Reliable Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Darryl Miller

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,345-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

RELIABLE LIFE INSURANCE Plaintiff-Appellee
COMPANY, INC.

versus

DARRYL MILLER Defendant-Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. C-2023-2738

Honorable Frederick D. Jones, Judge

*****

DIANNE HILL Counsel for Appellant

S. HUTTON BANKS Counsel for Appellee

*****

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Defendant Darryl Miller appeals the judgment of the trial court

granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff Reliable Life Insurance

Company (“RLIC”) and determining the rights of the parties under written

instruments related to immovable property in Ouachita Parish. For the

following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FACTS

RLIC is a company based in Monroe, Louisiana, and its authorized

representative and officer is Cleo Miller. RLIC filed a petition for damages

and declaratory relief against Darryl Miller,1 seeking a determination

regarding its rights under written instruments relating to immovable property

in Ouachita Parish located at 3702 Gouville Drive. Its suit sought a

determination of whether Darryl leased or purchased the property from it

and also sought a judgment returning its property because he had stopped

making payments in 2022.

RLIC purchased the property in May 2013 for $225,000, which was

paid to the seller at closing. In June 2014, acting through its authorized

representative Joseph Miller, it executed a written lease agreement leasing

the residential property to Darryl for $1,062.50 per month for a term of

48 months, and then month-to-month thereafter. The terms of the lease

required rent to be paid on the first of the month or a late charge of

10 percent would become due if not paid by the fifth day of the month and

another 10 percent if not paid by the tenth of each month. The lease stated

that Darryl waived his right to any notice and agreed to vacate the property

1
Darryl Miller is the son of Joseph and Cleo Miller. He was a former employee
of RLIC until he was terminated.

in the event the lessor declared the lease terminated. He also agreed to pay

reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Darryl took possession of the property and remained in possession.

He signed a promissory note on September 1, 2015, promising to pay RLIC

$198,00 plus interest in monthly installments of $1,062.50 as per the written

lease agreement. The promissory note further provided that in the event he

failed to make a single monthly payment, the holder of the note had the

option to accelerate the entire obligation without providing notice of default

to him.

In addition to the promissory note, Darryl, misidentified as

“Mortgagee,”2 also executed a collateral mortgage allowing RLIC,

misidentified as “Mortgagor,” to secure funds from Darryl, who declared

and acknowledged a debt of $225,000, less $27,000 previously paid by him

to it in the form of monthly rent toward the down payment on this mortgage

note represented by the promissory note. The mortgage also states that

RLIC warrants that record title to the mortgaged property shall be in the

name of the “Mortgagee.”3 Another clause states that in the event the

“Mortgagee” defaults, the “Mortgagor,” without making a demand and

without putting him in default, may seize all or part of the mortgaged

property and have it sold by executory process or any other legal process.

2. The promissory note was attached to a purported collateral mortgage that
references the sale by which RLIC purchased the property in 2013. RLIC’s petition
alleged that the collateral mortgage Darryl signed presumably misidentifies him as the
“Mortgagee” and RLIC as the “Mortgagor.” RLIC also alleged that there are no written
instruments conveying any ownership interest in the property to him. These instruments
create confusion, especially because the designations of the parties are reversed.

3. The “mortgage property” is not identified until the last page as the house Darryl
rented on Gouville Drive. Darryl is made responsible for all property taxes and
assessments made on the home.

2

The mortgage also contains a clause providing that if any proceedings are

instituted to enforce the mortgage, “either by executory process or by

ordinary suit, any and all declarations of fact made by authentic act by a

person declaring such facts lie within his knowledge shall constitute

authentic evidence of such facts for the purpose of the proceeding.” Despite

all of the allusions to a purported act of sale of the home from RLIC to

Darryl, no act translative of title was ever created.

