State of Louisiana v. James Russel Johnson, Jr.

Judgment rendered March 5, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,185-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

JAMES RUSSEL JOHNSON, JR. Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 246,920

Honorable Michael E. Nerren, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

RICHARD R. RAY
CHRISTOPHER WARREN
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the 26th Judicial District Court,

Parish of Bossier, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Michael E. Nerren,

Judge, presiding. The defendant, James Russell Johnson, Jr. (hereinafter

referred to as Johnson or Russell),1 was found by a six-person jury to be

guilty as charged of molestation of a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S.

14:81.2(A)(1) and (B)(2), and sentenced by the trial court to seven years’

imprisonment at hard labor. Johnson has appealed from his conviction. For

the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, James Russell Johnson, Jr., was charged by bill of

information on February 12, 2023, amended on February 6, 2024, with

molestation of a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (B)(2),2

as follows:

James Russel Johnson, Jr., on or about November 22, 2022,
being a person over the age of seventeen, did commit any lewd
or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child
when the victim is thirteen years of age or older but has not yet
attained the age of seventeen, and when the offender has control
or supervision over the juvenile, namely: H.M. (D.O.B.
10/29/2008), with the intention of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desires of either person by the use of force, violence,
duress, menace, psychological intimidation, threat of great
bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue of a position
of control or supervision over the juvenile.

1
The defendant’s middle name is misspelled throughout the record as “Russel.”
2
Subsection (B)(2) of La. R.S. 14:81.2 was amended by Acts 2024, No. 597, § 1
to increase the term of imprisonment, with or without hard labor, that can be imposed
under this section to not less than ten years nor more than twenty years. At the time of
the offense in question, however, subsection (B)(1) provided for a term of imprisonment,
with or without hard labor, of not less than five years nor more than twenty years.

During a session with her therapist in February 2023, H.M. disclosed

the incident, and an investigation began immediately upon the counselor’s

report of the allegations. H.M. was interviewed by a forensic interviewer at

the Gingerbread House Child Advocacy Center. Johnson was interviewed

by detectives with the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office and, after having been

read his Miranda rights, he admitted to drinking heavily one night and

providing H.M. with alcohol until she was “too intoxicated.” He also stated

that he slept in the bed with her. Johnson claimed to have no memory of

inappropriate contact with the young victim. He also told the detectives of

allegedly similar incidents involving females in which he had been drinking

that had occurred in the weeks prior to the incident under investigation.

On February 26, 2024, Johnson’s trial began with a hearing to address

several motions. His motion to recuse the judge was denied, then the court

heard testimony on the issue of whether the defendant’s statement to officers

was free and voluntary. The trial court found the interview given by Johnson

to be admissible.3 The admissibility of the victim’s Gingerbread House

interview had previously been determined.4 Jury selection began the

following day, and on February 29, 2024, a unanimous jury found the

defendant guilty of molestation of a juvenile. The trial court ordered a pre-

sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, and Johnson was sentenced on May

28, 2024, to seven years’ imprisonment at hard labor. In this appeal, the

defendant has challenged his conviction, urging that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in

This information was gleaned from the trial court’s minutes of February 26,
3

2024. The appellate record does not contain a transcript from February 26, 2024.
4
This information comes from the trial court’s minutes of August 15, 2023.
2

allowing into evidence testimony of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that did

not fall within the exceptions set forth in La. C. Cr. P. arts. 404(B) or 412.2.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The defendant first contends that the State failed to prove by a

sufficiency of the evidence that he was guilty of molestation of a juvenile.

In support, he notes that there was no physical evidence in this case, only the

testimony of the alleged victim, H.M. The State failed to introduce any

evidence of threats, force, or violence. This meant that the State had to

prove that Johnson had supervision and control over H.M.

According to Johnson, there was no testimony that H.M. spent any

significant amount of time with him. Their “relationship” existed through

his status as the former stepfather of her friend O.H. While Johnson was an

adult, there was no testimony that he had any authority to discipline H.M.

The only thing that could “suggest authority” would be his age, urges the

defendant. H.M. did not testify that she was afraid of him, felt threatened by

him, or was concerned about any repercussions based on her reaction to him.

