56,382-KA Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Joshua James Parks

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed August 27, 2025

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,382-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JOSHUA JAMES PARKS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 380,303

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

JOSHUA JAMES PARKS Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

KODIE K. SMITH
WILLIAM J. EDWARDS
MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Defendant Joshua Parks appeals his conviction for second degree

murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, for which he was sentenced to life in

prison without parole, probation or suspension of sentence. For the

following reasons, his conviction and sentence are affirmed.

FACTS

Defendant was indicted for the second degree murder of Edward

Lattin, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The murder occurred on

December 18, 2020, in Caddo Parish. At the trial of the matter in August

2024, the following evidence was adduced. Shreveport Police Department

(“SPD”) Corporal John Scheen testified that on December 18, 2020, at

9 a.m., he responded to a call about a shooting at 2826 DeSoto in

Shreveport. When he arrived, he saw an unconscious black male, later

identified as Lattin, lying face down in the street with multiple bullet

wounds in his back. Two distraught women were sitting beside him. Lattin

was transferred by ambulance to Oschner LSU Health Shreveport where he

was declared deceased. Cpl. Scheen testified that the victim did not have a

shirt on and that he was able to see the bullet wounds in his back.1

SPD Officer Monica Davis testified that she was dispatched to the

scene and saw a black male wearing a white shirt who had multiple gunshot

wounds to his upper torso. She was informed that the person who shot the

victim was nicknamed Coco, later identified as Defendant, who lived at

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Although how the victim was clothed after the shooting seems to be irrelevant,
Defendant raises discrepancies in the testimony of various witnesses in his argument
concerning sufficiency of the evidence.

2816 DeSoto. She cleared the residence, but he was not there. He was

described to her as a tall black male wearing all gray.

SPD Officer Michael Milczarski testified that after securing the scene

at Lattin’s home, he took part in a search of the path he believed the suspect

had traveled on the north side of the street. He did not find the suspect or a

gun. He also took part in a search of the victim’s house, found no weapons

but noted that a pair of jeans were found in a bedroom.

Zykira Ashley, best friend of Lattin’s girlfriend Laterrorica Griffin,

was at Griffin’s & Lattins’ house on the morning of the shooting. Griffin’s

mother, Teresa Johnson, was also there. Ashley testified that while Griffin

was cooking breakfast, Lattin left the home to go to Defendant’s house

nearby to get a phone charger. He came back angry and was “hollering.”

She said that he went back outside because he wanted to fight with

Defendant. A few minutes later, at Griffin’s request, Ashley went outside

because she heard Lattin screaming at Defendant. Ashley testified that

initially only Lattin and Defendant were outside but that Defendant’s

girlfriend, Deaquanesha French, joined them.

Ashley stated that when she went outside, Lattin and Defendant were

far apart. Lattin was in the street and Defendant was standing on his porch.

Lattin was not armed. Griffin came out a few minutes later and stood in the

street by Ashley. Ashley testified that French approached Lattin, who asked

her if she wanted to fight, and that is when “everything took place.” Shots

began being fired. She did not see Defendant shooting because it happened

so quickly, but she turned and ran as soon as the shooting began. When she

turned back around, she saw Lattin on the ground and Defendant approach

him and continue shooting. She testified that she was in shock, that French
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left the scene and that she and Griffin went to Lattin’s side to check on him.

The victim was still conscious at that point and was speaking. Griffin

removed his pants, but Ashley did not know why. She testified that there

were no weapons or guns around his body. She did not know who called

911, but the police and fire department arrived, and she was taken to the

detective’s office to make a statement. She was shown Defendant’s picture,

and she identified him at that time and in court. She testified that prior to the

shooting, Defendant did not argue or issue any warning of his intentions.

On cross-examination, Ashley stated that she had never met Lattin

before that day. She described him as being upset when he came back to the

house and stated she thought the reason was because he did not get the

phone charger, but she was not sure why he was upset.

