State of Louisiana v. Dontreal D. York

Judgment rendered July 16, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,312-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

DONTREAL D. YORK Defendant-Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 400,455

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for
By: Annette Fuller Roach Defendant-Appellant

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for
District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee

JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, STONE, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant was charged by bill of information with manslaughter, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:31, and armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S.

14:64. Defendant entered a plea of guilty to both charges, with no

agreement as to sentencing. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 40

years at hard labor, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence, for the manslaughter conviction, and to 25 years at hard labor,

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for the

armed robbery conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served

consecutively. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 19, 2021, defendant, Dontreal D. York, and Tremarcus

McKenney negotiated the purchase and/or trade of firearms with Nicholas

Toms and Jacob Decamp. The negotiations took place over a social media

application, and the parties agreed to complete the transaction at Toms’s

residence on Lindholm Street in Caddo Parish. Unbeknownst to Toms and

Decamp, if the transaction fell through, defendant and McKenney planned to

rob the occupants of the residence. When defendant and McKenney arrived

at the residence, they robbed and shot Toms and Decamp. Toms died due to

his injuries. Decamp survived and was able to identify defendant as the

person who shot and killed Toms. A neighbor, Wendy Culbert, also

identified defendant as the shooter.

Defendant was initially charged with second degree murder and

attempted second degree murder.1 However, pursuant to a plea deal, he was

charged by superseding bill of information with manslaughter, in violation

of La. R.S. 14:31, and armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.

Defendant pled guilty to both charges, with no agreement as to sentencing.

The trial court sentenced defendant to serve the maximum sentence

for the manslaughter conviction, 40 years at hard labor, without the benefit

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and to 25 years at hard labor,

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for the

armed robbery conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served

consecutively. The court did not articulate any reasons for imposing

concurrent sentences. Subsequently, the trial court denied defendant’s

motion to reconsider the sentences.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the consecutive sentences imposed, 40 and 25

years (totaling 65 years) at hard labor, without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence, are constitutionally excessive. Defendant

argues the trial court failed to fully consider his family history, his

youthfulness, employment, and educational endeavors.

The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled; claims are

reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the

guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is

1
The bill of information was amended under a new trial court docket number.
The original bill and proceedings under the original docket number were not included in
the appellate record.
2

constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id. The goal of La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence, not to

achieve rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v.

Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. There is no requirement that any specific factor

be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La.

12/3/03), 861 So. 2d 144.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Efferson,

52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052

(La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131. To constitute an excessive sentence, a

reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence

makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is

nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.

Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Efferson, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116; State v. Efferson,

supra. Generally, maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved for

the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.
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2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665. On review, an appellate court does not determine

whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but whether the

trial court abused its discretion. Id.; State v. McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156, writ denied, 23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So.

3d 149.

The penalty for the crime of manslaughter is imprisonment for not

more than 40 years. La. R.S. 14:31(B). The sentencing range for armed

robbery is 10-99 years at hard labor, without the benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence.

At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court heard victim impact

statements from Tina Toms, Toms’s mother, Darcy Piazza, Toms’s friend,

and Decamp, the surviving victim. Tina Toms stated that her son’s murder

“destroyed” her family. She also asserted she lost her home after her son

was killed, and her other son attempted suicide twice “because he wants to

be with his brother because he wasn’t there to help him when this

happened.”

Piazza stated she had known Toms for many years, and he lived with

her and her husband between the ages of 14 and 17, and “off and on for the

rest of his adulthood.” She described Toms’s life and personality, and

explained he was a “beloved son, brother, nephew, uncle, and friend who

was stolen from us way too young at the age of 23.” She also described the

grief she has experienced because of Toms’s death. Piazza pleaded for a

“harsh and just sentence” for defendant, stating, “[N]o sentence you could

give Mr. York could bring Nicholas back or make this better on us[.]”

Decamp, who was 23 years old when he was shot, stated he was shot

four times, once in the face, and he “can’t do nothing no more.” He
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explained that the shooting has deprived him “of so much peace,” and he has

trouble sleeping. Decamp also described Toms as his best friend, and he

expressed difficulty understanding how he survived, and Toms did not. He

detailed his grief and his ongoing struggle to cope with the emotional,

mental, and physical disabilities caused by the incident. Decamp further

explained that two bullets remain in his body, one of which is pressed

against his ribcage. He also described how he has difficulty obtaining

employment because of “liability concerns” due to the location of the bullets

in his body.

Speaking on defendant’s behalf, defense counsel requested leniency.

He emphasized defendant’s lack of a prior criminal history, his gainful

employment, and the fact that he accepted responsibility for his actions.

Prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court reviewed the

presentence investigation report and stated it had considered the factors set

forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court noted defendant’s actions created

a risk of death or bodily harm to more than one person, the offenses involved

the use of a dangerous weapon, defendant used threats or actual violence,

defendant discharged a weapon, and the crimes resulted in significant

permanent injury or permanent loss. As a mitigating factor, the court

observed defendant did not have a criminal history, stating defendant led a

“law-abiding life” before committing the instant offenses. The court also

noted defendant was originally charged with second degree murder and

attempted second degree murder, and he “benefited greatly from the plea.”