It is the defendant’s position that the evidence does not support that the State

established all of the essential elements of molestation of a juvenile under

La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (B)(2) beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State asserts that the record contains sufficient evidence to

support a conviction of molestation of a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt.

The basis for the charges against the defendant was H.M.’s report to her

therapist that Johnson supplied her with alcohol, she became intoxicated,

and he got into the bed in which she had been sleeping, where he

inappropriately touched her genitals.
3

In his interview with Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office detectives,

Johnson admitted to all of the above, except that he claimed to have no

memory of touching H.M.’s genitals. However, the defendant did admit to

other similar acts with adult females which had occurred in the days and

weeks prior to the incident involving the teen victim in this case. As he

related to the detectives, in these other incidents, Johnson was told that when

he became highly intoxicated, he had acted inappropriately by grabbing the

genitals of other adult women without their consent. He told the officers

that he had “blacked out” and did not remember the contact that occurred

when he had been drinking.

The State further points out that at trial, the jury heard testimony from

the victim, H.M., and the defendant’s stepdaughter that they both trusted

him. There was also testimony that H.M. reported to her friend O.M., the

defendant’s stepdaughter, the morning after the incident what had happened

and told her counselor in a session two months later. Both H.M.’s therapist

and Jordan Hughes, the forensic interviewer from the Gingerbread House,

testified at trial that delayed disclosure is not uncommon with child victims.

H.M.’s trial testimony was consistent with her statements to the forensic

interviewer, as contrasted with that of Johnson, whose testimony was

inconsistent with statements he made in his prior interview with detectives.

The State urges that the jury heard testimony that Johnson was the

adult responsible for the girls the night of the incident. They also heard the

defendant say that H.M. asked for alcohol in an attempt to shift the blame

for what happened onto her. However, in his interview with the detectives,

Johnson said that he needed to apologize to H.M. The jury clearly had

4

sufficient evidence from which it could discount the defendant’s self-serving

testimony and find credible the testimony of the young victim.

Applicable Legal Principles

Under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), “the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; State v.

Stockstill, 19-01235, p. 4 (La. 10/20/20), 341 So. 3d 502, 505-06. This

standard, now codified in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford an appellate

court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that

of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.

Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Instead, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. Where there

is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the resolution of which

depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter

is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen,

36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La.

3/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566, and 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2004). In the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Coffey, 54,729

(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 22-01574 (La.
5

12/20/22), 352 So. 3d 89; State v. Wilson, 50,418 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/6/16),

189 So. 3d 513, writ denied, 16-0793 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d 629.

The essential elements of the crime of molestation of a juvenile, each

of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are: (1) the

accused was over the age of 17; (2) the accused committed a lewd or

lascivious act upon the person of or in the presence of a child under the age

of 17; (3) the accused was more than two years older than the victim; (4) the

accused had the specific intent to arouse or gratify either the child’s sexual

desires or his or her own sexual desires; and (5) the accused committed the

lewd or lascivious act by use of force, violence, duress, menace,

psychological intimidation, threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of

influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile.

La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1); State v. LeBlanc, 506 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1987); State

v. Lewis, 52,367 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1220; State v. Wilson,

50,418 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/6/16), 189 So. 3d 513, writ denied, 16-0793 (La.

4/13/17), 218 So. 3d 629; State v. Terry, 47,425 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/21/12),

108 So. 3d 126, writ denied, 12-2759 (La. 6/28/13), 118 So. 3d 126.

It is uncontested that, at the time of the offense, H.M. was only 13

years old, and there was an age difference of more than two years between

her and Johnson, the ex-stepfather of her close friend. The only issues, as

raised by the defendant’s assignments of error, are whether the evidence

established that his conduct was lewd and lascivious and whether he had a

position of supervision or control over H.M.

A lewd or lascivious act is one which tends to excite lust and to

deprave morals with respect to sexual relations and which is indecent. State

v. Hernandez, 55,256 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 369 So. 3d 962; State v.
6

Coffey, 54,729 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 22-

01574 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So. 3d 89; State v. Redfearn, 44,709 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So. 3d 1078, writ denied, 09-2206 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So. 3d

381.

