State of Louisiana v. Laterrian Lewis

Judgment rendered July 16, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,353-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LATERRIAN LEWIS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Jackson, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 51,500

Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Sherry Watters

LATERRIAN LEWIS Pro Se

DANIEL W. NEWELL Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

DARRELL ROBERT AVERY
PERRIN NELSON SMITH, JR.
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, COX, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STONE, J.

The defendant, Laterrian Lewis (“Lewis”), was convicted of four

offenses arising out of the same event. The state filed a habitual offender

bill of information alleging that Lewis is a fourth or subsequent felony

offender pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. The trial court found that the state’s

evidence adequately proved Lewis’ status as such and rendered an enhanced

sentence of thirty years. Lewis filed this appeal, wherein he does not

challenge his instant convictions but instead makes several arguments

challenging the habitual offender adjudication and sentencing. He also

argues that his sentences are constitutionally excessive.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 17, 2020, Lewis entered the residence of his intimate partner,

Kaley Hall (the “victim”), without permission while she slept and began to

severely beat her with his fists. The victim managed to jump through a

closed window to escape. Meanwhile, Lewis hurriedly fled the victim’s

residence in his car but shortly thereafter lost control of his car and ran off

the road. Lewis’ car came to rest in the yard of Mr. David Gragg and was

stuck there because of the softness of the ground. Upon exiting his car,

Lewis fled on foot and subsequently called 911 alleging that the victim had

stolen his car. Shortly thereafter, Lewis was arrested and found to be in

unlawful possession of hydrocodone. Lewis was charged by bill of

information1 with five offenses:

COUNT 1: committed the offense of second degree
battery by intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury on
K.H.

1
It states in its heading that the defendant’s birth date is October 5, 1985, and that
his social security number is XXX-XX-4546. The prosecution filed an amended bill
which replicated this identifying information.

COUNT 2: did, without authorization, enter into an
inhabited dwelling belonging to and used as a place of
abode by K.H., with the intent to use force or violence
upon the person of another, namely K.H.;
COUNT 3: did knowingly or intentionally possess a
controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance
analogue classified in Schedule I, to-wit: Clonazolam;
COUNT 4: did knowingly or intentionally possess a
controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance
analogue classified in Schedule II, to-wit: Hydrocodone;
and
COUNT 5: did tamper with evidence by intentionally
distorting the results of a criminal investigation by causing
or inducing the alteration, destruction, mutilation or
concealment of any object with the specific intent to
impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in any
criminal proceeding

After a jury trial, Lewis was convicted and sentenced as follows:

(1) simple battery; six months in parish jail;
(2) unauthorized entry of inhabited dwelling; six years at
hard labor;
(3) guilty: possession of CDS (hydrocodone); two years at
hard labor;
(4) guilty: obstruction of justice; five years at hard labor.

The trial court ordered that these sentences run consecutively. The

Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (“USCO”) identifies Lewis as a

black male with the same birth date (October 5, 1985).

After the initial sentencing, the state filed a habitual offender bill of

information alleging the following predicate convictions:

• Jackson Parish: August 5, 2010—pled guilty to aggravated
battery (Exh. A; Second JDC, docket 41,674)
• Jackson Parish: May 19, 2013—pled guilty unauthorized entry
of inhabited dwelling (Exh. B; Second JDC, docket 45,826)
• Bienville Parish: January 28, 2020—obstruction of justice (Exh.
C; Second JDC, docket 50,394)
• Claiborne Parish: November 16, 2020—introduction or
possession of contraband in/into a prison (Exh. D; Second JDC,
docket 32,957)

2

The state presented the testimony of three witnesses and introduced

four exhibits as evidence of Lewis’ status as a fourth or subsequent habitual

felony offender.

Regarding Jackson Parish docket 41,674 (2010, guilty plea to

aggravated battery), Deputy Wesley Horton (“Dep. Horton”) testified that he

worked for the Jonesboro Police Department at the time of Lewis’ arrest,

and identified Lewis as the person for whom he (the deputy) obtained an

arrest warrant for the attempted second degree murder of a Deallo Baker in

mid-April of 2009.2 Dep. Horton was not present at the arrest or conviction,

and said he was “sure” he had seen Laterrian Lewis since 2009 since he

continued to work at the same job for a while afterward.

The prosecution introduced Exhibit A through the testimony of Dep.