In its petition, RLIC alleged that regardless of whether Darryl owed

the rent under a lease or pursuant to monthly installments due on a sale, he

stopped making payments of any kind in any amount around June 9, 2022,

although he continued to occupy the property. RLIC alleged that for

109 months of consecutive occupancy, the amount due was $115,812.50,

excluding late fees, penalties and/or interest, and he had paid only

$91,599.00.

RLIC noted that during the Covid pandemic, Darryl applied for

emergency rental assistance from the Louisiana Emergency Rental

Assistance Program (“LERAP”) and verified that he was leasing the

property from it. Accordingly, LERAP paid RLIC $17,137.50 in partial

compensation for his delinquent rental payments. RLIC alleged that,

pursuant to this admission to the state that he was renting the property, he

was estopped from claiming he purchased, rather than leased, the subject

property. RLIC noted that as a condition of accepting the check for

emergency rental assistance from the state, it agreed it would not charge, and

would waive and forgive, penalties, interest and court costs owed for the

months from April 2020 through July 2022. It reserved the right to charge

him a $100 late fee for each month during that time period.
3

RLIC prayed for damages and for judgment under La. C.C.P.

art. 1871 declaring that RLIC did not sell Darryl any ownership interest in

the property and that any and all rights and obligations owed to it would be

found in the lease agreement. It also prayed that he be found to be in breach

of the lease and ordered to vacate the subject property in addition to paying

all costs. In the alternative, it prayed that he be declared to have breached

the promissory note and found liable to it for that breach.

Darryl’s answer alleged that he is the owner of the home although he

admits he signed a lease. He claimed he signed the promissory note under

his father’s instructions and was under the impression that a deed to the

house would be issued and recorded, but that deed never materialized. He

claimed because the mortgage was “defective,” he quit making payments

although he continued to occupy the home. He contended that Cleo and her

daughter applied for and received funds under the guise of rental assistance.

He also alleged that he was defrauded by RLIC and his father’s failure to

execute and record the deed of sale of the home to him.

In November 2023, RLIC filed a motion for partial summary

judgment on the issue of default. In support of this motion, it filed Cleo’s

affidavit citing the lease agreement and stating that she was not aware of any

written instrument purporting to grant, transfer or convey any ownership

interest in the property to Darryl. In addition, it attached the lease

agreement, the promissory note, the collateral mortgage and answers to

interrogatories. The affidavit affirmed that Darryl had not made any

payments due to RLIC since June 2022 and that RLIC had received over

$17,000 from LERAP.

4

Darryl responded and stated that RLIC sued him based on an alleged

debt under a contract he signed but then failed to prove a valid contract. He

claimed the mortgage superseded the lease agreement, but it was defective in

that it was never filed and neither was any act translative of title deeding the

house to him. He also argued that the mortgage was defective because he is

designated as the “Mortgagee” instead of the “Mortgagor.”

On May 1, 2024, the matter was heard, and both parties were

represented. The trial court considered the exhibits, the entire record, the

objections and arguments and granted RLIC’s partial summary judgment

finding Darryl in default on rental payments for the house. The judgment

was signed on May 30, 2024, and was not appealed.

On June 21, 2024, RLIC filed a pleading entitled “Motion for

Summary Judgment Declaring Dissolution and Awarding Possession,” in

which it prayed for judgment in its favor awarding it possession of the real

property. The certificate of service stated that a copy of the motion for

summary judgment was served on all counsel of record by email. Further, it

certified that RLIC requested the Ouachita Parish Sheriff to serve Darryl

with the motion, memo, exhibits and executed Rule to Show Cause. That

same day, RLIC’s attorney sent an email to Darryl’s attorney, Dianne Hill,

referenced as “MSJ with memo and exhibits.pdf.” The message said,

“Please find attached pleadings filed to day [sic] in the above captioned

matter.” Attached to the motion were sworn affidavits and Darryl’s answer

and admissions of fact regarding the lease agreement and that no written

instrument exists which purported to convey any ownership interest in the

property to him. The admissions also included that he had agreed to pay rent

for the home and that he had not made any payments since he was
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terminated from employment with the company in June 2022. The executed

Rule to Show Cause setting the date for hearing on August 5, 2024, was

served upon Darryl by the sheriff’s deputy but not sent via email to Hill.