The meaning of the phrase “influence by virtue of a position of

control or supervision” in La. R.S. 14:81.2 is not restricted in its application

to persons to whom the parent entrusts the child for care, such as babysitters,

childcare workers, or teachers. Id. La. R.S. 14:81.2 permits finding

evidence of supervision or control by noncustodial parents, relatives, friends,

and neighbors of young victims. Id. Louisiana courts consider the

following factors when determining whether a defendant used influence by

virtue of his position of supervision or control over the victim: (1) the

amount of time the defendant spent alone with the victim; (2) the nature of

the relationship between the victim and the defendant; (3) the defendant’s

age; and (4) the defendant’s authority to discipline. Id.

Trial Testimony/Evidence

Jordan Hughes

Both H.M., the victim, and her best friend, O.H., were interviewed

separately on different dates by Jordan Hughes, a forensic interviewer with

the Gingerbread House in Shreveport, Louisiana. The interviews were

videotaped and played in the courtroom for the jury during Ms. Hughes’

testimony.

7

Summary of Interviews of H.M. and O.H.5

On the night of the incident, H.M. was at her best friend O.H.’s house.

O.H.’s mother J.P. is Russell’s ex-wife.6 Russell and J.P. are the parents of

D.J., O.H.’s younger sister. Russell and J.P. got a divorce because he was an

alcoholic and haven’t been together “for a really long time,” maybe since

O.H. was nine years old.

On fall break, H.M. and O.H. planned to go where Russell was living

at the time (at the ex-father-in-law’s house) so they could go hunting and

“hang out.” According to H.M., it wasn’t like “some random guy they were

going to hang out with.” O.H. considers Russell to be like her father.

The weekend of Thanksgiving, she and O.H. were at O.H.’s house

helping her mom put up and decorate the tree. They went to the store with

Johnson to get something else for the tree. After that, they went to look for

more beer. Russell got some Seagram’s and two 24-packs of Bud Light.

They went back to O.H.’s house. O.H. and H.M. got their stuff, put it in

Russell’s van, and they left. Halfway to the property, Russell told H.M. she

could start drinking if she wanted.

There were three bedrooms in the house. The owner and his girlfriend

had one. The second one was full of boxes, and Russell, H.M., and O.H. had

the third one. H.M. and O.H. went into the bedroom where their stuff was.

H.M. was still drinking. She “chugged” her fifth Seagram’s, and was “pretty

drunk” at this point. She got another one, took a sip of it, and put it down.

5
The trial testimony of both H.M. and O.H. was consistent with the information
they gave in their Gingerbread House interviews, except that O.H. testified that she was
untruthful about not drinking that night.
6
Both H.M. and O.H. referred to Johnson as “Russell.”

8

That’s when H.M. fell off the bed and kicked over the drink, spilling it.

Russell came back there and helped her onto the bed and told her she was

cut off because she was obviously drunk. He cleaned up the drink. H.M.

apologized, and Russell told her not to worry about it.

H.M. lay down because she didn’t feel well. She had a water, which

she sipped on, thinking it would help her, but it didn’t. Russell came into the

room, being loud, and that’s when she threw up. Russell held the trash can

for her when she threw up. She was sober enough to “text straight” and

changed her clothes, getting ready to go to bed. She and O.H. were in the

bed, and Russell was going to sleep on the floor.

O.H. told Russell he needed to sleep in the bed because he had a bad

shoulder and back, and she would sleep on the floor. O.H. watched videos

on TikTok on her phone, and H.M. tried to go to sleep, “balled up on the

edge of the bed. That’s when he grabbed me right here [pointing to her hip]

and move[d] my body onto his. Um, I was kinda just in shock. I didn’t

know what to do. And then he takes my leg and … put it in between his and

had my butt on him. And then he gets up to go get another beer, and that’s

when I snap a picture of a black screen on my phone on Snapchat and

explain what’s happening.”

O.H. remembered Russell getting up in the middle of the night to go

get another beer. Before that, she didn’t hear anything. O.H. was still

watching TikTok when Russell came back in the room and lay down. H.M.

was still in the bed. O.H. didn’t know whether H.M. was still asleep because

she couldn’t see her. O.H. heard Russell say something like, “Be still,

you’re moving too much.”