Our analysis regarding whether the sentences imposed are

disproportionate to the crimes is guided by the gravity of the offense and

culpability of the offender. In considering the nature of the offenses, both
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the trial court and the reviewing court may assess whether the crimes for

which defendant has been convicted adequately describe his conduct when

the convictions are for a lesser included responsive offense to the crimes

charged. The fact that the evidence might have supported a verdict of

second-degree murder is an appropriate sentencing consideration in a case

such as this one in which the defendant has been convicted of the lesser

offense of manslaughter. State v. Harris, 11-626 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/27/12),

105 So. 3d 914.

Defendant readily admitted he and Tremarcus McKenney went to the

Toms’s home, armed with firearms, with the intention of committing a

robbery. Once they entered the residence, defendant and McKenney

essentially ambushed Toms and Decamp, shooting both victims in the face

at close range. Toms died, and Decamp was severely injured, permanently

disfigured, and he experiences ongoing physical and emotional struggles.

Remarkably, Decamp managed to survive, despite being shot four times.

This evidence supports a specific intent to kill the victims. Thus, an

examination of the facts in this case demonstrates that defendant benefited

greatly by pleading guilty to manslaughter and armed robbery.

As to the mitigating factors, we note that defendant was a youthful,

first-felony offender, and he was gainfully employed when he committed the

offenses. The trial court acknowledged these factors and articulated the

factual basis for the sentences imposed and sufficiently complied with La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court specifically noted defendant’s actions created a

risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person, defendant used a

dangerous weapon and actual violence in the commission of the offenses,

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and the offenses resulted in a significant permanent injury or a significant

permanent loss to the victims and their families.

Louisiana courts have upheld maximum or near-maximum sentences

for first offenders convicted of manslaughter on numerous occasions. Our

courts have noted, “[I]n the context of a maximum-sentence analysis for

manslaughter, where the evidence would otherwise support a murder

conviction, Defendant can be considered ‘the worst type of offender.’” State

v. Hawkes, 23-234 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), 375 So. 3d 1063, 1072, writ

denied, 23-01655 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So. 3d 243, and writ denied, 24-00069

(La. 5/21/24), 385 So. 3d 244, reconsideration not cons., 24-00069 (La.

9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 636, quoting, State v. Ayala, 17-1041 (La. App. 3 Cir.

4/18/18), 243 So. 3d 681, 687-88. See also, State v. Little, 52,131 (La. App.

2 Cir. 8/15/18), 252 So. 3d 1038, writ denied, 18-1582 (La. 3/25/19), 267

So. 3d 594; State v. Ross, 50,231 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d

1035; State v. White, 48,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 280, writ

denied, 14-0603 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d 599; State v. Ponthieux, 20-317

(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 319 So. 3d 460, writ not cons., 21-00842 (La.

11/3/21), 326 So. 3d 889; State v. Angelle, 13-508 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13),

124 So. 3d 1247, writ denied, 13-2845 (La. 5/23/14), 140 So. 3d 724, and

writ denied, 13-2892 (La. 8/25/14), 147 So. 3d 693; State v. Hebert, 12-228

(La. App. 3 Cir. 6/13/12), 94 So. 3d 916.

Consequently, based on the record and the totality of the

circumstances of this case, the sentences imposed are neither grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the offenses of conviction, nor are they

shocking to the sense of justice. This assignment lacks merit.

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Defendant also contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive

sentences. He maintains concurrent sentences should have been imposed

because the offenses were based on the same act or transaction or constituted

parts of a common scheme or plan. Moreover, the court failed to set forth

the reasons for ordering the sentences to run consecutively.

When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction,

or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment

shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or

all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. It is within the court’s

discretion to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. State v.

Dunams, 55,443 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 251, writ denied, 24-

00205 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 632; State v. Robinson, 49,677 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 829, writ denied, 15-0924 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.

3d 1034; State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.

Concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of conduct are not

mandatory, and consecutive sentences under those circumstances are not

necessarily excessive. State v. Dunams, supra; State v. Hebert, 50,163 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 795.

When consecutive sentences are imposed, the court shall state the

factors considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms. State v.

Dunams, supra; State v. Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d

711. However, the failure to articulate specific reasons for consecutive

sentences does not require remand if the record provides an adequate factual

basis to support consecutive sentences. State v. Kennon, 50,511 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 661, writ denied, 16-0947 (La. 5/19/17), 220 So.

3d 747.
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In the instant case, the record reflects the offenses committed

constituted parts of a common scheme or plan. Defendant admitted to going

to Toms’s home to trade and/or purchase weapons; and prior to entering the

residence, he and McKenney agreed that they would rob the victims if the

negotiations to purchase/trade failed. Once they were unable to negotiate,

defendant shot Toms in the face, which resulted in this death, and Decamp

was shot multiple times. The planned robbery and killing occurred at the

same time and the same location, and defendant’s actions resulted in distinct

and significant losses to two different victims and families. Given the facts

of this case, we cannot say the trial court erred in imposing consecutive

sentences.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s convictions and sentences are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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