State of Louisiana v. Tobias Williams

Judgment rendered February 26, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,184-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TOBIAS WILLIAMS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 360,400

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward Kelly Bauman

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ALEX L. PORUBSKY
SAMUEL S. CRICHTON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before ROBINSON, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Caddo, the Honorable Christopher T. Victory presiding.

Defendant, Tobias Williams, was found guilty of aggravated flight from an

officer, adjudicated a fourth-felony offender, and sentenced to life

imprisonment without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence.

On appeal, Williams’ status as a fourth-felony offender was affirmed, but

this court vacated his life sentence and remanded his case for resentencing to

allow the trial court to consider Williams’ presentence investigation report

(“PSI”). Upon considering Williams’ PSI, the trial court resentenced

Williams to life imprisonment without the benefits of probation or

suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The following facts are taken verbatim from Williams’ prior appeal,

State v. Williams, 55,290 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 372 So. 3d 921, writ

denied, 23-01397 (La. 3/5/24), 380 So. 3d 570.

Around 3:40 a.m. on August 17, 2018, Shreveport Police
Department (“SPD”) Officer Corey Rabalais was on patrol in
the Highland-Stoner Hill neighborhood of Shreveport when he
observed an SUV with an obscured license plate driving down
Stoner Avenue. Officer Rabalais initiated a traffic stop by
turning on his lights and siren, then pulling his patrol car behind
the SUV; however, the driver, later identified as Tobias
Williams, refused to comply and continued to drive away. A
chase ensued during which Williams committed numerous
traffic violations recorded by Officer Rabalais’s dash camera in
his patrol car. The footage showed multiple 25 and 35 mph
speed limit signs on the roads which Williams traveled. The
footage further revealed Officer Rabalais was driving at times
in excess of 60 mph in order to keep up with Williams.
Williams is also seen operating his vehicle on the wrong side of
the road, failing to stop at multiple red lights, and driving
through numerous stop signs.

During this high-speed pursuit, Officer Rabalais was joined by
Corporal Jon Smith, also with the SPD. Cpl. Smith’s dash
camera recorded footage of a bicyclist on the same street as
Williams and Officer Rabalais; however, Williams and Officer
Rabalais turned before ever reaching the bicyclist’s position.
Additionally, both recordings reflect this high-speed chase
lasted about 15 minutes, having occurred between 3:40 a.m.
and 3:55 a.m. that morning.

Williams eventually encountered a construction roadblock
which forced him to stop his SUV. He immediately exited the
vehicle and fled on foot, but Officer Rabalais was unable to
catch up to him. Another SPD officer joined in the foot chase
and, after spotting Williams, gave verbal commands to put his
hands up and get down on the ground, which Williams ignored.
At some point during the chase, Sergeant Dan Sawyer, a K9
officer with the SPD, arrived to help apprehend Williams. Sgt.
Sawyer’s K9 was able to detain Williams by biting his arm and
holding on until Sgt. Sawyer arrived. He was arrested, then
transported to the hospital for treatment of his dog bite wounds.
….

Following arrest, Williams was charged by bill of information
with one count of aggravated flight from an officer, La R.S.
14:108.1(C). Jury trial began on December 14, 2021, and
resulted in Williams’ conviction as charged.
The state then filed a habitual offender bill of information
asserting Williams’ new conviction for aggravated flight from
an officer was his fourth felony offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1.
Williams’ three prior felony convictions were listed as follows:

1) January 28, 2008, guilty plea to Illegal Possession of
Stolen Things;
2) February 11, 2016, guilty plea to Aggravated Battery;
and

3) February 11, 2016, guilty plea to Illegal Possession of
Stolen Firearms.
In a motion to quash, Williams argued his two February 11,
2016, guilty pleas should only be treated as one prior felony
conviction. On May 19, 2022, the trial court held a multiple
offender hearing and found Williams was a fourth felony
offender. The trial court, noting its consideration of La. R.S.
15:529.1, concluded the events which led to Williams’
February 11, 2016, convictions were not connected, were not a
single criminal episode, and would be treated as two separate
felony convictions.
….