9

H.M. told Ms. Hughes she had the picture saved in “For My Eyes

Only” on her Snapchat App on her phone; H.M. then showed Ms. Hughes

the pic on her phone screen, and read it to her, “he started by putting his leg

i[n] between mine then he took his hand and grabbed my thigh and moved

my ass onto his dick.” H.M. also showed Ms. Hughes a saved pic of her and

O.H., taken around midnight that night, which is close to the time she threw

up. H.M. told Ms. Hughes she did not send the screenshot pic of her words

to anyone, she just typed it and put into her “For My Eyes Only” file and put

her phone down.

Russell came back and “he did the same thing as before,” moved her

body onto his and put her leg in between his. He then put his hand on her

“no-no square,” and she pushed it away. He put it back. She pushed his

hand away again, and she “kinda like said, ‘no, stop.’” Thirty seconds later,

he was snoring. In response to a question from Ms. Hughes regarding

Russell touching her “no-no” square the first time, H.M.’s response was that

before he got up, he didn’t do it. Her clothes stayed on the whole time; he

never touched her bare skin. “He started to rub, and it took me a second or

two to comprehend what was going on.” When she pushed his hand away,

he put it back and almost started to rub again, but she pushed it away again

before he could.

H.M. didn’t say no or stop or anything because she wanted Russell to

think she was asleep. She did make a “sleepy type” noise to deter him or

discourage him when she turned away and curled up into a ball. H.M. didn’t

think Russell had a shirt on, but he had his shorts on. When Ms. Hughes

asked H.M. about the words she wrote in the Snapchat picture, H.M. told her

10

“It was kind of like he was spooning me … He had his right hand moving

around on my hip and my butt.”

H.M. related to Ms. Hughes that Russell woke up before them, and

she and O.H. woke up around 10 or 10:30 a.m. He wasn’t in the room when

they woke up. O.H. felt that H.M. was acting “weird.” That’s when H.M.

brought up the picture on her phone, showed it to O.H., and told her, “This

happened last night.” O.H. was confused at first by what H.M. showed her.

H.M. couldn’t remember exactly what O.H. said—something like “are you

sure this happened?” O.H. believed her, she just wanted to be sure because

it was not expected by either of them. “I didn’t either. I know you don’t

expect it. I remember it. I typed it.” According to H.M., by typing it, to her,

that shows it happened. Her ability to do that, her awareness to type it at all,

shows to her that it was real.

H.M. related that her mom found out about the incident from H.M.’s

therapist Tammy Ewart. H.M. had been going through her “My Eyes Only”

in Snapchat trying to find something and that’s when she saw the picture she

had saved that night. When she did tell Tammy, which was approximately

three months after the incident, her therapist told her she had a duty to

disclose, which included telling her mother. H.M. knew that was going to

happen. She had told O.H. in advance she was going to disclose the incident

because Russell is her ex-stepfather, and it was going to affect her family.

H.M. told Ms. Hughes that she never sent out the screen shot she saved to

Snapchat to anyone or told anyone else prior to telling her therapist Tammy.

Ms. Hughes asked H.M. whether anything like that had ever happened

with Russell before. H.M. told Ms. Hughes that Russell had told “them” he

went around at a concert just grabbing girls’ butts. H.M. didn’t know what
11

concert but “he was drunk again. It’s like he’s proud of it. He’s telling us in

front of his daughter in seventh grade, saying he was running round at the

concert grabbing all these girls’ butts and was scared he was going to get

kicked out.” H.M. also related another incident told by Russell to O.H., who

told it to her. Russell was at a bar “doing the same thing.” He was at a bar

with a friend, who left him because he didn’t want to get the police called on

him for grabbing girls’ butts.

O.H. told Ms. Hughes that nothing like that had ever happened to her,

but she had not slept with Russell since she was eight years old. O.H. has

never felt uncomfortable around Russell, but he does smoke weed and drink

when he drives, so she doesn’t really feel safe around him. She knew he had

been drinking the night he came to pick them up because there was beer in

the truck. Russell has a loud and goofy personality and is always really

loud. He wasn’t acting any different that night. According to O.H., Russell

was definitely drunk “when he did it.” She knows he drank a lot that night

because she saw him. Also, when he was standing outside, he “literally like”

fell off the side of the porch.