Griffin testified that she had known Defendant for a very long time

and that he lived with French on DeSoto Street. She, her mother, Lattin and

Ashley were at the house that morning when Lattin left to go get a charger

from Defendant. When he returned, he was “just going off” because French

was upset with him for coming over to her house so early and waking up her

children. He left the house again, but she stayed inside because she was

cooking breakfast. By the time Griffin went outside, Lattin was standing

about four steps from their driveway, but French was crossing the street in

front of her house. Griffin stated that she and Ashley joined Lattin in the

street. She testified that Lattin removed his white shirt while he and French

were arguing. Defendant followed French out of their house and began

arguing too. Lattin put his hands up like he was about to fight, and

Defendant, who was standing behind French, without warning, started firing

a gun instead of fighting. She stated that they all froze “because what you
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got a gun for?” Defendant continued to shoot Lattin three or four times

before he fell facedown to the ground and said, “I’m down,” but Defendant

kept shooting. She stated that Defendant handed something to French, ran

into the house and disappeared.

Griffin testified that Lattin was still able to speak when she went to

him, and he told her to get a bag of powder out of his pants. She retrieved

her house keys from his pants but did not find any bags of powder, so she

took his pants off and put them in the dirty clothes basket in her house. She

did not see any guns or weapons and had testified earlier that she did not

allow guns in her house because they scared her. She stated that a man in a

red car witnessed the incident from the corner where he had stopped and that

he was the person who called the police.

On cross-examination, Griffin reiterated that Lattin never had a gun.

She testified that Lattin and Defendant had known each other for a long

time. She stated that the two of them had gotten into a physical altercation a

few weeks before the shooting because French had stolen Griffin’s air

conditioning unit out of her house and tried to “jump her.”

Steven Roberts, the driver of the red car, testified that he witnessed

the shooting as he was driving down DeSoto Street that morning. He saw

two men standing about 20 feet apart getting ready to fight. The victim was

shirtless and wore blue jeans; the other person was wearing gray. He could

hear the two men arguing about a phone charger. Roberts stayed in his car

and watched. He stated that the victim had his hands up and did not have a

weapon because he was “bar fighting,” which he defined as a fight when a

person has his “hands up and you’re just talking, cussing.” He saw

Defendant come around a car and, without warning, start shooting. He
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testified that the victim tried to get away as soon as the shooting began. The

victim spun around and took one shot to the back and then realized he had

been hit. Roberts said he got out of his car but was ducking because he did

not know where the bullets were coming from, and then Defendant shot two

more times. He testified that Defendant walked up to Lattin, stood over him

and shot him while he was facedown on the ground. Roberts stated that

Defendant fired four more times and that one of the shots as he stood over

him was to Lattin’s head. At that point, Defendant ran away. He called 911

and waited at the scene until the ambulance arrived. He approached Lattin

who asked him to tell his children that he loved them. Roberts testified that

he did not see any weapons near Lattin’s body and that he did not see

anyone remove anything from around the body. He also stated that Lattin’s

pants were on while he was speaking to him because he could see that the

waistband was loose, and there were no weapons hidden there. Roberts

stated that he did not know any of the people involved in this incident.

Dr. Long Jin, forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on the

victim’s body, and his report was published to the jury. He stated that Lattin

had been shot a total of eight times. The bullets were designated A through

H, and only one of them, the one that grazed but did not penetrate, was shot

from the front. Gunshot wound A entered the back of the head on the right

side and exited through the right cheek. He testified that out of all the

gunshot wounds to Lattin’s body, the wound caused by bullet C was the fatal

wound. It entered through his left back and perforated his heart and right

lung and lodged there. Dr. Jin was asked about the toxicology report, and he

indicated that Lattin had some cocaine in his system at the time of his death.

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Summer Johnson, a former employee of the North Louisiana Crime

Lab and an expert in firearms identification, testified regarding seven fired

.380 caliber cartridge casings and about bullets and fragments recovered

from the victim’s body, which had been delivered from the Caddo Parish

Coroner’s office. She testified that seven of the cartridge cases were fired

with one .380 caliber weapon, but the fragments were too damaged to be

identifiable.

Detective Stephen Herring was the lead investigator of this homicide.

After obtaining a search warrant, he conducted a search of Griffin’s house

and canvassed the entire area for any evidence. In the search of the house,

he found nothing to indicate the victim owned a firearm−no holsters, shell

casings or ammunition. He testified that Defendant turned himself in to the

police the day of the murder and that he had what appeared to be dried blood

on his tennis shoes. The blood was later determined to be that of the victim.