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On June 20, 2022, Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment
at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of
sentence, La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). The trial court first listed
Williams’ prior felony convictions and reiterated its finding
Williams was a fourth felony habitual offender. The trial court
also noted two of Williams’ four felony convictions were for
crimes of violence, aggravated battery and the instant
conviction for aggravated flight from an officer, La. R.S.
14:2(B)(5) and (39). In support of the life sentence, the trial
court stated it had considered the sentencing guidelines, then
thoroughly detailed Williams’ extensive criminal record,
expressed its belief Williams was not remorseful, and
concluded Williams did not understand the seriousness of his
crimes, nor would he in the future.

Id. at p. 1-3, 380 So. 3d at 923-24

Williams appealed his habitual offender status, arguing that the trial

court should only have adjudicated him a third-felony offender, as his

February 11, 2016, convictions for aggravated battery and illegal possession

of stolen things occurred on the same day and should have been considered

one felony for habitual offender purposes. Williams also argued his life

sentence was excessive given his prior felony offenses and in view of his

instant felony offense. He argued his aggravated flight from an officer

should not have been classified as a crime of violence because he did not

create a risk of harm or injury, as there were no vehicles present during his

offense and no injuries were reported. Williams also complained that the

trial court did not order a PSI.

This court affirmed Williams’ habitual offender adjudication as a

fourth-felony offender, but it vacated his life sentence and remanded the

case for resentencing. This court found that, given that the trial court

imposed the maximum sentence from of a range of 20 years to life, the

record was inadequate to determine whether Williams’ life sentence was

excessive. This court said that a PSI would have “shed some light on the

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reasons and justifications for Williams’ maximum life sentence.” Id. at p.

15, 372 So. 3d at 931. While the trial court thoroughly considered Williams’

criminal record and his ability to be rehabilitated, this court observed that it

made no mention of Williams’ personal history or evaluated the seriousness

of his instant offense and prior felonies. This court stated that while the

roads were empty (other than the bicyclist on an adjacent road) when he

committed his instant offense, Williams endangered the lives of multiple

officers during their chase. State v. Williams, supra. This court noted:

Williams’ argument may lend itself more to possible mitigation
as to the relative seriousness of his offense when compared to
other high-speed chases where multiple bystanders are actually
put in harm’s way or accidents occur. The trial court will need
to evaluate the facts of this case to determine the relative
seriousness of Williams’s conduct, in addition to the relative
seriousness of his prior convictions.

Id. at p. 17, 372 So. 3d at 932.

On February 15, 2024, Williams was resentenced. The trial court

informed Williams of his appellate and post-conviction relief time

constraints. The trial court reiterated that the sentencing range for Williams

as a fourth-felony offender was 20 years to life. The court found that all

three factors from La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) were applicable. The court

said that, looking at his criminal history, there was an undue risk that during

a period of probation Williams would commit another crime. The court

found that Williams needed correctional treatment in a custodial

environment due to his “lack of productive involvement in society up to this

point in his life as shown by the [PSI] on his family history.” The court said

imposition of a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of his crime;

the court again referenced his criminal history and noted that his instant and

aggravated battery offenses were crimes of violence.

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On the same day, the trial court filed written reasons for its sentence

and read portions of that filing during the resentencing hearing. The court

also filed Williams’ PSI into the record. The court addressed the specific

findings from this court’s opinion which found the record lacking support

for Williams’ life sentence. The trial court sentenced Williams to life at

hard labor without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence.

The trial court included the following in its written reasons for

Williams’ life sentence:

1. First, the court detailed Williams’ criminal history, which
began in 2008; he was arrested and charged at least 18 times,
and he had 3 prior felony convictions, not including the instant
offense.

a. On December 31, 2007, Williams was found in felony
possession of a stolen vehicle valued at over $500. He
knew or had reason to know that the vehicle was the
subject of a robbery or theft. He pled guilty to the
offense on January 28, 2008.