Ms. Hughes testified that during the interviews, she had an earpiece

in. The detective was in the next room, observing what was going on, able

to communicate if needed, and to propose questions. It was her job to gather

the facts and information, talk to the two girls, and get their sides of what

occurred. During H.M.’s interview, she made an active, delayed disclosure.

It was delayed because it had happened some time before. H.M. had not

previously been ready to talk, but in the interview room, she was. That is

what makes the disclosure active. Ms. Hughes was not at all surprised that

H.M. referred to her vagina as the “no-no square,” although that is a phrase
12

more frequently used by younger ages. She was also not surprised by

H.M.’s wording in her text screenshot.

Detective Lamaro Ramey’s Testimony

Detective Ramey testified that after serving in the U.S. Marine Corps

for 22 years, he joined the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office. In 2023, he was

working as a sex crimes investigator and was assigned to this investigation

in February 2023. Based on information he received from the initial

responding officer, which was disclosure of sexual abuse of a minor, he

contacted the family. Det. Ramey introduced himself and talked to them

about the next step in the process, which was a forensic interview at the

Gingerbread House.

Det. Ramey told the jury that, in her interview with Ms. Hughes at the

Gingerbread House, H.M. talked about the incident and made a disclosure.

O.H. was also interviewed by Ms. Hughes. Based on his training and

observation skills, Det. Ramey related that the two statements were

corroborative. Based on the information he obtained, he secured an arrest

warrant for the defendant for molestation of a juvenile. Det. Ramey

contacted Johnson, who agreed to make a statement. Det. Ramey identified

the videotaped interview as it began to play for the jury.

Taped Interview of the Defendant

Det. Ramey read Johnson his Miranda rights and had him sign a form

that he understood and waived his rights. Det. Ramey then told Johnson the

purpose of the interview—to talk about the evening of November 22, 2022.

Johnson said he took O.H. and her friend to “hang out” at the place where he

was staying at the time, which was a three-bedroom, three-bathroom house.

13

The three of them stayed in one room because one of the bedrooms had a

“whole lot of shit” in it, and no one could sleep in it.

Johnson related that he was going to sleep on the floor, but O.H. told

him to sleep on the bed because he was an old man. At that point, Johnson

asked the detective, “Is that what this is about?” Det. Ramey asked, “Who

did you sleep in the bed with?” Johnson responded, “Her friend. I didn’t do

nothing to that girl. Is that what this is about?” Det. Ramey, “Yeah, it’s

something like that. Let’s … keep talking. We’ll get everything … I’m

gonna lay it all out for ya.”

Johnson admitted to getting alcohol for the girls, a six-pack each. He

told Det. Ramey he thought H.M. was 15 years old. Returning to the

sleeping arrangements, Det. Ramey said, “So you slept with ‘what’s her

name’?” Johnson said, “I only hung out with her once. I didn’t sleep with

her. I slept in the same bed as her, with my back turned to her.”

Johnson didn’t know how much H.M. had to drink. He said that she

got sick, and he got a trash bag for her. The next day he woke up, felt

uncomfortable, and went out and did some things in the yard. Returning the

conversation to the previous night, Det. Ramey told Johnson that H.M. told

him her back was to Johnson, who was behind her and facing her direction.

When they were lying down, Johnson grabbed her hip and scooted her down

“back on his dick.” Johnson’s response was, “Really.” Det. Ramey

continued, “She then said he grabbed my leg, put it between his leg, and

started rubbing my vagina. She then said he got up, drank a beer, laid back

down, and repeated the same thing.”

Johnson said, “Do what now? I mean, I’m listening to you, but this is

new to me.” Det. Ramey asked Johnson whether he thought it was possible
14

that he was drunk to the point he didn’t remember. In the video, Johnson,

who was leaning over, sitting with one hand over his mouth, shaking his

head, stated, “Oh my God. I mean. I don’t remember doing none of that. I

remember going to bed, and I passed out. Now I will say this. I was at a

concert with my ex-girlfriend. And I was black-out drunk, and I was

rubbing on her friends’ twats. Nobody told me about that until, you know,

two months later.” Det. Ramey told Johnson, “I’ve heard that story. I heard

it from [H.M.] too.”

