James T. Coleman, Jr. v. Parish of Bossier

Judgment rendered April 9, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,179-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

JAMES T. COLEMAN, JR., ET AL Plaintiffs-Appellants

versus

PARISH OF BOSSIER, ET AL Defendants-Appellees

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 164,280

Honorable Charles A. Smith, Judge

*****

THE TOUCHSTONE LAW FIRM Counsel for Appellants,
By: Dylan D. Touchstone James T. Coleman, Jr.,
Clair S. Smith, Loggy
Bayou Properties, LLC,
Clair S. Smith Family
L.P. and Iriey Jean
Wafer.

COOK, YANCEY, KING & Counsel for Appellees,
GALLOWAY Parish of Bossier, Joe E.
By: Robert Kennedy, Jr. “Butch” Ford, Jr. and
Rachel Hauser

*****

Before COX, THOMPSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Plaintiffs were forced to extensively litigate, before both the trial and

appellate court, their rights to obtain documents determined to be public

records, and now seek the statutorily authorized recovery of their attorney

fees for having to do so. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court

approved recovery of only a portion of Plaintiffs’ actual attorney fees, and

that limited issue is what brings these parties back before this court.

Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount

for the award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs, we amend and as amended affirm

the judgment to increase the attorney fees award, and remand this matter to

the trial court for a determination of the additional attorney fees arising from

this appeal of the matter, assessing all costs to the Defendants.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts giving rise to Appellants’ claims for attorney

fees resulting from the refusal of the Bossier Parish Police Jury to provide

access to public records are detailed in this court’s opinion in Coleman v.

Parish of Bossier, 55,093 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 368 So. 3d 1228. In

summary, James T. Coleman, Jr., Ludell Wafer, Clair S. Smith, Loggy

Bayou Properties, LLC, and Clair S. Smith Family, L.P. (collectively

referred to as the “Plaintiffs”), filed their lawsuit stating that they own

properties on the east side of Red Chute Bayou, which is only accessible by

crossing the Swan Lake Road Bridge (“the bridge”). The Plaintiffs brought

an inverse condemnation suit against the Parish of Bossier, Joe E. Ford, Jr.,

and Rachel Hauser (collectively referred to as the “Defendants”), alleging

that they pursued the abandonment of the bridge and closed the bridge,

making the Plaintiffs’ properties inaccessible.

In or around October 2020, employees or agents of Bossier Parish

caused large mounds of dirt to be dropped onto the bridge, with the intention

of barricading the bridge from being crossed by vehicles. On October 30,

2020, Mr. Coleman and Mr. Wafer sent a letter to Bossier Parish seeking

copies of all the bridge’s inspection reports. On November 2, 2020, the

Parish, through Ms. Hauser, sent a response letter that stated the Parish

refused to provide copies of the requested reports. The Plaintiffs requested a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to terminate all actions to abandon the

bridge and require the obstacles to be removed.

On July 22, 2021, the Defendants filed exceptions of prescription and

improper cumulation of actions. The district court denied the exception of

improper cumulation of actions and continued all other matters to be heard

at a trial on the merits. On February 9, 2022, the district court signed its

judgment and ruled that the bridge’s inspection reports are privileged as

critical infrastructure information under La. R.S. 44:23.1; therefore, the

Plaintiffs’ request to produce the reports was denied. Plaintiffs appealed that

ruling and on August 9, 2023, this Court held that the records were not

privileged, reversing the ruling of the trial court, and the case was then

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. See Coleman, supra.

Following the remand and reversal, on September 20, 2023, the

Plaintiffs made a written demand to Defendants for release of the records, as

well as for payment of attorney fees incurred in litigating the issue.

Interestingly, Defendants did not release the records in response to the new

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written demand following the opinion of this Court on the topic. On

October 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Reset Hearing for Issuance of

Writ of Mandamus” in the trial court. Copies of the demand letter and

attorney fee affidavits were attached as exhibits to the motion.

In response, Defendants filed a motion for protective order, seeking to

limit the scope of the production and potential disclosure of the bridge

inspection reports. Plaintiffs submitted a rebuttal brief. With their rebuttal,

Plaintiffs produced supplemental attorney fee affidavits.

Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a total of four affidavits – two per

attorney working on the matter. The amount of attorney fees requested and

detailed on the four affidavits submitted totaled $24,474.00. All the

affidavits contained standard entries for legal work, including drafting

pleadings, preparing for and taking depositions, legal research, preparing for

and attending hearings, drafting the appellate brief, and preparing for and

attending oral arguments. The affidavits detailed a rate of $150 per hour for

one attorney and a rate of $250 per for the more experienced attorney.