b. On December 9, 2010, victim Xavier Stills was shot
outside an apartment building during an illegal narcotics
transaction. Stills clinically died while being transported
to the hospital, but he was revived. Witnesses said that
Williams was present when Stills was shot by another,
that he removed a necklace from Stills, and two
handguns were present at the shooting. The court stated
it considered a series of events involving firearms,
narcotics, and attempted murder to be “extremely
dangerous, serious, and warranting the harshest of
penalties.”

c. Williams’ second 2016 felony conviction followed the
previous shooting incident, where he was convicted for
illegal possession of a firearm. On December 10, 2010,
police officers went to an apartment in the same complex
where Stills was shot the day before. Williams was
present and the apartment was searched. Officers found
crack cocaine and a stolen handgun. Williams later
admitted he was present when Stills was shot. The court
also found that incident to be serious, dangerous, and
warranting a harsh penalty.

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d. The court detailed Williams’ instant offense,
aggravated flight from an officer. It stated that Williams
put the lives of everyone on the street in danger, as well
as the lives of the officers giving chase. The court noted
that the offense was a crime of violence.

2. Williams was arrested multiple times for gun-related crimes.

3. Williams was charged with multiple narcotics-related crimes,
several of which involved firearms, including possession with
intent to distribute a Schedule I, possession with intent to
distribute a Schedule II, illegal carrying of weapons while in
possession of controlled dangerous substances, and possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon.

4. Williams was arrested and charged with multiple crimes that
showed violent tendencies.

5. Williams was arrested for attempted first-degree murder in
2016, two counts of attempted second-degree murder in 2016,
one count of second-degree murder in 2016, and three counts of
second-degree murder as late as 2020.

6. Williams was sentenced to different hard labor sentences
only to be released and commit additional crimes

7. Williams did not appear remorseful.

8. His criminal behavior led the court to believe he did not
understand the seriousness of his crimes and would not in the
future.

9. When discussing Williams’ lack of potential for
rehabilitation, the court noted that he never held a steady job,
did not have custody of his only child, committed multiple
serious, violent felonies, admitted to being present during the
attempted killing of one person, and was charged multiple times
with murder and attempted murder.

10. Williams’ PSI showed that he was 34 years old and had 2
brothers and 4 sisters. His father passed away when Williams
was in the third grade. Williams attended school up to the tenth
grade. He said that he was mostly a good kid in school but was
somewhat of a troublemaker in high school, when he stole a
car, got arrested, was placed on probation, and was expelled
from school. He never attempted to return to school to get a
diploma or GED. He had one job where he worked in an oil

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field for three months. He was not married and the mother of
his only child had full custody. Williams was not religious and
did not have a religious preference.

On March 14, 2024, Williams filed a motion to reconsider sentence,

arguing that a natural life sentence is out of proportion with the seriousness

of his past offenses. Williams asserted that since there were no vehicles on

the road during his flight from law enforcement, the relative severity of the

crime is not so high as to warrant life in prison. The trial court disagreed

and denied the motion. Williams now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Habitual Offender Status

Williams argues that nothing in the record shows that the state proved

his discharge dates from custody for his prior offenses. He claims that the

state’s failure to provide such proof constitutes an error patent and his

habitual offender adjudication should be vacated and his case remanded for

further proceedings.

The state argues that Williams’ habitual offender adjudication is not

subject to relitigation as his fourth-felony habitual offender status was

affirmed by this court. The state points out that Williams sought review

with the Louisiana Supreme Court, which denied his writ, making his

conviction and habitual offender adjudication final.

Louisiana’s constitution does not afford a criminal defendant the right

to seek a second direct appeal. Once the appellate court renders a judgment

and that judgment is final, the defendant no longer has a right to appeal the

decision, but is limited to seeking supervisory review. La. C. Cr. P. art.

912.1(C)(1); La. C. Cr. P. art. 922; State v. Jackson, 39,515 (La. App. 2 Cir.

3/2/05), 895 So. 2d 695.
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Following the affirmance of his habitual offender adjudication in State

v. Williams, supra, Williams sought supervisory review with the Louisiana

Supreme Court, which was denied. State v. Williams, 23-01397 (La. 3/5/24),

380 So. 3d 570. Williams did not seek rehearing before the supreme court,

and his conviction and habitual offender adjudication are now final. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 922(A).