The directions for service ordered the sheriff to deliver everything,

including the executed order fixing the rule to show cause, to Darryl at his

home. A sheriff’s return states it was delivered to Darryl on June 27, 2024.

The attorney did not receive the notice setting the hearing date.

On July 30, 2024, Hill emailed RLIC’s attorney an untimely

opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, but it did not

contain any supporting documentation authorized under La. C.C.P. art. 966.

On August 2, 2024, Hill sent an email to Marie Madison, the trial court’s

assistant, and with a copy to RLIC, stating, “I notice this case is on docket

for Mon 8/5.-I was never served and do not waive service. I submitted

memo expecting hearing 8/15.”4

On August 5, 2024, the hearing took place with only RLIC’s attorney

present. The trial court revealed that it had received a communication from

Hill that she had not been served with notice of the date of the hearing.

RLIC’s attorney objected to ex parte communication but also stated that

RLIC’s reply memorandum and objection were based upon the failure to

timely file Darryl’s opposition and that without a timely and properly filed

brief, no argument would be allowed in response to the motion for summary

judgment. He noted that there had been no formal opposition to hearing

being held or to the motion for partial summary judgment.

4
Hill’s memorandum in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment
does not appear in the record as filed and there was no objection in the record to the
hearing taking place or indicating that she had not received service other than the email
above. Thus, there was no opposition to RLIC’s motion for partial summary judgment.
6

While addressing service of notice, the attorney introduced his email

to Hill sending the pleadings and exhibits and the certificate of service and

the sheriff’s return of service to Darryl Miller. He argued that service on the

litigant is sufficient and is “always good.” Darryl was personally served by

citation and Hill was served by certificate of service by email.

The trial court found that Darryl had been properly served per La.

C.C.P. arts. 966(C)(1)(b) and 1314 and that no objection or opposition to

summary judgment had been legally raised. Therefore, the trial court ruled

in RLIC’s favor granting its partial summary judgment declaring dissolution

and awarding possession of the property to it. Darryl was cast with costs

related to the partial summary judgment. The judgment was signed on

August 21, 2024.

Darryl appealed this partial summary judgment awarding dissolution

and possession of the property; however, the trial court had not certified the

judgment as a partial final judgment, and this court recognized that absent a

certification of the judgment as a final judgment under La. C.C.P.

art. 1915(B)(1), the matter would be converted to a writ application for

supervisory review. The matter was subsequently certified by the trial court,

and it is now ripe for review as a partial final summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Darryl argues that the trial court erred in granting a summary

judgment on dissolution and possession of the property in August 2024

without addressing the ambiguities and defects in the lease and the mortgage

in the May 2024 partial summary judgment. He argues that a declaration of

the rights and status of the parties requires interpretation of the contracts

they executed and that the trial court erred when it failed to address the
7

ambiguity between them. He also argued that the trial court used summary

judgment proceedings, found only that he had failed to make payments on

the house and granted judgment in RLIC’s favor.

Darryl contends the lease had already expired when the suit was

brought and that the same parties executed a mortgage and promissory note,

which he claims was an attempt to transfer title to him. He argues RLIC’s

proper remedy was to seek foreclosure; but, instead, it sought to revive the

lease to evict him from the house for nonpayment of rent. Darryl contends

either the lease is expired or there was a defective attempted sale, and

promissory notes cannot be enforced against a defective contract of sale. He

argues that these raise genuine issues of material fact which make summary

judgment inappropriate. He further argues that the Dead Man’s Statute,

which disallows parol evidence in certain cases when one of the parties to a

contract is deceased, is applicable to this case and that Cleo cannot give

evidence regarding the intent of the parties to the mortgage and promissory

note.

