State of Louisiana v. Tradavion Deanthony Hughes

Judgment rendered April 9, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,201-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TRADAVION DEANTHONY Appellant
HUGHES

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 380,133

Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Chad M. Ikerd

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

SENAE DENEAL HALL
ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD
FERNANDO BERNARD GRIDER, JR.
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Caddo, the Honorable Ramona Emanuel presiding. Defendant

Tradavion Hughes (“Hughes”) was convicted of second-degree murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefits. He now

appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 25, 2021, Hughes was charged by bill of indictment with

the second-degree murder of Eric Brownlee, Jr. (“Brownlee”), in violation of

La. R.S. 14:30.1. The offense occurred on December 6, 2020. Hughes pled

not guilty.

From October 30 to November 1, 2023, a trial was held where the

following evidence was adduced. Nakia Hall (“Hall”) testified that she was

engaged to Brownlee on the date of his death; they had been dating for eight

years. In the early hours of December 6, 2020, she and Brownlee stopped at

the Clark Gas Station on Jewella Avenue in Shreveport, Louisiana. Hall

entered the gas station’s store to buy lottery tickets and returned to their car,

which was parked at the gas pumps to the right of the store. Brownlee stood

outside the entrance to the store to speak with some people he knew. Hall

stated that she saw Brownlee “being jumped on” by four or five people, and

she tried to intervene. She got out of the car and started shouting for them to

stop; she then drew a handgun.

Hall testified that she was tackled by someone, kicked, and then her

gun was taken. The state entered still photographs from the gas station’s

surveillance videos into evidence. Hall said the photos depicted her entering

the store, the person who shot Brownlee, and her and Brownlee in a physical

altercation with others. Hall identified Hughes as the person who shot

Brownlee. Hall stated that she did not see what started the fight.

Corporal Jonathan Varnell (“Cpl. Varnell”) testified that he was

employed by the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) in its Crime Scene

Investigation Unit as a detective. He responded to a shooting at the Clark

Gas Station on December 6, 2020. Several photos of the crime scene were

admitted. They depicted Brownlee’s car parked at a gas pump located on

the right side of the gas station’s store entrance. The photos also showed

that, in front of the doors to the gas station, there was blood, expended 9 mm

projectile casings, and one projectile. The gas station surveillance videos

were admitted and played for the jury.1 One surveillance video was

recorded by a camera located inside the store and showed the double glass

doors at the entryway to the store and the outside area in front of the store.

The second surveillance video was recorded by a camera located outside the

store and showed the outside area in front of the store and some of the gas

pumps to the right of the store. The videos presented the altercation and

shooting which occurred outside at the front of the store.

Hughes entered the store with the handle of a handgun sticking out of

the right pocket of his pants. He exited the store and stood near the entrance

beside a silver truck, conversing with others. Brownlee, who was standing

near the truck, approached him and reached for the gun in Hughes’ pocket.

Hughes, Fredis Vercher (“Vercher”), and a third man (later identified as

“Ray” or “Juan”) then jumped on Brownlee. They beat him and attempted

to take the gun away. Hall approached the four men, tried to intervene, and

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Akram Abdalla testified that he was not present when Brownlee was shot, but he
provided the gas station’s video surveillance footage of the shooting to SPD.
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then pulled out a handgun from under her shirt near her waist. Ray/Juan

tackled her, and the two grappled for her gun. After several seconds,

Hughes left the altercation with Brownlee and ran to where Hall was

struggling with Ray/Juan. Hughes kicked Hall several times and took her

gun. He returned to Vercher and Brownlee, who were on the ground in front

of the doors to the store; the pair were still wrestling over Hughes’ gun.

Hughes cocked Hall’s gun.

Hughes leaned over the pair on the ground, speaking to Brownlee.

Hall returned to assist Brownlee and tried to get her gun from Hughes.

Ray/Juan pulled her by her hair away from Brownlee. Hall broke away from

the group, Hughes then shot Brownlee in his leg, and Hall entered the store.

Hughes stood by Brownlee and Vercher, who were still grappling on the

ground; Ray/Juan also stood near Brownlee and Vercher, but he was bent

over the pair. Two seconds after Hall re-entered the store, Hughes reached

between Vercher and Brownlee and appeared to fire the gun a second time.

Brownlee sustained a gunshot wound to his lip, and his mouth appeared

bloody in the video after Hughes fired a second shot. Vercher pulled the gun

away from Brownlee, it slid along the pavement, and stopped in front of the

truck’s back tire, which was several feet away from Brownlee. Vercher

retrieved the gun, and he and Ray/Juan exited the area displayed by the

videos.