Pursuant to this court’s order in State v. Williams, supra, Williams

was resentenced on February 15, 2024, again receiving life imprisonment

without the benefits of probation or suspension of sentence. His

resentencing only entitles him to appeal the length of his new sentence. He

is not permitted a second bite at the apple to relitigate the merits of his

habitual offender adjudication. Accordingly, this assignment of error is

without merit.

Excessive Sentence

Williams argues in the alternative that his life sentence is

constitutionally excessive given the facts of his case. Williams contends that

no other person was present or injured during his aggravated flight offense,

so it was not the worst offense and he was not the worst offender. He argues

that his aggravated flight offense should not have been considered a crime of

violence. He claims that his predicate offenses of illegal possession of

stolen things, aggravated battery, and illegal possession of stolen firearms

were not the most egregious offenses warranting a life sentence. He points

out that his arrests for different murder and attempted murder charges were

only arrests and not convictions because the district attorney was unable to

obtain indictments by which to charge him with those crimes. Williams asks

that this court vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing.
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The state contends that the trial court carefully considered Williams’

personal and criminal history and provided exhaustive oral and written

reasons to support his life sentence. The state argues that his life sentence is

appropriate considering his criminal history, showing that he violated the

law his entire adult life, amassing several felony convictions and arrests,

including four charges for second-degree murder. Williams’ sentence is

within statutory limits and the trial court complied with the provisions found

in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in sentencing him, weighing the aggravating and

mitigating factors found therein. The state illustrates Williams’ personal and

criminal history, like that found in the trial court’s written reasons for its

sentence. The state asks that this court affirm Williams’ life sentence.

In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, this court uses a two-step

process. First, the record must reflect that the trial court took the criteria set

forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 into account. The goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence, not rigid or

mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475

(La. 1982). The trial court is not required to list every aggravating or

mitigating circumstance, so long as it adequately considered them in

particularizing the sentence to the defendant. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688

(La. 1983). The important elements which should be considered are the

defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health,

employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and

the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);

State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. These

elements are consistently utilized by this Court when evaluating a sentence

for constitutional excessiveness. See State v. McCarthy, 55,038 (La. App. 2
9

Cir. 6/28/23), 366 So. 3d 1266; State v. McFarlin, 54,754 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/25/23), 354 So. 3d 888.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Trotter, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d

307. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another

sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused

its discretion. State v. Trotter, supra; State v. Bell, supra.

As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are reserved

for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031

(La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 22-00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So. 3d

1053. For the crime of aggravated flight from an officer, the longest

sentence Williams could have received was five years at hard labor, La. R.S.

14:108.1(E)(1). However, as a fourth felony offender, Williams faced up to

life in prison. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a)-(c) provides the following

sentencing ranges for fourth felony offenders:

(4) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first
conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment
for any term less than his natural life then the following
sentences apply:

(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the
fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less
than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no

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event less than twenty years and not more than his natural
life.

(b) If the fourth felony and no prior felony is defined as a crime
of violence under R.S. 14.2(B) or as a sex offense under
R.S. 15:541, the person shall be imprisoned for not less than
twenty years nor more than twice the longest possible
sentence prescribed for a first conviction. If twice the
possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction is less
than twenty years, the person shall be imprisoned for twenty
years.

(c) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies
defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), or a sex
offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 when the victim is under
the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense,
the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his
natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence.

As set forth in La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(c), two prior felonies, as well

as the fourth felony, must be crimes of violence to subject a defendant to a

mandatory life sentence as a fourth felony offender. While Williams’ fourth

felony is defined as a crime of violence, only one of his prior three felonies,

aggravated battery, meets that criterion, La. R.S. 14:2(5) and (39); therefore,

his sentencing range was 20 years to life pursuant to La. R.S.

15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

Considering the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of life

imprisonment, this court must determine whether the sentence imposed is

constitutionally excessive in light of the record before us. After a thorough

review of the record, we find the sentence was not constitutionally

excessive. The trial court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 at Williams’

resentencing hearing, focusing on the four categories cited by this court in

Williams, supra: (1) prior criminal record; (2) likelihood of rehabilitation;

(3) personal history; and (4) seriousness of offense.