RLIC argues that Darryl has already been found to be in default on his

obligations to it and that he declined to seek review of that ruling. It

contends that although Darryl filed the notice of appeal related to the

judgment dated August 8, 2024, he now seeks review of the judgment

rendered in May 2024 regarding his default on the payment for his

possession of the house under the various contracts he signed. It asserts that

the judgment concerning default is final because appeal delays lapsed before

it filed the second motion for partial summary judgment regarding

dissolution of the contracts and possession. For that reason, it claims the

only issue pertinent to this appeal is the judgment rendered in August 2024,
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pointing out that Darryl did not appear at the hearing and declined to oppose

the second motion for partial summary judgment. Because of these factors,

it asserts the trial court correctly ruled that the property should be returned to

it.

This case presents a procedural problem that has not yet been

addressed by this court. The May 2024 partial summary judgment addresses

only the issue of default and was not appealed. Therefore, it remains a

partial summary judgment that is considered an interlocutory judgment

which may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment

adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of all the parties. La. C.C.P.

art 1915(B)(2).5

The second partial summary judgment is that of August 2024, which

was certified as a partial final judgment and is one from which an immediate

appeal may be taken under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1).

5
As of August 1, 2025, La. C.C.P. art 1915 has been amended and states in
pertinent part as follows:
B. If an appeal is taken from any judgment rendered in accordance with
Paragraph A this Article, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to
adjudicate the remaining issues in the case.
C. Except as otherwise provided by law, when a court grants a judgment
or summary judgment, or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories by or against
a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-
claim, third-party claim, or intervention, that judgment is an interlocutory
judgment.
Comment (a) to the 2025 amendment states:
These amendments largely restore the Article to its pre-1997 form. The revisions
remove from Paragraph B of this Article the authority of the trial court to
designate a judgment as final and appealable after an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay. As a result, Paragraph A of this Article now
provides a list of judgments from which an appeal may be taken. This change
seeks to remove uncertainty as to whether an appeal or a supervisory writ should
be taken from a judgment that does not grant the successful party or parties all of
the relief prayed for or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case.
Comment (b) to the 2025 amendment states, in part:
Paragraph B of this Article retains much of the language of former Paragraph C.
The language of Paragraph C of this Article is new and provides for interlocutory
judgments that are not appealable. See Article 2083(C).
9

When an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment

determinative of the merits, an appellant is generally entitled to seek review

of all adverse interlocutory judgments prejudicial to him, in addition to the

review of the final judgment. Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, 16-0534

(La. App. 1 Cir. 1/18/17), 212 So. 3d 568. In the case of an appeal from a

partial final judgment or partial summary judgment designated as final under

La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B), an appellant may also appeal an interlocutory

judgment involving the same or related issues. Id. In Stevens, the court

found that because the trial court’s interlocutory ruling on the issue of

protective order was incorporated and interrelated with the trial court’s

contempt judgment, it was appropriate to consider the merits of the

petitioners’ second assignment of error.

In order to assist the appellate court in its review of designated final

judgments, the trial court should give explicit reasons, either oral or

written, for its determination that there is no just reason for delay. R.J.

Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1113. For

purposes of judicial efficiency and economy, the proper standard of review

for an order designating a judgment as final for appeal purposes when

accompanied by explicit reasons is whether the trial court abused its

discretion. Id. If no reasons are given but some justification is apparent

from the record, the appellate court should make a de novo determination

of whether the certification was proper. Id.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, this court will conduct a de

novo review of both partial summary judgments because the first is an

interlocutory judgment which may be reviewed now that the second has

been properly certified for appeal. Without the first one finding Darryl in
10

default, the second would not have been rendered. Even though there is still

an outstanding issue, i.e., if, and how much, Darryl owes RLIC, he is still

subject to losing possession of the home now.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) states that the burden of proof on summary

judgment rests with the mover. If the mover will not bear the burden of

proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary

judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate

all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, but,

rather, to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or

more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action or defense. Id.

The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is

not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.

