closed center console of

the rental car.

Defendant was not arrested that day. Rather, Lt. McKenna wrote his

phone number on the back of a business card and gave it to the defendant for

further communication. Lt. McKenna also provided defendant with a “cover

story” to provide the “neighborhood” with an explanation as to why he was

not arrested.8

On August 24, 2022 (14 days after the encounter), Lt. McKenna

obtained a warrant for defendant’s arrest. Approximately three months later,

on November 15, 2022, defendant was called to the probation and parole

office for a prearranged interview. After the defendant was interviewed

about the firearm, Lt. McKenna placed him under arrest for possession of a

firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, in violation of

La. R.S. 14:95.1.

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lt. McKenna was asked

why he broke the agreement not to arrest the defendant. He stated that he

was “not fully informed” when he made the agreement, and “new

information” had come to light after the agreement was made, i.e., the

handgun had been used in a prior violent crime, which was wholly unrelated

to the defendant.

On January 31, 2023, the defendant filed a pro se “Motion to Suppress

Inculpatory Statements and Physical Evidence”; the motion was later

8
The firearm was hidden in a bag to avoid onlookers from becoming suspicions
as to why the defendant was not taken into custody. Apparently, the defendant was well
known in the area, and Lt. McKenna was concerned that neighbors might wonder why he
was not arrested after a firearm was found in the rental car.
6

adopted by counsel. The defendant argued, inter alia, “McKenna had no

probable cause to enter his yard and go looking into the vehicle parked on

[defendant’s] property,” without a search warrant or an arrest warrant for the

defendant or anyone else on the property. On February 14, 2023, the

defendant filed a supplemental motion to suppress, arguing “any inculpatory

statements, and physical evidence should be suppressed as they were

obtained as a result of McKinna’s [sic] ‘influence and promise’ not to take

[defendant] to jail,” and were “tainted by McKinna’s [sic] coercion, and

promises not to take [defendant] to jail for the gun if one was found in the

vehicle.”

Hearings on the motions to suppress were held over the course of two

days: July 16, 2024, and August 29, 2024. During the hearing, although the

State had the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized

without a warrant, the State deferred to defense counsel to present evidence.

Defense counsel noted for the record that this was not the normal course of

proceedings for a hearing on a motion to suppress. Nevertheless, counsel

presented the evidence, and the State responded accordingly. At the

conclusion of the August hearing, the trial court denied both motions, stating

“This Court does not find that the motion is supported by law or evidence.

Motion is denied.”

The defendant filed an application for supervisory review. By order

dated November 20, 2024, this Court granted the writ to docket.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motions to

suppress. He argues Lt. McKenna took him aside, deactivated his body

camera, and induced the defendant to give permission to search the rented
7

vehicle. The defendant also argues Lt. McKenna obtained permission to

search the rental car by promising him he would not be arrested, and during

the suppression hearing, Lt. McKenna admitted to making the inducement

and agreement. However, two weeks afterward, Lt. McKenna breached the

agreement and obtained a warrant for the defendant’s arrest for possession of

the firearm.

In response, the State argues La. C. Cr. P. art. 215.1 allows a law

enforcement officer to stop a person in a public place if he or she reasonably

suspects the person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a

criminal offense. The officer may demand the person’s name, address, and

an explanation of his actions and may temporarily detain and interrogate

them. See, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889

(1968); State v. Taylor, 363 So. 2d 699 (La. 1978). The State also argues Lt.

McKenna “had reasonable suspicion or cause to initiate contact” with

defendant, based on the officer’s “experience, training, and common sense.”

The State concedes that Lt. McKenna promised not to arrest the defendant

because he wanted to use him as a CI. Nevertheless, the State asserts the

defendant’s statements regarding the gun came after he was advised of his

Miranda rights, and he did not invoke his right to remain silent.

The right of every person to be secure in his person, house, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the

1974 Louisiana Constitution. A search and seizure conducted without a

warrant issued on probable cause is unreasonable unless the warrantless

search can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the

warrant requirement. State v. Thompson, 02-0333 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So. 2d
8

330; State v. Hunter, 46,194 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/11), 62 So. 3d 340, writ

denied, 11-0889 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So. 3d 921. On the trial of a motion to

suppress filed under La. C. Cr. P. art. 703, the burden of proof is on the

defendant to prove the grounds of his motion. However, the State bears the

burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without a

warrant. La. C. Cr. P. art. 703(D); State v. Hunter, supra.