Johnson stated, “I get blackout drunk, and I don’t know what I’m

doing. Like, I did it to my ex-father-in-law’s girlfriend. Like I got blackout

drunk and didn’t know” I was doing it. Johnson said something about

getting up and getting in bed with his father-in-law. He’s been in

relationships for 17 years. Had he done that, he might have rolled over and

thought he was in bed with his ex-wife.7

Det. Ramey told Johnson that H.M. told O.H., and his ex-wife knows

of the allegations. Johnson told Det. Ramey he wants to call H.M. and

apologize. He is so, so sorry. Det. Ramey told Johnson, “that is considered

a lewd and lascivious act.” Johnson’s response was, “I’m 100 percent in

agreement with you.” Regarding timing of the two incidents Johnson told

the detective about, the one involving his ex’s friends at the concert was

about a month or so before the instant offense, and the one involving his ex-

7
At that point, as the videotape was playing the State’s Attorney interjected, “All
right. I want—want to stop it here, because this sounds like the ‘O.J. if I did it’ situation.
Did I understand that right, he said if I had done it, then maybe I thought it was my ex-
wife or ex-girlfriend in the bed with me?” Defense Counsel objected, the A.D.A.
withdrew his comment, a bench conference was held, and, at the request of both
attorneys, the judge admonished the A.D.A. to leave his opinion and comments out of the
trial.

15

father-in-law’s girlfriend was on November 19 (three days before the

incident).

James Russell Johnson’s Testimony

The defendant took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he

said he needed to call and apologize to H.M. during the interview because

the detectives weren’t asking him any questions—they were telling him

what he had done. He didn’t know what else to say.

Johnson knew about the other incidents he described during the

interview where he had been drunk because people told him about it

afterwards. He was with his friend, and they were just playing “grabass.”

He is still friends with those people, and no one has made any criminal

accusations against him about that. He denied being a “groomer.” He did

not buy alcohol for those girls with the intention of taking advantage of one

of them. He didn’t take them to where he was living with the intention of

taking advantage of them and didn’t go into the room and get in the bed that

night intending to touch or take advantage of one of them. Finally, Johnson

said that he didn’t touch H.M. inappropriately or make any sexual advances

towards her. He knows this because he was not near her at all that night,

only when he went to bed.

On cross-examination, Johnson said that his statement to detectives

was 100% true. He immediately fell asleep when he got into the bed after

having had a significant amount to drink. He admitted to saying in his

statement to police, “If I did something then I probably thought it was my

ex-wife.” Johnson pointed out that he also said that he didn’t know what

happened. On the stand, he said that he knew “for a fact” that it didn’t

happen. “Well, I know I wouldn’t ever touch anybody, period.” When the
16

A.D.A. reminded him that wasn’t what he said a year ago to detectives,

Johnson’s reply was, “I never admitted to anything.” Johnson denied that

there were any other incidents and claimed that his behavior at the concert

wasn’t inappropriate because “we were all doing it to each other.”

On redirect examination, Johnson explained that he didn’t recall a

discussion about a second incident at a bar. He knew about it from his

father-in-law’s fiancée, but his ex-father-in-law told him it didn’t happen, so

it wasn’t an “incident.” There was never a point that night in November

2022 that he told the girls to drink beer. He told them two things, “Respect

the house, and don’t do nothing dumb.”

Analysis

The evidence in this case is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that

the defendant is guilty of molestation of a juvenile. The record shows that

the defendant’s testimony was not that different from the information he

provided during his interview with detectives. It was within the jury’s

province to accept or reject the testimony of the witnesses as to these acts

and incidents. The evidence established that Johnson committed a lewd and

lascivious act upon the victim. H.M.’s account of the events of the incident

to Ms. Hughes in the Gingerbread House interview and her testimony in

court was consistent and unwavering. The surrounding corroborative facts

and events were similarly described by all three persons involved. The fact

that the defendant touched H.M.’s vaginal area while he was intoxicated and

both of them were wearing clothes and “spooning” does not negate the

criminality of his conduct. See, State v. Brown, 55,466, p. 14 (La. App. 2

Cir. 3/13/24), 381 So. 3d 1007, 1018, writ denied, 24-00452 (La. 11/20/24),

396 So. 3d 69.
17

We further find borderline ludicrous the argument that Johnson did not

have supervision or control over H.M. He was the former stepfather of

O.H., the victim’s friend. O.H. testified that she thought of him like a father.