On February 15, 2024, the mandamus and protective order issues were

argued before the trial court. The trial court ruled that a writ of mandamus

be issued requiring production of public records. Additionally, the trial

court awarded Plaintiffs $10,000 of the requested $24,474 in attorney fees,

providing the following reasons:

I will designate the award of attorney’s fees as at least a partial
final judgment because, in my mind at least, I’m separating out
what went into the mandamus action and what didn’t. And I’ve
looked at their bills and it’s my opinion that the work which
was performed with regard to the mandamus, as far as getting it
to the hearing, we finally did, the plaintiffs would be entitled to
the amount of $6,000 and I believe they’re entitled to another

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$4,000 for the appellate work. I’m going to leave a total of
$10,000 in attorney’s fees.

The requested records have since been provided to the Plaintiffs, but the

record reflects they have not received any payment of the attorney fee

award. Plaintiffs now appeal the narrow issue of the trial court’s award of

only $10,000 for attorney fees and argue that they are entitled to the full

amount, $24,474, detailed in their affidavits.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert one assignment of error:

Assignment of Error: The trial court committed manifest error when it
awarded Plaintiffs attorney’s fees in an amount less than detailed in
affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, with no countervailing evidence.

Plaintiffs argue that La. R.S. 44:35 provides that attorney fees shall be

awarded when rights are enforced under the public records law. Plaintiffs

assert that when they were awarded relief under the public records law and

were provided with the bridge inspection reports, it was the culmination of

many hours of work, memoranda researched and written, and appearances at

hearings and depositions. The lawyers’ affidavits were the only positive

evidence as to the amount of time spent working on the issue. Plaintiffs

argue that the trial court’s reduction of the requested amount was manifest

error.

Plaintiffs cite Carter v. City of Shreveport, (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/27/17),

244 So. 3d 659, where this Court reversed and increased the amount

awarded by the trial court, which had awarded an amount less than what the

prevailing attorney requested and demonstrated by supporting affidavit.

This Court noted in Carter, supra, that there had been no hearing on attorney

fees, the Defendants never challenged the affidavit or offered contradictory

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evidence, and the trial court did not provide a reasonable basis for its lower

award. Plaintiffs argue that this Court should reinstate the original amount

submitted to the trial court since there was no contradictory evidence

presented to dispute it.

In response, Defendants argue that because the Plaintiffs originally

consolidated their summary proceeding with two ordinary proceedings, their

attorney fee request on the public records request is too high. Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees in connection with the

litigation required by the public records request but are not entitled to

attorney fees in connection with their injunction action, which was

dismissed, and their takings claim, which is still pending. Defendants argue

six points in response to Plaintiffs’ single assignment of error:

1. Plaintiffs pursued three actions in this single lawsuit, but are entitled
to recover attorney’s fees at this time for only one of those actions;

2. Most of the pleadings, memoranda and court proceedings, including
the prior appeal, involved actions other than the public records
request.

3. Plaintiffs did not submit to the trial court all of counsel’s invoices
and/or time records showing all time spent on pleadings, memoranda,
hearings, and the appeal, most if not all of which involved actions
other than the public records request, so that the trial court could
determine a reasonable allocation of fees to the public records request
issue;

4. Plaintiffs provided no explanation of how attorney’s fees were
allocated among the three actions;

5. Some of the claimed fees were not recoverable under La. R.S.
44:35(D); and

6. Much of the claimed fees are clearly excessive and/or unnecessary,
and require reduction under the precedent of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. See Covington v. McNeese State University, 12-2182 (La.
5/7/13), 118 So. 3d 343.

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Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not bring their action for public

records in a summary proceeding, as required under La. R.S. 44:35(C).

Rather, they cumulated their public records action with two other actions,

one for an unconstitutional takings claim and one for an injunction.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees only for the

public records litigation, but not the other two actions. Defendants argue

that Plaintiffs submitted only self-serving affidavits to the trial court, and

they did not submit complete copies of invoices, bills, or records of billable

time. Defendants claims that Plaintiffs did not provide the trial court with an

explanation of how they arrived at the fee amount requested. Defendants

argue that the Plaintiffs have made claims for excessive and/or unnecessary

fees, and the trial court was required to reduce those fees. Finally,

Defendants argue that Ludell Wafer, one of the three plaintiffs that initially

had standing in the public records litigation, has passed away and no longer

has a right of action in this matter. Therefore, Defendants argue that any

award of attorney fees should be reduced by one-third.

The public’s right to access public records is a fundamental right

guaranteed by the state constitution. La. Const. art. 12, § 3; Title Research

Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933 (La. 1984). In accordance with this

fundamental right, the public records statutes should be construed liberally.

Id. With regard to attorney fees and costs, La. R.S. 44:35(D) states:

If a person seeking the right to inspect or to receive a copy of a
public record prevails in such suit, he shall be awarded
reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation. If such
person prevails in part, the court may in its discretion award
him reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof.