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Williams has an extensive criminal record that includes being charged

with more than 25 criminal offenses since 2007, the bulk of which involved

felony drug offenses or crimes of violence. In addition to the present

conviction for aggravated flight, Williams’ prior felony convictions include

illegal possession of stolen things, aggravated battery, and illegal possession

of a stolen firearm. Two of these offenses are crimes of violence as defined

by La. R.S. 14:2(B).

Most concerning however, are Williams’ arrests in 2016 and again in

2020 for a total of four counts of second-degree murder and three counts of

attempted second-degree murder. The trial court was permitted to consider

all prior criminal activity in particularizing a sentence, even where the arrest

did not result in prosecution. State v. Doyle, 43,438 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/13/08), 989 So. 2d 864; State v. Russell, 40,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/05),

920 So. 2d 866, writ denied, 06-0478 (La. 9/29/06), 937 So. 2d 851. This

pattern of conduct by Williams establishes his violent nature and propensity

for continued criminal conduct.

We further find that Williams’ prospects for rehabilitation outside the

penal system are slim. He has either been incarcerated or unemployed his

entire adult life. Nothing in the record suggests that Williams has the desire

or capability to mend his ways and become a law-abiding citizen. The trial

court specifically noted that Williams did not appear remorseful for his

actions or even acknowledge his own culpability. Furthermore, his

conviction for aggravated flight implies that he would sooner abscond from

law enforcement in a manner that poses a threat to human life than accept

any responsibility for his own conduct. Rehabilitation is unlikely.

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At rehearing, the trial court duly considered Williams’ personal

history as well, and the trial court’s amended written reasons in support of

his sentence show that Williams’ age, family ties, marital status, health, and

employment record were taken into consideration when imposing the life

sentence.

The trial court also took into account the seriousness of the offense.

Williams willfully engaged in a 15-minute flight through Shreveport, driving

over 60 miles per hour on residential streets on the wrong side of the road

without stopping at red lights or stop signs. In fact, his vehicular flight only

ended when he collided with a construction roadblock, at which point he fled

on foot until a K9 officer apprehended him. We agree with the trial court

that Williams’ deliberate criminal conduct “put the lives of everyone on the

street in danger along with the lives of law enforcement officers.” Because

of the trial court’s thorough compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 on

rehearing, the first step of our analysis is satisfied.

The second step in reviewing a sentence for excessiveness is a

determination of whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. A

sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to

the severity of the crime or nothing more than a purposeless and needless

infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La.

1993); State v. Trotter, supra. A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-

0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.

Here, we do not find the sentence imposed was constitutionally

excessive. When not incarcerated, Williams has spent the bulk of his adult
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life either participating in violent criminal acts or “being suspiciously close

to crime.” State v. Welch, 45,950 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/26/11), 57 So. 3d 442,

writ denied, 11-0423 (La. 9/16/11), 69 So. 3d 1145. Many of Williams’

convictions involve the use of a firearm, and seven of Williams’ almost two

dozen arrests are the most violent offenses one can commit in Louisiana:

second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. We find that

the trial court was well within its discretion to consider these arrests.

Williams received a life sentence under the habitual offender statute

due to his continued lawlessness and his persistent disregard for the safety of

others. Williams’ 15-minute flight through Shreveport posed a significant

risk not only to the unsuspecting public but also to the police officers

engaged in the pursuit and tasked with the all-important duty of enforcing

laws and protecting public welfare. Williams’ criminal and dangerous flight

is not mitigated by his sheer luck that the streets were quiet at that time. The

lack of public injury does not support a claim of excessiveness. State v.

Winslow, 45,414 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 55 So. 3d 910, writ denied, 11-

0192 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So. 3d 1033.

Based on the record before us, we do not find that the sentence

imposed was grossly out of proportion to the severity of Williams’ crimes,

nor was it simply a needless infliction of pain and suffering. Accordingly,

the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in resentencing Williams to

life without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, Williams’ conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.
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