Todd v. Angel, 48,687 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So. 3d 453, writ

denied, 14-0613 (La. 5/16/14), 139 So. 3d 1027. A fact is material if it

potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate

success or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Id. A genuine issue

of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if

reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial

on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Gauthier v. Foster

Homes, LLC, 53,143 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 284 So. 3d 1206.

We have conducted a de novo review of this record of the first partial

summary judgment rendered in May 2024 and find that the trial court did not

err in rendering judgment in RLIC’s favor. Although we cannot ascertain

the true intent of the parties to the promissory note and collateral mortgage,
11

there is no act translative of title to Darryl, and RLIC remains the legal

owner of the home. RLIC presented evidence that Darryl was occupying the

subject property under a lease and that he had not been making payments

under either the lease or on the promissory note/mortgage. Further, after the

signing of the promissory note and collateral mortgage, LERAP paid rent on

Darryl’s behalf to RLIC. Although Darryl denied having applied for these

funds, RLIC also denies having made the application and asserts that only

people renting could apply for these emergency funds. RLIC proved all

elements of its claim, and Darryl was unable to provide factual support in

opposition or to prove the existence of a material issue of fact that would

preclude this judgment. For these reasons, this assignment of error is

without merit.

Because of the foregoing decision, the assignment of error related to

application of the Dead Man’s Statute is pretermitted. Parol evidence is not

necessary to explain the validity or purpose of the promissory note and

collateral mortgage once the determination was made that, for whatever

reason, Darryl was occupying the home without making payments for years.

The partial summary judgment granted in August 2024 found that

RLIC was entitled to dissolution of the contracts between it and Darryl and

that the home should be returned to it as the owner. Darryl has raised an

issue in regard to this partial summary judgment and argues that because

service of notice of the date of the hearing was deficient, he was denied the

right to oppose the motion at the hearing on August 5, 2024; and, in fact, his

attorney did not file any timely opposition and did not appear to argue in

opposition to the motion.

12

Notice to Darryl by the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office was properly

served per La. C.C.P. arts. 966(C)(1)(b) and 1314, and no objection or

opposition to summary judgment had been legally raised. La. C.C.P.

art. 966(C)(1)(b) provides that notice of the hearing date shall be served on

all parties in accordance with Article 1313(C) or 1314 not less than thirty

days prior to the hearing. La. C.C.P. art. 1314(A)(1) provides that a

pleading which is required to be served shall be served by the sheriff by

service on the adverse party in any manner permitted under La. C.C.P.

articles 1231 through 1266. La. C.C.P. art. 1231 provides that service of

citation or other process may be either personal or domiciliary and La.

C.C.P. art. 1232 provides that personal service is made when a proper officer

tenders the citation or other process to the person to be served. For the

foregoing reasons, we agree that service was proper, and this assignment of

error is without merit.

We have conducted a de novo review of the record regarding the

partial summary judgment ordering dissolution and awarding possession of

the property to RLIC. RLIC’s motion was filed along with supporting

documentation of its entitlement to the return of its property including all of

the documents previously filed indicating it is the present owner of the

subject property by virtue of the sale to it in 2013. The lease contains

clauses giving RLIC the right to enforce the terms in any mode provided by

law if any default occurs. It also contains a clause that RLIC has the right to

immediately declare the agreement terminated if the tenant fails to pay the

rent on time, and the tenant “shall immediately vacate the Property.”

There was no opposition to RLIC’s motion. It proved all the elements

necessary through documentation showing that it is the owner of the
13

property, that Darryl did not make payments for many years and that he was

legally found in default of the agreement. For these reasons, the trial court’s

judgment granting partial summary judgment dissolving the agreement

between them and restoring the property to RLIC was proper and is

affirmed. For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without

merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgments of the trial court granting the

motions for partial summary judgment in favor of Reliance Life Insurance

Company, Inc., finding Defendant Darryl Miller in default on payments for

occupancy of the home and declaring that the property should be returned to

its owner, are affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Darryl Miller.

AFFIRMED.

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