Violating a traffic regulation provides reasonable suspicion to stop a

vehicle. State v. Hunter, supra. If a police officer observes a traffic

infraction, then the subsequent stop for that offense is clearly legal. Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); State

v. Hunter, supra. The subjective intent of the officer making the traffic stop

is irrelevant, as long as he observed the traffic violation. Whren, supra.

When a police officer makes a lawful arrest of an individual, that

officer is authorized, without more, to search the arrestee and his wingspan,

or lunge space, for weapons and evidence. State v. Hunter, supra; State v.

Stoutes, 43,181 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/2/08), 980 So. 2d 230. If a lawful arrest is

made of the occupant of a vehicle, then law enforcement is permitted to

search the entire passenger compartment when it is reasonable to believe the

vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Thornton v. United States,

541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2004).

When deciding whether a statement is knowing and voluntary, a court

considers the totality of the circumstances under which it is made, and any

inducement is merely one factor in the analysis. State v. Blank, 04-0204 (La.

4/11/07), 955 So. 2d 90, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S. Ct. 494, 169 L.

Ed. 2d 346; State v. Platt, 43,708 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/3/08), 998 So. 2d 864,

writ denied, 09-0265 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 305. Promises of immunity
9

from prosecution, clemency, or leniency, inducements and implied promises

will void a defendant’s statement. See, State v. Jackson, 414 So. 2d 310 (La.

1982); State v. Platt, supra; State v. English, 582 So. 2d 1358 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1991), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1172 (La. 1991).

In State v. Alexander, 18-1772 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 672, the

defendant made a statement after a detective assured him that anything he

said would “remain in the interrogation room” and that no one would need to

know what he told the detective. In a per curiam opinion, the Louisiana

Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion

to suppress. The Court stated:

The district court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
suppress his statement. Defendant made his statement after a
detective assured him anything he said would stay in the
interrogation room and that no one would need to know what he
told the detective. The detective’s assurance amounted to a false
promise of confidentiality that subverted the Miranda warning
that anything defendant said will be used against him in a court
of law, and thus rendered defendant’s statement involuntary.
See Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584-585 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“An officer cannot read the defendant his Miranda warnings
and then turn around and tell him that despite those warnings,
what the defendant tells the officer will be confidential and still
use the resultant confession against the defendant.”).

In the instant case, after Lt. McKenna advised the defendant of his

Miranda rights, he promised the defendant he would not be arrested in

exchange for providing information. The officer’s promise came after the

defendant had refused to consent to the search of the rental car several times.

We have reviewed the body camera footage introduced into evidence, and

the defendant was clearly depicted granting consent to search his vehicle

(the Cadillac involved in the traffic stop). The defendant could also be heard

stating he could not, and he would not give consent to search the rental

10

vehicle. When Lt. McKenna continued to ask the defendant about the rental

vehicle, the defendant told him he was not exiting the vehicle at that time; he

was merely retrieving his crutches from the car. Further, prior to searching

the vehicle, Lt. McKenna asked the defendant what would be found in the

car, and the defendant stated a firearm was in the vehicle, and at the officer’s

directive, the defendant retrieved the gun from the console of the car.

After carefully reviewing the record, we find that like in State v.

Alexander, supra, Lt. McKenna’s assurance that the defendant would not be

arrested “amounted to a false promise of confidentiality that subverted the

Miranda warning that anything defendant said will be used against him in a

court of law and thus rendered defendant’s statement involuntary.”

Furthermore, the defendant was not the person who committed the

traffic violation, and he was not a passenger in the stopped vehicle. He was

seen near a rented vehicle parked in a vacant lot several yards away from the

location of the traffic stop. Neither the defendant, nor the rental car, was

involved in the traffic stop, and the officers’ interest in the defendant and the

rented vehicle did not amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause to

question the defendant or search the rental car. Accordingly, we grant the

defendant’s application for supervisory writs, reverse the judgment of the

trial court denying the motion to suppress, and remand the matter to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the writ is granted, the judgment of

the trial court denying the motion to suppress is reversed, and the matter is

remanded to the trial court.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; REMANDED.
11