Horton. This exhibit consists of certified copies of the minutes of court and

the bill of information. The bill was filed June 3, 2008, and alleges that

Lewis committed this offense on or about April 12, 2008. The bill bears an

unsigned handwritten amendment reducing the charges to “aggrivated [sic]

battery” on August 5, 2010.3 Dep. Horton was shown the minutes from

Exhibit A, which reflect that on August 5, 2010, a Laterrian Lewis pled

guilty to an amended charge of aggravated battery.4 The minutes state

Lewis’ social security number (XXX-XX-4546) and date of birth (October

2
The minutes reflect that the defendant had already been arrested as of the date of
his arraignment, as the court also continued the defendant’s motion to reduce bond on
that date and heard and denied the motion on July 1, 2008.
3
The minutes also reflect the charge being amended to “Aggravated Battery.”
4
Original charge: attempted second degree murder.

3

5, 1985), and Lewis’ sentence of 10 years at hard labor.5 The name of the

victim is not stated on the bill of information. Nor is it stated anywhere in

Exhibit A.

Regarding Jackson Parish docket 45,826 (2013, guilty plea,

unauthorized entry of inhabited dwelling), Deputy Tim Wyatt (“Dep.

Wyatt”), of the Jackson Parish Sherriff’s Department, testified that he was

working as a patrolman or patrol supervisor in 2013, and was personally

involved in arresting a Laterrian Lewis, and identified Lewis as the same

person as the arrestee. Dep. Wyatt further stated that he had subsequently

seen Lewis in court numerous times.

The state used Dep. Wyatt’s testimony to introduce Exhibit B,

consisting of certified copies of the court minutes, bill of information, and

judgment of conviction in Jackson Parish docket 45,826. The Laterrian

Lewis therein convicted is alleged to have a birth date of October 5, 1985,

and a social security number of XXX-XX-4546. The date of the offense

alleged in the bill is September 27, 2013. On May 19, 2014, the Laterrian

Lewis therein pled guilty to “unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.”6

The minutes of the guilty plea reflect the same social security number and

birth date. The judgment of conviction is dated May 19, 2014, and reflects

5
The court suspended all but four years of this sentence and ordered five years of
supervised probation upon completion of the four-year jail term.
6
The bill of information bears a purported amendment–apparently handwritten by
the minute clerk–that changes the name of the charge from “Home Invasion” to
“Unauthorized Entry of an Inhabited Dwelling.” However, the statute cited for the
offense, La. R.S. 14:62.8, was not changed. That statute defines “Home
invasion…[as]…the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling…[with the intent to
commit specified criminal acts therein].” La. R.S. 14:62.3 separately criminalizes such
entry when intentional but committed without the intent to commit a crime therein; this
statute is entitled “Unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling.”

4

the same social security number and birth date. The Laterrian Lewis therein

convicted received a sentence of four years at hard labor with credit for time

served since his initial arrest on October 5, 2013.

Finally, Probation Officer Charles Herman (“Ofc. Herman”) testified

that he has been in his current employment since 2015 and did intake work

regarding Laterrian Lewis’ parole on February 20, 2020, i.e., parole from

incarceration for aggravated battery and obstruction of justice convictions.

He stated that this intake process usually takes two to three hours. On direct

examination, Ofc. Herman identified Lewis as the same person on whom he

did parole intake and the same person as the convict on all four predicate

convictions. He at first denied that he had supervised Lewis’ parole but then

implied otherwise when the prosecutor asked him questions presupposing

that he had supervised Lewis. The prosecution led Ofc. Herman, asking if

he, “as part of his supervision of [Lewis] on parole,” found that Lewis “had

been convicted of a subsequent felony in Claiborne Parish?” Ofc. Herman

responded “yes, sir,” and indicated that the conviction was on Claiborne

Parish docket 32,957 obtained on November 16, 2020.

Yet on cross-examination, Ofc. Herman again stated that he had not

supervised Lewis. Ofc. Herman indicated that he based his testimony on the

PSI report compiled for the instant case, which he did not prepare. He stated

that he believed a Shirley Warren made the report, and that he had not

“double-checked” all of it. The state did not offer the PSI into evidence.

The state introduced Exhibit C via Ofc. Herman’s testimony. The

state rested after Ofc. Herman’s testimony. Exhibit C includes a certified

copy of a bill of information—filed in Bienville Parish under docket

50,394—charging Lewis with obstruction of justice pursuant to La. R.S.
5

14:130.1; the bill alleges that Lewis committed this offense on or about

October 26-28 of 2018. This exhibit also includes a certified copy of a

written guilty plea form which reflects that the date of birth of the Laterrian

Lewis who therein pled guilty is October 5, 1985. It also reflects that he is a

black male with a state identification number of xxxxx7342. This plea

agreement was signed on January 28, 2020. The court rendered a sentence

of two years at hard labor with credit for time served since November 7,

2018.