Brownlee sat up and raised his hands, which were empty, and

exchanged words with Hughes for 9 to 10 seconds. While standing over

Brownlee, who remained seated on the ground, talking and gesturing with

his hands, Hughes shot him in the left cheek at point blank range. Brownlee

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fell to the ground and did not move again. Hughes left the scene. The

altercation lasted 1 minute and 23 seconds.

Cpl. Varnell testified that he received Hughes’ name through a Crime

Stoppers’ tip. He interviewed Hughes and provided the following summary

of Hughes’ statement (verbatim):

He advised that he was there at the store for a period of time.
He went and bought some cigarettes. Eric [Brownlee] was
there. He stated that when he started handing out cigarettes,
Eric tried to grab his gun. So him, who he called Fred
[Vercher], and Ray went to Eric to try to get the gun back.
That’s when his Ms. Hall came [and] introduced her weapon to
the incident. Ray went and engaged her. Mr. Hughes stated he
left the initial encounter with Eric and went to Ms. Hall, kicked
her a few times, was able to get the gun from her, went back to
Eric where he shot him in the leg, shot him once again. And
then prior to the final shot, he stated that Eric said if he didn’t
kill him that he would kill him later and that’s when he shot and
killed him.

The video of Hughes’ statement was as Cpl. Varnell described.

Hughes also said that his father was shot and killed during a robbery a

couple of years prior, and he was very scared when Brownlee told him that

he was going to kill him. Cpl. Varnell said that another Crime Stoppers’ tip

led them to Vercher. Cpl. Varnell attempted to interview Vercher through

his attorney but was unsuccessful. Cpl. Varnell said that the murder weapon

was not recovered.

Dr. James Traylor (“Dr. Traylor”) was accepted as an expert in

forensic pathology and stated that he performed the autopsy on Brownlee.

He testified that Brownlee’s manner of death was homicide, and his cause of

death was two gunshot wounds to his face. The first shot to Brownlee’s face

entered at the left corner of his mouth at his upper lip, breaking a tooth and

exited at the right side of his chin. The bullet re-entered his body near his

right clavicle. The second shot to Brownlee’s face, the final shot that
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Hughes fired, which was fatal, entered just below Brownlee’s left eye, exited

beneath the right side of his chin, and re-entered his body just below his

right clavicle, hitting his right subclavian artery. Hughes’ first and second

shots to Brownlee’s face exited at nearly the same place on his chin and re-

entered his body at the same place below his clavicle. Dr. Traylor estimated

that the bullets were fired approximately 6 to 18 inches from Brownlee’s

face, based upon the presence of gunpowder particles on the victim.

Dr. Traylor noted that Brownlee had abrasions on his right hand. He

also stated that he did not notice a wound to Brownlee’s leg during the

autopsy. However, photos taken by police at the hospital just after Brownlee

died showed a wound to his left leg.

On cross-examination, Dr. Traylor stated that Brownlee was alive

when he got to the hospital where hospital staff performed procedures to

preserve his life. He testified that Brownlee was given therapeutic levels of

ketamine and fentanyl during that treatment, which explains why his

toxicology screening showed the presence of those substances. The state

rested.

Vercher testified that he knew both the victim and defendant. He

stated that he went to the Clark Gas Station on the night of Brownlee’s death

to purchase snacks. He was at the store for about 45 minutes. He saw

Brownlee take Hughes’ gun and attempted to intercede to break up the fight.

Vercher stated that a woman “popped out” with a gun and pointed it at them.

He said that someone tried to grab the firearm from her. He testified that, at

that point, he was on the ground, and he could not get up because Brownlee

had his leg pinned. Vercher said that he heard maybe two gunshots. He

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stated that when the first gunshot was fired, Brownlee did not react like he

had been shot.

On cross-examination, Vercher affirmed that SPD arranged to

interview him, but he did not show up. When questioned about whether he

retrieved the firearm from under his truck, Vercher said he did not recall.

Following a colloquy, Hughes elected not to testify in his own

defense. The defense rested. The trial court read its charge to the jury,

which included instructions as to self-defense, the aggressor doctrine, and

the definitions of second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent

homicide. The jury began its deliberations but returned to the courtroom to

ask the court to recite the legal definition of manslaughter. The court

complied, and the jury continued to deliberate. The jury returned a verdict

of guilty as charged. The jury was polled, and the verdict was unanimous.

Hughes filed pro se motions for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal

and for a new trial. He filed counseled motions to request deviation from the

mandatory life sentence, for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and for a

new trial. On January 10, 2024, Hughes was before the court for sentencing.