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The amount of an award for attorney fees is within the discretion of

the trial court. Dwyer v. Early, 2002-1545 (La. App. 4 Cir. 03/12/03), 842

So. 2d 1124, writ denied, 03-1013 (La. 05/30/03), 845 So. 2d 1053; Bohn v.

Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 482 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1986), writs denied, 486 So. 2d 750 (La. 1986) and 486 So. 2d 752 (La.

1986). Generally, each case is considered in light of its own facts and

circumstances, but the amount awarded must be reasonable. Bohn, supra.

We disagree with Defendants’ arguments regarding the Plaintiffs’

affidavits. La. R.S. 44:35(D) provides that attorney fees and other costs of

litigation shall be awarded in the event a party prevails in their public

records request. The Plaintiffs prevailed; this court ruled that the bridge

inspection reports they sought to inspect were not privileged. Plaintiffs have

been required to continually seek judicial intervention to obtain copies of

public records to which they have been entitled, which intervention is costly

and time-consuming. We note that the trial court denied Defendants’

exception of improper cumulation of actions in 2021. Defendants’

continued arguments relating to their desire to separate the summary

proceeding from the ordinary proceedings are not applicable to the issue of

attorney fees owed at this stage of the litigation. The ability to review the

bridge inspection reports – which we have ruled are public records – is

fundamental to all Plaintiffs’ claims asserted in their lawsuit.

While we recognize La. R.S. 44:35(D)(1) provides the court may in its

discretion award attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof, we find that

the trial court erred in lowering the amount of attorney fees requested by

“separating out what went into the mandamus action.” The affidavits

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specifically detailed the work Plaintiffs’ counsel performed to prevail on

their public records request. We conclude the trial court was manifestly

erroneous to limit Plaintiffs’ recovery to the additional work that was

necessary to be performed on the mandamus action they were forced to file

when Defendants refused to produce the bridge inspection reports, even after

this Court already ruled that those very reports were not privileged. The

legal fees on all issues are so tightly intertwined and interrelated that it is

error to attempt to designate a particular action or expense as not related to

or arising from such an essential element regarding the very genesis of the

legal action.

In the affidavits submitted to the trial court, Plaintiffs included a table

detailing the date of the legal work performed, a description of the work

performed, and an amount of billable time for each entry. While invoices

detailing amounts paid for billable time were not included, this table

represents an appropriate time-keeping instrument that is sufficient to show

the work performed by Plaintiffs’ counsel on the public records request

issue. The affidavits do not contain an unreasonable amount of legal work,

and the reasonable hourly rates for both attorneys are consistent with rates

charged by other lawyers in this community with similar experience. The

total time spent on the issue – from the initiation of the pleadings, ongoing

discovery, multiple hearings, and through the prior appeal to this Court –

was a reasonable and understandable 127 total hours between two attorneys.

The trial court did not hold a hearing specifically on the issue of

attorney fees. Defendants did not offer contradictory evidence to refute the

accuracy of the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel. We conclude the

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trial court’s reasoning for limiting the award to the mandamus action was

erroneous. Having reviewed this record and the affidavits submitted by

Plaintiffs’ counsel, we find the trial court abused its discretion by awarding

only $10,000 of the applicable attorney fees the Plaintiffs have been forced

to incur to obtain records to which they are entitled. Accordingly, we find

that Plaintiffs’ assignment of error has merit and agree the attorney fees

should be increased to $24,474 for counsel’s 127 hours of work and hereby

amend the judgment accordingly and as amended we affirm the judgment.

This court has held that the general rule regarding additional attorney

fees for work done on appeal is that an increase in attorney fees is usually

allowed where a party was awarded attorney fees by the trial court and is

forced to, and successfully defends, an appeal. It is within the appellate

court’s discretion to award or increase attorney fees for appellate work.

Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 46,514 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/21/11), 79 So. 3d 347, writ

denied, 11-2301 (La. 12/02/11), 76 So. 3d 1178.

Here, Plaintiffs were again successful in obtaining relief on appeal,

and the appeal necessitated additional work. As such, pursuant to the

mandatory attorney fee language in La. R.S. 44:35(D), we find Plaintiffs are

entitled to an increase in attorney fees for this appeal. This matter shall be

remanded to the trial court for the determination of the additional reasonable

attorney fee award for Plaintiffs for the necessary work on appeal by their

respective counsel not previously included.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s $10,000 judgment for

attorney fees is amended and Plaintiffs are awarded attorney fees in the

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amount of $24,474, and as amended is affirmed. The matter is remanded to

the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion

relative to fixing any additional attorney fee award, in accordance with La.

R.S. 44:35(D). Costs of this appeal in the amount of $2,551 are assessed to

Defendants.

AMENDED; AS AMENDED AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

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