Thereafter the court took up Lewis’ motion to quash the habitual

offender bill. Defense counsel argued: (1) the earliest two of the predicate

convictions were invalid for purposes of the habitual offender proceeding

because they were based on unsigned handwritten amendments to the bill;7

(2) Exhibit A was insufficient to prove the 2010 “aggrivated [sic] battery”

conviction because the bill did not name the victim and misspelled the name

of the offense; (3) Exhibit B was insufficient to prove conviction of

7
La. C. Cr. P. arts. 473, 487, and 384. Re: Exh. A: Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art.
473, the defendant argued that the name of victim is required for crimes such as second
degree murder and aggravated battery to be charged validly. The bill of information, in
both its original and amended form, fails to state the name of the alleged victim.
Re: Exh. B: Relying on article 384, The defendant argued oral amendment in
open court invalid because ADA signature is required. The handwriting on the bill
indicating amendment is not signed—so cannot be effective (e.g., could have been done
by minute clerk.) The trial court, however, did order the bill so amended in open court.
The court pointed out that no contemporaneous objection was made. Article 487 is also
relevant as it provides that misspelling does not invalidate a charge, but it also requires
that a statute be cited as defining the crime charged, and in crimes with a specific victim,
name the victim.
Re: Exhs. C and D: The defense argues that the evidence fails to prove that the
defendant is the same Laterrian Lewis as was convicted of the predicate offenses, since it
was testimony of Ofc. Herman who admittedly had no personal knowledge of the
convictions.
The state argued that prior proceedings are presumed valid, and that objection
thereto is waivable by deadline and by lack of specification. The state asserts lack of
specification in the motion to quash. The defense countered that it could not be specific
prior to the expiration of the deadline because it did not then have the state’s exhibits to
review.

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unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling because the bill does not cite the

statute defining the crime; and (4) the latter two predicates were not proved

because Ofc. Herman had no personal knowledge of them.

At the conclusion of the habitual offender adjudication, the trial court

denied the motion to quash and determined that the state had proved beyond

a reasonable doubt that Lewis was a fourth (or subsequent) felony offender.

The defense requested a downward deviation from the statutory minimum of

20 years. The court sentenced Lewis to “30 years at hard labor,” referring to

the reasons expressed at original sentencing. The trial court neither

specified which of the underlying sentences it enhanced, nor vacated any of

the underlying sentences in connection with the habitual offender

adjudication. Lewis, thereupon, moved the court to reconsider but made no

argument other than citing State v. Dorthey. The trial court denied the

motion.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Lewis argues: (1) that his right to counsel was violated by

the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue the habitual offender

proceeding to allow him to obtain different counsel; (2) that the evidence

was insufficient to prove him a fourth-time offender under La. R.S.

15:529.1; (3) that his sentences are illegal and indeterminate; and (4) that his

sentences are unconstitutional.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Continuance; right to choose counsel

Lewis argues that the trial court erred in refusing his motion to

continue the habitual offender adjudication to allow him to change lawyers.

He argues that the defense counsel had not spoken with him in the months
7

preceding the adjudication hearing, and he had no notice of the habitual

offender proceedings against him (despite having been present at his

arraignment on the habitual offender bill wherein he pled not guilty).

Lewis’ argument that he had no notice of the habitual offender bill

pending against him must be regarded as false, as the record shows that he

was present in court with counsel for his arraignment on that bill. From that

point onward, Lewis knew that if he wanted to change lawyers, he needed to

act without unreasonable delay. He failed to do so. Regardless, our ruling

on the remaining matters moots all aspects of this issue.