The parents of both girls had entrusted Johnson to host and supervise them

for their short overnight trip to the deer lease. The fact that Johnson took

O.H. and H.M. there so they could “hang out” and “safely” drink alcoholic

beverages does not negate the fact that he was the adult in charge of them.

As noted above, the other elements of the crime of molestation of a juvenile

were not contested by the defendant.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Evidence of Other Crimes or Bad Acts

Johnson asserts that the trial court improperly introduced at trial

evidence of other acts which involved adult women. The source of this

evidence came from the defendant’s statement to the detectives when he

referred to previous incidents involving adult women that occurred when he

had been drinking.

Appellate counsel argues that, at the conclusion of the free and

voluntary hearing held on February 26, 2024, the first day of trial, defense

counsel objected to the introduction into evidence of the first two statements

as violative of La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and/or 412.2. The State’s position was

that evidence about the incidents was admissible because it was deemed

admissible when the Gingerbread House video was found admissible

(October 24, 2023).8 In that video, the victim, H.M., stated that the

defendant told her something about “butts at a concert.” Appellate counsel

8
This finding was apparently made at a status conference on October 24, 2023,
according to the court minutes.
18

asserts that the purpose of the Gingerbread House hearing was to determine

the admissibility of the taped interview as a whole—a ruling on the

admissibility of the interview does not mean that inadmissible statements

cannot be redacted from the interview.

Rather than complying with article 720, which requires notice if the

prosecution intends to introduce evidence of other crimes pursuant to La. C.

Cr. P. art. 404(B) or 412.2, the State had a paragraph in its “boiler plate”

answer to discovery which only referred to evidence of prior convictions and

even then, did not identify for what admissible purpose the other crimes

evidence would be if used at trial. Nonetheless, the trial court found that this

satisfied all of the requirements relevant to providing notice of other crimes

evidence, relying mainly on the voluntary nature of Johnson’s own statement

than to which exception to the prohibition against the use of such evidence

was applicable.

According to the defendant, the other crimes evidence in this case did

not fall within the scope of La. C. Cr. P. art. 412.2, which provides only for

the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to show a

lustful disposition towards children. Evidence which is merely evidence of

another sexual offense not involving children is inadmissible under article

412.2. See, State v. Parker, 42,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07), 963 So. 2d

497.

Furthermore, urges defense counsel, La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) provides

that a trial court may not admit evidence of other crimes to show that a

defendant is a person of bad character who has acted in conformity

therewith, and such evidence is generally inadmissible because of the

“substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant.” See, State v. Prieur,
19

277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). Even if the prior bad acts evidence may

otherwise be admissible, the trial court must balance its probative value

against its prejudicial effects. La. C.E. art. 403. According to the defendant,

the statements related to uncharged conduct between him and adult women

had little to no probative value in the instant case, particularly considering

the State’s failure to prove system, motive, intent, plan, knowledge, or

identity. The prejudicial effect of the statements was great, and the

interviews of both the victim and the defendant should have been redacted to

remove all references to them, urges Johnson.

The State contends that the recent prior acts of the defendant in

getting “blackout drunk” and groping the private parts of women is relevant

to establish intent, motive, opportunity, identity, and absence of mistake or

accident, as these acts tend to show that he believed he could act with

impunity in committing his crimes, since he had done the same thing

“multiple times” without any consequences. The State argues that this

evidence further tends to prove Johnson’s intent and his method of

opportunity to sexually abuse women. As the trial court stated, “Mr.

Johnson volunteered the information…to the detective when he was being

interviewed.” The trial judge also found relevant that Johnson had

apparently talked about these instances with H.M., who discussed them in

her Gingerbread House interview. As the trial court observed, “[I]t would be

awfully strange if…the alleged victim made up a statement that turned out to

be almost exactly consistent with a statement that Mr. Johnson made when

he’s interviewed by the detective, a statement that he made voluntarily.”