The trial court denied his motions. The trial court asked Hughes if he was

ready for sentencing, and he stated that he was. The court sentenced Hughes

to life imprisonment without benefits, with credit for time served. The trial

court informed him of his appellate and post-conviction relief time

constraints. Hughes filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was denied.

He now appeals.

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DISCUSSION

Insufficient Evidence

Hughes first argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove he

was guilty of second-degree murder. Hughes argues that he and those

participating in the fight were not the aggressors, and his killing of Brownlee

was justified. Defendant says that while he was fighting with Hall, his gun

was taken from Brownlee, which he argues the surveillance videos show he

did not see. Hughes states that, once her gun was taken away, Hall returned

to the fight with Brownlee. Hughes maintains that after Brownlee was shot

twice and sat up, he made aggressive hand gestures and told Hughes that he

would kill him later if Hughes did not kill him right then, which gave him a

reasonable belief that Brownlee continued to present a danger to him.

Hughes states that, at that time, he did not know where his gun was, but he

acknowledges that Brownlee did not have a gun in his hands. Hughes asks

this court to find that he acted in self-defense and overturn his conviction.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.

C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.

State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie,

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43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La.

11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. Id. The appellate court does not assess

credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95),

661 So. 2d 442; State v. Morehead, 55,825 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/23/24), __So.

3d __, 2024 WL 4549403, writ denied, 24-01434 (La. 2/19/25), __ So. 3d

__, 2025 WL 547107. A reviewing court accords great deference to the trier

of fact’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in

part. State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists

when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the

prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S.

14:10(1). Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances

surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Walker,

53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334

(La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83. The determination of whether the requisite

intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of this

determination is guided by the standards of Jackson v. Virginia. Id. The

shooting of a firearm at close range and aimed at the person is indicative of

specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim. State v.

Cotton, 55,435 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 224.

Hughes does not dispute that he killed Brownlee. Instead, he claims

that he acted in self-defense.
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Louisiana Revised Statute 14:20(A)(1) provides that a homicide is

justifiable:

When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably
believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or
receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to
save himself from that danger.

Factors to consider in determining whether a defendant had a

reasonable belief that the killing was necessary include the excitement and

confusion of the situation, the possibility of using force or violence short of

killing, and the defendant’s knowledge of the assailant’s bad character.

State v. Crow, 52,817 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 278 So. 3d 416.

When self-defense is raised as an issue by the defendant, the state has

the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not

perpetrated in self-defense. State ex rel. D.P.B., 02-1742 (La. 5/20/03), 846

So. 2d 753; State v. Allen, 50,703 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 376,

writ denied, 16-1734 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 981. When the defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-defense case, the

question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. State

v. Matthews, 464 So. 2d 298 (La. 1985); State v. Morehead, supra.

In the present case, the court instructed the jury as to self-defense and

the aggressor doctrine. Counsel presented the jury with two versions of the

shooting. The state argued Hughes shot Brownlee without justification. The

defense argued the homicide was committed in self-defense, that is,

Brownlee snatched Hughes’ gun from his pocket which started a fight to get

control of the gun which lasted 90 seconds. The defense further argued that

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Hughes feared for his life when Brownlee snatched his gun and when Hall

approached with a second gun which she brandished at the group fighting

over Hughes’ gun. The defense said that Hughes shot Brownlee to break up

the fight, but the first two shots did not faze the victim. The defense said

that Brownlee, having been shot twice, sat up, stared at an armed Hughes,

and threatened to kill him if he did not kill him first.

The jury chose to credit the state’s argument rather than defendant’s,

and this court agrees that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the killing of Brownlee was not committed in self-

defense. The evidence was also sufficient to support Hughes’ second-degree

murder conviction.

There is no question here that Hughes shot and killed Brownlee; he

admitted that he did so in his statement to SPD. The jury was tasked with

considering whether defendant killed the victim because he reasonably

believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his life, and Hughes was

unable to persuade the members of the jury that he acted in self-defense.

Hughes contends, and we agree, that Brownlee was the initial

aggressor in the altercation when he stole Hughes’ handgun from his pocket.

This court’s concern is not about how the dispute began, but how it ended.

Hughes’ argument to this court is that it was Vercher who disarmed

Brownlee while defendant was fighting with Hall; therefore, he did not

know where the gun was when he shot Brownlee a third time. However, the

surveillance videos show that Vercher disarmed Brownlee about 18 seconds

after Hughes rejoined the fight between Vercher and the victim. Ten

seconds after that, Hughes fired his third shot, killing Brownlee.