Sufficiency of evidence of fourth felony offender status

Lewis argues that: (1) one of the predicate convictions did not occur

until after the instant offenses; and (2) the state failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt his identity as the person who was convicted of the

predicate felonies. The predicate convictions offered were:

• August 5, 2010—pled guilty to aggravated battery (Exhibit A;
Second JDC, Jackson Parish, 41,674)
• May 19, 2013—pled guilty unauthorized entry of inhabited
dwelling (Exhibit B; Second JDC, Jackson Parish, 45,826)
• January 28, 2020—pled guilty to obstruction of justice (Exhibit
C; Second JDC, Bienville parish docket 50,394)
• November 16, 2020—introduction or possession of contraband
in/into a prison (Exhibit D; Second JDC, Claiborne Parish
docket 2020-F-32957)
Sequencing. Lewis argues that La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) precludes the

use of a conviction as a predicate if, as here, it was obtained after the instant

offense(s) were committed:

Any person who, after having been convicted within this
state of a felony, thereafter, commits any subsequent
felony within this state, [shall be subject to enhanced

8

punishment hereunder] upon conviction of said
[subsequent] felony8

This statutory language must be given literal effect. The November

16, 2020, conviction cannot be counted as a predicate conviction because it

was not obtained until after Lewis committed the instant offenses on May

17, 2020. The fact that Lewis committed the offenses underlying the

November 16, 2020, conviction before May 17, 2020 (i.e., the date of the

instant offenses) is irrelevant. This conviction cannot serve as a predicate for

purposes of the instant habitual offender bill.

Cleansing periods: error patent. Though not specifically argued by

the defense, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence reveals that the

state was required to, but did not, prove non-expiration of the cleansing

period for the 2014 conviction for unauthorized entry into an inhabited

dwelling. That period is established by La. R.S. 15:529.1(C), which in

relevant part, provides:

(1) Except as provided in Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
Subsection, the current offense shall not be counted as,
respectively, a second, third, fourth, or higher offense if
more than five years have elapsed [i] between the date of
the commission of the current offense or offenses and the
expiration of the correctional [custody and/or]
supervision…for the previous conviction or convictions,
or [ii] between [a] the expiration of the correctional
[custody and/or] supervision…for each preceding
conviction or convictions alleged in the multiple offender
bill and [b] the date of the commission of the following
offense or offenses. In computing the intervals of time as
provided in this Paragraph, any period of parole,

8
The defendant cites State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La. 10/19/04), 884 So. 2d 568,
and State v. Landfair, 10-1693 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/20/11), 70 So. 3d 1061, as further
support for his literal application of the statutory language. However, neither of these
cases squarely addressed the circumstances presented here. Johnson held that multiple
convictions obtained on the same day could be counted as separate predicate offenses if
based on unrelated conduct. Landfair held that there was no sequencing requirement
amongst the predicate convictions; it did not address the question of whether a conviction
obtained after commission of the instant offense could be used as a predicate.

9

probation, or incarceration…shall not be included in the
computation of any of the five-year periods between the
expiration of the correctional [custody and/or]
supervision…and the next succeeding offense or offenses.
(2) Except as provided in Paragraph (3) of this Subsection,
the current offense shall not be counted as, respectively, a
second, third, fourth, or higher offense if more than ten
years have elapsed [i] between [a] the date of the
commission of the current offense or offenses and [b] the
expiration of correctional [custody and/or]
supervision…for a crime of violence…or [ii] between [a]
the expiration of correctional supervision…for
each…[predicate conviction]…for a crime of
violence…and [b] the date of the commission of the
following offense or offenses. In computing the intervals
of time as provided in this Paragraph, any period of parole,
probation, or incarceration…shall not be included in the
computation of any of the ten-year periods between the
expiration of correctional [custody and/or] supervision
…for a crime of violence…and the next succeeding
offense or offenses. (Emphasis and bracketed material
added.)

In State v. Boykin, 29,141 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/31/97), 688 So. 2d

1250, 1257–58, we explained:

This “cleansing period” begins to run from the date that a
defendant is actually discharged from state custody and
supervision. The state has the burden of proving the date
of defendant’s discharge from state supervision. Where a
defendant has been adjudicated a habitual offender, the
state’s failure to prove the defendant’s date of discharge
and thus prove that the “cleansing period” has not expired
is error patent on the face of the record. (Internal citations
omitted; emphasis added.)

Lewis’ 2014 conviction for unauthorized entry into an inhabited

dwelling has not been proved to be unexpired. That is because: (1) the

prosecution failed to introduce any evidence of when Lewis was

unconditionally released from correctional custody and/or supervision; and

10

(2) more than five years elapsed between this predicate conviction and the

commission of the current offenses.9

Identity. Lewis argues that the state failed to introduce sufficient

evidence identifying him as the person convicted as to all predicate

convictions.