The State urges that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be presented at the
20

defendant’s trial. However, assuming that the admission of this evidence

was erroneous, it was harmless as there was overwhelming evidence of

Johnson’s guilt.

Applicable Legal Principles

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes

will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Wright, 11-

0141, pp. 10-11 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309, 316. This same standard is

applied to rulings on the admission of other crimes evidence and evidence

under La. C.E. art. 412.2. Id., 11-0141, p. 11, 79 So. 3d at 316; State v.

Williams, 02-1030, p. 5 (La. 10/15/02), 830 So. 2d 984, 987. Relevant

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts involving sexually assaultive

behavior or which indicate a lustful disposition toward children may be

admissible under La. C.E. art. 412.2 if its probative value substantially

outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time.

La. C.E. art. 403; State v. Johnson, 50,005, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/12/15), 175 So. 3d 442, 453, writ denied, 15-1687 (La. 9/16/16), 206 So.

3d 203; State v. Johnson, 43,843, p. 14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/28/09), 2 So. 3d

606, 614-15, writ denied, 09-0464 (La. 11/06/09), 21 So. 3d 300. When

evidence is sought to be admissible under art. 412.2, while notice is

required, there is no requirement for a pre-trial hearing. State v. Williams,

02-1030, p. 6, 830 So. 2d at 987.

As set forth in State v. Layton, 14-1910, p. 5 (La. 3/17/15), 168 So. 3d

358, 360, La. C.E. art. 412.2 does not strictly limit evidence of past

“sexually assaultive behavior” to sexual offenses defined by state law.

Furthermore, La. C.E. art. 412.2 “does not limit the admissibility of prior
21

acts only to those identical or similar in nature.” State v. Wright, 11-0141,

pp. 9-10, 79 So. 3d at 315; State v. Sessions, 21-0118, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/14/21), 332 So. 3d 729, 736-37; State v. Williams, 11-876, p. 9 (La. App.

5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So. 3d 437, 441, writ denied, 12-1013 (La. 9/21/12), 98

So. 3d 334.

It is not necessary, for purposes of Article 412.2 testimony, for the

defendant to have been charged, prosecuted, or convicted of the “other acts”

described. State v. Layton, supra; State v. Dale, 50,195 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/18/15), 180 So. 3d 528, writ denied, 15-2291 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d

1203. The admissibility of such statements under La. C.E. art. 412.2 is

dependent on whether the probative value of the statements substantially

outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time.

La. C.E. art. 403; State v. Williams, supra; State v. Dale, supra.

Analysis

The hearings at which the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of

alleged other crimes or bad acts evidence occurred were not transcribed. In

fact, these hearings were held to rule on motions regarding the admissibility

of the two Gingerbread House interviews and the free and voluntary nature

of the defendant’s statement to detectives. Apparently after finding all

statements to be admissible, the trial court then entertained specific defense

objections to portions of the victim’s interview and Johnson’s statement.

Contrary to appellate counsel’s argument in brief, as set forth by the

Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Wright, supra, La. C.E. art. 412.2 does

not limit the State to admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts to “only those identical or similar in nature” to the offense with which
22

the defendant was charged. Id., 11-0141, pp. 9-10, 79 So. 3d at 315.

Additionally, all the State is required to provide a defendant with is notice of

its intent to offer evidence of the specific crimes, wrongs, or bad acts.

In this case, the State provided the defense with notice of its intent to

use the video statements/interviews of Johnson and H.M. in its discovery

responses. After considering the arguments made by defense counsel and

the A.D.A., the trial court found the evidence of the alleged bad acts to be

admissible. Defense counsel had time to prepare, and at trial, counsel was

able to cross-examine the State’s witnesses and question Johnson and other

defense witnesses as to these alleged bad acts. There were no

contemporaneous objections to this evidence re-urged at trial; in fact, while

cross-examining the State’s witnesses and during Johnson’s testimony,

defense counsel was able to elicit clarification and further explanation as to

this evidence, thus giving the jury more context for it. Even if the trial

court’s rulings pre-trial rulings were erroneous, they were harmless, in light

of this record.

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the conviction and sentence of the

defendant, James Russel Johnson, Jr., are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

23