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During the 10 seconds prior to Hughes shooting Brownlee a third

time: (1) Brownlee was sitting on the ground with both of his hands raised in

Hughes’ direction; (2) Hughes stood over Brownlee, facing him; (3) the pair

exchanged words; (4) Brownlee’s hands were empty, and he was gesturing

with his hands while he was speaking with Hughes; and (5) Brownlee did

not make any sudden moves toward Hughes or attempt to access a gun.

The surveillance videos show that Hughes was at close range and

aimed the gun at Brownlee’s head when he fired his last shot. Those facts

confirm that Hughes had the requisite specific intent to kill or inflict great

bodily harm to the victim who was unarmed and sitting on the ground. We

find that Hughes did not act in self-defense and the evidence was sufficient

to support his conviction of second-degree murder.

Manslaughter

In the alternative, Hughes argues he should have been found guilty of

the lesser, included offense of manslaughter. He contends that the entire

confrontation lasted 90 seconds, and it was not realistic to believe that a

reasonable person’s blood would have cooled in such a short timeframe and

under such stressful circumstances. He argues that there were two guns that

Brownlee and Hall had control over with unknown intentions during the

struggle and Brownlee did not back down or attempt to disengage from the

fight. He asserts that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that

there was sufficient provocation and lack of time to reflect on the

circumstances and act coolly.

Manslaughter is a homicide which would be either first-degree murder

or second-degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or

heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an
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average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not

reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender’s blood

had actually cooled, or that an average person’s blood would have cooled, at

the time the offense was committed. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood,” which distinguish

manslaughter from homicide, are not elements of the offense, but mitigatory

factors exhibiting a degree of culpability less than is present when the

homicide is committed without them. State v. Tompkins, 403 So. 2d 644

(La. 1981); State v. Keen, 55,915 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), __ So. 3d __,

2024 WL 4830414. Provocative acts held to rise to the level of mitigating

conduct involve physical threats or actions on the part of the victim. State v.

Ramsey, 55,491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 308, writ denied, 24-

00379 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So. 3d 865. Mere words or gestures, however

offensive or insulting, will not reduce homicide from murder to

manslaughter. State v. Smith, 49,839 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/15), 166 So. 3d

416, writ denied, 15-1244 (La. 6/3/16), 192 So. 3d 753. Provocation and the

time for cooling are questions for the trier of fact to determine according to

the standard of the average or ordinary person. State v. Jones, 56,042 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 12/18/24), __ So. 3d __, 2024 WL 5150179.

Brownlee’s killing was not the product of a sudden passion or heat of

blood which deprived Hughes of his self-control or cool contemplation.

Brownlee’s verbal threats, if true, were insufficient to reduce Hughes’ crime

to the lesser offense of manslaughter. The jury heard Hughes’ statement to

SPD in which he said that Brownlee threatened him and he was afraid. The

jury did not believe that Brownlee’s alleged last words constituted a

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provocation that deprived Hughes of his self-control and cool reflection in

firing the final shot that killed Brownlee

At that time, Hughes had already shot Brownlee twice. Brownlee was

sitting on the ground with his empty hands in the air in front of him. Hughes

stood over the victim, who made no further attempt to harm anyone or get a

weapon; they exchanged words for 10 seconds before Hughes shot Brownlee

a third time. When Hughes shot Brownlee a third time, all other people

originally involved in the struggle had fled the immediate vicinity. After

viewing the surveillance video, we believe that 10 seconds is crucial in

concluding that Hughes’ conduct in killing Brownlee constituted second-

degree murder rather than manslaughter. Hughes, while standing over

Brownlee, was able to have a conversation with him and see that he was not

armed. Hughes could have chosen to walk away, but he instead shot

Brownlee a final time, killing him.

The trial transcript reveals that the jury asked the court to provide it

with the definition of manslaughter, deliberated for another 20 minutes, and

then returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. The jury

considered finding Hughes guilty of manslaughter and rejected that verdict.

We cannot say that the jury erred in rendering its verdict. Defendant’s

conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Error Patent

The record was reviewed for errors patent, and one was found. The

record shows that the trial court failed to observe the 24-hour sentencing

delay under La. C. Cr. P. art. 873, and there was no express waiver of the

delays by defendant. But, when asked by the trial court if he was ready for

sentencing, Hughes affirmed that he was. He did not object to the trial
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court’s failure to observe the delay, and there was no showing of prejudice.

Thus, the trial court’s failure to observe the 24-hour delay was harmless

error. See State v. Carroll, 52,484 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d

499.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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