In State v. McGill, 52,169 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So. 3d 872,

876, writ denied, 18-1552 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 594, this court stated:

To meet its burden under the Habitual Offender Act, the
state must establish both the prior felony conviction and
the defendant's identity as the same person who committed
that prior felony. Both the identity and the prior conviction
alleged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
trial court’s determination of this question of fact will only
be reversed if it is clearly wrong.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
Habitual Offender Act does not require the state to use a
specific type of evidence to carry its burden at a habitual
offender hearing. Rather, prior convictions may be proved
by any competent evidence. Various methods of proof
establishing identity have been recognized as sufficient to
sustain the state’s burden of proof, including testimony of
witnesses, expert opinion as to fingerprints, photographs
contained in duly authenticated records, and evidence of
identical driver’s license number, sex, race, and date of
birth. (Internal citations omitted.)

Furthermore, “[a] trial court may take judicial notice during habitual

offender proceedings of any prior proceeding which was a part of the same

case it had previously tried.” State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21),

310 So. 3d 307, 312. In Bell, this court recognized the authority of the

sentencing judge, in deciding the habitual offender enhancement, to take

9
Aggravated battery is a crime of violence. La. R.S. 14:2(B). It is, therefore,
subject to the 10-year cleansing period in La. R.S. 15:529.1(C)(2). Because the
conviction for this predicate offense occurred less than ten years before the commission
of the instant offenses, the cleansing period cannot possibly have expired. Likewise, the
defendant’s January 28, 2020, conviction for obstruction of justice cannot possibly have
expired.

11

judicial notice of the reasons she articulated as the basis for the initial

sentence. Id. However, our statement in Bell does not supplant La. C.E.

arts. 201 and 202, which substantially restrict the facts that can be so

established.

Here, the state relies predominantly on “evidence of identical driver’s

license number [or social security number], sex, race, and date of birth.” In

the trial of the instant offenses, the testimony of one of the arresting officers

included a description of the Laterrian Lewis he arrested as a black male; at

trial, the deputy identified Lewis as that same person. However, neither the

bill of information, the amended bill of information, nor the USCO relating

to the instant offenses were introduced into evidence at the trial on the

instant offenses. Nor were they introduced in the habitual offender

adjudication. Therefore, while the Laterrian Lewis convicted of each the

predicate offenses has been proved to be one and the same person (by his

matching social security number and birth date with respect to all the

predicates),10 the Laterrian Lewis convicted of the instant offenses has not

been proved to be one and the same as he who was convicted of the

predicate offenses. The trial court cannot take judicial notice of the birth

date and social security numbers attributed to Lewis in the instant bills of

information and the original USCO, if for no other reason, because neither

such document was introduced into evidence in the prior proceedings. La.

C.E. arts. 201 and 202.

10
These were introduced into evidence, as Exhibits A, B, and C, at the habitual
offender adjudication, as discussed in the earlier sections of this opinion.

12

Illegal sentence

Lewis argues that: (1) the trial court failed to specify which of the

sentences for the instant offenses would be enhanced, thus making the

sentence “indeterminate”; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to vacate the

sentence for the underlying offense(s) that were enhanced as required by La

R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3), which states:

When the judge finds that he has been convicted of a prior
felony or felonies, or if he acknowledges or confesses in
open court…the court shall sentence him to the
punishment prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the
previous sentence if already imposed, deducting from the
new sentence the time actually served under the sentence
so vacated. (Emphasis added.)

In sum, Lewis asks that the case be remanded and that the trial court

be ordered to specify which underlying sentence is enhanced, and that such

underlying sentence be vacated as it is replaced by the enhanced sentence.

Lewis is correct. The trial court failed to specify which initial

sentence was enhanced, and the statutory language supports Lewis’

argument that the initial sentence serving as the basis of the enhancement

must be vacated as it is required to be replaced by the enhanced sentence.

Excessive sentences

Lewis argues that the trial court exceeded constitutional limits in

imposing the “maximum” sentence for all of the instant offenses and

ordering that they run consecutively. However, because Lewis’ argument

about the illegality and indeterminacy of his sentences is correct, it would be

premature to determine excessiveness at this point.

CONCLUSION

Lewis’ convictions for the instant offenses are affirmed. Lewis’

13

adjudication as a habitual offender is reversed as to all predicate offenses

alleged in the habitual offender bill of information. Lewis’ enhanced

sentence is vacated. Lewis’ claim of excessiveness is pretermitted as

premature. His claim of lack of notice and violation of his right to change

counsel are denied as moot.

This matter is REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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