On August 21, 2024, a unanimous jury returned a verdict of guilty as

charged of second degree murder. Sentencing took place on September 4,

2024, and Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor

without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence in

accordance with La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Defendant appeals his conviction but not his sentence.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to show he did not act in self-

defense when he shot Lattin, or alternatively, that a verdict of manslaughter

was more appropriate. He contends that the state has the burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-
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defense. He asserts that the state failed to show even minimally sufficient

evidence that he was not acting in self-defense. Defendant reiterated

evidence at trial and challenged the witnesses’ powers of observation

because of conflicting testimony regarding how the victim was clothed, i.e.,

whether he was shirtless, or had on a white shirt, and whether he had on

pants where a weapon could have been concealed. In the alternative,

Defendant contends manslaughter would have been a more appropriate

verdict.

The state argues that the evidence presented was clearly sufficient for

the jury to have reached a verdict of second degree murder because

Defendant had the specific intent to kill Lattin. Nothing in the evidence

suggests Defendant acted in self-defense, in defense of his girlfriend or in a

sudden passion. Based on the evidence, a rational juror could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the second degree

murder of Lattin.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now codified in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford the appellate court with a means to

substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.

State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Johnson,

55,254 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 91.
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Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-

3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. Where there is conflicting testimony

concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App.

2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03),

849 So. 2d 566, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert

denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed 2d 90 (2004).

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-

defense case involving a homicide, the question becomes whether, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was

not committed in self-defense. State v. Jackson, 55,312 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 354. A homicide is justifiable when committed in

self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger

of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is

necessary to save himself from that danger or when committed for the

purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or

of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is

about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention.

La. R.S. 14:20 (A)(1) and (2). The circumstances must be sufficient to

excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to
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his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the

killing. La. R.S. 14:20(A)(2). A person who is the aggressor or who brings

on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws

from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary

knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the

conflict. La. R.S. 14:21.

Manslaughter is defined as a homicide which would be murder under

either La. R.S. 14:30 (first degree murder) or La. R.S. 14:30.1 (second

degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of

blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average

person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds

that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s

blood had actually cooled, at the time the offense was committed. Id.

Manslaughter is also a homicide committed without any intent to cause

death or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2).

For murder to be reduced to manslaughter, the following must be

proved: (1) the homicide was committed in sudden passion or heat of blood;

(2) that sudden passion or heat of blood was immediately caused by

provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and

cool reflection; (3) the defendant’s blood did not cool between the

provocation and the killing; and (4) an average person’s blood would not

have cooled between the provocation and the killing. State v. Johnson,

supra.

In any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is

raised pursuant to La. R. S. 14:19 or 20, the state shall have the burden to
9

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-

defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 390(A).

When the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in such

a case, the question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-

defense. State v. Matthews, 464 So. 2d 298 (La. 1985); State v. Cook,

46,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So. 3d 672, writ denied, 12-0640 (La.

6/22/12), 91 So. 3d 969.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.

R.S. 14:30.1(A). Specific criminal intent is that state of mind that exists

when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the

prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La.

R.S. 14:10. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred

from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant.

State v. Graham, 420 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1982). Specific intent to kill may be

inferred from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a person.

State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 368. It may also be

inferred from the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries and the

defendant’s use of a deadly weapon to produce those injuries. State v.

Jackson, supra.

We find that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s

conviction for second degree murder. The issue of self-defense was never

raised during the trial; and, realistically, it could not have been raised under

the facts of this case. Every single witness to the shooting and the
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investigation afterwards testified that the victim was unarmed, was

expecting a fist fight, was shot at least seven times in the back as he was

attempting to retreat from a verbal altercation and was shot as he was

already facedown, all of which was over an unneighborly act of attempting

to borrow a phone charger before 9 a.m. The state clearly proved that this

was not self-defense, that there was no provocation at all for such an act of

violence and that it was entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Defendant committed second degree murder. For

these reasons, the assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Defendant

Joshua James Parks are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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